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Introduction
Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein
Islam in Indonesia has long been praised for its tolerance, at home and
abroad, by the general public and in academic circles, and by politicians
and heads of state. Among the aspects highlighted are the incorporation
of rituals and beliefs that, strictly speaking, do not conform to Islam, and
the willingness of IndonesianMuslims to accept in their midst Christians,
other non-Muslims, and fellow Muslims who are considered heretics by
mainstream Islam. However, this image of tolerance has been challenged
in the last ten to 15 years by armed confrontations, if not civil wars, in
the Moluccas, Lombok, Poso on Celebes, and Banjarmasin on Borneo,
in which religion was one of the motivating factors; by mob violence
perpetrated by localMuslims and Islamic vigilante groups ofwhich the fpi
(Front Pembela Islam, Front of the Defenders of Islam) is the best known;
and by the emergence of terrorist organisations. Initially, terrorism in
Indonesia was the work of Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community),
a group made up of Indonesians and Malaysians who had close links
with al-Qaeda and Islamic insurgents in the Philippines; inspired, if not
headed, by one of Indonesia’s most radical clerics, Abu Bakar Baʾasyir,
Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible for bombing outrages on Bali (12
October 2002) and other terrorist attacks in the early years of this century.
Most of its former leaders and members have now been killed, jailed
or executed. Recent reports suggest that Jemaah Islamiyah has been
replaced by a number of smaller terrorist groups, less capable of building
large bombs like the ones used in Bali, but also, in the absence of one
mother organisation, more difficult for the authorities to detect and
round up.
The ugly side of Islamic radicalism has also come to the fore in the, at
times, violent protests by local Muslims against the presence of Christian
churches and ordinary houses where congregations meet, and, to a
lesser extent, against Chinese temples, often leading to such places being
closed down or regular services being discontinued. Part of the problem
can be traced back to a joint decree by the Ministers of the Interior
and Religious Affairs issued in 1969 and revised in 2006, requiring the
consent of the local administration and local residents for the building of
houses of worship, a condition not always easy for Christians to meet
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in an Islamic environment, and giving protestors a legal argument to
justify their actions.¹
Christians and Chinese are not the only victims of intolerance. The
vast majority of Indonesian Muslims are Sunni, and in the last couple of
years Ahmadiyah members and Shiʿites have become the victims of some
brutal attacks (see the contribution by Bastiaan Scherpen in this volume).
Such incidents were already taking place during the New Order, the
years between 1965 and 1998, when Suharto was in power and, generally
speaking, political Islam was forbidden and its proponents were liable to
prosecution, and radical groups were kept under close watch. After 1998,
the year Suharto was forced to step down as president, the protests and
attacks became more frequent, with a steep increase in the last couple
of years. According to figures published in the newspaperThe Jakarta
Post on 29 October 2010, the number of cases amounted to 470 between
1967 and 1998, and 700 between 1998 and 2010. A more recent figure,
published by the Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace, which has
the promotion of religious tolerance as one of its aims, was 144 attacks
against religious minorities in 2011 and 264 in 2012. Another ngo with
the same objective, the Wahid Institute, mentioned a figure of 274 for
2012. The latter institute also noted an increase in such incidents over
the years since 2009, while a Human Rights Watch report published in
February 2013 concludes that violence against religious minorities – it
also mentions attacks against the Bahai – had ‘deepened’.²
Such violence against religious minorities cost Indonesia a reprimand
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi
Pillay, when she visited Indonesia in November 2012. After meetings with
representatives of groups experiencing the consequences of this violence
she said that she ‘was distressed to hear accounts of violent attacks, forced
 According to the Indonesian 2006 regulation regarding religious practices, a new
place of worship should be used by at least 90 people while 60 local residents
of another religion should agree to its construction. In Aceh these figures are
150 and 120 (Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri
nomor 9 tahun 2006, nomor 8 tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas
Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat
Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian
Rumah Ibadat, art. 14; Peraturan Gubernur Nanggroe Darussalam Aceh nomor
25 tahun 2007 tentang Pedoman Pendirian Rumah Ibadah, art. 3).
 The Jakarta Post, 29 December 2012, 3 February 2013; Human Rights Watch, ‘In
Religion’s Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia’, February 2013,
report available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/indonesia0213
_ForUpload_0.pdf (accessed 16 June 2014).
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displacement, denial of identity cards and other forms of discrimination
and harassment against them’. She warned that Indonesia’s ‘rich culture
and history of diversity and tolerance’ might become a thing of the past
if the situation did not change and if ‘firm action is not taken to address
increasing levels of violence and hatred towards minorities and narrow
and extremist interpretations of Islam’.³
Mainstream Muslims have to respond to efforts to bring about a
further Islamisation of Indonesian society. One important development
facilitating this process was the promulgation of the Law on Regional
Government in 1999 and its revision in 2004, which gives regional
governments – those of the provinces, regencies and cities – far-reaching
autonomy, and has provided proponents of a strict Islam with an
additional means to advance their cause. The law allows for regional
administrations to issue local regulations (peraturan daerah, in short
perda) independently of supervision or control by a higher administrative
level, except in a few fields that remain the prerogative of the national
government, of which religion is one. The fact that local administrations
are not allowed to issue religious byelaws has not prevented them
from implementing so-called Sharia Regional Regulations. These may
take a variety of forms. Some require civil servants to attend Islamic
courses in the fasting month or make the ability to read the Qurʾan
a prerequisite for entering secondary education or for concluding a
marriage. A number of new byelaws, and among those most criticised,
affect the lives of women. They force them to conform to Islamic dress
codes (a headscarf and ‘unrevealing garments’) at government offices and
institutions of secondary education, or introduce a kind of curfew, not
allowing women to leave the house unaccompanied by a male relative
in the evening or making them afraid to do so. In August 2012 the
(Indonesian) National Committee on Violence against Women counted
282 byelaws discriminating against women. Ninety-six of them concerned
regulations on prostitution and pornography which, as Euis Nurlaelawati
andMuhammad Latif Fauzi argue in this volume, can have a wider effect,
complicating the lives not only of prostitutes but also of other women;
60 of them were related to dress codes and ‘religious standards’, and 38
restricted ‘women’s mobility’.⁴
A special case is Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra. In an effort to
persuade the separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,
 ‘Indonesia must tackle rising discrimination and violence, says un human rights
chief ’, un News Centre, 13 November 2012, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp
?NewsID=43478 (accessed 21 January 2013).
 The Jakarta Post, 17 September 2012.
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gam) to lay down arms, Jakarta granted the province special auton-
omy in October 1999. Aceh was given the right to draft its own laws
and regulations in the fields of religion, education and local customs;
a power other provinces do not have. The result has been a number of
Islamic laws (qanuns) promoting ‘correct’ Islamic behaviour (including
the way women dress; men seem to escape such restrictions), forbidding
non-Sunni practices and beliefs, making acts like gambling and the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages punishable, and giving local authorities
the power to act upon and punish illicit sexual relations. This includes
the assumption that two unmarried persons of different sexes without
close family ties who are alone together in a secluded space are guilty of
illicit sex (see the contribution by Reza Idria).
It is not just in Aceh that the central government cannot interfere
when such laws and regulations are promulgated; in other parts of
Indonesia too, regional autonomy makes the annulment or revision
of local legislation difficult. The argument that the Law on Regional
Government does not allow the issuing of religion-inspired byelaws
does not prevent proponents from enforcing such legislation. They argue
away the Islamic nature of such regulations, stressing instead the need to
uphold Indonesian and local (if not Asian) values and norms of morality
as the reason for their introduction, at times also suggesting a connection
between the way women dress and sexual harassment. Politicians equally
do not seem to mind or, when forced to comment, advance similar
arguments. It took until February 2006 for the central government to
announce that it might interfere with and annul such local regulations,
yet two years later the then Minister of the Interior, Mardiyanto, was
still quoted as saying that there were no Sharia regulations in force in
Indonesia, only ‘byelaws that implement the Islamic do’s and don’ts’.⁵ In
January 2012 his successor, Gamawan Fauzi, mentioned an impressive
number of byelaws reviewed by his ministry since he was appointed in
2009: 15,000; resulting in the rejection ‘partially or completely’ of 915 of
them. Since 2002 his department has ‘annulled’ a total of 1,878 byelaws.
Over 1,800 of these are said to concern local taxes and levies, 22 the sale
of alcoholic beverages.⁶ Other instances of ‘Sharia byelaws’ were not
mentioned. This in itself already indicates that the most contested local
religious regulations escaped scrutiny. Moreover, annulled may not be
the right word. The 1999 Law on Regional Government still gave the
central government the authority to annul byelaws that are in violation
of higher legal products or against the general interest (art. 114, par. 1);
 The Jakarta Post, 16 February 2008.
 The Jakarta Post, 18 January 2013.
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the revision of 2004 (art. 145, par. 3) requires a Presidential Decree
(Peraturan Presiden) to do so. The Minister of the Interior does not have
the authority to cancel byelaws, and a governor cannot annul a byelaw
issued in a city or regency in his province.⁷
Some of the information presented in the media and in scholarly and
ngo reports about interreligious violence, assaults on religiousminorities,
and discrimination against women as a consequence of a greater stress
on Islam in Indonesia or support for the implementation of Islamic law
in all its aspects may overstate the case.⁸ On the other hand, using the
description ‘smiling Islam’ to sketch the nature of mainstream Islam
in Indonesia is to view the situation, both past and present, through
rose-tinted glasses. Though the collapse of the New Order in 1998 was
a watershed in Indonesian history which was followed by a period of
real democracy and freedom of expression known in Indonesia as the
Reformasi or Reform Era, the topics discussed in this book are not
simply the outcome of decentralisation, the introduction of a democratic
political system, and of greater freedoms that came after 1998. As pointed
out in a number of contributions, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia did
not suddenly appear after 1998. Its roots can be traced back to the New
Order, not only to its closing days, but also to its early years, and even
further back in Indonesia’s history. Efforts to promote Islam have also
been initiated by the New Order government, for instance by financing
the building of mosques and Qurʾan recitation competitions. In this
respect, special mention should be made of defining the competence
of religious courts and the publication of the Kompilasi Hukum Islam
through which the government aimed further to codify Islamic family
and inheritance law on the national level and which is to be consulted
by Muslim judges in giving judgment (see the contributions by Euis
Nurlaelawati and Stijn van Huis).
 It seems extremely unlikely that many of the disputed local regulations can be
cancelled. The law requires that a Presidential Decree be issued within 60 days
after the regional administration has submitted a byelaw to the central government
for scrutiny (which has to take place within a week after its promulgation). In 2012
two Joint Regulations of the Ministers of the Interior and of Justice and Human
Rights were issued on regional regulations. These take the form of guidelines
for local governments in drafting them to ensure that they are not a breach of
human rights.
 Ms Pillay, for instance, also expressed her concern about Aceh condemning
‘enforcing brutal punishments of stoning’ there, which, as is pointed out in the
Aceh section of this book, are included in the draft of a new Islamic Act, which
did not come into force because the governor refused to sign it.
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The present book reports on a number of important contemporary
developments, which all show how Islam in Indonesia is developing and
how far it has moved beyond the stereotype of a smiling Islam. These
developments are taking place against the background of a growing
adherence to the prescripts of Islam in the wider society. As in the rest
of the Muslim world, the number of people dressing and behaving in
an Islamic way has grown; institutions to propagate the faith, such as
Islamic schools and religious meetings, have increased in number and in
popularity; and the exponents of radical Islam have become more vocal,
staging demonstrations and organising mass gatherings. By dealing with
a number of these developments, this book aims to shed light on an
intriguing paradox. We observe that in spite of an ongoing Islamisation
of Indonesian society, Islamic parties do not fare so well in Indonesia,
while at the same time we see that, despite this subordinate role of Islamic
parties, legislation which is clearly Islamic can in fact be promulgated.
This book is a spin-off from a joint research effort which was made by a
number of Dutch and Indonesian researchers in the framework of the
research programme entitled ‘Strengthening Knowledge of and Dialogue
with the Islam/ArabWorld’, in short the ‘Islam Research Programme’
(irp). This programme was funded by the Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and aimed at supplying a number of embassies in the
Muslim world with relevant academic information on contemporary
developments in eight countries. The present book is based on the final
report of the Indonesian branch of this project.⁹ The irp Jakarta research
project ran from 2010 until December 2012 and was embedded in the
Leiden Institute for Area Studies (lias).
Through intermediate reports and in-depth discussions with the
Netherlands Embassy staff in Jakarta and invited experts, the project
aimed to analyse religious trends in contemporary Indonesian society
and specifically looked at developments relating to the role of Islam in
political, cultural and socio-legal contexts. The project staff was attached
to one of three research clusters, each cluster consisting of a cluster leader,
an Indonesian post-doctoral researcher, and a junior Indonesian and
a junior Dutch researcher. The entire project was managed by Marise
van Amersfoort. The three research clusters were 1) Islamic political
parties and socio-religious organisations (led by Kees van Dijk, lias); 2)
Sharia-based legislation and the legal position of women and children
(led by Léon Buskens, lias); and 3) Sharia and counterculture in Aceh
 See for the other country projects the website of the Project Office irp: http://
www.projects.leiden.edu/irp (accessed 6 December 2013).
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(led by Nico J.G. Kaptein, lias). Much of the research consisted of field
work in Indonesia, complemented by desk research, both in Indonesia
and in the extensive library collections on Indonesia in Leiden, the
Netherlands.
The present book is based on the final report and is organised in
line with the three research clusters mentioned. In the first section
the leaders of the Islamic political parties and the large socio-religious
organisations affiliated with them take centre stage. They are prime
actors in determining to what extent national and regional legislation can
reflect Islamic principles. They also play an important role in the Islamic
debate in Indonesia, either as a driving force of a further Islamisation
of society and legislation, such as the Islamist pks (Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera/Prosperous Justice Party) and the Jemaah Tarbiyah (discussed
in detail by Ahmad-Norma Permata), or as people called upon to take an
active role in countering intolerance and radicalism, such as in the case
of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The second section deals
with the consequences of the introduction of Sharia-based legal products
in Indonesia in general, and the final section discusses the support for
and resistance against enforcing an Islamic way of life in Aceh, where,
as already mentioned, this was allowed more extensively than in other
parts of the country.
This publication is the result of teamwork and it is impossible to thank all
the participants in the irp Jakarta research project individually. However,
a number should be mentioned here. First of all, it is our pleasure to
thank Koos van Dam, Annemieke Ruigrok, Tjeerd de Zwaan, Onno
Koopmans and Wachid Ridwan who in different phases of the project all
played a vital role on behalf of the Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta. In
Leiden, our thanks go to the Leiden Institute for Areas Studies (lias),
in particular the former manager of lias, Rogier Busser, and to the
Leiden University Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (lucis) for
its administrative support in the final phase of the project. lucis also
supported and facilitated the publication of this book. Two members
of its staff were especially helpful: Heleen van der Linden who edited
the irp report which formed the basis of this book, and Annemarie
van Sandwijk, who together with Hannah Mason, took care of the final
editing process.

part 1
ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES AND
SOCIO-RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS
Kees van Dijk
A paradox in present-day Indonesia is that Islam is thriving but that
Islamic political parties are not. With one exception, the pks (Prosperous
Justice Party/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), their results in elections held
after 1998 have been poor. This is even more remarkable because some of
these parties are closely linked to socio-religious organisations that do
seem to thrive and have a large following, which in the case of Nahdlatul
Ulama and Muhammadiyah amounts to tens of millions. This indicates
that recruiting or winning over national and local religious leaders to
gain more votes at general elections appears to be less effective than is
often assumed.
Disappointing past election performance confronts politicians of
Islamic parties with a dilemma. They may reach out to non-Muslims,
accepting them as members and recruiting them as candidates, or they
may focus on non-religious issues in their campaign. Such approaches,
however, can backfire. Immediately after May 1998 when the Reform Era
was taking shape new political parties were established, among them
Islamic parties being ‘open’ to others, i.e. to Indonesians with another
religion, due to concerns with Amien Rais of the pan (Partai Amanat
Nasional/National Mandate Party) and Abdurrachman Wahid of the
pkb (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/National Awakening Party) about the
intensity of communal conflicts in those days, which in some regions
had taken a very violent form. Gradually, the selection of candidates with
a different religion and the downplaying of Islam became a strategy to
tap into new groups of voters, but it has been argued that the decision
not to stress their own, specific, religious stance may have cost votes,
and, indeed, could well explain the poor election results.
While preparing for the general elections of April 2014 a number of
politicians toldThe Jakarta Post in January 2013 how they intended to deal
with what the newspaper called ‘the country’s increasingly secular voters’.¹
 The Jakarta Post, 23 January 2013.
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The pan would ‘no longer use Islamic attributes’, while the pkb stressed
that it had never ‘introduced itself as an exclusive Islamic party’. Speaking
on behalf of the pks, a political party that owes part of its success in the
past to its image of being a ‘clean’ party, i.e. its leaders not being tainted
by corruption, the chairman of the pks faction in Parliament, Hidayat
Nur Wahid, underlined the importance of impressing the electorate with
the party’s ‘commitment to good governance and corruption eradication’.
A few days later the chairman of the pks would be arrested on suspicion
of corruption. Shortly after the arrest of Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, a sex
scandal followed when a close political friend of his, Ahmad Fathanah,
was arrested in a hotel – in bed with a girl who certainly was not his
wife. In November of that year, Ahmad Fathanah was found guilty of
corruption by the Jakarta Anti-Corruption Court and sentenced to 14
years in prison. In March 2014, the Jakarta High Court added two years
to the sentence. In December 2013 Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq got 16 years.
Some pks members tried to belittle the incident by calling the friend
a ‘secret agent whose mission it is to ruin the party’s image ahead of the
2014 elections’.²
The ppp (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/United Development Party)
and pbb (Partai Bulan Bintang/Crescent and Star Party) refused to
change their religious approach. The ppp announced that it would not
recruit non-Muslim candidates and seemingly intended to reach out to
fundamentalist groups, such as the fpi (Front Pembela Islam/Front of the
Defenders of Islam) and even the mysterious Al-Zaytun boarding school,
linked to a sect brainwashing itsmembers and aiming at the establishment
of an Islamic state.³ The pbb lashed out against ‘hypocritical, pragmatic
politicians’ who were prepared to cast aside their ideology just to win
seats.⁴
In April 2014 the pks and pbb saw their share of the vote drop
compared to the general elections of 2009. The pks obtained 6.8 per cent
of the votes instead of 7.9 per cent; the pbb 1.5 instead of 1.8 per cent. The
ppp performed slightly better and saw an increase from 5.3 to 6.5 per
cent. The pan and pkb also saw their positions improve. They gained 7.6
and 9 per cent (instead of 6 and 4.9 per cent) of the vote respectively.
 The Jakarta Post, 13 May 2013.
 The Jakarta Post, 14 March 2013, 1 April 2013.
 Maklumat Partai Bulan Bintang, 23 January 2013 (http://bulan-bintang.org/
maklumat-partai-bulan-bintang, accessed 12 May 2013).
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One of the reasons for the weak election performance of Islamic polit-
ical parties is that they do not have a monopoly on Islam. Labelling their
rivals, Golkar, pdi-p (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan/Indone-
sian Democratic Party-Struggle) and Partai Demokrat, ‘secular parties’
or using the term ‘secular voters’ fails to appreciate the role of Islam
in politics in general. Already during the New Order politicians and
office holders, including President Suharto himself, rushed to Islamic
institutions and gatherings to increase their popularity. Organisational
ties were also developed. During the New Order Golkar established
links with traditional and modernist Muslims via a number of organisa-
tions of which the guppi (Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan
Islam/Joint Effort to Modernize Islamic Education) and an association
of former members of the hmi (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Islamic
Student Association) are the best known, while in August 2007 the pdi-p
launched its Islamic wing, Baitul Muslimin (House of Muslims). At times
the secular pdi-p even appears to be an Islamic party. At the close of
the New Order, protestors supporting the pdi-p suspended their street
protests to pray, while Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati, the party’s popular
leader, initially appeared on party posters with her hair uncovered, but
was later depicted wearing a headscarf.
A second factor contributing to the poor election results of the
Islamic political parties is that they and the organisations they turn
to for mobilising support are complex entities. Within one and the
same party or organisation members have different, even mutually
exclusive, opinions about what an Islamic society should look like
and what reaching it involves; disputes amongst the leaders can be
frequent and bitter. Adding to this is a built-in source of conflict: the
presence of religious advisory boards and fatwa councils, institutions
that clash with their executive boards, one of the most important points
of friction being the primacy of religious considerations over political
ones. This certainly comes to the fore in Permata’s in-depth analysis
of the rivalries within the pks and the socio-religious organisation
affiliated with it, the Jemaah Tarbiyah, and between the two. The pks
is a proper choice because it is an Islamist party which, together with
the Jemaah Tarbiyah, strives for and identifies itself with the promotion
of a drastic Islamisation of Indonesian society. Yet the delicate internal
relationships described in Permata’s report are also very present in the
other Islamic parties and socio-religious organisations. It also underscores
that in the relation between political party and affiliated organisation,
the latter may be or intends to be a moral compass, something that also
comes to the fore in Bastiaan Scherpen’s report about reactions to the
Ahmadiyah persecution in which he touches upon the relations between
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the pkb and the socio-religious organisation it is close to, the Nahdlatul
Ulama.
The contributions by both Permata and Zuhri show how diverse
membership can be. Members of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama
and other Islamic organisations have joined the pks, while pks and Jemaah
Tarbiyah activists are among the members of the Nahdlatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah. This has given rise to the accusation of ‘infiltration’ of
Islamists in Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. There may indeed
have been real cases of infiltration, but in other instances, probably more
numerous, using that word conceals the point that fundamentalist Islamic
ideas advocated by the pks are also supported in Nahdlatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah circles. Under such circumstances, the pks’ missionary
zeal has met with fierce competition over control of social and religious
institutions. Zuhri concentrates on one of these cases, reconstructing how
the pks took over a ‘Muhammadiyah’ mosque in Central Java and the
‘war’ that was the result. Other cases, also touched upon by Zuhri, involve
rivalries over the control of boards of branches of Nahdlatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah and secular and religious schools and universities.
While Permata’s report can serve as an example of the internal
dynamics of Islamic organisations, Zuhri’s analysis provides an insight
into competition as a result of Islamisation efforts within the Islamic
community, which is also played out elsewhere in Indonesia. Their
contributions are complementary. While Permata concentrates on the
pks as a political party, Zuhri focuses on its religiouswork amongMuslims
and the central role the mosque plays in the religious propaganda and
political mobilisation of the pks. Zuhri describes the growing concern
of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama over the rising influence
of Islamists in their community and the competition over religious
institutions, forcing them in 2006 and 2007 to take measures to turn the
tide of such ‘infiltration and sabotage’. Warnings against the points of
view of Middle Eastern Islamists have also become more frequent.
Islamic political parties and socio-religious organisations are prime
actors in the embedding of religion in national and regional legislation
and in society. They can act both as a motor and as a brake. There have
been frequent appeals to Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, being
the largest socio-religious organisations in Indonesia, to speak out in
favour of religious tolerance, and to combat the spread of terrorism in
the country. A litmus test of religious tolerance is the attitude towards
Ahmadis and Shiʾites and the reaction to their harassment.That is why this
section concludes with an analysis by Bastiaan Scherpen on the response
of the Islamic political parties and the socio-religious organisations
associated with them to the mob violence targeted against Ahmadiyah
islamic political parties and socio-religious organisations 27
communities. The point of departure is the killing of three members of
Ahmadiyah by an angry crowd of between 1,000 and 1,500 people on
6 February 2011 in West Java. What happened is one of the instances
in which Muslims, stressing that Ahmadiyah is a deviant sect and that
Ahmadis should not live in their midst, resort to violence. In this case
the target was a house in the village of Umbulan in Cikeusik inhabited by
an Ahmadiyah family. To avoid violence the previous day the police who
had been alerted by an sms message to the possibility of mob violence
had persuaded the family in question to leave the village, but failed to
convince 17 Ahmadiyah members who had arrived in Umbulan in the
morning of the 6th to stand by their fellow believers to do the same.
When the attack came three of them were killed and five were seriously
wounded. The police did not interfere. It was one of the instances in
which the police said they had felt overpowered. Fear for their own
safety and wellbeing when police officers are confronted with an angry
crowd at times makes them decide not to act. In February 2013, even
the Indonesian National Police used being outnumbered as an excuse
to explain the failure to protect members of religious minorities when
attacked by crowds of radical Muslims. Its spokesman, commenting on a
Human Rights’ Watch report criticising the reluctance to act resolutely
when Ahmadis and Shiʾits were molested, said that when police officers
were ‘outnumbered by a mob, an omission could happen’ in enforcing the
law.⁵ Gruesome as the Cikeusik incident was, the follow-up created even
greater controversy. Twelve attackers were prosecuted and sentenced
to a mere three to six months in jail. A six-month prison sentence was
also received by one of the Ahmadiyah followers, who had travelled to
Umbulan and himself had been seriously wounded. He was charged
with resisting a police order to leave the village, assault, and as their
leader inciting the other members of his group. Bastiaan Scherpen’s
contribution shows how difficult it is for the Indonesian government
and for Islamic parties and organisations to deal with, on the one hand,
demands to ban the Ahmadiyah as a deviant sect, and, on the other hand,
calls in Indonesia and abroad to uphold principles of religious freedom
and human rights. It also brings to the fore that universal values can have
different meanings for different groups, be it Western governments or
Muslims, especially where religious minorities are concerned.
 www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/02/02/national-police-play-down-report-
religious-violence.html.

1 A Study of the Internal Dynamics of the
Prosperous Justice Party and Jamaah Tarbiyah
Ahmad-Norma Permata
1 Introduction
This research explores the internal dynamics of the Prosperous Justice¹
Party or Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (pks) and its mass organisational root
and supporter, the Jamaah Tarbiyah (jt).² Since a political organisation
is never a unitary actor, there are always internal plurality, differences,
tensions and even conflicts. This study uncovers the internal dynamics
inside the two organisations, the tensions and dividing issues between
the two, as well as the key figures in each group.
jt is a unique organisation in contemporary Indonesian politics. At
its core, it is an Indonesian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers
(Ikhwanul Muslimin), founded in 1983 by a group of graduates who
studied in the Middle East. However, it is joined by networks of activists
from different organisations, ranging from domestic political and social
organisations – such as ddii,³ Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (nu),
 It is worthy of note that the word ‘justice’ has been used ubiquitously among the
Muslim Brothers’ network across the globe (political party and social movement):
e.g. ‘Justice and Development’ is used at the same time in Turkey, Libya, Morocco,
Syria and Algeria, while the Egyptian Brotherhood party is called the ‘Justice and
Freedom Party’. A closer analysis reveals that at least for pks ‘justice’ does not
refer to the idea of ‘fair treatment’, but rather to ‘political retaliations’. Members of
the pks perceive themselves as victims of repression and persecution both by
Western colonial rulers and secular national governments. And now the time has
come for them to fight back, to do what others have done to them, to do justice.
 Jamaah Tarbiyah literally means ‘Community of Education’. In practical terms,
‘education’ means training and indoctrination, i.e. of a comprehensive Islamic
way of life.
 DewanDakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (or Indonesian Islamic PropagationCouncil)
was founded in 1967 by Mohammad Natsir and several other ex-Masyumi
politicians after they were thwarted by the Suharto regime in their bid to return
to politics. It received large funds from Middle Eastern countries, especially
Saudi Arabia.
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hmi⁴ – to Salafi⁵ groups. This wide variety of groups sets the organisation
apart from its Egyptian counterpart. In 1998, jt activists founded a
political party called the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, pk), which was
then renamed the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera,
pks). The relationship between the jt and pks is also unique because the
jt is an informal organisation insofar as it is not formally registered and
thus – according to Indonesian legal reasoning – cannot be banned. The
jt could be described as a shadow organisation for the pks which differs
from the relationship between the nu and pkb⁶ or Muhammadiyah and
pan,⁷ both of which are formal organisations, albeit operating in different
arenas (one is social and the other is political).
The Prosperous Justice Party (pks) is one of the stars of Indonesian
democratisation. Firstly, it marks a new era of Muslim politics. This is
because the party was not born from mainstream Muslim organisations.
This is a critical point, as during the New Order era the government
manipulated and compromised all Muslim organisations and key figures
within them. Consequently, virtually no Muslim organisation operating
at that time was immune to the regime’s political engineering. The pks,
although it was founded during the Suharto regime, was led by a new
 Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Association), founded in 1947, is
the largest university student organisation in Indonesia and a powerful political
network. It has been a supplier of leaders and activists to the country’s political
parties, including Akbar Tanjung (former chairman of Golkar), Ismail Hassan
Metareum (former chairman of ppp) and Anas Urbaningrum (at the time of
writing chairman of the ruling Partai Demokrat). In 1986, responding to the
law that obliged mass organisations to adopt the state ideology, Pancasila, the
organisation split into two camps: its leadership accepted the law in order to
be acknowledged as a legal organisation by the government – subsequently
known as the dipo faction (an acronym of Diponegoro Street where its office was
located in Jakarta). Another group, however, rejected Pancasila, retained the
Islamic ideology, and went underground. It is known as the mpo faction since
it declared itself to be the Organisation’s Saviour Council (Majelis Penyelamat
Organisasi). When the law was cancelled, the dipo faction dropped Pancasila
from its ideology and readopted Islam, but the two factions failed to reconcile –
as they developed distinct traditions and networks – and run independently as
twin hmi organisations.
 From Arabic Salaf al-Salih, or pristine generations – i.e. this refers to the first
generations of Muslims, including the companions of the prophet Muhammad.
These are conservative groups that adopt Saudi-style Islamic ideas and practices.
 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) was founded by nu
leaders, but has no organisational link with nu.
 Partai Amanat Nasional (or National Mandate Party) was founded by Muham-
madiyah leaders but has no organisational link with Muhammadiyah.
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generation of Muslim activists who did not belong to any of the existing
Muslim organisations. These activists perceive themselves as part and the
continuity of Muslim politics in Indonesian history, yet they have broken
away and differentiate themselves from existing Muslim organisations
and activists whom they deem to be compromised and contaminated by
the regime.⁸
Secondly, the party has many of the brightest Muslim politicians who
are graduates, not from Islamic educational institutions like the leaders of
other Muslim organisations, but from top rank secular universities across
the country.The pks’s leadership are, uncommonly, not religious scholars
by training, as in other Muslim organisations. Activists are graduates
from secular academic disciplines ranging from engineering, economics,
and medicine to physics and mathematics.These universities still provide
the main avenue for the younger generation wanting a route into the
bureaucracy and other professional occupations. In this way, the party
quickly established its networks among the country’s elite.⁹
Thirdly, many perceive its political ideology as suspicious with
regard to its participation in democratic politics. The Jamaah Tarbiyah
adopts its ideology from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and its gradual
Islamisation political project, namely: (i) the Islamisation of individuals;
(ii) the Islamisation of families; (iii) the Islamisation of society; (iv) the
Islamisation of the political system.¹⁰ The programme drew critics from
inside and outside Muslim communities. ManyMuslim organisations see
the party as spreading aggressive activities that are not only undermining
their territories, but also jeopardising Indonesian Muslims’ moderate
political tone. Others even accused the party of promoting a radical
political agenda to change the Indonesian nation-state into an Islamic
political system.
Fourthly, the party also impresses the Indonesian public because of
its organisational consolidation. It is the only major political party in
Indonesia that does not suffer from an organisational split. It is also the
only party capable of maintaining the solid adherence of its supporters.
These characteristics have given the party advantages, especially in
local elections, in which it has won several plurality majorities in
situations where multiple candidates were standing for election. The
Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2007 is a telling example, in which
 Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Politik Islam Indonesia
(Jakarta: Harakatuna, 2005), 23–24.
 Elisabeth Collins, ‘Islam is the Solution’, Kultur 3, no. 2 (2003), 157–182.
 Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna,
2003), 144.
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the elected governor needed all the other 16 parties in the provincial
Parliament to join forces in order to beat the pks by 56 per cent to 44 per
cent The solidity of its support is also a powerful weapon for the party in
political negotiations, or to press its demands.¹¹
1.1 Internal Fractures
That said, observers will not fail to notice internal – sometimes very
serious – rifts in the party. Firstly, internal tensions had already begun
to surface during its foundation. In 1998, following the regime change,
senior activists of the jt discussed the possibility of forming a political
party to advance their interests and agendas, but reached no agreement
regarding the timing. Some of them agreed that the time was right
to create a political party and join in democratic competition; others
thought they were not ready yet and preferred to stay aloof from power
competition. The dispute was resolved by distributing questionnaires
to around 6,000 Tarbiyah activists around the world. Sixty-eight per
cent of those who returned the questionnaires agreed to create a political
party.¹²
Secondly, different strands can also be found among the party
leadership on how to manage the organisation. During the first four years
of its history, under the name of the Justice Party, its organisation was
decentralised and more democratic, with the highest decision-making
body being the party’s national congress.This meant that sovereignty was
in the hands of the party members. However, from 2003, when the party
was renamed the Prosperous Justice Party, the party’s statute (Anggaran
Rumah Tangga, art) was also amended, and the highest decision-making
body became the elite in the Deliberation Assembly (Majelis Syuro).
This change represents not only different organisational structures, but
also competing political perspectives: i.e. democratic versus pragmatic
tendencies.¹³
Thirdly, different opinions also emerge in the party’s programmatic
platforms. There are several inconsistencies in the party’s organisational
 Ahmad-NormaPermata, ‘TheProsperous Justice Party and theDecline of Political
Islam in 2009 Election in Indonesia’, in Islam and the 2009 Indonesian Elections:
Political and Cultural Issues: The Case of Prosperous Justice Party (pks), ed. Remy
Madinier (Bangkok: irasec, 2010), 48–49.
 Collins, ibid.
 Ahmad-Norma Permata, Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous
Justice Party in Indonesia 1998–2007, PhD dissertation, Westfaelische-Wilhelms
Universität Münster, 2008, 187.
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statutes. Many who see these as intentional point to the double face of
the party. Yet closer analysis shows that, in fact, these inconsistencies
represent disagreements among the statute’s authors and deep divisions
within the party itself. For instance, there are clauses in its statute that
stipulate that the pks is an open party and all Indonesians aged 17 and
over are eligible to become members. However, other clauses in the same
statute prescribe that in order to become a party member it is necessary
to recite an oath that includes the Islamic shahadah – ‘there is no God but
Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger’. This would make them, at least
nominally, Muslims – thus, only Muslims can become party members.¹⁴
Lastly, the party’s political behaviour also records internal differences.
For example, the party saw the 1999 legislative elections as just another
activity of religious propagation (dakwah or tabligh). During the election
campaign the party leadership instructed its activists to intensify their
religious activities, to persuade people to accept Islam instead of pro-
moting their party, and to pray to God to help them win the elections.
However, five years later, during the 2004 elections, the same leadership
body issued a fatwa to its activists and members to mobilise people to
vote for the party in the elections, regardless of whether they agreed with
the party’s political perspectives or not.¹⁵
Close observation reveals that tensions and frictions between the jt
and pks – as well as inside each of the two – stem from their experiences in
democratic political competition. Basically, jtmembers are pksmembers.
However, intensive and increasingly systematic and specialised political
activities separate pks activists from other jt members who do not get
involved in party organisations. pks activists are increasingly pragmatic
in their behaviour, while jtmembers aremore likely to remain normative.
Inside the pks, there are divisions between ‘office oriented’ and ‘policy
oriented’ politicians: the former perceive politics as a competition to
maximise power and as a resource that has to be pursued in its own way
and with its own rules, while the latter perceive politics as a competition
to influence public policies and something that needs to be pursued
in accordance with Islamic principles. Furthermore, inside the ‘office
oriented’ camp there are ‘pragmatists’ who have established networks with
former President Suharto’s family, the military and Chinese businessmen,
and pushed the idea that the party should become an open, secular,
political party. There are also ‘reformists’, who are politically closer to
the networks of democratic activists that brought down the Suharto
regime and who moved the pks’s political agenda in line with the wider
 Ibid., 176.
 Ibid., 213–218.
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Indonesian agenda for democratisation. By contrast, among the ‘policy
oriented’ camp there are ‘moderates’ who accept office-seeking politics
as a tolerable short-term strategy, and ‘radicals’ who perceive politics
purely as a struggle to influence policies; they staunchly insist that pks
activists are, in principle, preachers and not politicians.
Meanwhile, within the jt there are differences between ‘loyalists’ who
blindly support the pks and ‘critics’ who support the pks only when
it follows jt principles. Furthermore, inside the ‘loyalist’ camp there
are groups of people who are loyal to certain leaders – because of the
access and resources these leaders share, or for other more personal
reasons – but critical of others. It should be noted that those who are
loyal to organisations defend them vehemently from external critics. By
contrast, among the ‘critical’ activists there are those who stayed inside
the jt network and criticise the pks from this position, and those who left
the jt network and criticise the pks as outsiders. The figure on page 35
aims to capture the sub-divisions as described.
The tensions, frictions and divisions are intensely disturbing and
unsettling for jt and pks leaders, and they are desperately seeking ways
to overcome them. Two ideas are worth close attention. Firstly, some
perceive the problem to be rooted in the separation of the jt and pks
leaderships. The two organisations are basically two sides of the same
coin, adhering to the Muslim Brotherhood’s motto that the party is
the jamaah (a community of the faithful), and the jamaah is the party
(al-hizb hiya al-jamaah, wa al-jamaah hiya al-hizb). However, the two
have different rules and patterns of behaviour: the jt follows Islamic
principles under the guidance of the supreme leader (muraqib ʿamm),
while the pks follows the Indonesian political system and competitions
led by the party’s president. Therefore, the jt and pks tend to go their
different ways. To overcome the problem, it has been suggested that
the leaderships should be united and the supreme leader of the jt
should assume the position of the party president of the pks. In this
way, there would be a single line of command across both the jt and
pks networks of organisations and this would minimise tensions and
frictions.¹⁶
Secondly, another argument, starting from the same observation,
is that the root of the tensions and frictions among the jt and pks is
the incompatibility between the two organisations: jt members are
informal and follow their own internally set rules, while the pks is
a political party that must comply with state rules and the political
 Interview with Yusuf Supendi, Jakarta.
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reality. However, in contrast to the previous perspective, which proposes
leadership unification, this group suggests that the jt and pks must be
separated organisationally. The jt needs to be formalised as a social
organisation, registered and bound by state regulations. In this manner,
the two organisations – which are in fact composed of the same group of
people – can operate in different arenas, the one social the other political,
and need not interfere with or disturb each other.¹⁷ In other words, pks
politicians can do their pragmatic political jobs without the worry of
being exposed to the scrutiny of jt members.
1.2 Review of the Literature
Researchers and analysts have different attitudes to the internal dynamics
of the pks and Jamaah Tarbiyah. Some deem the current dynamics to be a
sign of the party’s strength and superiority. Such opinions are commonly
held by party functionaries and members. Zulkifliemansyah, a pks Mem-
ber of Parliament, has written several articles in this vein. He eloquently
argues how the party, which evolved from the dakwah movement, seeks
to achieve progressive objectives in democratising Indonesia, without
losing its commitment to moral ideals. Yon Machmudi, an academic
and pks founder, explains that the Jamaah Tarbiyah and pks represent a
new generation of Muslim politicians and social activists. It transcends
the moderate versus radical dichotomy of Muslim political activists
that was typical during the New Order era – the former heavily stress-
ing accommodation, whilst the latter put much weight on purification.
The Tarbiyah community overcomes the dilemma of purification and
accommodation through non-confrontational gradual Islamisation. This
strategy succeeded in attracting followers and sympathisers from both
modernist and traditionalist circles of Indonesian Muslims – something
that Machmudi argues has never happened before.¹⁸
Others argued that the internal dynamics reflect the parties’ hypocrisy.
One widely circulated article of this type is by Sadanand Dhume. In it, he
describes the pks as a radical party actively promoting the Islamisation of
Indonesian politics. Although Dhume sees the pks as a peaceful political
 Interview with Abu Ridho, Jakarta.
 See Zulkifliemansyah, ‘Overcoming the Fear: pks and the Democratization’,
Jakarta Post 5 December 2005. ‘Prospect for the Justice and Prosperous Party
(pks) and Political Islam’, usindo Open Forum, Washington d.c. 8 June 2006.
‘Understanding pks as Living Entity within Indonesia’s Democratic Space’, Jakarta
Post 10 August 2007. Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru
Islam Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Harakatuna, 2005).
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organisation that is willing to participate in the democratic political
process, he believes that this is merely a facade to conceal its real agenda.
He wrote, provocatively, that
despite the Justice Party’s social work, little separates its thinking from
Jemaah Islamiyah’s. Like Jemaah Islamiyah, in its founding manifesto,
the Justice Party called for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Like
Jemaah Islamiyah, it has placed secrecy – facilitated by the cell structure
both groups borrowed from the Brotherhood – at the heart of its
organisation. Both offer a selective vision of modernity – one in which
global science and technology are welcome, but un-Islamic values
are shunned. The two groups differ chiefly in their methods: Jemaah
Islamiyah is revolutionary; the Justice Party is evolutionary.¹⁹
Yet others try to capture the complexity and paradox more comprehen-
sively. Martin van Bruinessen wrote that pks politicians are ‘imperfect
democrats but perhaps Indonesia’s strongest force for democratisation’
based on the fact that many of the party’s spokesmen believe in anti-
Islamic conspiracies, are anti-Zionistic, anti-Western, and have been
known to be hostile to liberals and secularist Muslims. At the same time,
the pks
is one of the very few forces in the political arena that may seriously
contribute to a gradual democratisation of the country, as it believes
in participation in the existing political system and in changing
society through persuasion of individuals rather than through grabbing
power.²⁰
Likewise, Bubbalo and Fealy wrote that the pks has some ambivalence
towards theWest, actively participating in various protests against Amer-
ican support of Israel and the invasion of Iraq, and tends to be suspicious
of the political agendas of the eu and us, especially the ‘war on terror’.
Yet many of its senior figures have a Western tertiary education and visit
the West frequently, and their awareness of international developments
is probably higher than that of any other Indonesian Islamic party.²¹
 Sadanand Dhume, ‘Radicals March on Indonesia’s Future’, Far Eastern Economic
Review 168, no. 5 (2005).
 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Soeharto
Indonesia’, Southeast Asian Research 10, no. 2 (2007), 117–154.
 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, ‘Joining the Caravan?TheMiddle East, Islamism
and Indonesia’, The Lowy Institute for International Policy paper 05 (Alexandria:
Longueville, 2005).
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Meanwhile Kees van Dijk explains that the ambiguity visible in pks
political behaviours is a logical consequence of the complexity of the
changing political environment in Indonesia.This complexity has created
asymmetrical alliances among different political actors and, subsequently,
ambiguous behaviours and internal dynamics among political actors
seeking to compromise their ideological objectives and political realities.
The pks is distinctly Indonesian in its structures and behaviours.²²
1.3 A Theoretical Note: A Failing or a Post-Islamism?
Any attempt to explain the developments of a political organisation will
face at least two dilemmas. The first is a dilemma between the rational
and natural perspectives of an organisation. The rational perspective
conceives an organisation primarily as a tool for a group of people to
achieve certain – previously set – objectives. Perhaps this is the most
widely used definition of an organisation, i.e. that any development
and dynamics within the organisation can only be explained in light of
the organisation’s objectives, because any member of the organisation
should act according to the specific tasks and division of labour of that
organisation. This implies that the yardstick for measuring or valuing
behaviours of the members and dynamics of the organisation are the
organisational objectives that are set a priori.
The natural perspective of an organisation, however, maintains that
in any organisation, as long as there are multiple people there will be
multiple objectives being pursued. Consequently, the real objectives of
the organisation are never set a priori, but rather a posteriori following
successive problems faced by the organisation. Of course it does have
previously set, long-term, objectives, but they are often subordinated or
compromised bymore immediate andmore urgent short-term objectives.
And, because there is a plurality of objectives being pursued simultane-
ously by different members, the real objectives of the organisation are
none other than the lowest common denominator, the objective that all
members agreed upon, namely the survival of the organisation. Hence, in
contrast with the rational perspective, which takes the a priori objectives
as the yardstick for all members’ behaviours and organisational dynamics,
the natural perspective puts the highest value on any behaviour and
dynamic that guarantees the survival of the organisation.
 C. van Dijk, ‘Different Settings, Different Definitions, and Different Agendas:
Islamic and Secular Political Parties in Indonesia and Malaysia’, in Interpreting
Islamic Political Parties, ed. M.A.Mohamed Salih (New York: PalgraveMacmillan,
2009), 51–81.
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The second is the dilemma between the collective and selective system
of incentives. The former deems that the collective incentives a political
organisation gives to its members should be distributed amongst all
members equally.Themost fundamental of these are identity and solidar-
ity. As politics is about collective goods, not owned by certain groups but
available to all, political organisations also promote collective incentives
to all of their members. This explains why people join and participate
in political organisations without being paid or receiving other material
rewards. Meanwhile, the latter system proposes to understand an organ-
isation as an arena in which to pursue personal interests and, therefore,
different members will receive different rewards according to their dif-
ferent roles, efforts and achievements. This perspective explains why in
political organisations, which are by default voluntary organisations – i.e.
people participate not because they are being paid or coerced – members
are constantly competing for control of the organisation and for power
and resources. This is because different organisational positions provide
different authorities that entail different sets of incentives.²³
Perceived from this perspective, the tensions and frictions within and
between the jt and pks are part of the normal process of organisations
seeking to survive in a rapidly changing political environment. However,
these developments are interesting in light of current discussions on
Islam-based politics. Two theories are relevant at this point: namely,
Oliver Roy’s thesis on the failure of political Islam, and Asef Bayat’s notion
of post-Islamism. Roy built his observations on Islam-based politics in
Afghanistan. He argues that Islam-based politics failed to accomplish its
mission to build a comprehensive Islamic system of life that included an
Islamic society and an Islamic state. For him, the failure was due to its
circular ideological and political programme, in which proponents of
political Islam believe that a true Islamic society can only be built under
an Islamic state – which will ensure the enactment and enforcement of
Islamic values. Yet, at the same time, a true Islamic state can only be
created if politicians uphold and enact Islamic principles, i.e. under an
Islamic society. Unable to break this vicious circle, they abandoned the
idea of creating an Islamic state and resorted to promoting Islam in terms
of private values.²⁴
Meanwhile, Asef Bayat, based on his observations of post-revolu-
tionary Iran, found a different feature of political Islam that he calls
 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), chapter 1.
 Oliver Roy,The Failure of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press,
1994), 60–68.
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‘post-Islamism’. He explains that, having gone through a period of politi-
cal experimentation and of establishing a comprehensive Islamic system
of life, political Islam was exhausted by both internal contradictions and
external pressures. However, in Bayat’s observation, instead of crumbling
or giving up its mission, the movement evolved into a new and more
open one by adapting to its environment and adopting critiques and
questions once directed to it – such as democracy, human rights, gender
equality, religious pluralism, etc. – as part of its new mission.²⁵
The present research has found that like Roy’s thesis, the jt and pks
are ensnared by their circular comprehensive agenda of Islamising the
Indonesian society and state. Although on paper the Muslim Brothers’
gradual Islamisation agenda adopted by the jt-pks seems to offer a
breakthrough to escape the vicious circle, in reality the circle and its vices
remain. It occurs, for example, when jt-pks members have to decide in
which phase of Islamisation they find themselves. Many of them believe
they have accomplished the Islamising of society and are now moving on
to Islamising the political system. However, there are just as many who
believe that they are still in the phase of Islamising the society, and are not
yet ready to Islamise the state. Since they all believe that for each phase of
Islamisation there are different priorities and different strategies, as well
as different leadership compositions, tensions and frictions emerge when
they argue about which priorities should be implemented, which strate-
gies should be pursued, and who should be in charge. And when money
and power are involved, conflicts and confrontations are inevitable.
However, also like what Bayat observed, the jt and pks have evolved
in terms of qualitative development, by adapting into a democratising
political system, and adopting new ideas and programmes – formerly
foreign to them – into their own. Previously holding the belief that the
existing secular democratic (albeit pseudo) system will gradually be
replaced by an alternative, comprehensive Islamic system of life, they
now see Islam more as a contributing system, which will improve the
existing democratic system, making it more religious and humane.
2 Historical Developments and Institutional Settings
This section deals with the historical development of the jt and pks,
starting from their inception and moving on to the contemporary
situation. The focus is on the interplay between three factors: the
ideas and ideals adopted from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, the
 Asef Bayat, ‘What Is Post-Islamism’, isim Review 5, no. 16 (2005), 5.
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histories and legacies of Islam-based political activism in Indonesia,
and the institutional frameworks provided by the dynamics of political
competition. This will show how the jt is uniquely Indonesian in
character and needs to be assessed in its own context.
Among its unique characteristics, the jt never publicly declared itself
to be a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and it never disclosed
its mechanism of relationships with its Egyptian headquarters. This has
resulted in different interpretations among observers, as well as among its
members. It is unlike other transnational Islam-based organisations such
as Hizbut Tahrir, Ahmadiyah, or Jamaah Tabligh, which publicly declare
their status and, consequently, the people who join the organisations
know that they are part of international networks and under the auspices
of their headquarters overseas. Although among jt’s top leadership it is
clear that their organisation is a local branch of the Egyptian Muslim
Brothers and it is bound by their statute, this is not so clear for jt activists
and members lower down the hierarchy. Many perceive the jt to be a
domestic Islamist organisation, or an organisation only inspired by the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
2.1 Chronological Events
The history of the jt started when four graduates – Hilmy Aminuddin,
Salim Segaf al-Jufri, Abdullah Baharmus, Encep Abdusyukur – returned
from studying in the Middle East and founded an organisation dedicated
to Islamic propagation (dakwah) by adopting the model of the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers’ organisation, including its organisational structure,
recruitment and training. They utilised cell-like groupings, in which one
mentor recruits, trains, and supervises five to ten members, and the cell
members only know each other; they do not know members of other
cells.²⁶
Initially, under the leadership of Salim Segaf, the jt recruited only
select members. They targeted those who were fluent in Arabic and
knowledgeable in Islamic studies, and therefore they remained a limited
and a small group. Later, when Salim Segaf went to continue his studies
in Saudi Arabia, the leadership of the organisation was handed over to
 Some speculate that mb founder Hassan al-Banna adopted the organisational
structure of Mussolini’s facist army: see Francis Fukuyama and Nadav Samin,
‘Can Any Good Come of Radical Islam?’, Commentary Magazine, September
2002. Others say it refers to the Sufi tradition of which al-Banna had been a
member. See IbrahimM. Abu Rabi, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in
the Modern Arab World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 67.
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HilmyAminuddin. In contrast to Salim Segaf, HilmyAminuddin decided
to simplify the recruitment requirements and targeted students of secular
universities. In this way, the jt succeeded in extensively recruiting new
members and expanded its branches to various major cities across the
country.²⁷
By the late 1980s, the jt had established a stronghold in many major
cities. In Jakarta and Bogor it established a network of institutions:
Nurul Fikri (Arabic, lit. illumination of ideas), study groups assisted high
school students in their studies but were used by jt activists to recruit
members; Sabili (Arabic, lit. my way), a magazine promoting Islamic
teachings to the public, especially to the young led by Rahmat Abdullah;
Khairul Ummah (Arabic, lit. the best community), a dakwah group led
by Yusuf Supendi; Al-Hikmah (Arabic, lit. wisdom), an Islamic boarding
school led by Abdul Hasib Hasan; and ‘Studies and Information on
Contemporary Islamic World’, a study group that distributes information
about international politics and conflicts, especially in Palestine and
Afghanistan, led by Abu Ridho and Almuzammil Yusuf.²⁸
During the 1990s, the jt had stable networks in many universities in
major cities across the country, and it started taking over intra-curricular
and extra-curricular student organisations. From the North Sumatra
University in Medan, North Sumatra, to the Indonesian University in
Jakarta, Bogor Institute of Agriculture in nearby Bogor, Bandung Institute
of Technology in Bandung, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta,
Sepuluh November Institute of Technology in Surabaya and Brawijaya
University in Malang, down to the Hassanuddin University in Makassar
South Sulawesi, the top leadership and activists among all their students
were jt members.
During the months of crises ahead of the regime change in the
mid-1990s, when Indonesian Islam-based political activism under the
umbrella of the icmi (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association)²⁹
was active in mobilising issues and support, jt students’ networks
established kammi, facilitated by icmi networks and led by Fahri Hamzah.
Subsequently, this organisation would supply many of the jt and pks
 Arief Munandar, Antara Jemaah Dan Partai Politik: Dinamika Habitus Kader
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (pks) Dalam Arena Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004,
PhD dissertation, The University of Indonesia, 246.
 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan
Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 139–175.
 icmi was founded in 1990 under the patronage of former President B.J. Habibie –
then Minister of Research and Technology – and played a bridging role between
the Suharto regime and Islam-based politics.
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leadership.When Suharto eventually stepped down and a new democratic
government was formed, followed by the opening-up of the political
system, jt activists discussed whether they should take the chance to
participate in the competition for power. Opinion was split among jt’s
central leadership, and so they decided to hold a vote. More than 6,000
questionnaires were distributed within their networks with three options:
joining the political competition by creating a political party, joining
with another, existing political party, or remaining non-political but
going public. Fifty-six per cent of the votes returned were for the first
option.
A political party called Partai Keadilan was established in 1998. During
the 1999 elections it garnered 1.7 per cent of the national vote and failed to
pass the electoral threshold required by law to allow a party to participate
in the next elections. With only seven seats in Parliament it merged
with Amien Rais’ pan, joining forces to push for new amendments
to the constitution that would prevent the military from returning to
power. During the short-lived Abdurrahman Wahid presidency, the pk
received one ministerial post (forestry), but this did not last long as the
minister was sacked by PresidentWahid for arresting and bringing to trial
powerful businessmen for illegal logging, in fear of political retaliation
by their business network. During Megawati’s presidency, she offered the
pk another ministerial post, but the party declined, on the ground that it
rejected a female president, and she was perceived as being supported by
secular and Christian politicians.
To be able to continue its participation in politics, the jt needed
to establish a new political party. It did so in 2003 and founded Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera, using pk’s organisational networks and leadership.
In the 2004 elections it surprisingly tripled its share of the vote to 7.3
per cent, and secured 45 seats in Parliament. In return for supporting
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidential candidacy it received three
ministerial posts: housing, agriculture, and youth and sport. In the 2009
elections it won 7.8 per cent of the vote, collected 57 parliamentary
seats and became the biggest Islam-based political party. It also received
four ministers: Science and Technology, Agriculture, Information and
Communication, and Social Affairs. Interestingly, although its percentage
increased, the actual votes the party collected decreased from 8,325,020
votes in 2004 to 8,206,955 in 2009.
2.2 Legacy of Domestic Islam-based Political Activism
A closer observation, however, reveals that the history of the jt did not
start at its foundation, and its history did not emerge out of the blue.
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When the jt was created in the early 1980s, there were already networks
of dakwah activists and organisations spanning across the major cities
in the country, and especially among young academics. This network
organised regular recruitment and training sessions for activists, and
established centres in – or near – campus mosques in various cities such
as Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Malang, Palembang,
Lampung, Padang, and Makassar.³⁰
This network of activism dated back to 1968 when ddii organised
training sessions called Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (lmd, or Dakwah
Fighters Training) in Jakarta for young Muslim activists. Well-known
figures involved in this training included former Masyumi politicians
such as Natsir, Roem, and former Minister of Religious Affairs Mukti Ali,
while the participants included Imaduddin Abdurrahim, Amien Rais,
Kutowijoyo, Abu Ridho and Mashadi. The last two went on to become
senior jt activists.³¹
From 1974 onward, alumni of the lmd started to spread to various
campuses, with two of these locations rising to particular prominence.The
first was the Salman³² mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology
(itb) where Imaduddin Abdurrahim established a series of training
sessions called Latihan Hidup Islami (lhi, or Islamic Life Training) to
promote an Islamic way of life among students and the public.The second
was the Shalahuddin mosque of Gadjahmada University in Yogyakarta,
under the leadership of Amien Rais. Here they established a Salahuddin³³
community that organised lectures and discussions on Islam. From
these two institutions younger generations of dakwah activists emerged
who later became jt leaders, such as Hidayat Nur Wahid, Mutamimul
Ula, Untung Wahono, Tifatul Sembiring, Tjahjadi Takariawan, amongst
others.³⁴
2.3 Institutional Frameworks for Political Competition
Another factor that contributed to the unique trajectory of jt’s historical
development is the political institutions that have regulated political
 A.M. Luthfi, ‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, in Jimly Ashidiqy et al., Bang Imad:
Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwahnya (Solo: Gema Insani Press, 2002), 158–166.
 Ibid.
 The name refers to Salman Al-Farisi, the Prophet Muhammad’s companion who
is regarded as his best military strategist.
 It refers to a Kurdish Muslim general during the Crusades, Salahuddin Al-Ayyubi
(1138–1193).
 Ibid.
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competitions in Indonesia in the last five decades. These institutional
settings are characterised by a complex triangular antagonism and an
alliance between the Suharto regime, the military and Islam-based
politics.
The first institutional setting faced by Islam-based political actors was
the refusal by the newly founded New Order regime in the mid-1960s
to revive the banned Masyumi party as well as the return to politics
of ex-Masyumi leaders. In this setting the antagonism was between
the Suharto regime, backed by the military, and Islam-based politics.
The situation forced Islam-based politics to split their resources: on the
one hand, they relied on younger politicians to get involved in political
competitions through the newly created Parmusi party; on the other
hand, the ex-Masyumi politicians created the non-political Indonesian
Islamic Dakwah Council (ddii). It was the ddii that started a systematic
synthesis of religious propagation and political activism, and spread it
among secular university students.
The second institutional setting was Law No. 3/1975, which forced
all Islam-based and Muslim-based political actors to fuse into a single
party named the United Development Party (ppp), while the other
parties were lumped into the Indonesian Democratic Party (pdi). In this
setting, the antagonism was between the Suharto regime and Islam-based
politics and other political parties, whereas the military suffered an
internal fracture between Suharto aides and his critics and stayed aloof.
Meanwhile, complexity increased in internal Islam-based politics as
the fusion combined two bitter rivals, the traditionalist and modernist
groups.This political ordeal in the mid-1970s brought university students
into the limelight as they were involved in riots in Jakarta in January
1974. This urged the regime to react by issuing a law that prohibited
students from engaging in political activities, known as theNormalization
of Campuses’ Life/Student Coordination Body (nkk/bkk), issued in
May 1978. On the one hand, this succeeded in suppressing student
political activism. Instead of discouraging, however, this policy further
intensified student political radicalism. In fact, it was under such a
political atmosphere that senior members of the jt and pks matured
during the late 1970s and early 1980s.³⁵
The third institutional setting was the regime’s move to mobilise
former Darul Islam rebels in a pretext to intercept the return of the
 Adam Johnson and Jonathan Paris, eds.,The Politics of Post Suharto Indonesia
(New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1999), 33–35. Damien Kingsbury,The
Politics of Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 84–86.
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communists.³⁶ The revived di networks subsequently developed an
ambiguous relationship towards the regime that revived them, and its
‘evil twin’, Islam-based politics. It was during this period that Hilmy
Aminuddin, the son of a high ranking di leader, Danu Mohammad
Hassan, emerged among di detainees. He served three years in military
detention and was released without charge. This history created a dark
side to the jt-pks history, because many Islam-based activists accused
Hilmy of being co-opted by the military or the intelligence service. jt-pks
rejected the allegation by pointing to the fact that Hilmy was released
without charge.³⁷
The fourth institutional setting was the political laws known as the
package of five laws, one of which – Law No. 8/1985 – stipulated the
mandatory adoption of the state ideology, Pancasila, as the sole basis
for all organisations. This setting drew a complex political constellation:
on one side, there was the bitterest antagonism between the regime and
Islam-based politics; on the other side, the regime was also in conflict
with the joint forces of a group of retired military generals, ex-Masyumi
politicians, and social activists, known as ‘Petition 50’. On yet another side,
the military suffered a further split between Suharto loyalists, under Vice
President Lt. Gen. Sudharmono, and professional soldiers under Chief
Commander Gen. BennyMoerdani resenting the growing Suharto family
businesses.³⁸ The mandatory adoption of Pancasila as the sole ideology
intensified radical tensions among Islam-based organisations. Indeed,
many of them went clandestine – rejecting the law and preferring illegal
status – including the Indonesian Islamic Students (pii)³⁹ and a faction
of the Islamic Student Association (hmi), known as the ‘mpo faction.’
 The revival of the former di combatants was conducted by Ali Moertopo, then
Suharto’s personal assistant, against the will of the commander of the State
Intelligence Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara, bakin)
Sutopo Yuwono. Moertopo insisted that he had personal approval from Suharto:
see Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari
’74 (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1998), 167. Asvi Warman Adam,Menguak Misteri
Sejarah (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 222–226.
 Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and The
Prosperous Justice Party (Canberra: anu e Press, 2008), 93–94.
 Jun Honna, ‘Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure during the
Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts’, Indonesia 67 (1999), 77–126.
 The pii was founded in 1947, and was an influential network because many of its
activists became notable figures in Indonesian social and political organisations,
until it went clandestine in 1985 when it rejected the adoption of Pancasila as the
sole ideology. It was among the few organisations membership of which included
students of secondary and higher education institutions.
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Many of the top activists of these clandestine Islam-based organizations
subsequently joined the jt and later on the pks, including Mutamimul
Ula (former pii national chairman), Tamsil Linrung and Nur Sanita
Nasution (hmi-mpo).
The fifth institutional setting was the sour relations between Suharto
and the military, which pushed the former president to form an alliance
with Islam-based politics. This setting created a new and complicated
platform of political constellations, in which every camp suffered internal
fractures: the regime was split between pro- and anti-democratisation;
Islam-based politics was split in two directions, i.e. between pro- and
anti-Suharto, and between pro- and anti-democracy; the military was
also split in two directions, i.e. between the Islam-leaning camp (green
soldiers) and the secular-leaning and Christian (the red soldiers) factions,
and between those who were anti- and pro-democratisation. It was this
complicated political constellation that gave pks politicians first-hand
experience that politics was never simple and black-and-white, as
was understood by jt members. It was from this moment on that
pks politicians – and in fact many other Islam-based politicians –
learned about strategic alliances based on similar political interests,
set aside political ideology, and went on to form a faction known as the
pragmatists.⁴⁰
3 Ideology, Organisation, Factionalism
This section explores the internal structures of the jt and pks, as well as
the relationships between the two, in terms of both organisation and
leadership. In principle, these organisations constitute two sides of the
same coin, following the mb’s principle, ‘the community is the party,
and the party is the community’. However, since the two organisations
operate in different arenas, the one political and the other social, and are
governed under different regulations, they have inevitably developed
different sets of rules and procedures that sometimes are not compatible
with each other: the jt is a social religious organisation that operates
under the principles of personal ethics and piety, while the pks engages
in political power struggles and mostly operates under the principles of
programmatic achievements and accountability. Consequently, the two
often clash with each other.
 R. William Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation’,The
Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 3 (1996), 613–634.
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3.1 The Politics of Gradual Islamisation
As an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the jt has adopted
its ideology, political programmes and organisational structures. Ide-
ologically, the jt follows an ideal of ‘gradual Islamisation’: moving in
phases from Islamising individuals, to Islamising families, to Islamising
society, and then Islamising the polity.⁴¹ For jt members, this evolu-
tionary programme is not only ideal, but also logical in that it follows
the logic of societal development: by Islamising individuals it would be
easier to move towards injecting Islam into families as the smallest social
units. And, once families live under Islamic teachings, then society will
move to uphold Islamic values and cultures. Finally, if Islamic norms
become public norms, then the emergence of an Islamic political system
is just a matter of time.⁴²
This form of gradual Islamisation also represents the moderateness of
the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which is a peaceful Islam-based
movement, and cannot be linked to radical Islam-based movements and
organisations. jt activists are keen to put forward this argument, as the
Muslim Brotherhood is continuously being labelled and interpreted,
by foreign as well as domestic writers, as a radical and revolutionary
movement, and the implicit implication being that the jt and pks, as its
derivatives, are likely to follow the same path. Furthermore, in the context
of the Indonesian Islam-based movement, the gradual Islamisation
programme of the Muslim Brotherhood exemplifies a breakthrough that
transcends the antagonism as well as the failures of radical movements
such as Laskar Jihad or the fpi and accommodative movements such
as Muhammadiyah and the nu. This is a new trend among Indonesian
Muslims that has given rise to a new type of santri.⁴³ Abdi Sumaithi –
a.k.a. Abu Ridho – explained that such gradual steps of preaching Islam
was the method implemented by the Prophet Muhammad. He started
by persuading individuals to follow Islam, and then internalise Islamic
 Theoriginal concept of gradual reforms (islah) fromMuslimBrotherhood founder
Hassan al-Banna runs as follows: reforming individuals (islah al-nafs), reforming
Muslim families (islah al-bait al-Muslim), reforming society (islah al-mujtamaʿ),
national independence (tahrir al-wathan), reforming the government (islah
al-hukumah), and international prominence and international expansions.
See Fathi Yakan, Revolusi Hassan Al-Banna: Dari Sayyid Qutub hingga Rasyid
Al-Ganusyi, trans. Fauzun Jamal and Alimin (Bandung: Harakah, 2002), 12–13.
 Interview with Khalid Machmud, 19 April 2007.
 Interview with Yon Machmudi, a pks founder and lecturer at the University of
Indonesia.
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values and behaviours through Muslim families, which would then
externalise into Islamising social structures and customs. After Islam
became the framework of society the Prophet would establish a political
system, a state, followed by the international expansion of Islam to other
countries.⁴⁴
Another typical ideological trait of the Muslim Brotherhood which
the jt has adopted is concern and enthusiasm for international conflicts
involving Muslims, especially Palestine-related issues. This internation-
alism serves several functions for jt members. Firstly, it provides an
ideological foundation for the jt, as part of the Muslim Brotherhood
network, to struggle for Islam and Muslims and to fight against the ene-
mies of Islam – especially the Jews. For them, the Jewish people always
pose trouble for Muslims, and they – out of fear and hatred towards
Islamic prominence – have been involved in the downfall of all major
Islamic empires, from the conquering of the Umayyad dynasty by the
Mongols to the abolition of the Ottoman Empire by Atatürk.⁴⁵ Secondly,
international issues are very useful for attracting new recruits, especially
among students. Thirdly, they are also a strong issue for attracting public
attention and sympathies.
From this gradual programme, the jt also adopts evolutionary
political strategies, known as the ‘stages of dakwah’: the first stage is
‘foundation’ (tanzim) in which jt activists start to explore Islamic political
programmes and research the social and political environments in which
they operate. The second is socialisation (shaʾbi) in which they start to
socialise their political programmes and recruit and train members. The
third is institutionalisation of their resources (muʾassasi), during which
they encourage jt members to pursue careers in diverse professional
occupations (public, private and voluntary), utilising networks of alumni
from major universities, and achieving positions in their respective
vocations in order to extract resources to support jt programmes. The
last is participation in power struggles through political competitions
(daulah), during which they become involved in political competitions,
assume public office and implement policies.⁴⁶
jt activists believe that the first and second stages were passed through
during the 1980s, when the organisations carried out underground
activities formulating strategies, recruiting and training members and
 Interview with Abu Ridho, Jakarta.
 Interview with Yusuf Supendi, Jakarta.
 Yon Machmudi, ‘Islamizing Indonesia’, (Canberra: anu e Press, 2008), 177–186.
Anis Matta,Menikmati Demokrasi: Strategi Dakwah Menikmati Kemenangan
(Jakarta: Pustaka Saksi, 2002), 9–11.
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activists. The third stage came during the 1990s, and when the political
environment became more conducive they started to go public, ran
various institutions, while their members advanced their careers in
various professional jobs. Finally, the fourth stage was entered from 1998
when they established a political party, participated in elections, held
government office and implemented public policies.⁴⁷
3.2 Key Ideological Issues
3.2.1 Islamic State
The pks, following the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, does not have
a specific blueprint concept of what kind of state or political system
there should be. This is in contrast to Hizbut Tahrir, which seeks to
revive a universal Islamic caliphate, or Jemaah Islamiyah under Abu
Bakar Baʾasyir, that seeks to create a Southeast Asian alliance of Islamic
governments.⁴⁸ In fact, just like those radical movements, the pks believes
that Islam is a comprehensive system of life that should be enacted in
the individual, societal and political spheres. However, for the pks,
what makes those spheres Islamic are not the structures, but rather
the behaviours of individuals within them. An Islamic society is a
society where its people behave according to Islamic teachings, while the
structure of the society can be modern, traditional or tribal. An Islamic
society is where Muslims enact Islamic rituals regularly, Islamic values –
dress codes, cuisines – become norms in public life, and crimes and
immorality are minimised or altogether absent.
Likewise, an Islamic political system is not confined to a universal
caliphate, but can be a kingdom or a republic, as long as it follows Islamic
principles. For the pks, people live in a society and the state is a means
to improve that society. Thus, the state serves as a supporting factor to
create an Islamic society – an ummah. It is a structure that provides rules
and regulations by which people should live, and it has the authority to
enforce them, and to punish transgressions. An Islamic state is a political
system that is capable of enacting Islamic principles in society.⁴⁹ The pks
also believes that Indonesia is a fundamentally Islamic state because it
accommodates religion as part of state and government affairs. Pancasila,
as Indonesian state ideology, was formulated by Muslim politicians, and
 M. Aay Furqon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum
Muda Muslim Indonesia (Bandung: Teraju, 2004), 124.
 Sidney Jones, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki Network” in
Indonesia’, icg Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002, no. 14, 693–617.
 Interview with Untung Wahono, Jakarta.
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it represents the spirit of Islamic teachings in political life. The problem
for the pks is that Indonesian administrations have not implemented
Pancasila comprehensively, because the rulers do not have a commitment
to Islamic principles. Only if political leaders and government officials,
who are mostly Muslims, have a personal commitment to Islamic values,
can Pancasila be applied comprehensively.
The pks accepts a democratic system on two grounds: firstly, democ-
racy is a flexible system; it can be socialist or capitalist, a monarchy or
republic, secular or religious. Political consultation as the basic princi-
ple of democracy is perfectly in line with Islamic teachings. Secondly,
democracy is a political reality in Indonesia – and internationally – and
therefore it should be taken as a starting point for building an Islamic
political system. Politics is a means to propagate religion (dakwah),
and it – as the term Tarbiyah implies – aims at changing people and
improving their conditions. Thus, dakwah activities, including those in
politics, should start from comprehension and acceptance of reality, and
not a denial of it.⁵⁰
3.2.2 Religious Pluralism
For the jt-pks, Islam is the ultimate and universal truth that must
be propagated to all humankind wherever and whoever they are. It is
mandatory for all Muslims to preach their religion according to their
capacity and opportunity. However, Islamic propagation should focus on
achieving benefits and avoid loss and risks. In a societal and political
context, this means that dakwah activities should be carried out in ways
that avoid conflicts and instabilities – which will not only harm society,
but also give a negative image of Islam and Muslims. Indonesia is a
democratic and religious country, in which the constitution sanctions
freedom of religion. This means that Indonesian people are free to
live according to their faith. Religious pluralism does not entail an
acknowledgement that all religions are the same, but refers to a condition
in which people can profess and express their religious beliefs. Therefore,
for the pks it is not religious pluralism, but rather a pluralism of religions,
meaning that Indonesians live in a country that recognises different
religions.This does not abolish the obligation for allMuslims to propagate
Islam. Islam must be propagated, but in a peaceful way.
There are, in fact, two different pluralisms, external and internal.
External pluralism means coexistence and tolerance towards other
religions, while internal pluralism is understanding and cooperation
with other Muslims from different traditions. With regard to external
 Interview with Abu Ridho, Jakarta.
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pluralism, the pks shows a tolerant attitude towards other religions, while
in relation to internal pluralism it also shows tolerance towards other
Muslim groups as long as there is no question of doctrinal heresy or
political interests. There are two cases worth special attention. Firstly,
the Ahmadiyah controversy that sparked deadly violence against the
members of a minority group. In this case, pks politicians urged the
government authorities to act firmly to prevent any violent acts, yet at
the same time they also urged the government to disqualify Ahmadiyah
as an Islamic group. A study by Bastiaan Scherpen in this volume
maps the political attitudes of Indonesian Islamic social and political
organisations on the issue of Ahmadiyah, and the pks shows a harsh
and conservative attitude. The pks also reportedly expelled a member
who converted to Shiʿism and took care of his wife who decided to
divorce him following his decision.⁵¹ Secondly, the jt-pks also shows
a changing attitude towards other Islamic organisations. In the past,
it has aggressively recruited and mobilised members of other Islamic
organisations, as well as infiltrated and taken over religious forums and
mosques belonging to other organisations. Research by Syaifuddin Zuhri
reveals a sensitive example of how the party took over Muhammadiyah’s
mosque in Yogyakarta, taking advantage of an earthquake disaster.⁵²
However, after major organisations such as the Muhammadiyah and
nu reacted officially by issuing statements and policies criticising the
pks, the party responded by issuing clarifications and instructions to
its members to maintain harmony and brotherhood with other Islamic
organisations.⁵³
3.2.3 Gender Equality
Gender equality is an extremely sensitive issue in the jt-pks, and they
treat it cautiously. Basically, the pks upholds a rather misogynist idea
of gender, which believes that men are superior to women. The party’s
Sharia Council issued a statement on the participation of women in
politics, specifying thatmen andwomen have a different set of obligations
and rights, and women’s participation in political life is allowed as long
as it is deemed appropriate. Interestingly, the statement specifically listed
inappropriate conduct that women in politics should avoid, such as
dressing too smartly, wearing too much perfume and speaking in a
 Arief Munandar, ‘Antara Jamaah dan Partai Politik’, 217.
 See Syaifuddin Zuhri’s contribution to this volume.
 Triono Wahyu Sudibyo, ‘Kampanye di Semarang, Hidayat Klarifikasi pks Anti
Maulid’, 28 March 2009, http://news.detik.com/read/2009/03/28/175913/1106503/
700/kampanye-di-semarang-hidayat-klarifikasi-pks-anti-maulid?nd992203605.
internal dynamics of the prosperous justice party and jamaah tarbiyah 53
seductive voice – as if the Sharia Council was so worried that pks female
politicians were unable to understand what was inappropriate conduct
by using their common sense.⁵⁴ The misogynist understanding of gender
relations in the pks is also obvious from the fact that many pks leaders
from different factions – from radical and conservative to pragmatic and
liberal – practise polygamy.
There are female pks politicians who have earned a good reputation
in politics, such as Nur Sanita Nasution, the late Yoyoh Yusroh, and
Ledia Hanifa. They support the interpretation that there are different
obligations and rights between men and women, but that the two sexes
are equal, i.e. thatmen andwomen have equal status before God, state and
society. Yet, since they have different biological and psychological natures,
they have different roles, both in private and in public life.⁵⁵ A number
of women have tried to initiate a more progressive understanding, but
the unfortunate consequence was that they were expelled from the party
structure for their efforts.⁵⁶
The pks provides relatively open opportunities for women, andwomen
politicians and activists participate in every section of the party structure.
Women were among the original founders of the party (five out of 50),
and the party allocates seats for women in every organisational structure.
In the powerful Deliberation Assembly, ten out of 100 members are
women; in the Party Advisory Board three members are women; there
are even two women members of the Sharia Council – something very
unusual for Islamic organisations. In addition, the pks also has a special
department for women, which deals specifically with women’s issues.⁵⁷
The pks also put forward a significant number of female candidates in
the parliamentary elections. During the 2004 elections it had 446 female
candidates for national, provincial and district/mayoral legislatures and
all of them passed the qualification requirements, although there is
no further information on how many of them were actually elected
as members of Parliament. In comparison, the female candidates of
other Muslim parties were as follows: ppp – 497 candidates; pkb – 551
candidates; pan – 554 candidates, and pbb – 372 candidates. With regard
to the recommended 30 per cent quota for female candidates the pks
did even better, and fulfilled the quota in 65 electoral regions (Daerah
Pemilihan). This was the highest number compared to other parties: the
pan and pkb managed to achieve this in 45 regions, the pbb in 42 regions
 Permata, ‘Islamist Party and Democratic Participation’.
 Interview with Nur Sanita, Jakarta.
 Interview with Arief Munandar.
 Interview with pks member of Parliament Yoyoh Yusroh, 21 June 2007.
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Cover of vcd used for campaigning by the pks in the run up to the 2004 general
elections
and the ppp in only 30 electoral regions.⁵⁸ In the national legislatures, the
pks had one female out of seven mps (14 per cent) during the 1999–2004
period. In the period of 2004–2009 the pks had more female Members
of Parliament, but their percentage was lower, i.e. three out of 45 (6 per
cent).⁵⁹
 See Republika, 29 January 2004.
 Interview with pks member of Parliament Yoyoh Yusroh, 21 June 2007.
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Figure 2 Female mps (2009–2014) and candidates
(2009) in the Indonesian Parliament
In the general election of 2009, the pks had the highest number of
female candidates for national legislators amongmajor parties – 212 out of
579 or 36.1 per cent. However, when it came to the number of candidates
who were elected in the 2009–2014 Parliament, the party experienced the
lowest number – three out of 57 or only 5.2 per cent. This discloses the
reality of the situation of women politicians in the party who suffer from a
paradox: on the one hand, at a personal level, female leaders and activists
of the pks have a high level of education and skills and have played
substantial roles in contributing to the party’s achievements. On the
other hand, at an institutional level, they have limited opportunities both
to advance their careers and to be acknowledged for their contributions.⁶⁰
3.3 Asymmetrical Organisations
Until 1998, the jt was organised as a secretive movement, imitating the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, with a supreme leader at the top holding
religious as well as organisational authority. He was assisted by deputies
with different tasks. The jt supreme leader came under the auspices of
 Permata, “The Prosperous Justice Party,” 36–37.
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and was in consultation with the supreme leader of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, especially in matters regarding organisational procedures
and political strategies. However, he was not under the direction of the
foreign authority. There are coordinative forums for regional as well as
international Muslim Brotherhood networks. The networks also use
the hajj pilgrimage to coordinate with each other and consult with the
Egyptian headquarters.⁶¹
Under this centralistic leadership, the jt organises recruitments and
indoctrination training through cell-like networks of activists, known
as usroh groups, which consist of five to 12 participants supervised by a
mentor. In many cases, members of a cell do not reveal to members of
other cells who their mentor is. On their part, the mentors form further
cells, etc. There are regular activities conducted by the groups; the first
is a weekly meeting (liqo), in which members of cells meet with their
mentor to learn and discuss religious subjects, mostly theology and
prophetic history. The second is a monthly gathering (mabit) in which
cell members spend a night in a mosque, to offer night prayers and hold
in-depth discussions on certain topics with their mentors. The third is a
gathering (daurah) in which larger numbers of participants gather and
invite potential recruits, usually under cover of student events in schools
and campuses. The fourth is travelling (rihlah) in which a large number
of jt activists, accompanied by their families, travel to tourism sites to
socialise with each other in a more informal way. The fifth is outbound
(mukhayam), during which a group of jt members spends several days
out of town for physical exercise and to learn survival skills.⁶²
Among jt members there are formal as well as informal structures.
Formal structures regulate how members interact with each other, based
on seniority in joining the organisation as well as their position in the
organisation. As the organisation is composed of ramified usroh cells,
networks of mentors and students, on paper each member will have
certain relations with other members in terms of seniority. Informal
structures, meanwhile, deal with non-structural factors that affect the
way members interact or behave towards certain members. Commonly,
they differentiate between people who are trained in Islamic studies
and those who have a secular educational background. Among those
who hold degrees in Islamic studies, the highest and most respected are
those scholars of Islamic law (Sharia), followed by theological studies
(usul al-din), and other Islamic studies (education, history, Arabic etc).
Meanwhile, there are also degrees of seniority among those with secular
 Interview with Yusuf Supendi, Jakarta.
 Permata, ‘Islamist Party and Democratic Participation’, 99.
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education. Hard science scholars are highest in status, followed by
scholars with a background in social and cultural sciences.⁶³
Since 1998, when the jt established a political party, the organisational
structures of the jt have blendedwith those of the pks. During 1998–2003,
the highest decision-making body was the National Assembly, which
holds the authority to draft and amend statutes, to elect the chairman of
the Shura Assembly, and to select chairmen and functionaries for the
Advisory Council, the Shariah Council, and the party’s central leadership.
The Shura (or Deliberation) Assembly had 99 members, 65 of whom
were elected proportionally from 33 provinces based on the approximate
numbers of jt members of each province, plus as two special members
the current and former Assembly chairmen (Hilmy Aminuddin and
Salim Segaf Al-Jufri), and 32 additional members who were selected by
the Assembly based on professional expertise.
In 2003, however, under the banner of the pks, the highest decision-
making body moved to the Shura Assembly, thus giving the supreme
leader – as the chairman – near-absolute authority. Although the National
Assembly still holds the right to draft and amend statutes, and to elect
the chairman and members of the Shura Assembly, it is in the hands
of the Shura Assembly to decide where, when and how the National
Assembly should be held. This change represents what political scientists
call ‘oligarchy’; that is, the shifting of the highest authority from the
hands of the members into the hands of the elite. The reason commonly
put forward by jt and pks leaders for this shift is that it simplifies the
decision-making process.⁶⁴
The new structures also create complexities as they blend jt organisa-
tional rules, which follow Islamic principles, and pks organisational rules,
which follow the national party system and the logic of political compe-
tition. As a consequence, what commonly happens is that most decisions
are taken with political considerations but stated, communicated and
explained using religious terminology. Party leaders need to commu-
nicate with their members using religious language, while at the same
time they have to make public statements using rational language. It also
explains the party’s ambiguous behaviour and its sometimes double stan-
dards. During national and especially regional elections, the pks always
issues official statements about why it nominates certain candidates using
Islamic criteria, while there are many media reports purporting to show
how those decisions are made based purely on political deals.⁶⁵
 Interview with Arief Munandar, Jakarta.
 Permata, ‘Islamist Party and Democratic Participation’, 187.
 Tempo, 26 August 2012.
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Figure 3 Organisational structure of the pks
The powerful position of the supreme leader generates its own prob-
lems, as it creates an alternative authority and loyalty for party leaders and
members. The authority enables him to bypass organisational procedures
that split the party machinery between loyalty to the organisation and
to the supreme leader. The most infamous case is the dominant position
enjoyed by the party’s general-secretary, Anis Matta, who not only held
the position for three terms because of his closeness to the supreme
leader, but even dared to take on more terms as party president. For
example, he engineered the resignation of the party president, Hidayat
Nur Wahid (pks president 2003–2005), in 2005, under the auspices of
the Shura Assembly.⁶⁶ He also defied Tifatul Sembiring (pks president
2003–2005), ahead in the 2009 election, when he unilaterally established
an ad hoc ‘National Election Winning Team’ headed by himself while
 Interview with Yusuf Supendi, Jakarta.
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the party president took his seat only as a regular member – though
this team did not perform well, as many of its members sided with
Sembiring.⁶⁷
It is this unsolved structural asymmetry that eventually created
irreparable fractures within the jt and pks. To keep the organisation
running well, the jt leadership has to follow two incompatible rules
of the game: the one subjective and symbolic, the other objective
and tangible. This has created double standards for the party: on the
one hand, it takes decisions based on rational political calculations
of cost-benefit risks, while at the same time it maintains the use of
religious language – commonly backed up by quotations from the Qurʾan
and Prophetic Traditions – to communicate them, especially to their
members.
Three cases will suffice to show how this dilemma manifests itself.
The first was the 2004 presidential election, when the party was split
between supporters of Amien Rais, a democratic leading figure with
high Islamic credentials but a poor chance of winning, and supporters of
the former army commander Wiranto, a secular pro-Suharto candidate
with a greater chance of success. What actually occurred was rivalry
between Hilmy Aminuddin (the supreme leader), who had a political
deal with Wiranto, and Hidayat Nur Wahid (the party president), who
was committed to supporting Amien Rais. Yet both of them tailored
religious arguments to support their choices. The second example was
the 2008 pks national congress, held in Bali, at which it was proposed
that the party should drop its exclusively Islamist ideology and declare
itself an ‘open party’. The supreme leader and party general secretary
endorsed this idea, while the party president (Tifatul Sembiring) rejected
it. The arguments were again tailored to religious debates. Yet, in fact,
the leadership disagreed about the best strategy for the 2009 elections:
whether to stay in a narrow niche of conservative Muslim voters or to
move into the wider share of plural voters. The third case involved a
fatwa issued by the pks Shariah Council of Solo, Central Java, in 2010, on
the legality of electing a Christian as a political leader, in order to explain
a political deal made between the party and the pdi-p who nominated a
Catholic, F.X. Rudyatmoko.⁶⁸
 Arief Munandar, ‘Antara Jamaah dan Partai Politik’, 93–94.
 See Solo pks Sharia Council, ‘Pengangkatan Non Muslim Dalam Pemerintahan:
Sebuah Pandangan Dan Analisa Syar’ (On Electing Non-Muslim Government
Leader: An Islamic Interpretation), January 2010.
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3.4 Frictions and Factions
After the 2004 election, when the party tripled its votes and obtained
almost seven times the number of seats it had held in Parliament, and
held three ministerial offices, the central leadership was confronted with
the impossible task of maintaining polarising trends between steadily
idealistic jt activists and increasingly pragmatic pks leaders. jt activists –
most of whom were not involved in party structures – started to demand
that the jt’s top leaders, especially the supreme leader, return to the basic
jt commitment as a dakwahmovement and organisation, and thus soften
its political agenda. The tension was high when in March 2009 a group
of senior jt activists – including the pks’s 1999 presidential candidate
Didin Hafiduddin – handed a petition to the supreme leader, Hilmy
Aminuddin, demanding that he should be held accountable in terms
of the ideological, organisational as well as financial management of
the pks. They accused Hilmy of utilising the jt for the pks’s political
agendas.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the political pressures on the pks in the
national arena forced the party leadership to rely more and more on
effective decision-making mechanisms by recruiting practically minded
politicians – sometimes from outside the jt. This new pks leadership,
in return, demanded that the supreme leader focus on allocating jt
resources to support the party’s capacity to compete in an unstable
political environment. Having succeeded in winning the supreme leader’s
influence, they started to excommunicate and fire critical jt activists –
including former party vice president Syamsul Balda and party founder
Yusuf Supendi.
The polarisation between the jt and pks continues, and there is even
polarisation within the two. Inside the pks, for example, there are divi-
sions between ‘office oriented’ politicians (who focus on maintaining
party positions in political competitions) and ‘policy oriented’ politicians
(who focus on promoting Islamic policies). Furthermore, among office
pursuers there are pragmatists, who use politics to advance personal
and party interests – including collaborations with the Suharto fam-
ily, military networks and businessmen (Anis Matta, Fahri Hamzah,
Zulkieflimansyah); and reformists, who put the party’s interests in line
with democratic reforms (Hidayat NurWahid, Tifatul Sembiring, Sohibul
Iman). Among policy pursuers, there are moderates who do not get
involved in pragmatic politics but tolerate it (Mutamimul Ula, Untung
Wahono); and radicals who do not tolerate any pragmatic political
behaviour (Abu Ridho, Yusuf Supendi).
 Interview with Didin Hafiduddin, Bogor.
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Inside the jt, among those who are not involved in party structures,
there are divisions between loyalists who unswervingly support decisions
by the party leadership, and critical activists who criticise what they
perceive as defiant behaviour and decisions by party elites. Among the
loyalists, there are activists who are loyal to certain party leaders but
critical towards others (mostly younger activists, still unstable in their
financial life, who enjoy cliental relationships with certain party leaders),
and those who are loyal to the party and eager to defend the pks from
outside critics. Meanwhile, among critics there are activists who remain
in the jt (Didin Hafiduddin, Daud Rasyid Sitorus) and those who have
left the organisation and launch their criticism from outside (Tizar Zein,
Ihsan Tanjung, Mashadi).
There are three different answers commonly put forward by the pks
with regard to the frictions inside the jt and pks: the first is a cliché, that
friction and factionalism are common phenomena in any organisation,
especially among political parties. Proponents of this argument typically
add that the pks is the most solid of all parties in Indonesia, the only
party that does not suffer from an organisational split. The second answer
was put forward by Yusuf Supendi, who argues that the frictions are
caused by the asymmetrical structures of the jt and pks, and deems party
structures as being foreign to Muslim Brotherhood tradition. In order
to resolve the frictions, he proposes that the supreme leader take the
position of party president, so that there will be a single authority and
single line of command.⁷⁰ The third answer was provided by Abu Ridho,
who sees the frictions as a result of blending two incompatible structures
into a single organisation: the jt’s social structures and the pks’s political
structures. To overcome the factionalism he suggests separating into two
different organisations: the jt, with a different leadership, should follow
the logic of a social organisation; and the pks, with another leadership,
should follow the logic of political competitions.⁷¹
4 Democratic Participation
This section discusses the pks’s experience in terms of democratic
political participation, i.e. how the party has been caught between
maximising political interests and promoting Islamic values. It explores
pks behaviour in three political arenas: political mobilisation, coalition
and government formation, and policy formulation and implementation.
 Interview with Yusuf Supendi, Jakarta.
 Interview with Abu Ridho, Jakarta.
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In those three arenas, the party experienced a dramatic change from
normative perceptions and behaviours, perceiving politics as an integral
part of dakwah activities and therefore needing to be conducted in line
with Islamic norms, into pragmatic understandings and dealings, by
taking politics as an instrument for the objectives of dakwah that need
to be handled in their own way. At the same time, the change marked
the polarisation between increasingly pragmatic pks politicians and
normative jt activists, which turned into tensions and frictions.
In terms of political mobilisation, the pks has experienced a trajectory
from natural understanding of political competition, from perceiving
elections as a formal test and a trial of the political party’s reputation
in society, into a rational understanding of it as contestations that
involve strategies to engineer information and reputations, and into a
transactional understanding inwhich it realised that political competition
through elections is not only about winning or losing, but rather how
to play what it has. Similarly, in the arena of coalition and government
formation, initially it perceived a coalition exclusively in terms of
ideological cooperation and rejected the notion of collaborating with a
secular party. Subsequently, it started to realise that a coalition with a
secular party might be seen as a pragmatic short-term strategy in order
to achieve normative long-term objectives. Finally, in the area of policy
formulation and implementation the party seems to have been trapped
between formulating symbolic-normative and rent-seeking policies.
4.1 Political Mobilisation
The pks has experienced a significant change in political mobilisation, in
terms of how it understands the notion ofmobilisation as well as theway it
carries it out. Firstly, during the early years of its history, jt and pks leaders
perceived political mobilisation as a natural social process, in which
reputation and popularity are by-products of society’s appreciations of
their good and beneficial deeds. Secondly, after they followed through
various events of political mobilisation – from rallies on the streets,
media warfare to influence public opinion, to elections campaigns – they
started to realise that politics is not a natural social process, but rather a
series of engineered events through the manipulation of information.
Thus, they started not only to amplify their profiles and reputations, but
also to fabricate them, sometimes almost out of nothing.⁷² Thirdly, when
 pks strategies for socialisation included taking advantage of natural disaster relief
activities that were often required, by putting its name on aid packages which
were sent by other people or organisations to disaster victims; escorting trucks
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they learnt more about the nature of democratic competition, especially
the idea of plurality – that to win a competition does not only mean to
become a majority, but to measure any achievement towards a certain
benchmark – they started to utilise political mobilisation as a means of
political transaction.
This change, however, did not take place for the pks network as a
whole, but rather more among its political elites. Not all pks members
agreedwith this interpretation of politics, andmany of themfirmly believe
that politics is just a means for dakwah, and political achievements are
merely by-products of dakwah achievements. Thus, the change marks
polarisations of perceptions and behaviours among jt-pks members,
between politically oriented and dakwah oriented factions.
The first event at which the jt was involved in a serious political
mobilisation was the 1999 election. At this time – perhaps influenced
by the idea of gradual Islamisation – they understood politics as a
natural social process, in which elections are merely an arena for political
parties to test their popularity and reputation in society. Therefore,
they did not prepare a systematic campaign ahead of the elections,
but rather intensified their regular activities: coordination meetings,
religious sermons, as well as personal rituals such as night prayers. A
statement (Bayan) issued by the party’s central board ten months ahead
of the election day informs us about what it deemed important. Firstly,
jt members should dedicate their activities to Allah, not to the party.
Secondly, the party’s ultimate mission is to enact God’s laws on earth,
political activities through the party aremerely ameans to an end.Thirdly,
maintaining harmony and preventing prejudices, especially with other
Muslims, are more important than political achievements. Fourthly,
elections are not a trial for the party but an arena for the jt to exercise its
ability in implementing religious and political skills. Fifthly, minimising
political and social costs is more important than achievements.⁷³
Things were different during the 2004 election, however. After the
Justice Party failed to pass the 2.5 per cent electoral threshold, the jt
founded the Prosperous Justice Party with a new understanding about
politics and political mobilisations. There were at least three changes:
firstly, in terms of organisation, they established a more systematic
organisational structure. During the previous period, the party had not
established an institutionalised organisational structure – as it had barely
carrying aid, but were not owned by the pks; or using vehicles with pks flags.
These activities helped to fabricate a public image of a party that cares for the
suffering of the people.
 Justice Party Central Board Official Release, 22 August 1998.
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one year from inception to election – and relied more on its internal
networks of usroh cells. In addition, the electoral law had not required
any organisational benchmark. For the 2004 election, the electoral Law
No. 8/2000 required that in order to be eligible to participate in the
elections a political party needed to establish organisational branches
in all of the provinces and half the total number of districts in those
provinces.
Secondly, in terms of human resources, it started to sort and select
party leaders and functionaries not only based on their seniority in
the jt network, but rather on individual character and skills suitable
to the organisation’s requirements. The pks also systematically trained
and upgraded the various skills and capabilities of party leaders and
functionaries by organising courses, workshops and training on various
subjects, such as delivering public speeches, writing in public media,
talking in front of tv cameras, lobbying, fundraising, even in carrying out
psychological warfare through black campaigns, such as how to exploit
the weaknesses and scandals of other parties in order to demoralise its
political competitors and to boost the confidence of its supporters.
Thirdly, in terms of political strategy, in which they perceived politics
no longer as a natural social process, but rather a competition needing to
be pursued in its own way. They raised funds intensively, both from jt
members and external donors, domestic and foreign. They started to
perceive politics merely as a means to an end, and strategic collaborations
with anyone were viewed as tolerable or even necessary, as long as the
partners were committed to the long-term goals of the party’s mission.⁷⁴
They publicised their opinions and activities by organising rallies and
protests against various domestic and international issues. pks leaders
became aware of and skilful in using public media by inviting reporters
to their activities.⁷⁵
At this point the disagreements started to emerge among jt and pks
members respectively. Controversy often centres around the issue of
fundraising: fundraising, in which pks functionaries actively mobilise
financial support from external donors, including government institu-
tions, the network close to the Suharto family and business companies
owned by non-Muslims. Critics and protests started to emerge among jt
activists who saw these activities as defiant both morally and politically.
Morally, the critics argued that politics should be taken as an integral
 Interview with Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta. He also mentioned that years ahead
of the election pks members persuaded jt members to save white shirts and
headscarves to be printed with the party logo for election campaigns.
 Permata, ‘Islamist Party and Democratic Participation’, 216.
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part of dakwah activities, and therefore should be funded exclusively by
morally accountable funds, while politically they accused pks politicians
who received funds from non-Muslims of collaborating with enemies
and thus betraying their own mission. Both proponents and opponents
supported their opinion with religious arguments backed with quotations
from religious books and authorities.⁷⁶
Later on the pks exhibited another trend of behaviour in political
mobilisation, namely transacting votes with other political resources.
Following the rules of the game in a multi-party democratic system,
pks politicians quickly learnt that the options available for election
participants are not only either to win or lose, but rather to win a
bigger or smaller prize according to whatever they got. In democratic
politics, for a political party votes are like money for business companies
and transferable into other resources. Once pks politicians got this
idea, they started to exchange their votes for other resources, offices or
money. This is known as ‘political dowry’ (mahar). They play the game
effectively, andmost of the time smoothly, especially during gubernatorial
and district/mayoral elections, because they have loyal voters. In the
2007 Jakarta gubernatorial election, the pks received 30 billion rupiah
(us$3 million) for nominating Let. Gen. (ret) Adang Darajatun, former
vice-commander of the Indonesian police.⁷⁷While in the last 2012 Jakarta
gubernatorial election, after its candidates lost in the first round, the
pks asked for 100 billion rupiah (us$100 million) from the incumbent
Fauzi Bowo in return for its 500,000 votes; but the latter bargained for
20 billion rupiah (us$20 million), and a deal was reached.⁷⁸
These political actions added more fuel to the existing resistance by jt
conservative activists, since such political transactions enabled certain
 A telling example is the case of a pks politician, a holder of a doctoral degree
in Islamic studies from Saudi Arabia. In the 2004 election he lost in his home
district, a traditional Muslim stronghold in Banten province, to a Roman Catholic
North Sumatran politician from the secular party pdi-p. Perplexed by the defeat –
he believed he had had good contact and coordination with his supporters –
he conducted an inquiry into why he had lost. He found that it was because his
rival had given ‘direct aid’ (a euphemism for buying votes) a few days ahead of
the polling day. In the 2009 election, unwilling to repeat the same mistake, he
provided his voters with direct aid and won a seat in Parliament. The politician
opined that money politics is more tolerable than letting a Roman Catholic
politician from a secular party represent his Muslim community. Interview with a
former student who became an expert member of staff of one of the parliamentary
committees.
 Interview with Yusuf Supendi, Jakarta.
 Tempo, 26 August 2012.
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politicians to enjoy lavish lifestyles. The tensions were so high that a
few critical jt activists were actually excommunicated or expelled from
the party for criticising this behaviour. Indeed, some even left the jt
and organised their own groups criticising the pks and jt leadership for
misleading the organisation and betraying the Muslim Brotherhood’s
political mission.⁷⁹ However, some of the more skilful politicians were
able to secure support both fromhigh ranking party officials, by providing
a significant cash supply badly needed by the party in the increasingly
capital intensive political competition, as well as from younger jt activists,
by opening channels for funds, networks and careers.⁸⁰
4.2 Coalitions and Government Formation
Similar to what happened in terms of political mobilisation, the pks
also experienced changing perceptions and behaviour with regard to
political coalitions in government formation. Initially, during the early
years of its history, the pks’s leaders understood the government as an
institutional mechanism for formulating and implementing policies,
and assumed that political parties would pursue policies following their
particular ideology and programmes. Later on, they started to learn
that coalitions, just like gathering votes, are instrumental to political
objectives and thus should be pursued in their own right. Again, this
change also marked the emergence of internal divisions between activists
who perceived political activities as an integral part of dakwah activities
and thus should be pursued in line with Islamic principles, and those
who perceived politics as instrumental to dakwah objectives and thus
argued that the end justifies the means.
The first joint venture the party participated in was the formation of
the Communication Forum of Islamic Parties (fsppi, Forum Silaturrahmi
Partai-Partai Islam) in 1998. It demanded that the government should
repeal Laws No. 3/1985 and No. 8/1985 that required organisations to
adopt Pancasila as their sole foundation and it was successful in this.
Secondly, fully recognising their minimal calibre, eight of the Forums’
members – ten minus the ppp and pbb – agreed to pool their remaining
votes in the election in order to get additional seats, the so-called Stembus
Accoord; a term borrowed from the Dutch.⁸¹
The second political move was to join pan to form the Reform Faction
(Fraksi) in the Parliament. This is rather interesting as pan is actually not
 Email correspondence with an ex-jt member.
 Arief Munandar, ‘Antara Jamaah dan Partai Politik’, 98–99.
 Permata, ‘Islamist Party and Democratic Participation’, 240–241.
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an Islamic party; at the same time, other Islam-based parties from the
fsppi requested that the pks join the Islamic Party Faction. According
to Hidayat Nur Wahid, Amien Rais, not pan, was the deciding factor.
pks leaders knew Amien Rais very well, and they were confident that he
would pursue a political agenda parallel to that of the pks. Furthermore,
Amien Rais and other pan leaders also had credentials as reformists,
which was in line with the pks’s political vision. Finally, the pks’s decision
to join pan was based on democratic reasoning, as it made the Reform
Faction – with 41 seats – the fifth largest faction in the Parliament. Thus,
it had the right to receive a vice chairmanship in the legislature, defeating
the Military Faction, which held 38 seats.⁸²
The next political coalition that the pks joined was the Central Axis,
a coalition of Islam-based politicians under Amien Rais designed to
challenge the candidacy of B.J. Habibie (who was perceived as a remnant
of the Suharto regime) and Megawati (who was perceived as a secular
politician backed by Christians).⁸³ Amien Rais, against all the odds,
nominated AbdurrahmanWahid as the alternative candidate. Initially
the pks, together with another Islam-based party, the pbb, preferred to
support Habibie.⁸⁴ When eventually Habibie withdrew his candidacy, the
pks reluctantly gave its support to AbdurrahmanWahid with a qualifying
statement that he was the least bad choice.⁸⁵ Senior jt activists and former
interim pks president Untung Wahono observed that it was beyond
doubt that the pks preferred Habibie to AbdurrahmanWahid.⁸⁶
When Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as president, he offered
the pks one ministerial position in his cabinet. The pks accepted and
 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 282–286.
 Despite the widely held belief that the coalition had been initiated by Amien Rais
in order to mobilise support fromMuslim politicians, closer observation revealed
the opposite.The forum was initiated by a number of senior Muslim politicians to
bring Amien Rais back into his proper habitat of Islamic politics. It was triggered
by Amien Rais’s agreement to join forces with Megawati and Abdurrahman
Wahid in furthering a reform agenda. Islamic politicians responded to this move
with anxiety, both for ideological as well as democratic reasons. Ideologically
they associated Megawati and her pdi-p with secular and Christian politics;
while democratically many perceived both Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid
not really as reformists, because they were reluctant to support reforms such as
amending the constitution and the demilitarisation of politics. See Suharsono,
Cemerlangnya Poros Tengah (Jakarta: Perennial Press, 1999), 86–88.
 Untung Wahono, Peran Politik Poros Tengah (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003),
115.
 pk Bayanat, 17 September 1998.
 Wahono, Peran Politik Poros Tengah, 134.
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nominated its chairman, Nur Mahmudi Ismaʾil, for the position. In a
meeting held following the offer, pks leaders discussed which department
was most preferable, and they agreed on several criteria: firstly, it must
be a populist ministerial post, i.e. it must deal directly with the public;
secondly, it should be in accordance with the party’s human resources
in order to maximise its performance; thirdly, it should not depend on
foreign funds; fourthly, the pks also preferred a department with the
least number of problems. Based on these criteria, the pks proposed the
Ministry of Agriculture. Abdurrahman Wahid seemed to agree with
the pks’s proposal and Ismail was on the cabinet list as the Minister
of Agriculture. However, when the new Indonesian United Cabinet
was made public, Ismaʾil was shifted to the Ministry of Forestry and
Horticulture.⁸⁷
When President AbdurrahmanWahid was impeached by Parliament,
the pks fully supported the impeachment and Megawati’s rise to the
presidency. Interestingly, the pks did not join the cabinet, although
Megawati reportedly offered one ministerial position. At least four
factors might have motivated the pks to take this decision. Firstly, the
Megawati presidency was controversial among conservative Muslims
because of her gender. pks conservative ideology perceives political
leadership to be the privilege of male politicians, and thus Megawati
was not a proper choice when there were many capable male politicians.
Secondly, joining the government under the Megawati presidency was
not preferable from a policy point of view, because she and her party
were perceived as the reincarnation of the secular-nationalist pni from
the previous era, and thus the arch-rivals of Islamic politics. Thirdly,
another anti-Megawati sentiment was that many Muslims perceived
the pdi-p to be the vehicle for Christian politicians, notably Maj. Gen.
(ret.) Theo Syafeʾi, one of Megawati’s closest aides, who was believed
to have strong anti-Islam feeling. Fourthly, pks leaders felt that they
needed to improve their party organisation as it had failed to pass the
electoral threshold and was unable to participate in the next election
as a result.⁸⁸
The party’s perception and attitude towards political cooperation
changed drastically when the party was renamed the pks. The first
moment this became clearwas on the eve of the 2004 presidential election.
In line with the change of party leadership, its perceptions and attitudes
towards political coalition were also moving from idealistic, policy
oriented to pragmatic, power oriented. Again, this change exacerbated
 pk Bayanat, 29 October 1999.
 Permata, ‘Islamist Party and Democratic Participation’, 245.
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tensions between normative jt activists and increasingly pragmatic pks
politicians. Consistently with their attitude in the past, pks leaders under
Hidayat Nur Wahid supported the nomination of Amien Rais. A few
weeks ahead of election day, however, a new option was pushed by Hilmy
Aminuddin to back General Wiranto. Hilmy argued that the top priority
of the pks’s strategic political agenda was to stop Megawati, who had
been made favourite by some observers as she paired with nu chairman
Hasyim Muzadi. Amien Rais was preferred ideologically, yet his chances
of winning were slim. Wiranto, meanwhile, had a greater chance as
he was supported by the winner of the last election, the Golkar party.
Undaunted by Hilmy’s move, Hidayat urged a vote in the Shura Assembly
and won the support of the majority of the members of the party’s highest
decision-making body.
This incident marked the tension and split among the pks leadership
between reformists (those who put the pks agenda in line with the agenda
of democratic reforms) and pragmatists (those who take politics purely
as instrument to achieve power and interests). Hilmy Aminuddin, the
supreme leader of the jt, and the then chairman of the pks’s Shura
Assembly, lost face in front of that council and Wiranto for failing to
bring the party to support him. He blamed Hidayat Nur Wahid for this.
It is said that after that moment he vowed that after 2009, Hidayat, who
in 2004 was elected speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly (mpr),
would be an ordinary legislative member.⁸⁹ The tension continued until
a new mpr was installed in 2009, during which period the pragmatic
camp, represented by the party’s general secretary, Anis Matta, was in
constant conflict with the reformist faction under the party president,
Tifatul Sembiring.
Later developments show how the pragmatic camp had the upper
hand. Two simultaneous factors were at play here. On the one hand there
was the powerful position of Hilmy Aminuddin, who combined the
spiritual authority of the jt and the organisational authority of the pks.
On a personal level, he is very charismatic – a combination of spiritual
piety, Sundanese aristocracy and an authoritarian attitude similar to that
of a military commander. As the founder of the jt he has a lot of pupils
under his mentorship, and he gave many of them important positions in
party structures, and together they orchestrate the pks’s management.⁹⁰
On the other hand, the pks’s pragmatic trend is also framed by real world
 Arief Munandar, ‘Antara Jamaah dan Partai Politik’, 262.
 Arief Munandar, ‘Antara Jamaah dan Partai Politik’, 29, 334; Jakarta Post, 29
March 2011.
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politics and an increasingly capital-intensive political competition.⁹¹
This – in addition to the rampant corruption in regional administrations –
forces political parties to collect huge amounts of money for regional
elections as well as other political activities. In this situation, just like
other parties, the pks relied heavily on its practically minded politicians.
During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, the pks showed
another peculiar pattern of coalition behaviour, in which it took coalition
agreements hostage for political leverage. In Yudhoyono’s first term
(2005–2009) as a coalition partner, the pks was involved in political
bargaining with the president regarding the plan to raise oil prices. At
first, pks leaders rejected the plan as it was unpopular and could lead to a
heavier economic burden on Indonesians already struggling tomake ends
meet. The pks clearly understood that supporting this government policy
would incite negative reactions from its supporters. The party president,
Tifatul Sembiring, repeatedly insisted that his party rejected the plan.
One week later, however, the party leader met with the president, and the
pks turned its political stand on the issue through 180 degrees. ‘We have
to come to terms with political realities’, said Tifatul Sembiring, referring
to the fact that the majority of the parties in Parliament supported the
plan, and that abstaining from supporting the government policy at such
a decisive moment would risk its cabinet portfolios.⁹²
The decision triggeredwaves of reactions from pks supporters. kammi,
the pks student organisation, sent its representative to the pks faction
in the Parliament to deliver their protests, and questioned the party’s
commitment to the struggle for the poor. kammi’s branches in some
provinces also voiced similar complaints.⁹³ Some pks regional branches
also voiced their disappointment with the party’s decision to support the
unpopular policy. A few of them even urged their leaders to withdraw
from the coalition government, since the support had resulted in a
deterioration in the pks’s popularity. The damaging impact of the oil
price policy caused great concerns among pks leaders, with some surveys
reporting that only 2.6 per cent of Indonesian voters intended to give
their vote to the pks in the next election – a two thirds decline from the
7.3 per cent it had garnered in elections a year before.⁹⁴
 Commenting on this topic,Minister of the Interior Gamawan Fauzi acknowledged
that the costs of a district/mayoral candidacy can be as high as 50 billion rupiah
(us$50 million). www.inilah.com/read/detail/490041/begitu-mahalnya-menjadi
-bupati/.
 Tempo, 28 March–3 April 2005.
 Tempo, 21–27 March 2005.
 Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 22 May 2007.
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In Yudhoyono’s second term, the pks played the game of political
hostage several times. The first case was in relation to the pks’s participa-
tion in initiating a special parliamentary committee in December 2009
to inquire into alleged illegal bailouts by the Indonesian Central Bank
under Budiono (then newly elected vice president) and former Finance
Minister Sri Mulyani, to save the failing Century Bank.This was a serious
case as it could lead to an inquiry about Yudhoyono’s campaign funds in
the run up to the presidential election. President Yudhoyono saw the
pks’s move as deviant. He believed that as it was a coalition partner and
had received cabinet portfolios in his administration, it was supposed
to back his position. Indeed, the President struck back. Muhammad
Misbakhun, a pks politician who was among the initiators of the Century
Bank inquiry in Parliament, was reported to the police for submitting
fictitious credits to the failed Century Bank. Misbakhun was found guilty
and was sentenced to two years in jail and expelled by his party from
Parliament.⁹⁵
In the summer of 2011, the pks joined the opposition parties and
proposed to increase oil prices in order to reduce the budget deficit, whilst
the government now desperately rejected any plan to increase oil prices,
fearing the public’s negative reaction. The President’s Democratic Party
harshly criticised the pks’s moves as unethical, and urged the pks to leave
the coalition if it did not want to support the government. pks Members
of Parliament replied that they were just doing what parliamentarians
should do, namely, channelling public political aspirations. In October
2011, Yudhoyono sacked the pks Minister of Research and Technology,
Suharna Suryapranata, and gave the post to his own party.⁹⁶
The decision of the pks to remain in the coalition but at the same time
constantly criticise the government was caused by the internal dynamics
and tension between the reformists who wanted to build a positive public
image of the party and the pragmatists who did not want the party to
lose its cabinet portfolios. The situation caused a particular dilemma for
pks ministers in the cabinet, such as the Minister of Communication
and Information, Tifatul Sembiring, who was accused of becoming the
mouthpiece of the government, while his own party criticised government
policies.⁹⁷
 www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/06/10/078339847/PKS-Siapkan-Pengganti
-Misbakhun-Arifinto-dan-Yoyoh.
 http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/10/18/18581479/Menristek.Suharna
.Surapranata.Sudah.Berpamita.
 Interview with Sapto Waluyo, Jakarta. Kompas, 15 April 2009. Koran Tempo, 8
March 2011.
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The next event, and perhaps the most controversial incident during
the political coalition, took place in local politics. Law No. 32/2004
provides that only a party or a coalition of political parties with 15
per cent of the seats in the local legislature can nominate candidates
in local elections. Because the pks is only a minority party in many
regions, it needed to enter into a coalition in order to be able to nominate
candidates. Until 2008, the pks had won in 92 regional elections, either
on its own or as a partner in a coalition. Eight times had this happened
at the provincial level, 84 times at the district level. There are two
important points to be made in this regard: firstly, the pks had won
only five times without a coalition (or 5.4 per cent). The other 87 wins
were in coalition with other parties and in only 12 of these cases (or
13.9 per cent) were the elected leaders pks members. As such, in these
regional elections the pkswas either a rather unimportant junior coalition
partner or it recruited candidates from outside the party. Secondly, and
perhaps more interestingly, out of 161 political coalitions it had joined
during 244 regional elections held in 2005–2008, 60 per cent were in
conjunction with Islam-based parties and 40 per cent with secular and
Christian parties: 33 were with the pan (Muslim-based party), 29 with
the Golkar (secular party), 24 with the ppp (Islam-based party), 22 with
the Democrats (secular), 20 with the pkb (Muslim-based party), 17 with
the pbb (Islam-based party), 14 with the pdi-p (secular party), and one
with the pds (Christian party).
4.3 Policy Formulation and Implementation
There are two different perspectives in understanding policymaking
processes: firstly, the normative perspective called ‘policy accountability’,
in which a political party formulates and implements policies that are
in line with its ideology or programmatic platform, even though it
may contradict people’s aspirations and thus could risk voters’ support
for the party in the next election. Secondly, the rational perspective
called ‘policy effectiveness’, in which a party pursues policies that
respond to public aspirations in order to secure voter support in
the next election, even though it may run counter to its ideology or
programmatic platforms. In terms of behaviour, the pks consistently
promotes populist policies that appeal to public sentiments; yet in terms
of understanding it has perceived the policies differently in different
periods. Previously, it opted for populist policies because it regarded
policies as derivative of ideology and programmatic platforms. Later on,
in parallel with its increasingly pragmatic and rational understanding
of politics, it pursued a similar course of populist policies. However,
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this time the pks no longer understands it as a logical consequence of
its ideological formulations, but rather as a strategy to attract public
sympathy.
An example of the populist orientation of pks policies is its selection
of cabinet portfolios, in which it prefers ministerial posts that have direct
access to the public, such as Social Affairs, Housing, Agriculture and
Youth and Sports. It is through such populist ministries that the party
can promote itself to the vast networks in society, especially among the
economically lower classes that comprise the majority of Indonesian
voters. As seen from previous discussions, pks leaders preferredministers
with direct access to the public as it is interested in promoting its ideology
and programmatic agenda. Yet, in later years, it has not only promoted its
ideological agenda, but also its political profile.There are other interesting
facts about pks public offices. It seeks to extract as many resources as
possible from every office it holds. It mobilises party functionaries as
assistants and aides for its ministers, even replacing housekeepers of
prayer rooms in the offices with party members. The pks also maximises
the collaboration of networks of its public officers, for example West
Java governor Ahmad Heryawan, a senior jt activist and reputed rally
organiser, received many awards – normally followed by grants and other
subsidies – from pks ministers.⁹⁸
The pks also exhibits inconsistent patterns in policymaking, as can be
seen in the case of the oil prices. During Yudhoyono’s first presidential
term, the pks initially rejected the government’s plan to increase the oil
price on the ground that it would worsen economic conditions in society.
Then, it supported it on the ground that it should conform as a coalition
partner. During the second term of Yudhoyono’s presidency, the pks
again played with the oil price issue, this time by supporting a proposal
from opposition parties to increase the oil price when the government
opted for the opposite. In this case, it seems that the pks was playing two
different games at the same time: firstly, it tested the waters in relation to
both the governing party as well as the opposition; and secondly, it played
at internal power bargaining between its central board and its ministers
in public office, as there had been continuous tension between general
secretary, Anis Matta, and former party president, Tifatul Sembiring,
who was the Minister of Information and Technology. The idea was that
the central board was capable of causing or preventing trouble for the
party’s ministers and, thus, the latter needed to comply with the former.⁹⁹
 www.ahmadheryawan.com/8-profil-ahmad-heryawan/3333-daftar-penghargaan.
 http://www.tempo.co/read/fokus/2012/03/24/2316/Kenaikan-Harga-BBM
-PKS-Dituding-Berpolitik-Dua-Muka.
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The pks also displayed a double-standard populist policy when
it supported the Anti-Pornography Law that censored pornographic
displays and lustful entertainment, but did not apply the same standard
to its own politician who was caught watching a porn video. The law was
controversial, as many groups accused it of being arbitrary, ambiguous,
imposing uniform esthetical standards and discriminating against
women. It was ratified as Law No. 44/2008 on 28 October 2008. The pks
was one of the staunchest supporters of the Act, and a pks politician
served as the vice-chairwoman of the bill’s committee. Unfortunately,
a pks Member of Parliament was caught watching a porn video during
a parliamentary session. Since then, the pks has been in a defensive
position, as the media blew up the scandal and pressed the pks to impose
the Anti-Pornography Law on its own politician. Nevertheless, the pks
still pushed the policy forward by proposing and supporting the creation
of a Taskforce for the Prevention and Tackling of Pornography¹⁰⁰ as a
special body that supervises the implementation of the Anti-Pornography
Law. The Taskforce is coordinated by the Minister for Social Affairs
and involves various ministries such as those of Religious Affairs,
Education, Law and Women’s Empowerment, and the police and also
non-governmental institutions such as academics and ngo activists.¹⁰¹
Lastly, the pks is also involved in implementing Sharia-inspired local
regulations. These are local regulations implemented by provincial and
district governments based on religious values, such as the prohibition
of liquor and gambling, forcing people (especially women) to wear
Islamic clothing, stopping public activities during Friday religious
meetings, requiring Qurʾanic literacy, etc. Out of 151 local governments
implementing such regulations, 42 are supported by the pks. In this case,
it seems that the pks’s perspective on policymaking is more rational and
normative, as it is eager to support government leaders with any policy
vision, not just those who implement Sharia-inspired regulations.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the internal dynamics of the Indonesian
Prosperous Justice Party (pks) and its organisational root and supporter,
the Jamaah Tarbiyah (jt), in the context of democratising Indonesian
politics.The emergence of the pks on to the Indonesian political scene has
 Presidential Decree No. 25/2012, ratified on 3 March 2012.
 http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/03/13/15352741/Satgas.Antipornografi
.Sudah.Bekerja.sejak.3.Maret.
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attracted vast scholarly and popular attention, debates and controversies –
both in terms of its ideological profile as an offshoot of the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers, and with its amazing political achievements; moving
from a small party that failed to pass the electoral threshold into the
largest Islam-based party in the Parliament and part of the government.
Its ideological orientation drew suspicions of pursuing a radical Islamist
agenda in order to replace democracy with an Islamic political system,
while its rocketing success raised questions about the prospect of
Indonesian democratisation that enabled an apparently radical party to
become prominent.
This chapter started with tracking the historical development of the
jt and pks. It is true that the jt was founded following the ideological
formula and organisational structure of the Egyptian Muslim Broth-
erhood model by a group of young graduates of institutions of higher
education in the Middle East in the early 1980s. However, further inquiry
reveals that the organisation has developed through already existing
networks of activists and leadership, nurtured by Islam-based politicians
and activists from a previous era, especially young academics in secular
universities. The jt evolved into a movement characterised by a mixed
political agenda. On the one hand it has adopted the political aims and
strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood and wants to create a comprehen-
sive Islamic way of life through a gradual process of dakwah, political
democratisation against the background of an authoritarian regime and
a politically involved military. On the other hand it is caught up in the
realities of Indonesian politics and of the intra-Muslim competitions
with other Islam-based political and social organisations.
Such a developmental trajectory and institutional setting created
certain internal dynamics inside the jt and pks. Amid progressive
democratic consolidation – especially the consolidation of the party
system that made political parties work more professionally – the pks
witnessed an increasingly pragmatic tendency, in both its organisational
structures and political behaviour. Organisationally, it experienced a
process of oligarchy, in which, initially, the highest authority was in the
hands of its members, exercised through the national congress. Later,
it was handed over to its elites in the Deliberation Assembly – on the
grounds of organisational effectiveness. Behaviourally, it experienced a
change in perception and behaviour regarding politics, from perceiving
politics as part of Islamic propagation (dakwah) to being conducted
following Islamic principles and as an instrument of propagation that
needed to be pursued in its own way. These changes led to polarisation,
divisions and factionalism both between and inside the jt and the
pks.
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In turn, these internal tensions, divisions and frictions influenced
a number of aspects of the party’s democratic participation: political
mobilisation, coalition and government formation, and policy formu-
lation. Initially, the party perceived political mobilisation merely as a
contest of profiles and reputations by political actors in front of the
public; then it started to perceive political mobilisation as a political
competition that requires special preparation and strategies. Finally, its
politicians started to realise that during political mobilisation political
parties not only compete against, but also cooperate and collude with
each other. In terms of coalition and government formation, initially
the party perceived it exclusively from an ideological perspective and
thus it was willing to cooperate with Islam-based political parties only
and rejected cooperating with secular ones. Yet, later on, it adopted a
more rational perspective in which coalitions are seen as strategies to
maximise political gains, and it became willing to cooperate with any
party with any ideology – including Christian parties. Finally, the pks
started to see government coalitions as political cards that can be played
against other parties in order to maximise interests or even in intra-party
power struggles. Lastly, with respect to policy formulation, the pks con-
sistently pursues populist policies; yet it perceives these differently at
different times. Initially, it understood policymaking normatively as a
derivative of ideological orientations. Later, while pursuing the same
populist pattern, the party started to perceive populism rationally and
as instrumental to attracting public sympathy in order to increase votes
in the next elections. As a result, it exhibits inconsistent behaviour in
policymaking: on the one hand, it is always keen to join government
coalitions; on the other hand, it is also willing to criticise unpopular
government policies.
The participation of the jt and pks in Indonesian democratising
politics is also interesting in light of current theoretical debates on the
prospects of Islam-based politics. Two theories are relevant: Oliver Roy’s
thesis on the failure of political Islam, and Asef Bayat’s ideas on a political
post-Islamism. Much as in Roy’s observation, the pks is also trapped in
its own utopian vicious circle of a comprehensive Islamisation of society
and state: i.e. that a true Islamic society can be built only under an Islamic
state, and that the formation of a true Islamic state requires an Islamic
society – in the form of tensions between its political section (pks) and its
social section (jt). Realising the situation, jt-pks leaders are now starting
to discuss how to overcome these tensions: some suggest a unification in
which one of its sections needs to be subordinate to the other; others opt
for a complete separation between political and social sections, and thus
pursue the comprehensive agenda of Islamisation in separate ways.
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However, the development of the jt and pks also resembles Bayat’s
notion of post-Islamism, in which political Islam, exhausted by its own
mission of building a comprehensive Islamic way of life both in society
and in the state, has started to adopt programmes it once criticised, such
as democracy, human rights, gender equality, religious pluralism, etc.
This seems to apply to the jt-pks, which no longer perceives itself as
offering an alternative ideology and programmes to replace the existing
ones, both in the Muslim community and for the religiously plural
Indonesian people. Rather, it has started to acknowledge its ideology and
programmes as being supplementary to making the Muslim community,
Indonesian society and the Indonesian nation-state better.
Appendix
Table 1 pks Involvement in local governments
implementing Sharia regulations
No Region Head of Government
 Kab. Bangka Barat pks
 Kab. Bengkulu Utara pks
 Prov. Bengkulu pks
 Kab. Sukabumi pks
 Kota Depok pks
 Kab. Bekasi pks
 Kota Banjarmasin pks
 Kab. Kepulauan pks
 Kab. Kampar pks
 Kab. Solok Selatan pks
 Prov. Bangka Belitung Other Party
 Kab. Pandeglang Other Party
 Kab. Serang Other Party
 Kab. Muko-Muko Other Party
 Kab. Gorontalo Other Party
 Prov. Gorontalo Other Party
 Kab. Cianjur Other Party
 Kab. Indramayu Other Party
 Kota Tasikmalaya Other Party
 Kota Semarang Other Party
 Kab. Cilacap Other Party
 Kab. Gresik Other Party
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No Region Head of Government
 Kab. Sidoarjo Other Party
 Kab. Ketapang Other Party
 Kab. Balangan Other Party
 Kab. Hulu Sungai Utara Other Party
 Kota Banjarbaru Other Party
 Kota Baru Other Party
 Prov. Kep. Riau Other Party
 Kota Batam pks
 Kota Kupang Other Party
 Kab. Pelalawan Other Party
 Kota Dumai Other Party
 Kab. Pangkep Other Party
 Kab. Luwu Utara Other Party
 Kab. Selayar Other Party
 Kota Kendari pks
 Kab. Pasaman Other Party
 Kab. Padang Pariaman Other Party
 Kab. Hulu Sungai Selatan pks
 Kab. Tanah Laut Other Party
 Kab. Pangkep Other Party
2 The Mosque as a Religious Sphere
Looking at the Conflict over the Al Muttaqun Mosque
Syaifudin Zuhri1
1 Introduction
For Muslims, the mosque is a central institution. Not only does the
mosque serve as a religious institution where sermons, prayer and
devotional acts are performed in order to create a ‘moral community’,²
but also as a ‘religious sphere’.³ Theoretically, the notion of ‘mosque as
religious sphere’ is derived from the idea of public sphere in the Western
context, something that is considered as lacking theoretical significance
in the Muslim world.The narrow definition of the so-called public sphere
in the Western context implies the receding role of religion, limiting the
significance of religion to the household and private sphere. Introducing
the concept of a religious sphere makes it possible to do justice to the
considerable role of religion in public space.⁴ Within the just mentioned
 An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Research
Conference on Muhammadiyah (ircm) in December 2012. I would like to thank
two discussants, Azyumardi Azra and Rizal Sukma, for their invaluable comments
on the draft. The greatest thanks go to Kees van Dijk for invaluable suggestions
and comments.
 Barbara D.Metcalf, ‘Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia: History, Community,
Morality’, in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich, Islam in an Era of Nation
States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Hawai’i: Hawai’i
University Press, 1997), 309–320.
 Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, ‘Public Islam as an Antidote to
Violence?’, in Esther E. Gottlieb (ed.), Identity Conflicts: CanViolence be Regulated?
(New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 80–81.
 Armando Salvatore andDale F. Eickelman, ‘Preface Public Islam and theCommon
Good’, in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds.), Islam and the
Common Good (Leiden: Brill, 2006), xi–xxv; José Casanova, Public Religions in
the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Craig Calhoun
(ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Studies in Contemporary German Social
Thought) (Cambridge: mit Press, 1993); Reinhard Schulze, AModern History
of the Islamic World (London: ib Tauris, 2000); Dale F. Eickelman and James
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perspective, the centrality of the mosque lies in its multiple-functionality,
which represents a way for Islam to leave the private sphere and officially
enter the public sphere linking the dynamics of Muslim life and its
many facets, from the religious, social and cultural to the political.⁵ In
politics, for example, the mosque functions as a vehicle for supporting
certain political views or otherwise as a social site for the mobilisation of
collective action, in addition to being an arena for controlling religious
discourse prevalent in society.⁶
However, the strategic position of the mosque in many cases leads
to conflicts between Muslim agencies, groups and views, even the
government’s, over who has power in relation to the mosque. This
has happened in Europe, and also elsewhere, where Muslims are
struggling to maintain their Islamic identity in the face of rapid change
brought about by modernity and the Western political circumstances of
non-Muslim surroundings. Mosques in European countries have been
one of the most heatedly debated issues – and, in many cases, the cause
of conflicts – between Muslims and their non-Muslim environments,
betweenMuslims and governments, not to mention between the multiple
Islamic interpretations and views of Muslims themselves.⁷ In Malaysia,
Partai Islam se-Malaysia (pas, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) and the
United Malays National Organisation (umno) have challenged each
other’s control over the mosque.The issue of debate between these parties
is the extent to which mosques are open to political campaigning.⁸
In Indonesia, as in other Muslim countries, there has traditionally
been a distinction between ‘official’ and ‘private’ mosques. Whereas
Piscatori,Muslim Politics, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),
xvii; Quintan Wiktorowicz,TheManagement of Islamic Activism (New York:
State University of New York Press, 2001), 53.
 Stefano Allievi, ‘Mosques in Europe: Real Problems and False Solutions’, in
Stefano Allievi (ed.),Mosques in Europe: Why a Solution has become a Problem
(London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2010), 24.
 Akbar S. Ahmed, ‘Mosque: the Mosque in Politics’, in John Esposito (ed.),The
Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 140–143; Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘State Power and the
Regulation of Islam in Jordan’, Journal of Church and State (1999) 41 (4), 677–696.
 StefanoAllievi,Conflicts overMosques in Europe: Policy Issues andTrends (London:
nef Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe, 2009).
 ‘pas claims kl mosque misused by umno’, www.themalaysianinsider.com/litee/
malaysia/article/pas-claims-kl-mosque-misused-by-umno/ (accessed 7 Decem-
ber 2012); ‘Adib Zalkapli, pas, umno tussle over Selangor mosques’, www
.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/pas-umno-tussle-over-selangor
-mosques (accessed 7 December 2012).
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the former type are founded by the state, which controls all related
activities and disseminates a ‘depoliticised’ version of Islam designed to
remain passive in the face of state power, the private ones, in contrast,
are built with private donations, often from wealthy individuals and
provide a ‘free’ space for an Islamic discourse that is not controlled by
the state.⁹ Unfortunately, no accurate data are available on the number
of mosques in Indonesia. One estimate from 2010, not differentiating
between official and private ones, mentions 800,000.¹⁰ This number
probably does not include smaller places of worship, such as the surau,
langgar and musholla.¹¹ Each kabupaten usually has only one official
mosque, often called the Masjid Jami (grand mosque), whereas others
are private. These private mosques are usually attached to Islamic
organisations, primarily Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (nu).
For these two organisations mosques are pivotal in disseminating their
Islamic discourse to their audiences, despite the half-hearted political
interests of both organisations in Indonesian politics. In addition to
official and private mosques, there are also the semi-official mosques
funded primarily by the New Order government through the Yayasan
Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (yamp).The yamp is a semi-governmental
organisation initiated by the New Order government in 1982. By 2009 it
had built 999 mosques throughout the archipelago. Unlike the mosques
attached to Muhammadiyah and the nu, these semi-official mosques are
erected on the initiative of the state and display particular symbols that
refer to the interests of the state; for example, the ornament on the top of
the mosque that reproduces the word of Allah in Arabic script within
a pentagonal frame, resembling the pentagonal symbol of Pancasila.¹²
Consequently, these yamp mosques are often called ‘Masjid Pancasila’,
Pancasila mosques.
 Jean-Claude Vatin, ‘Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism’, in Richard
T. Antoun,Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in
Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 212–218;
Patrick D. Gaffney, ‘The Changing Voice of Islam: the Emergence of Professional
Preachers in Contemporary Egypt’,TheMuslim World 81 (January, 1991), 27–47.
 ‘Dialog Jumʾat’, Republika, 29 January 2010.
 Surau, langgar and musholla are small buildings or halls serving as a place for
prayer, mainly the five daily prayers, but not the Friday prayer which is mostly
performed in a mosque.
 Hugh O’Neil, ‘Islamic Architecture under the New Order’, in Virginia M. Hooker
(ed.), Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 160. Another important article relating to the discussion
of mosque architecture in the light of Indonesian history is by Kees van Dijk who
discusses varieties, characteristics and changes in mosque structural design from
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Besides the above mosque distinction, it is worth mentioning four
ways in which the public attaches a particular identity to a mosque
and links it with certain Indonesian Muslim organisations. Firstly, the
identification is based on a public announcement by an individual or a
group who transferred his or her authority over the land and the building
of the mosque to a certain organisation through a waqf (endowment).
Secondly, the identification is built upon attributes which characterise
a certain organisation, such as the dominant symbol of the mosque,
the colour of the building, the calendar hanging on the wall, and other
such features. These attributes mainly represent certain organisations
or groups, such as the pentagonal symbol of the Pancasila mosque and
the crescent-star which is mainly seen as a symbol of Muhammadiyah.
The dominant colour of the mosque building may also play a key role in
the identification. Brown is mainly associated with the Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera/pks (Prosperous Justice Party), whereas green is attributed to
Nahdlatul Ulama and white to Muhammadiyah. Therefore, the colour
is not merely of aesthetic consideration, but also an organisational
statement as well, as is the calendar on the wall of the mosque. Thirdly,
the rituals performed in the mosque may also signify the identity of the
mosque. Fourthly, the organisational affiliation of the takmir ([senior]
mosque managers) is yet another essential element of identification.
Most mosques in Indonesia are mainly identified through the last two
patterns, as is the case with the Al Muttaqun mosque discussed here.
As a general topic, this contribution emphasises the political dimen-
sion of themosque. In so doing, it concentrates on the conflict between an
Indonesian Islamist party, the pks, and the second largest Muslim orga-
nisation in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, over the Al Muttaqun mosque
in Prambanan, Klaten, Central Java. It starts with a discussion about
the centrality of the mosque in the light of pks politics and the party’s
political performance in Klaten. The last two sections will specifically
deal with the conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah over the Al
Muttaqun mosque.
2 The pks’s View of the Centrality of the Mosque
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (pks) was founded on 20 July 1998 as the Partai
Keadilan.The party was officially launched on 9 August 1998 by a number
pre-independence Indonesia to the New Order: see Kees van Dijk, ‘the Changing
Contour of Mosques’, in Peter J.M. Nas,The Past in the Present Architecture in
Indonesia (Leiden: kitlv Press, 2007), 45–60.
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of tarbiyah¹³ activists at the Al-Azhar mosque in Jakarta. As a movement,
tarbiyah introduced a creed that combined the Islamism of Egypt’s
Ikwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) with the idea of individual
faith and reform, and one of the specific characters of tarbiyah is their
overt political orientation.¹⁴ This is clearly demonstrated through its
statute in which pks claims to be amanifestation of the umma through the
slogan al-hizbu huwa al-jamaʾah wa al-jamaʾatu hiya al-hizb (the party is
the Muslim community and the Muslim community is the party).¹⁵ It
also stresses that it is a dakwah (Arabic: calling or invite) party which is
translated as ‘a party that strives to implement Islam as the solution for
the life of the nation and the country, to realise the Islamic system and
values as blessings for the universe.’¹⁶ Nevertheless, the pks’s ideology
and political platform to cultivate dakwah have generated suspicion that
the party harbours a hidden agenda to establish an Islamic state.¹⁷ The
pks is also depicted as being a fundamentalist party, a representation of
Indonesian-Wahhabism, and of having aims to establish a worldwide
khilafah.¹⁸
 As a movement, tarbiyah (Arabic: education) refers to Islamic activism, which
flourished during the 1980s at major Indonesian universities as a response
to the repressive policy of the New Order government through Normalisasi
Kehidupan Kampus dan Badan Koordinasi Kampus/nkk-bkk (Normalisation of
Campus Life/Body for the Coordination of Student Affairs), which prevented
students from being active in politics or from criticising the government.Through
mosques located on many campuses, the movement found fertile grounds for the
recruitment and cultivation of members through small religious study groups
(halqa and liqo): Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20
Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 67–68.
 Ahmad-Norma Permata, ‘Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosper-
ous Justice Party (pks) in Indonesia 1998–2006’, Unpublished PhD thesis. Münster
University, 2008, 16.
 Syamsul Balda, Abu Ridha, and Untung Wahono, Politik Daʾwah Partai Keadilan
(Jakarta: dpp Partai Keadilan, 2000), 57.
 pks, Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga pks, article 2 and 5–6 (2006);
Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and Pragmatism
(Singapore: iseas, 2010), 123–124.
 Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Electoral Politics and Daʾwa Mobilization among Youth:
The Prosperous and Justice Party (pks) in Indonesia’,The rsis Working paper
series No. 184, 2009, 14; Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Political Islam in Indonesia’, in Ishtiaq
Ahmed,The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge,
2011), 150–151.
 Firman Noor, ‘Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism: Understanding the Political
Thinking of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (pks)’, Studia Islamika, Vol. 14, No. 3,
2007, 449–481. Kees van Dijk, ‘Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Radical, Moderate
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From a historical point of view, since its first development, tarbiyah
has depended heavily on the mosque as its power base, particularly
campus-based ones, throughout Indonesia.¹⁹ In the 1980s, one of the
founding fathers of tarbiyah, Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, introduced the
thought, political concepts and organisational traditions underpinning
Ikhwanul Muslimin to the Salman mosque community of the Institut
Tekhnologi Bandung (itb). Due to the networks of Lembaga Dakwah
Kampus/ldk (Campus Dakwah Bodies), tarbiyah could also expand
the Islamic tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood to mosques in other
usually state-owned universities, such as the Shalahuddin mosque in
the Universitas Gadjah Mada (ugm) of Yogyakarta, the Al-Huriyyah
mosque in the Institut Pertanian Bogor (ipb), and the Arief Rahman
Hakim mosque in the Universitas Indonesian (ui) of Jakarta.²⁰ However,
this model of political mobilisation is not a unique trait of tarbiyah as the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Islamist movements have also
used mosques as their headquarters in order to develop their political
activism.
In addition to the historical facts mentioned above, the importance of
the mosque for pks politics is well accentuated through the pks’s call for
a Gerakan Kembali ke Masjid (Back to the Mosque Movement) in 2011,
which the party used to emphasise the centrality of the mosque in terms
of Islamic education and as a way of preventing teenagers frommisbehav-
ing.²¹ However, this programme is neither merely ethical nor religious as
it is also closely linked to the pks’s political mobilisation through the
mosque. In addition, in 2011, Tifatul Sembiring, the former president
of pks and now Minister of Communication and Telecommunication,
announced the so-called ‘Online Masjid Raya’ programme that connects
thousands of Remaja Masjid/Remas (young activists of the mosque).²²
and Practical’, in Kees van Dijk and Machasin, Cleveringa Lecture, 4 December
2004-ui Depok (Jakarta: kitlv-Jakarta, 2005), 10; Ken Michi, ‘Penetration of
Islamism in Contemporary Indonesia: Militant or Moderate?’, in Masatoshi
Kisaichi, Popular Movements and Democratizations in the Islamic World (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 132; Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam:
Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia, Jakarta: the Wahid Institute,
2009.
 Imdadun Rahmat, Ideology Politik pks. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008).
 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 180.
 pks Serukan Gerakan kembali ke Masjid at http://beritapks.com/pks-serukan
-gerakan-kembali-ke-masjid/ (accessed 3 November 2012).
 The term Remaja Masjid implies young and teenage activists of the mosque.
They have been the backbone of mosque-based activities among their age group,
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The programme is administered by a special pks related body, Jaringan
Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia/jprmi (Indonesian Network of
Mosque Youth and Teenagers). jprmi, founded on 11 September 2005, is a
national body of young activists of the mosque and is headed by an active
member of the pks, Valentino Dinsi. Besides focusing on education,
health and charitable activities, it has carried out a number of activities
related to entrepreneurship. In addition, jprmi provides five million
rupiah for takmir and remas to develop their economic activities.²³ The
two programmes without a doubt demonstrate the significant position of
the mosque in the framework of pks politics in Indonesia.
Along with the pks’s political activities through the mosque, the
party has also been renowned for establishing Islamic schools or the
so-called ‘Sekolah Islam Terpadu’ (Integrated Islamic Schools), rather
thanmadrasah. This type of educational institution has flourished due
to mosque-based activism and the schools are mainly established in
areas surrounding mosques. The words ‘Islam Terpadu’ refer to a type
of education that practises Islamic models of curricula and integrates
secular and Islamic subjects. The tarbiyah movement introduced the
name and concept of these Islamic educational institutions in the 1990s,
claiming that such education guaranteed the fulfillment of the spiritual
and intellectual health of children and teenagers. In such educational
institutions, students have to undergo a full day of schooling in which
they learn secular and religious topics under the strict supervision
of their teachers, resembling the model of the cadre education of
the Islamic Brotherhood, which emphasises the dominant role of the
murabbi (Arabic: instructor) in supervising the religious life of the
students.²⁴
Another dakwah activity by the pks worthy of mention is the pks’s
affiliated relief organisation, Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat/pkpu (Centre
for Justice and the Care of Society). This has been one of the most
important relief organisations operating specifically in disaster-affected
particularly providing religious lessons for teenagers and children. The pks’s
attention for these young activists is not surprising when we look at the fact
that the pks relies on the political support of the younger generation and the
party’s strategic agenda to educate and indoctrinate young activists for the sake
of winning future elections.
 ‘jprmi Kembangkan Kewirausahaan’, Republika, 12 August 2011, ‘Juni Supriyanto,
Tak Sebatas Pelatihan’, http://koran.republika.co.id/koran/52/142898/Juni
_Supriyanto_Tak_Sebatas_Pelatihan (accessed 3 May 2012).
 Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Education, Young Islamists and Integrated Islamic Schools in
Indonesia’, Studia Islamika, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, 79–111.
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areas, both nationally and internationally.²⁵ One of the most distinctive
characteristics of the pkpu is that it pays attention not only to tangible
problems brought about by natural disasters, but also to religious ones.
In so doing, the pkpu has aimed at the building of mosques in many
areas, including places where no natural disaster has occurred.
In short, the above discussion reveals that one of the remarkable
characteristics of the pks is its model of political mobilisation, which
combines religious and political struggles. Stressing that it is a dakwah
party makes for an institution that is a political party as well as an Islamic
socio-religious organisation. Its roots and past activities as well as its
political performance emphasise the centrality of the mosque for the pks.
The following discussion is on pks politics in the local context, i.e. Klaten,
Central Java. How the dakwah slogan is translated into local politics is
an important part of the discussion, in addition to the consequences of
pks dakwah politics.
3 The pks in Klaten
Klaten is home to the abangan²⁶ community. It also is a ‘red area’ as
it had been a base for Sukarno’s Indonesian nationalist party (pni,
Partai Nasional Indonesia), rather than Islam.²⁷ The results of two
general elections during the reformation era, in 2004 and 2009, place the
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan/pdi-p (Indonesian Democratic
Party-Struggle) of Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati, in pole position. The
pdi-p gained 18 seats in the 2004 election for members of the Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/dprd (Regional House of Representatives) of
Klaten. This number decreased to 15 seats in the 2009 election, whereas
the pks garnered five seats in the 2004 and 2009 elections.²⁸ Even though
pks’s political achievement at these two elections remained the same, the
 Hilman Latief, ‘Islamic Charities and Social Activism: Welfare, Dakwah and
Politics in Indonesia’,Unpublished PhD thesis, Utrecht University, the Netherlands,
2012.
 Abangan refers to the Javanese community who practise Islamic values while
continuing to hold animistic values central to their own well-being. It is also
used to describe non-practising Muslims. The term was popularised by Clifford
Geertz in 1964 through hisThe Religion of Java.
 Sutiyono, Benturan Budaya Islam: Puritan dan Sinkretis (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010),
32.
 One seat in the Regional House of Representatives was due to the pks in
Prambanan. M. Agung Suryantoro serves as the current representative of the pks
from Prambanan at the dprd of Klaten.
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party has been quite successful in establishing affiliated organisations.
These organisations are without a doubt important vehicles for the pks’s
political mobilisation in Klaten.
As far as the pks in Klaten is concerned, the party is in control of
four affiliated organisations: Hidayah, Yayasan Adil Sejahtera (yasr),
Pesantren Ibn Abbas and AlMuttaqun. Hidayah, founded in 1997, focuses
on Islamic education and charity activities. It runs the Taman Kanak-
kanak Islam Terpadu/tkit Mutiara Hati kindergarten, the Sekolah Dasar
Islam Terpadu/sdit Hidayah elementary school, the Sekolah Menengah
Pertama Islam Terpadu/smpit Hidayah junior high school, and a special
body for charitable activism, Dompet Sosial Hidayah (dsh). Though it is
hard to find clear evidence of a connection between these institutions and
the pks, Muhammadiyah activists in Klaten have mentioned a number of
cases that justify that assumption. Darwanto, the head of development of
the branches of the Muhammadiyah board (Pimpinan Daerah Muham-
madiyah/pdm) in Klaten, revealed that the Muhammadiyah in Klaten
receivedmany complaints fromMuhammadiyahmembers who sent their
children to Hidayah educational institutions. They complained that their
children were repeatedly instructed by their teachers to hand out leaflets
promoting pks programmes and views to their parents. In addition,
Darwanto claimed that recipients of zakat (mandatory alms) and sedekah
(Ar. sadaqa, voluntarily alms) were indoctrinated by the pks when they
attended meetings where the dsh distributed zakat and sedekah.²⁹
Like Hidayah, yasr was established in 1999. It professes to be an
Islamic organisation whose activities are related to Islamic education and
dakwah.The organisation is led by SuciningsihWisnu who currently runs
Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu/sdit Cendekia and Pesantren Takwinul
Ummat. However, unlike Hidayah, the relationship between yasr and the
pks can be seen from the structure of the organisation in which Hidayat
Nur Wahid serves as the head of its consultative body. In addition, in
the 2005 Klaten local elections, Suciningsih was a pks candidate for
the position of district head. Pesantren Ibn Abbas, founded on 23 July
2003 by Hidayat Nur Wahid, is an Islamic boarding school the main
curriculum of which is devoted to memorising the Qurʾan. In addition,
it also runs the Sekolah Menengah Pertama Islam Terpadu/smpit Ibnu
Abbas, Sekolah Menengah Umum Islam Terpadu/smuit Ibnu Abbas,
andMaʾhad Ali.³⁰ The main goal of the pesantren is to educate teenagers
 Interview with Darwanto, 13 April 2012.
 Maʾhad Ali is the highest level in pesantren education and resembles the university
level in the modern educational system. Those who study there are the more
advanced students of a pesantren (santris).
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and to create agents of dakwah. As is also the case with Hidayah, leaders
of the pesantren belong to the pks elite in Klaten. Among them are
Muʾinuddinillah Basri, the director of the pesantren, and Suciningsih,
the director of yasr and a member of the consultative body of the
pesantren, as is Hidayat Nur Wahid. It is worth noting that, in addition
to being director of the pesantren and an active member of the Shariah
Council of the pks, Muʾinuddinillah Basri also serves as director of
the post-graduate programme for Islamic studies at the Universitas
Muhammadiyah Surakarta (ums).
Hidayat Hur Wahid also established the Yayasan Al Muttaqun (Al
Muttaqun Foundation) on 26 June 2006, precisely one month after the
Yogyakarta earthquake. In its official document, the foundation explains
that it carries out a number of activities related to dakwah, collects and
distributes zakat, infaq and sedekah, and handles the management of the
Al Muttaqun mosque, which the foundation has made its headquarters.³¹
However, it is important to note that the establishment of the foundation
is closely related to the pks’s political activism through the mosque, i.e.
the political efforts of Hidayat Nur Wahid and core members of the
pks in relation to controlling the mosque, replacing Muhammadiyah.
In addition, the establishment is also related to the efforts of the pks
to acquire financial support from Middle Eastern waqf foundations,
which require potential recipients to have official permission from the
government or at least a notary public’s certificate. In view of this, it is
not surprising that the establishment of the Al Muttaqun foundation has
generated conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah. This conflict
will be discussed in detail in the next section.
4 Disputes over the Al Muttaqun Mosque
Disputes over mosques are not unusual in Indonesia as the country’s
mosques have been associatedwith certain Islamic organisations or views.
Prior to Indonesian independence and during the first half of the New
Order period, the conflicts involved reformist (Muhammadiyah) and
traditionalist (Nahdlatul Ulama/nu)Muslims. In the practice of azan (call
to prayer) for example, traditional Muslims read the shalawat (praises to
the Prophet Muhammad) prior to the azan, whereas reformists consider
such practice as bidʿa (unlawful innovation). Another example that
illustrates the controversial issues between the two is the presence of the
bedug (drum), the function ofwhich is tomark religiousmoments,mainly
 Kantor Notaris Mochamad Imron, Akta Pendirian Yayasan, 26 June 2006.
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to alertMuslims to the five daily prayers.Whereas reformists consider this
instrument to be un-Islamic and a kind of bidʿa, traditionalists have kept
firmly to this tradition. However, during the 1980s, such controversial
issues concerning sunnah (recommended ritual) and bidʿa were not given
much public attention as Muhammadiyah and nu had started to work
together.³²
Following the Indonesian reformation of 1998, public disputes over
the mosque re-emerged. A clear indication of the new prominence of
disputes over mosques is the emergence of the ‘sabotage and infiltration
of mosques’ issue.This refers to mosques that were previously attached to
Muhammadiyah or the nu but came to be controlled by organisations or
groupswhose Islamic ideals and principles are considered to be contradic-
tory to those of these two organisations.The perpetrators are usually iden-
tified as transnational and Islamist groups whose Islamic views challenge
the idea of Indonesia as a national state and endanger social harmony in
society. Specifically, the accusation of sabotage is levelled at the pks, which
is perceived as being the most active in resorting to what are considered
to be sabotage and infiltration. Responding to this external threat by
the pks, in 2006 Muhammadiyah issued a circular letter on ‘Konsolidasi
Organisasi dan Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah’ (Consolidating Muham-
madiyah’s organisation and its social services bodies) aimed at protecting
Muhammadiyah’s assets from being taken over and their management
committees and boards from being infiltrated by the pks.³³ In 2007, in
an identical move, the nu issued a fatwa alerting Indonesian Muslims to
the danger presented by the idea of khilafah, the promotion of an Islamic
state, and the call for byelaws implementing Shariah that were propa-
gated by Islamist organisations through their mosque-based activism.³⁴
Though the nu’s fatwa does not mention the pks by name, as the circular
letter of Muhammadiyah does, the nu shares Muhammadiyah’s suspicion
of the pks, where cases of so-called mosque infiltration are concerned.³⁵
 The growing acceptance of each other by Muhammadiyah and nu has been
identified since the 1970s when both started to work hand in hand for the benefit
of the Muslim community, rather than continuing their antagonism: see William
R. Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: “A Political Explanation”’, Journal of
Asian Studies, Vol. 55, No. 3, August, 1996, 623.
 Muhammadiyah, Surat Keputusan Pimpinan PusatMuhammadiyah, No. 149/Kep
/I.0/B/2006 tentang Kebijakan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah mengenai
Konsolidasi Organisasi dan Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah.
 Nahdlatul Ulama, Keputusan Majelis Bahtsul Masaʾil Nahdlatul Ulama tentang
Khilafah dan Formalisasi Shariʾah, 2007.
 ‘pbnu Minta pks Hentikan Perebutan Masjid’, www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic
-s,detail-ids,1-id,34016-lang,id-c,warta-t,PBNU+Minta+PKS+Hentikan
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Judging from the articles published in Suara Muhammadiyah, an
official magazine of the organisation, during 2006–2007, the threat
posed by the pks was seen as a major issue to which a number of
Muhammadiyah national leading figures responded. An article entitled
Sendang Ayu: PergulatanMuhammadiyah di Kaki Bukit Barisan (Sendang
Ayu: Muhammadiyah’s Fight at the Foot of the Barisan Mountains), drew
attention to the fate of the Muhammadiyah local office in Purwodadi,
Central Java, when, in 2006, Abdul Munir Mulkhan called attention
to the problem of ideological infiltration in Muhammadiyah circles.³⁶
Responding to the article, Farid Setiawan’s Ahmad Dahlan Menangis:
Tanggapan terhadap Tulisan Abdul Munir Mulkhan (Ahmad Dahlan
Cries: A Response to Abdul Munir Mulkhan’s Article), and Tiga Upaya
Menyelamatkan Muʾalimin dan Muʾalimat (Three Efforts to Save Senior
High School for Male and Female Students),³⁷ clearly pointed to the
problem of the ‘tarbiyah virus’ that infected not only the organisation, but
also the minds of Muhammadiyah activists.³⁸ Haedar Nashir joined in
the discussion with his article,Manifestasi Gerakan Tarbiyah: Bagaimana
Sikap Muhammadiyah? (Manifestation of the Tarbiyah Movement: How
should Muhammadiyah Respond?), in which he called for reform within
the organisation in order to protect Muhammadiyah from infiltration
by the tarbiyah ideology and prevent the advance of the jamaah³⁹ (i.e.
pks) in the jamaah (i.e. Muhammadiyah).⁴⁰ To the local Muhammadiyah
leaders in Prambanan the issue of sabotage and infiltration by the pks
+Perebutan+Masjid-.phpx (accessed 3 May 2012); AbdurrahmanWahid (ed.),
Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia (Jakarta:
the Wahid Institute, 2009), appendices 1 and 2.
 Abdul Munir Mulkhan, ‘Sendang Ayu: Pergulatan Muhammadiyah di Kaki Bukit
Barisan’, Suara Muhammadiyah, 2 January 2006, 23.
 Muʾalimin dan Muʾalimat are the first two formal educational institutions owned
by Muhammadiyah. Established by the founder of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad
Dahlan, in 1918, these two are based in Yogyakarta.
 Farid Setiawan, ‘Ahmad Dahlan Menangis’ (Tanggapan Terhadap Tulisan
Abdul Munir Mulkhan), Suara Muhammadiyah, 20 February 2006, 34–35;
Farid Setiawan, ‘Tiga Upaya Menyelamatkan Muʾalimin dan Muʾalimat’, Suara
Muhammadiyah, 15 April 2006, 34–35.
 Jamaah literally means ‘group’. The term is commonly used only to indicate
groupings not only in terms of religious, but also of ideological and political
affiliation.
 Haedar Nashir,Manifestasi Gerakan Tarbiyah: Bagaimana SikapMuhammadiyah?
(Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2007); see also Masykur Waritmo, ‘Mem-
bendung Ideologi Lain di Lembaga Pendidikan Muhammadiyah’, Suara Muham-
madiyah, 31 May 2006, 12–13.
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presented just as great a problem as it did to the national ones. Following
the Yogyakarta earthquake on 26May 2006, the pks andMuhammadiyah
became involved in a serious dispute concerning the status of the Al
Muttaqun mosque.
The Al Muttaqun mosque is located in front of the Hindu temple,
Candi Prambanan, in the sub-district of Prambanan, Klaten, Central
Java.⁴¹ It dates from 1955, was rebuilt in 1980, and again in 2006. Erected
on a piece of land obtained from the Surakarta kraton (palace) as a waqf
for Muslims living in Prambanan, the mosque is a private rather than an
official one. Despite the fact that the mosque was given to Muslims in
general, the people living in the environs of the mosque maintained that
it belonged to Muhammadiyah, prior to becoming a pks one later. They
based their view on the fact that the rituals performed in the mosque
were akin to those of Muhammadiyah and that its takmir was affiliated
to Muhammadiyah.
Prior to the 2006 earthquake, the Al Muttaqun mosque was sur-
rounded by two other buildings, a house belonging to Bani Ibrahim and
the Taman Kanak-kanak Aisyiyah Bustanul Athfal/tk aba Ngangkruk.
The house of Bani Ibrahim had been in the area since the colonial era
when Ibrahim, the great-grandfather of the last occupant of the house,
Ahmadi, served as katib (secretary whose duties include the registration
of Islamic affairs, mainly marriage). tk aba Ngangkruk is a kindergarten
founded in 1956 that falls under the supervision of the Prambanan branch
of Aisyiyah, the women’s organisation of Muhammadiyah.⁴²
One month after the Yogyakarta earthquake, the dispute over the Al
Muttaqun mosque between the pks and Muhammadiyah broke out.⁴³ It
 Though the Prambanan temple is located there, only 1 per cent of the inhabitants
of Prambanan areHindus, whereas 94 per cent areMuslims (Badan Pusat Statistik,
Penduduk Menurut Kecamatan dan Pemeluk Agama di Kabupaten Klaten Tahun
2010, http://klatenkab.bps.go.id/Subyek_Statistik/04.Sosial/agama.pdf accessed 3
March 2012).
 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Piagam Pendirian Taman Kanan-Kanan
Aisyiyah Bustanul Athfal, 7 May 1992, Dinas Pendidikan Agama Kabupaten
Klaten, Surat Piagam, 1 May 1970, Pimpinan Aisyiyah Daerah, Surat Tanda
Terdaktar, 1 December 1984, Pemerintah Kabupaten Klaten-Dinas Pendidikan
dan Kebudayaan, Sertifikat Nomor Identitas Sekolah (nis), 1 July 2004.
 However, the root of the tension between the two organisations can be traced
back to prior to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. According to one respected
Muhammadiyah leader in Prambanan, tension dated from the time when conflict
between a father and son, between Muhammad Syukri and Hidayat Nur Wahid,
surreptitiously occurred. It is said that, as one of Muhammadiyah’s leading figures
in Prambanan, Syukri strongly criticised Hidayat Nur Wahid’s activities in the
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The present Al Muttaqun mosque, Prambanan, Klaten, Central Java (by courtesy
of pcm Prambanan)
started when, responding to the earthquake casualties, the pks established
a ‘posko’ (a post for humanitarian aid) next to the mosque, helping people
affected by this natural disaster.This led to a number of religious activities,
cadre and recruitment training sessions given by the pks, such asmabit
and liqo, held in the mosque.⁴⁴ It was then exacerbated by the fact that
some people affiliated to the pks – in close relationship with Hidayat
Nur Wahid – announced a new takmir that, according to activists of
Muhammadiyah, excluded members of their organisation.This increased
suspicion in Muhammadiyah circles that the pks had sabotaged and
tarbiyah movement, which had been at the root of the party and is the most
important vehicle for the pks’s cadres and political mobilisation. Furthermore, he
severely criticised his son’s efforts to involve Muhammadiyah in political affairs.
Interview with anonymous person, 23 March 2012.
 Liqo (Arabic: meeting) refers to weekly gatherings of small groups (five to
12 people) to learn Islamic studies under the guidance of more senior and
qualified Islamic teachers of the pks called murabbi, whereas mabit (literally
means sleepover) refers to a spiritual gathering at night (usually held once a
month) attended by a liqo group and murabbi. See Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena
Partai Keadilan, 129–133; Ahmad Ali Nurdin, ‘pks’s Democratic Experiences in
Recruiting Members and Leaders’, Al Jamiʾah: Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 49,
No. 2, 2011, 340–345.
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taken over the management of the mosque. The tension between the
Muhammadiyah and the pks came to a head when Hidayat Nur Wahid
registered the so-called Al Muttaqun Foundation (Yayasan Al Muttaqun)
at the office of the notary public, which issued a notarial deed (Akta
Notaris) on 26 June 2006.The deedmentions that themosque came under
the control of the Al Muttaqun Foundation. In addition to Hidayat Nur
Wahid, Agung Suryantoro, now serving as a pks member of the Regional
House of Representatives, and a number of Muhammadiyah leaders
signed the deed, including the former chairman of the Pengurus Cabang
Muhammadiyah/pcm (Board of theMuhammadiyah sub-district branch)
in Prambanan, Ahyadi, later appointed chairman of the Al Muttaqun
takmir.
However, it is worth noting that the establishment of foundations
by the pks is not unusual, particularly when referring to cases in
Prambanan after the 2006 earthquake. During my fieldwork, I found
three notary deeds registered on 1 July 2007. These concerned the
establishment of three foundations all named the tk aba foundation.
These deeds seem to be illegal as only the Muhammadiyah central board
can issue deeds founding Muhammadiyah schools. When I confronted
the leaders of Muhammadiyah of Prambanan with these findings, they
acknowledged that the organisation had investigated these problems.
The investigation revealed that a number of Muhammadiyah leaders
mentioned in the deeds were ignorant of the establishment of those
foundations. However, they acknowledged that people from Hidayat Nur
Wahid’s circle had asked them to hand over their identity cards (Kartu
Tanda Penduduk/ktp) for the purpose of obtaining financial support
for Muhammadiyah schools, not for registering new organisations.
The pcm then reported the matter to the notary public who issued
the deeds and warned him that the pcm might pursue the case in
court. The three deeds were annulled by the notary public a few days
later.⁴⁵
Serving as chairman of the board (Dewan Pembina) of the Al
Muttaqun Foundation, Hidayat Nur Wahid played an important role
in the transformation of the Al Muttaqun mosque. Hidayat Nur Wahid
was born on 8 April 1960 in Prambanan. He studied at Muhammadiyah
schools before continuing his studies at Pesantren Gontor in Ponorogo,
East Java, the State Islamic Institute of Sunan Kalijaga (iain suka)
and Ummul Qura in Medina, Saudi Arabia. He once served as the
president of the pks party, replacing Nur Mahmudi Ismaʾil when the
latter was appointed Minister of Forestry and Plantation in 1999. In 2004,
 Interview with anonymous person, 13 March 2012.
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Hidayat Nur Wahid became chairman of the Majelis Permusyawaratan
Rakyat/mpr (People’s Consultative Assembly), gaining many contacts in
the world of politics and in the bureaucracy.
With the experience he gained in politics and in the bureaucracy,
while serving as chairman of the mpr, Hidayat Nur Wahid was seen as
the mastermind behind the initiative to change the status of the mosque
from a waqf for Muslims in general to one owned by a specific institution
(i.e. the Al Muttaqun Foundation). Muhammadiyah activists in Klaten
are sure that the transformation of the status of the mosque would have
been impossible without the political intervention of Hidayat Nur Wahid
as chairman of the mpr.They see the ultimate proof of this in the fact that
it took only one day (1 July 2006) for a land certificate for the mosque to
be issued, legitimising the Al Muttaqun Foundation’s ownership of the
land. This is exceptional as usually such a procedure takes months to be
completed.⁴⁶
5 The Conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah in
Prambanan Reaches its Climax
Following the 2006 earthquake and the establishment of the Al Muttaqun
Foundation, Hidayat Nur Wahid had several meetings with a number of
national leaders including the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono. He informed them that the Al Muttaqun mosque had
collapsed, and invited them to contribute to its restoration. Having
received a financial contribution from the Waqf Ministry of the Qatar
government, the pks was able to rebuild the mosque in 2006 to the
tune of 12 billion rupiah. The new building of the mosque is brown – a
colour commonly linked to the pks by the public – and it was officially
inaugurated on 13 March 2009. Hidayat Nur Wahid, the Indonesian
Minister of the Interior, Mardiyanto, and a number of officials in
Central Java, among them its governor, Bibit Waluyo, and the head
of Klaten kabupaten, Sunarno, attended this public ceremony, where
 For a land certificate to be issued the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan
Nasonal/bpn) must perform several procedures, ranging from registration of the
applicant, measuring the land, and ensuring the status of the land is not in dispute.
In its official regulation, the whole process needs at least 98 days to complete for
waqf land. See the regulation at www.bpn.go.id/Beranda/Layanan-Pertanahan/
PELAYANAN-PENDAFTARAN-TANAH-PERTAMA-KALI/Wakaf/WAKAF
-DARI-TANAH-BELUM-BERSERTIPIKAT-KONVERSI,-PE.aspx (accessed
3 May 2012).
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the establishment of the Saihul Jasim Bin Muhammad Alistani Islamic
Centre, named after the founder of modern Qatar, was also announced.
In his official speech at the inauguration, Hidayat Nur Wahid men-
tioned that the building of the mosque expressed his deep commitment
to the development of his homeland (bali ndeso, mbangun ndeso [back to
village to develop it]) and the building of the mosque was inspired by the
Hindu legend of Bandung-Bondowoso who built the Prambanan temple
in only one night.⁴⁷ With regard to its architecture, Hidayat Nur Wahid
said that the building also represented the nature of Islam in Java, which,
he stressed, respects other religious traditions and might have provided a
model for the development of Islam in Indonesia.⁴⁸ He also mentioned
that the building reflected the glorious past of Islam in Indonesia, Europe
and the Middle East. The gate of the mosque was modelled on the gate of
Cordoba’s mosque in Spain, while the two minarets resembled those of
two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. Furthermore, there are names
of Javanese wali in Arabic script written along the whole length of the
interior wall of the mosque.
Leaders of the pcm in Prambanan questioned the reports about
the collapse of the Al Muttaqun mosque in the media and also what
Hidayat Nur Wahid had told the Indonesian President in May and again
in October 2006. In an interview, the chairman of the Al Muttaqun
takmir, Ahyadi, indirectly acknowledged that the earthquake had not
caused damage to the mosque. However, he refused to respond to the
accusation by Muhammadiyah activists that Hidayat Nur Wahid had
manipulated information about the condition of the building following
the earthquake.⁴⁹ They argued that the mosque had still been standing
firmly, unaffected by the earthquake, whereas two other buildings, the
 This reference to a Hindu legend rather than to Islamic ones, such as that of
Sunan Kalijaga who built the Demak mosque in one night, is surprising. It might
be that he wanted to relate the mosque to the Hindu temple located just in front
of it, showing his respect for other religions, but he may also have been ignorant
of the story of the Demak mosque.
 ‘Masjid al Muttaqun Potret Keberagamaan’, Republika, 13 March 2009.
 ‘sby Dukung Pembangunan Kembali Masjid Prambanan’, http://
masjidrayaalmuttaqun.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=61:sby-dukung-pembangunan-kembali-masjid-prambanan&catid=34:umum
&Itemid=66 (accessed 3 March 2012); ‘Presiden Kunjungi Pengungsi Korban
Gempa di Prambanan’ (date 30 May 2006), Antaranews, www.republika.co.id/
berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/09/03/14/37141-masjid-al-muttaqun-potret
-keberagaman; ‘Masjid Al Muttaqun Potret Keberagaman’, Republika, 13 March
2009.
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house of Bani Ibrahim and tk aba Ngangkruk, were totally ruined.⁵⁰ A
number of Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan said they were almost
sure that Hidayat Nur Wahid had given out falsified information for the
sake of his party.
The conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah deteriorated even
further in October 2006 when the pcm in Prambanan officially launched
a plan for the rehabilitation of the tk abaNgangkruk building. According
to Sajiran, the chairman of the pcm in Prambanan, the takmir took a
number of steps to prevent this. It had invited leaders of the pcm and
Aisyiyah in Prambanan to a number of meetings in which the takmir said
Muhammadiyah had to choose between two options, which amounted
to the same thing; i.e. to abandon the kindergarten, either by moving it
to another place or renting a house for the kindergarten, or building the
school elsewhere. The reason was that the takmir wanted to establish an
Islamic centre on the premises of the tk aba. In addition, on 14 October
2006, the head of the village also came out against rebuilding the school.
In an official letter he instructed Muhammadiyah to cancel the plans
for the official cornerstone-laying ceremony for the reconstruction of
the tk aba building.⁵¹ The pcm did not comply and the ceremony took
place on 15 October. It was attended by Amien Rais, former chairman of
Muhammadiyah and thempr,⁵² andChamamah Suratno, the chairperson
of the central board of Aisyiyah.
Sajiran and other Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan said that
they had been targets of intimidation prior to the cornerstone-laying
ceremony. pks activists and the takmir of Al Muttaqun had come to
their houses and had threatened to harm them and their families if the
ceremony went ahead. They added that the takmir had also warned
them that they would burn and destroy the new building of tk aba
Ngangkruk once its construction was completed. Furthermore, Sajiran
claims that Hidayat NurWahid had givenmoney to high-ranking officials
in Prambanan and Muhammadiyah members in an effort to prevent
 Interview with leaders of Muhammadiyah, Prambanan, 30 April 2012.
 Official letter from the head of the village of Kebondalem Kidul to the Pengurus
Cabang Muhammadiyah in Prambanan on the objection of an official regarding
the plans for the cornerstone-laying ceremony, No. 141/56/x/2006.
 Prior to the ceremony, the pcm met with Amien Rais to discuss the possibility of
him attending the ceremony and to consult with him about the conflict between
the pks and Muhammadiyah in Prambanan. According to Sajiran, Amien Rais
strongly rejected the takmir’s plan to close the tk aba. He also considered it
wrong that Bani Ibrahim had accepted money in exchange for moving house.
Amien Rais gave 30 million rupiah to Bani Ibrahim (Ahmadi) and asked him to
return the money to the takmir.
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Amien Rais speaking at cornerstone-laying ceremony for
the reconstruction of the tk aba Ngangkruk building (by
courtesy of pcm Prambanan)
the rebuilding of the kindergarten. Mursyid Suprihatin, a teacher at
the Muhammadiyah school in Prambanan, and Slamet Sugimin, one of
Muhammadiyah activists in Prambanan, were mentioned. They would
receive a Rp. 5 million monthly salary from the Al Muttaqun Foundation
if they sided with Hidayat Nur Wahid, rather than with Muhammadiyah.
In addition, Hidayat Nur Wahid would have given free tickets for an
exclusive pilgrimage package (Haji-plus) to the heads of the sub-districts
(camat) of Prambanan and Ahyadi.⁵³
Worried by the conflict over Al Muttaqun, the head of Klaten
kabupaten invited Muhammadiyah and the pks leaders to a series
of meetings in order to arrive at a solution.⁵⁴ It is also reported that
national leaders of Muhammadiyah held a number of informal meetings
with Hidayat Nur Wahid to discuss the problem.⁵⁵ A compromise was
reached. Whereas the takmir of Al Muttaqun would be responsible
for mosque affairs and the rebuilding of the mosque, Muhammadiyah
would be allowed to continue with its plan for the construction of a new
building for the tk aba Ngangkruk next to the mosque. However, this
 Interview with Sajiran, 3 April 2012.
 The conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah received attention from the
head of the regency (bupati) of Klaten to whom the pcm complained about the
attitudes of the local officers in Prambanan. The bupati then invited the heads
of the sub-district and of the village to his office and instructed them not to
challenge the pcm’s plan to rehabilitate the tk aba building.
 Interview with anonymous, 23 March 2012.
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did not mean that the tension between the two disappeared. A number
of Muhammadiyah activists in Klaten remain of the opinion that the
pks had, in their words, sabotaged and taken over their mosque. In a
series of interviews, they left no doubt that, in their opinion, the conflict
between the two sides was far from over, pointing out that the affair had
generated a ‘perang’ or war between the pks and Muhammadiyah at the
local level. Furthermore, from the moment the dispute over the mosque
emerged, Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan refused to visit the
mosque to perform prayers or other religious rituals, out of resentment.
The takmir rejected the accusations of sabotage and of using the
mosque for pks politics; emphasising that the mosque was endowed for
Muslims in Kabondalem Kidul, Prambanan, and open to all Muslims,
regardless of their backgrounds, Ahyadi maintains that Muhammadiyah
is in fact still in control of themosque as amajority of the takmirmembers
have a Muhammadiyah background.⁵⁶ However, Ahyadi’s arguments
seems to be apologetic as the problem of changing the management of
the mosque from Muhammadiyah to the pks – not to mention sabotage
and infiltration – is acknowledged by Muhammadiyah colleagues as well
as the people who live near the mosque.
According to some Muhammadiyah members in Klaten, the politi-
cisation of the Al Muttaqun mosque by the pks is quite obvious. They
point to a number of cases that indicate that the mosque is becoming
a place for political mobilisation by the pks, such as through mabit
and liqo meetings. In addition, a prominent Muhammadiyah leader in
Prambanan says that he received many complaints from the parents of
students of the Muhammadiyah Boarding School/mbs in Prambanan.
They received a leaflet issued by the Al Muttaqun Foundation inviting
them to enroll their children at an Islamic school (Islamic centre) that was
to be founded by Hidayat Nur Wahid and the takmir of Al Muttaqun.⁵⁷
Sajiran also points out that the exclusion of Muhammadiyah from the
takmir and the list of khatib (preachers of the Friday sermon) of the
mosque also shows that the takmir has excluded Muhammadiyah and
uses the mosque for pks’s political ends.⁵⁸
Even though he admitted that in 2007 Hidayat Nur Wahid had paid
for his pilgrimage, Ahyadi rejected the accusation that the pks has used
the Al Muttaqun mosque for political mobilisation. He stressed that the
 Interview with Ahyadi, 22 April 2012.
 Interview with anonymous person, 23 March 2012; Iskak Sulistita, General
Secretary of Pengurus Daerah Muhammadiyah/pdm, interview, 9 April 2012,
Darwanto and Husni Thamri, pdm Klaten, interview, 13 April 2012.
 Interview with Sajiran, 3 April 2012.
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Al Muttaqun mosque serves as a religious institution for Muslims in
KebondalemKidul, Prambanan, to express their religiosity. Moreover, the
takmir of the mosque had explained to Muhammadiyah that they were
not attached to a certain political party. The primary task of the takmir is
to serve the religious needs of the people living near the mosque and to
organise religious activities such as the five daily prayers. Countering
the accusation that the takmir excluded Muhammadiyah members
from joining the congregation, Ahyadi made the case that a number
of Muhammadiyah leaders are still involved in the management of the
mosque and that the takmir invited a khatib fromMuhammadiyah to
deliver Friday sermons in the mosque.⁵⁹ Ahyadi’s explanation however
did not impress Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan. He was called a
snake in the grass and was accused of being a spy for Hidayat Nur Wahid
in Muhammadiyah circles. Because of this, Ahyadi failed to become
chairman of the pcm in 2010. Sajiran was re-elected.⁶⁰
Having experienced what it considers to be sabotage and infiltration,
and responding to the 2006 circular letter from the Muhammadiyah
central board concerning the protection of Muhammadiyah assets,
the local board of Muhammadiyah in Klaten has taken measures to
protect its mosques from other acts of ‘sabotage’. It has initiated a
so-called ‘bersih-bersih’ or purification programme intended to protect
Muhammadiyah assets, to get rid of pks activists in Muhammadiyah, and
to shield the minds of Muhammadiyah followers from the tarbiyah
ideology. In an interview, Iskak Sulistiya, the General Secretary of
Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah/pdm in Klaten, explains that up to
now this has taken two forms: plangisasi (labelling the mosque) and dai
muqim (the resident Islamic preacher). In the plangisasi a ‘label or stamp’
is given to every Muhammadiyah mosque, leaving no doubt that they
indeed belong toMuhammadiyah.Through dai muqim,Muhammadiyah
invite their activists at the local level to participate in training courses
for mosque management. In addition to improving the skills of Islamic
preachers through training, Muhammadiyah in Klaten also provide
financial support to promotemosque-based outreach programmes and to
protect Muhammadiyah mosques.⁶¹ Furthermore, the current chairman
of the Muhammadiyah branch in Prambanan considers the issuing of
notary deeds for Muhammadiyah assets in Prambanan to be of primary
importance, as it protects Muhammadiyah’s schools and mosques from
further attempts at sabotage.
 Interview with Ahyadi, 22 April 2012.
 Interview with anonymous person, 13 March 2012.
 Interview with Iskak Sulistiya, 9 April 2012.
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6 Conclusion
Themulti-functionality and significant position of the mosque can, in
many cases, lead to disputes and conflicts over it. As discussed above,
the case of Al Muttaqun demonstrates that the mosque has become a
ground for potential arguments, disputes and conflicts among Muslim
agencies. The conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah over the
management of the Al Muttaqun mosque is one example demonstrating
the multi-functionality of the mosque and its significance in the practice
of ‘Muslim politics’.⁶² In addition, it is also important to take into account
the shifting nature of disputes over mosques in Indonesia. Prior to the
reformation era, Islamic rituals had been one of the primary issues of
dispute between Islamic proponents, while after 1998 politics came to play
a key role. The Al Muttaqun case further demonstrates that the mosque,
as the centre of religious rituals for Muslims, has played a significant
role in the dissemination of a certain interpretation of Islam as well as in
political mobilisation. Because of this, the principle of the neutrality of
the mosque is called into question.
As far as the dispute over the Al Muttaqun mosque is concerned,
the conflict is in essence an internal organisational confrontation as it
represents the dynamics within a certain Muslim group. The dispute
over the Al Muttaqun mosque in Prambanan demonstrates that the
conflict involved different groups within Muhammadiyah. Therefore, the
so-called external interference of the pks is probably better understood
in terms of the internal dynamics of Muhammadiyah as some of
its members later joined another group (i.e. pks). Pragmatism does
seem to be the driving factor determining this later development by
Muhammadiyah activists. This argument is probably applicable to
other cases involving activists of nu and other Indonesian Muslim
organisations. In addition, this contribution further demonstrates that
disputes over mosques and Muhammadiyah’s assets in general are taking
place among Muhammadiyah elites at a local level, rather than the
national one. Even though national leaders of Muhammadiyah have had
a number of meetings with pks leaders to lessen the tension between
the two organisations, it seems that those meetings had little impact at
the local level. There, leaders and members of Muhammadiyah remain
suspicious of the pks, seeing the party as a threat to Muhammadiyah
assets. This suspicion manifests itself in the use of the word perang and
the bersih-bersih programme.
 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 2nd ed. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004).
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To conclude, and to position the case in a more general trend,
this specific form of conflict over the mosque may become more
frequent in Indonesia in the future. Therefore, as a recommendation
for future research on mosques in Indonesia, the variety of mosques in
contemporary Indonesia is an important subject of inquiry. The research
should also include a discussion of the central position of the mosque in
the religious sphere of Muslims, as well as the socio-political position
of the mosque in the Indonesian public sphere. One of the important
questions concerning the latter is the extent to which the mosque plays
a significant role in political mobilisation, in addition to looking at
models of mosque-based engagement in politics. Another important
subject for examination is the relationship between Indonesian Muslim
organisations and political parties, mainly Islamic parties. In order to
do so, the clear-cut differentiation of civil society, on the one hand, and
political society, on the other, must be critically questioned.

3 Enforcing Religious Freedom in Indonesia
Muslim Elites and the Ahmadiyah
Controversy after the 2011 Cikeusik Clash
Bastiaan Scherpen
1 Introduction
The Ahmadiyah controversy in Indonesia took a deadly turn for the
worse in February 2011 when an angry mob clashed with followers of the
sect in a remote village in Banten province, brutally killing three men in
the process. As graphic footage of the Cikeusik mob attack circulated on
YouTube, Islam-based organisations and parties were forced to take a
stand. In this chapter, the aftermath of this attack will be used as a case
study to examine the attitudes and behaviour of mainstream Islamic
organisations and Islam-based political parties. Based largely on personal
interviews and an examination of statements in various media and in
the House of People’s Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/dpr),
this contribution shows that there is considerable divergence between
proposals by politicians and those by civil society groups associated with
their parties about how to deal with a sect almost unanimously seen as
deviant in Indonesia. It is shown that while major civil society groups
like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah seem to advocate pragmatic
solutions, Islamic idealism often prevails in the political arena.
2 Muslims, Minorities and Democracy¹
While the sprawling Indonesian archipelago is often said to be a vanguard
of ‘pluralist’ or ‘moderate’ Islam – as opposed to more ‘radical’ Islamic
ideas and practices said to be prevailing in Middle Eastern countries –
 Besides the people who kindly freed up some of their valuable time for an
interview with me (and who are mentioned throughout this paper), I would like
to thank the following people for their feedback, advice and help in contacting
sources: Martin van Bruinessen, Kees van Dijk, Ridho al-Hamdi, Ahmad-Norma
Permata, Nico J.G. Kaptein, Anita Rachman and Moch Nur Ichwan.
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a number of developments in recent years have led people to start
questioning the idea of Indonesia as a representative of ‘Islam with
a smiling face’.² But of all the focal points in the ongoing discussion of
where Indonesia is headed in terms of democratisation, controversies
surrounding the freedom of worship have probably generated the most
attention, internationally as well as domestically. The presence of the
minority Muslim³ sect, Ahmadiyah, is one of those controversies.
The most important theological point of contention in the ongoing
Ahmadiyah debate is the status of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908),
and there is a long history in terms of highly complex claims and
counter-claims with regard to the nature of Ghulam Ahmad’s religious
leadership.⁴
Indonesia’s government has experienced considerable difficulties in
coming to terms with the presence of the sect – an issue that was not
really an issue until a powerful lobby group decided to take it up a decade
ago.⁵ The issue has proven to be particularly divisive and has led to
heated debates across Islam-based organisations in recent years. The
Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, mui) declared
Ahmadiyah a deviant sect in several fatwas, most recently in 2005, and
hardline groups have even threatened to topple the government if it fails
to issue an outright ban on the sect. While Ahmadiyah communities
 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘What happened to the smiling face of Indonesian Islam?
Muslim intellectualism and the conservative turn in post-Suharto Indonesia’,
rsis Working Paper No. 222, 6 January 2011, www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/
workingpapers/wp222.pdf.
 Whether or not Ahmadis are actually Muslims is at the core of the contro-
versy. I choose to refrain from taking sides in this highly complex debate and
call Ahmadiyah a Muslim sect because Ahmadis identify themselves as Mus-
lims.
 A detailed examination of the debate on Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s status is beyond
the scope of this chapter. Herman L. Beck presents Ghulam Ahmad’s ideas and
doctrinal differences between Ahmadiyah and mainstream Sunni Islam in ‘The
rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya’, in Bijdragen tot de
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 161–162 (2005): 210–246, 215–219. Erni Budiwanti’s
account: Pluralism collapses: A study of the Jamaʾah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and
its persecution, Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 117, National
University of Singapore, 2009, is more comprehensive. For a detailed refutation
of many accusations commonly levelled at Ahmadis see M.A. Suryawan, Bukan
sekedar hitam putih. Kontroversi pemahaman Ahmadiyah (Tangerang: Azzahra
Publishing, 2005).
 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah decree. Asia
Briefing No. 78. Jakarta/Brussels, 7 July 2008: 2–3, 14–15.
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throughout the country suffered intimidation and physical violence,
the government issued a Joint Ministerial Decree (Surat Keputusan
Bersama/skb) of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General
and the Minister of the Interior on 8 June 2008. This skb outlawed any
form of Ahmadiyah proselytisation but did not ban the organisation
itself. Human rights groups lamented what they saw as a restriction
on the freedom of worship while hardline groups slammed what they
considered to be a half-hearted move taken under foreign pressure. It
was against this background that on 6 February 2011, three Ahmadis
were brutally slain in the village of Umbulan, in the Cikeusik sub-district
of Pandeglang in Banten province.
With the Ahmadiyah controversy taking a deadly turn for the worse
and graphic footage of the Cikeusik mob attack circulating on YouTube,
Islam-based organisations and parties were forced to take a stand. It is
this topic that I will use here as a case study to examine the attitudes and
behaviour of mainstream Islamic organisations like Nahdlatul Ulama
and Muhammadiyah and Islam-based political parties⁶ in Indonesia’s
House of People’s Representatives. This chapter will show that there is
considerable divergence between politicians and the civil society groups
associated with their parties with regard to proposals on how to handle
the Ahmadiyah issue. Islamic idealism prevails among politicians while
civil society groups generally seem to be more pragmatic in handling the
issue. This divergence is much less visible when making a comparison
along the lines of traditionalists, modernists and tarbiyah activists – the
various groups traditionally seen as broadly making up the landscape
of Indonesian Islam – and which – as Syaifudin Zuhri shows in his
contribution to this book – are involved in a struggle for various social
spaces in the religious domain, like mosques.
 The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/pks), National Mandate
Party (Partai Amanat Nasional/pan), United Development Party (Partai Persat-
uan Pembangunan/ppp) and National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan
Bangsa/pkb) are (more or less) Islam-based, but are relatively small parties.
The Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat/pd), the Golkar Party (Partai Golon-
gan Karya/Golkar) and the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan/pdi-p) are the largest parties but – although
far from ‘secular’ – do not stake a claim to Islam. Of all the parties mentioned
here, only the pdi-p is not represented in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s
Second Indonesia United Cabinet.
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3 The State
Noted lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution, who served as President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono’s top legal adviser (2007–2009), says that he
strongly argued against disbanding Ahmadiyah but that the skb was still
issued as a compromise due to pressure from hardliners.⁷This seems to be
confirmed in a confidential diplomatic cable of 11 June 2008 in which the
us Embassy in Jakarta reported to Washington on the skb’s coming into
force.The cable states that embassy officials had raised us concerns about
the decree with one of Yudhoyono’s foreign affairs advisers, who allegedly
told the Americans that the decree’s ambiguous wording was ‘a delicate
balance’ and that ‘we have to be a little tricky’ in devising a compromise.⁸
In terms of both domestic laws and international covenants and
declarations, however, there is no lack of willingness on the part of the
Indonesian government to show its dedication to the freedom of religion.
To name a few examples, in 2005 Indonesia ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), while 60 years earlier
the fledgling republic had already mentioned in its constitution that
‘[t]he state will guarantee the freedom to every resident to adhere to their
respective religion and to perform their religious duties in accordance
with their religion and that faith’.⁹
3.1 Executive Branch: Dialogue that Remained a Monologue
In the immediate aftermath of the deadly Cikeusik incident, President
Yudhoyono surprised observers with a statement that many considered
rather mild. He said he ‘regretted’ the fact that people had died. He
did order a thorough investigation and said that police apparently had
failed to offer protection.¹⁰ Djoko Suyanto, the coordinating minister
for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, added that the government
‘condemns whoever is behind violence against any Indonesian citizen’.
 Adnan Buyung Nasution, Nasihat untuk sby (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara,
2012): 88–107.
 [us] Embassy Jakarta, Cable No. 08jakarta1143, ‘Sect members allowed to
worship despite edict’. Created 11 June 2008, released by WikiLeaks on 30
August 2011, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08JAKARTA1143.html (accessed
10 September 2011).
 Muhammad Asʾad, ‘Ahmadiyah and the freedom of religion in Indonesia’, Journal
of Indonesian Islam 3–2 (December 2009): 390–413, 392–393.
 ‘Police negligent in Ahmadiyah attack: Yudhoyono’, Tempo, 8 February 2011, www
.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2011/02/08/brk,20110208-312084,uk.html (accessed 5
October 2011).
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However, he also called on the Ahmadiyah community to ‘respect the
joint [ministerial] agreement signed in 2008’.¹¹
Suryadharma Ali, a graduate of iain Syarif Hidayatullah (1984) and a
former Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa
Islam Indonesia/pmii) activist who has been the chairman of the ppp
since 2007, is an important player in the Ahmadiyah controversy,
not only because he is the religious affairs minister, but also because
he has said that Ahmadiyah should be disbanded, in a more or less
personal note.¹² Officially, however, the Minister so far has maintained
his support for the skb while, as he said, the government is working on
a more permanent solution. Representatives of the main Ahmadiyah
organisation in Indonesia, the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Community
(Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia/jai), nevertheless refused to attend a
meeting with Suryadharma Ali at the Religious Affairs Ministry, planned
for 22 March 2011, saying the Minister could not be expected to be
a fair facilitator for dialogue. ‘From the start he has been intent on
disbanding Ahmadiyah’, jai spokesman Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh said.¹³
The smaller Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement (Gerakan Ahmadiyah
Indonesia/gai),¹⁴ however, did join the meeting.
3.2 Legislative Branch: The Search for a Solution
On 9 February 2011, three days after the Cikeusik incident and a religion-
inspired riot in Temanggung,¹⁵ Central Java, the dpr’s Commission viii
 ‘sby orders investigation into fatal attack onAhmadiyah’, Jakarta Globe, 7 February
2011, www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/sby-orders-investigation-into-fatal-attack
-on-ahmadiyah/421163 (accessed 18 March 2012).
 ‘Ahmadiyah: Daripada dibiarkan, lebih baik dibubarkan’, PolitikIndonesia, 28
February 2011, http://politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=politisiana&i=19223
(accessed 8 October 2011). It is also worth noting that the minister supported
‘dialogue’ as a way of bringing groups seen as deviant back to mainstream
Islam: see ‘Shia Conversion Is Solution: Minister’,The Jakarta Post, 6 Septem-
ber 2012, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/06/shia-conversion-solution
-minister.html (accessed 7 January 2013).
 ‘Menag tidak fair, alasanAhmadiyah absen dialog’,PolitikIndonesia, 23March 2011,
http://politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=politik&i=20144 (accessed 8 October
2011).
 Worldwide, there are two main groups of Ahmadis, the Qadian community and
the Lahore community. They view Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in a slightly different
light, with the Lahore Ahmadis saying he was a reformer (mujaddid) of the faith,
and not the Messiah. In Indonesia, the gai represents the latter group.
 On 8 February 2011, a Muslim crowd went on the rampage in the Central Java
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for Religion, Social Affairs and Women’s Empowerment (chaired by pkb
politician Abdul Kadir Karding until he was replaced in February 2012)
met with the Minister of Religious Affairs and National Chief of Police
General Timur Pradopo to discuss the government’s role in protecting
interreligious freedom and harmony and how to prevent violence. The
Minister said that the 1945 Constitution guarantees each citizen freedom
of religion and belief as well as freedom of worship, but he added that ‘in
exercising these freedoms every person is subject to restrictions specified
in the laws’. Suryadharma Ali also said that Ahmadiyah had been causing
trouble from the start.¹⁶
3.2.1 Traditionalist Parties: pkb and ppp
The leader of the pkb faction in the dpr and a chairman of the party’s
Central Leadership Board (dpp), Marwan Jaʾfar, said immediately after
the Cikeusik incident that ‘[t]he attack on Ahmadiyah members is highly
immoral, in violation of human rights and denies the principles of Islam’s
peaceful teachings’. He called the attack ‘a setback for religious life in
Indonesia’ and said people should not take it upon themselves to decide
who is an infidel and who is not.¹⁷
During meetings of the dpr’s Commission viii, Ali Maschan Moesa
did most of the speaking for the pkb. On 9 February, during the meeting
with the religious affairs minister and the chief of national police, Moesa
suggested a re-evaluation of current policies, to see whether they were
wise in the context of interreligious dialogue. He also argued for a
re-formulation of the skb, saying that apparently it did not solve any
problems. Just calling somebody an infidel (kafir) is easy, he said, and
is the sign of a very shallow understanding of Islam. He stressed the
need for dialogue, as even when people agree that others are wrong,
there should be talk, not violence. ‘We cannot just say: leave Islam, while
people actually want to be Muslims’, Moesa said.¹⁸
town of Temanggung, after a Christian man was sentenced to five years in prison
for blaspheming Islam – which the crowd deemed insufficient. Several churches
and government buildings were subsequently vandalised.
 dpr-ri, Risalah rapat [Minutes of a meeting of Commission viii with the minister
of Religious Affairs and the national police chief], 9 February 2011, www.dpr.go
.id/id/komisi/komisi8/risalah/1708/Raker-dengan-Menteri-Agama-dan-Polri
(accessed 18 March 2012).
 ‘Sejumlah partai Islam kutuk tragedi Cikeusik’, PolitikIndonesia, 7 February 2011,
http://politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=politik&i=18162 (accessed 8 October
2011).
 dpr-ri, Risalah Rapat 9 February 2011.
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For the pkb, the Ahmadiyah issue also seems to have been used as an
opportunity to showcase its ties to the nu, of which it claims to be the sole
legitimate political representative. According to then Commission viii
Chairman Karding,¹⁹ the pkb follows the decisions of the nu’s Central
Leadership Board (pbnu). Asked what he thought about the position of
one of the most liberal kyais, or religious leaders, at the top of the nu,
Masdar Farid Masʾudi (whose views will be discussed in greater detail
below), Karding said he agreed that only God is able to decide whether
someone’s beliefs are deviant or not. At the same time, the young pkb
politician said the Ahmadiyah presence posed a very complex political
challenge, mainly from the legal point of view. ‘Ahmadiyah has to be
regulated, but the skb has no [legal] power’, he said, adding that it would
be difficult to decide whether Ahmadiyah could legally be seen as a
religion in itself (agama) or as a stream (aliran) within Islam. Karding
concluded that the best solution was to come up with an umbrella law
that would also deal with Ahmadiyah and that would, once and for all,
guarantee religious harmony in Indonesia.
On the more conservative side of Muslim politics, the ppp is a staunch
supporter of an outright ban on Ahmadiyah. ppp politicians themselves
describe the party as the only true representative of pluralist Indonesian
Islam, and people from most mainstream Islamic organisations indeed
are active in the party. Unlike the pkb, which is based on Pancasila, the
ppp is based on Islam, because it wants to stress that it believes only Islam
is the true rahmatan lil alamin (blessing for all creation).
SuryadharmaAli is the general chairman of the ppp, but, asmentioned,
because he is also the Minister of Religious Affairs, he was obviously
expected not to stray too far from the official government line in the
Ahmadiyah controversy. ppp lawmakers do not face such restrictions and,
after Cikeusik, seem to have been trying to make up for this limitation
faced by their political leader.
On 9 February, Commission viii member Hasrul Azwar made the
case for disbanding the sect by explaining that ever since Ahmadiyah
had arrived in Indonesia in the 1920s, there had been trouble. He even
had a bad experience himself: when once in Medan, North Sumatra, he
performed salat, the obligatory prayer, at an Ahmadiyah mosque. After
he was done and the space he had occupied was cleaned with water, he
said, ‘[b]ut who is the infidel: me or the Ahmadiyah?’.²⁰
According to Hasrul Azwar, all the government had to do was act
decisively and disband Ahmadiyah. The lawmaker also said that the
 Interview with Abdul Kadir Karding, Jakarta, 13 October 2011.
 dpr-ri, Risalah Rapat, 9 February 2011.
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Ahmadiyah issue should not be classified as a human rights issue. ‘It’s
sacrilege, desecration of the religion I profess’, he said, adding that people
should not hide behind human rights to insult religion. A week later, also
at the dpr and facing jai leader (amir) Abdul Basit, Hasrul Azwar made
sure there would be no misunderstanding about his position. Ahmadiyah
beliefs were substantially different from true Islam, he stressed, and there
was only one solution: ‘Disband Ahmadiyah!.’²¹
However, outside the dpr, at least one senior ppp politician held a
less combative position right after the Cikeusik clash. Lukman Hakim
Saifudin, the deputy head of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat/mpr), a chairman of the ppp’s central leadership
board and a former nu activist, said the violent acts could not be justified,
but he also stressed that all parties involved should respect the skb.²²That
sentiment was shared by M. Arwani Thomafi, another ppp chairman and
also a member of Commission viii at the time of the Cikeusik incident.
Arwani said he believed that with the skb there were sufficient legal
grounds to ban Ahmadiyah, but that the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
government apparently did not want to ‘follow through on what has
already been decided at the level of the Religious Affairs minister’ based
on ‘its [the government’s] own political considerations’.²³
Regarding the Ahmadiyah issue, Arwani stressed there had been
no reconsideration of the party line after Cikeusik. The ppp had made
up its mind and it was up to the president to act, he explained. The
reasoning behind this stance is that the ppp sees Indonesian society,
or at least its constituents, as people for whom religion plays a very
important role. This does not mean, however, that those people are
fundamentalists or opponents of pluralism, Arwani pointed out. ‘Indeed
it has been proven that Indonesian society is a society that can be
united by Pancasila’, he said. But when it came to religious beliefs,
he said, that was something deeply rooted in people’s hearts, ‘which
should be seen as a fundamental issue’. He added that for Christians or
Hindus it would also be unacceptable if something that was considered
holy were to be mocked or even abused. ‘Muhammad in Islam is
considered very noble, and very sacred, protected from sinful acts.
If this concept is being violated, what happens is that the people get really
angry’.
 Statements from this 16 February 2011 meeting between representatives of the jai
and members of the dpr’s Commission viii are taken from a recording by tv
Parlemen.
 ‘Sejumlah partai Islam kutuk tragedi Cikeusik’, PolitikIndonesia, 7 February 2011.
 Interview with M. Arwani Thomafi, Jakarta, 25 July 2011.
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For Arwani, the Ahmadiyah issue was not a problem of pluralism,
but an internal problem of Islam. ‘It has no relation at all to pluralism,
and nor is it in any way tied to the freedom of religion’, he said. When it
comes to human rights, Arwani stressed that these are limited by other
people’s human rights, which, however, do indeed to include the freedom
to adhere to any religion of one’s choice. ‘But don’t follow a religion that
destroys other religions’, he said. ‘Christians believe that God is Jesus.
What if all of a sudden a person appears who claims to be a Christian,
but his God isn’t Jesus? His God is Goliath, for example, or Pharaoh …?
Christians would get angry, right?’
3.2.2 The Initiative Lies with Ahmadiyah: pan
The National Mandate Party (pan) was founded in 1998 by a group
of reform-minded people that included the Muhammadiyah general
chairman of the time, Amien Rais. It is therefore often seen as a
Muhammadiyah-linked party, but in fact there are no structural links
between the two organisations, and the pan is not based on Islam. It does
however see religion as the ‘moral and ethical foundation of nation and
state’.²⁴
During the 9 February hearing of Commission viii, Amran and Dewi
Coryati spoke on behalf of the pan. Amran argued that the skb really
needed to be made better-known at the grassroots level of society, as
he had contacted some leaders in his constituency who only after the
Cikeusik incident had heard – on television – about the very existence of
the skb. Amran, from South Sulawesi, later explained²⁵ that his party does
defend freedom of religion, but in the sense of ‘enjoying religion in line
with its teachings’. Christians, for example, are free to worship based on
the Bible. But in the case of Ahmadiyah, it is clear that the sect is deviant
because Islamic leaders – and even the Qurʾan – have made it very clear
that Muhammad is the final prophet. ‘Ahmadiyah says there is another
one after the last one. That deviates from the Islamic Shariah’, he said.
‘Therefore there are two alternatives: if Ahmadis want to identify them-
selves as Muslims, they have to return to Islam’s teachings. And if they do
not want to return to Islam’s teachings, they should leave Islam.’ But the
lawmaker also stressed that Ahmadis have the right to live in Indonesia
as citizens of the Republic and that dialogue was the only solution.
During the 16 February meeting with the jai leader, most of the
speaking for the pan was being done not by Amran, but by Ahmad
 ‘Platform Partai Amanat Nasional’, Partai Amanat Nasional, www.pan.or.id/
index.php?comp=home.detail.99 (accessed 12 November 2011).
 Interview with Amran, Jakarta, 1 August 2011.
112 islam, politics and change
Rubaie, the faction’s deputy chairman at the dpr. He said that blood
should not have flowed, calling the Cikeusik incident a violation of
human rights. But he explained that every religion has its leaders and
that for Indonesian Muslims the guide should be the mui, which ‘cannot
enforce beliefs but it does have the authority to explain, socialize and
teach’. And as the mui issued a fatwa in 2005 declaring Ahmadiyah
deviant, the best solution would be that Ahmadis return to Islam, to
‘maintain the purity of the Islamic ummah’. Differences of interpretation
should then be left to the mui. ‘If they do not want to join Islam’, the pan
politician said, ‘they have to declare a new religion’. The initiative lies
with Ahmadiyah.
3.2.3 Real-world Implications: The pks
The pks in recent years has received more attention from scholars and
media than all the other more or less Islam-based parties combined,
probably because of widespread fears – in Indonesia and abroad – of
its Islamist agenda. It is a well-organised party that takes Islamic issues
very seriously, but it seems to be particularly concerned with morality
issues like the anti-pornography legislation that was passed in 2008.²⁶
With regard to the Ahmadiyah controversy, the pks’s Central Shariah
Board (Dewan Syariah Pusat/dsp) had, as early as in May 2008, made its
position abundantly clear in a detailed bayan (explanation taking the
shape of a fatwa).²⁷ What is most interesting about this bayan is that it
explicitly refers to the practical implications of Ahmadiyah’s deviance for
Muslims – something that other political parties and also civil society
groups seem less concerned about.
According to the dsp, led by kh. Surahman Hidayat (who in October
2011 briefly became deputy chairman of Commission viii), ‘Ahmadiyah
has desecrated the holiness of Islam, desecrated the holiness of the Qurʾan
and desecrated the Prophet Muhammad saw as the final prophet and
messenger’. Ahmadis who have already been told about their deviance
and who refuse to repent have to be considered murtad (apostates)
andmusyrikin (idolaters), not as ahlul kitab (People of the Book, like
Christians). Furthermore, as a legal consequence of the Ahmadiyah
followers’ apostasy, ‘[i]t is not halal to marry an Ahmadiyah woman, to
let a Muslim woman marry an Ahmadiyah man or to eat the meat of
animals slaughtered by an Ahmadi’. Also, someone who dies as a follower
 pks observer Ahmad-Norma Permata pointed this out to me.
 ‘Bayan dsp pks Nomor: 17/b/k/dsp-pks/1429 Tentang Ahmadiyah’, 9 May 2008,
http://harakatuna.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/bayan-dsp-pks-tentang-ahmadiyah
-1429-2008/ (accessed 18 December 2011).
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of Ahmadiyah cannot be given Muslim funerary rites or prayers and is
not allowed to be buried in a Muslim cemetery.²⁸
The bayan of the dps is the most detailed exposé of the practical
consequences of the perceived deviance of Ahmadis and shows a
preoccupation of the more religion-minded elements within the pks with
practical Islam. But on the political level, pks lawmakers have also been
calling upon the government to act firmly against Ahmadiyah, primarily
to prevent conflict within society.²⁹ Former kammi³⁰ activist and now
senior pks parliamentarian Mahfudz Siddiq said in 2010 that it was time
for the government to act.³¹ He said that if the government had a reason
to disband Ahmadiyah, it had better go ahead. ‘There already is the mui
fatwa, so the government already has clarity about Ahmadiyah’s status,
but so far this hasn’t been executed’. Mahfudz said he feared that if the
government continued to drag its feet on the issue, it would amount to
‘inviting a dangerous situation’.
After Cikeusik, then-pks secretary general Anis Matta³² asked the
police to act decisively against those responsible for the violence:
‘[a]lthough the background is religious, this is a criminal act’. Matta, who
was also the deputy chairman of the dpr, added that the problems related
to Ahmadiyah’s status could be debated later, but that the legal issue
of people being murdered should be the priority.³³ In an interview
on the same day that Matta spoke, pks lawmaker and member of
Commission viii Herlini Amran said two things should happen: the
government should stand firm on the issue and Ahmadiyah should stop
 In March 2011, in West Java’s West Bandung district, residents of Cililin removed
the (already-buried) body of an Ahmadi from an Islamic burial ground. See
‘Makam pengikut Ahmadiyah dibongkar warga, jenazah diletakkan di tanah
kosong’, Pos Kota, 3 March 2011, www.poskota.co.id/berita-terkini/2011/03/03/
makam-pengikut-ahmadiyah-dibongkar-warga-jenazah-diletakkan-di-tanah
-kosong (accessed 18 December 2011).
 For a detailed examination of the various camps within the pks and their goals
and strategies see Ahmad-Norma Permata’s contribution to this book.
 kammi, or Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Action Unit of Indone-
sian Muslim Students), is not officially tied to the pks, but shares its ideological
outlook. Its positioning will be discussed in section 4 of this chapter.
 ‘pks: Penyelesaian Ahmadiyah Jangan Berlarut-Larut’, Mahfudz Siddik’s blog,
3 September 2010, http://mahfudzsiddik.blogspot.com/2010/09/pks-penyelesaian
-ahmadiyah-jangan.html (accessed 21 September 2011).
 Anis Matta replaced Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq as president of the pks on 1 February
2013, after the latter resigned amid suspicions of his involvement in a major graft
case.
 ‘Sejumlah partai Islam kutuk tragedi Cikeusik’, PolitikIndonesia, 7 February 2011.
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claiming to be part of Islam. The root of the problem is one of faith, she
said, adding that Ahmadis would have a pleasant life, side by side with
people of other denominations, including Islam, if only they would let
go of their claim to be part of Islam. From the government, Herlini was
expecting clarity: ‘[t]he government, especially the Prosecutor’s Office,
really needs to take a firm stand against Ahmadiyah. You want to disband
it or not? … Don’t let it be undecided, like now. Like this, the Ahmadis
themselves are put in danger.’³⁴
Asked if she felt that Ahmadis’ human rights were being violated
by telling them to leave Islam, she said that ‘not everything should be
connected with human rights issues, especially issues related to belief and
faith’. Discussing the 2005 mui fatwa that some activists and Ahmadis
themselves have blamed for the violence against the sect, Herlini said,
‘the mui has been carrying out its tasks properly and in accordance
with prevailing legislation. In line with its task to protect Islam, the
mui has conducted an in-depth assessment of Ahmadiyah’s presence.
… Ahmadiyah’s aqidah [creed] is distorted, so it should be declared
heretical.’ And therefore, Herlini said, ‘the decree against Ahmadiyah
cannot legitimately be seen as one of the triggers of the deadly violence
in Cikeusik’. Herlini also said the government should listen to the Islamic
ummah – the majority in Indonesia.³⁵
In the meeting between lawmakers and senior government officials
on 9 February 2011 lawmaker Jazuli Juwaini – from Banten – did most
of the speaking for the pks. He started by saying that he ‘deplored’ the
fact that ‘people were massacred in the name of religion’. ‘All Indonesian
citizens should be protected, whatever their beliefs, faith or religion’, he
said, criticising the chief of police by asking him how it was possible that
mass violence such as that in Cikeusik could happen. He also wanted
to know whether the attack was masterminded by someone and how
it was possible that all of a sudden such a large crowd should show up in
this relatively remote area. Addressing the Minister of Religious Affairs,
Jazuli said that Ahmadiyah’s controversial status should be clear by now,
and that ‘[w]e have to differentiate between giving people freedom of
religion and the desecration of religion’. And he added, ‘religious freedom
does not mean desecrating a religion that already exists’. He also said
it was a good thing the minister invited Ahmadiyah to a dialogue, to
tell them that if they want to use the name Islam, they should return to
 ‘Herlini Amran: Sebaiknya Ahmadiyah buat agama baru saja’, PolitikIndonesia,
7 February 2011, http://politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=wawancara&i=18180
(accessed 18 December 2011).
 Ibid.
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the true teachings of Islam, and if they do not want that, they should
start their own religion – without using the name Islam. However,
he stressed that ‘no matter how much someone had deviated from
Islam, nobody should be allowed to take the law into their own hands,
killing people with impunity, destroying property – this can never be
justified’.
4 Voices of Islam in Civil Society
Indonesia’s mainstream, Islam-based political parties to some extent
all fall back on social groups. The most important of these are the
traditionalist socio-religious organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (the nu,
founded in 1926) and the modernist Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912).
It is difficult to give exact figures on the number of people affiliated
to these organisations but totals run in the tens of millions for both,
with the nu being the bigger of the two. Although there is no formal
link, Muhammadiyah is often seen as tied to the pan, as this party
was founded in 1998 by the Muhammadiyah chairman at that time,
Amien Rais. In a similar way, the pkb (founded in 1999) is tied to the
nu. However, the ppp (founded in 1973 through a merger of four Islamic
parties, including the nu) also targets the nu voter base. The pks draws
from the tarbiyah movement, has been particularly successful among
urban voters, and is informally tied to the active and well-organised
student group kammi.
The mui, the organisation that has outlawed Ahmadiyah on religious
grounds in no fewer than three fatwas since 1980, is of course another
important player in Indonesian Islamic civil society, but its positioning
does not fall within the scope of this contribution. Suffice it here
to say that after the Cikeusik attack, it was quick to explain that
violence against Ahmadis should not be tolerated. Slamet Effendy
Yusuf, the head of the council’s religious harmony division – and also
one of the chairmen of the pbnu’s Tanfidziyah, or executive council –
advocated zero tolerance with regard to ‘activities that lead to death’.³⁶
Theoretically, the mui represents the broad spectrum of Indonesian
Muslims, through the leaders of the many Islamic organisations in
the country. It is a government-funded, but relatively independent
organisation that aims to advise both the government and the ummah
 ‘Zero tolerance buat kekerasan atas Ahmadiyah’, PolitikIndonesia, 7 February
2011, http://politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=pendapat&i=18179 (accessed 16
March 2012).
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with its fatwas. However, largely due to the one-organisation-one-vote
system,³⁷ hardline groups have come to dominate the mui.
In the next three sections, I will discuss the various positions on the
Ahmadiyah issue taken up by key figures in Islamic civil society, starting
with the nu.
4.1 Traditionalists: Dakwah with No Time Limit
Nahdlatul Ulama presents itself as the moderate voice of pluralist
inclusivism and a run-of-the-mill socio-religious organisation facilitating
democracy through its insistence on dialogue. The nahdliyin (nu
followers), the argument goes, understand that the Qurʾan does not
condone violence against minorities and therefore are rarely involved in
violence. In this sense, the nu masses are contrasted with the hardliners
involved in the Cikeusik attack and those in Temanggung soon after,
who ‘use sticks rather than logic’.³⁸
It is interesting to note that many prominent players in the Ahmadiyah
controversy have roots in nu circles.This of course does notmean that the
nu as an organisation bears any kind of responsibility for steps taken by
such functionaries as part of their non-nu positions, but it does show that
the nu is far from monolithic and that the traditionalist Islamic beliefs
found at all levels of this socio-religious organisation can give rise to a
wide array of perspectives, particularly in a politically delicate debate. One
key player, for instance, is kh. Maʾruf Amin. He is one of the chairmen of
mui’s executive board and a member of President Yudhoyono’s advisory
council (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden, Wantimpres), where he deals
with religious affairs. As a former chairman of the Dewan Syuriah
 Many, relatively small (compared with the nu and Muhammadiyah) groups like
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam,
fpi) have the same power as massive movements like the nu andMuhammadiyah,
Ahmad Suaedy explains. See his ‘Religious freedom and violence in Indonesia’, in
Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki and Ahmad Suaedy (eds.), Islam in contention:
Rethinking Islam and state in Indonesia (Jakarta, Kyoto and Taipei: wi, cseas and
capas, 2010), 139–169. The late former Indonesian President and eminence grise
of the nu, AbdurrahmanWahid, has called the mui a ‘bunker of radical Islam’.
See Abdurrahman Wahid, ‘Musuh dalam selimut’, in Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.),
Ilusi Negara Islam. Ekspansi gerakan Islam transnasional di Indonesia (Jakarta:
Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Wahid Institute, Maarif Institute, 2010), 11–41,
39.
 Zainal Abidin Nawawi, ‘nu dan revitalisasi pluralisme agama’, nu website, 28
February 2011, http://nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/4/27067/Kolom/NU_dan
_Revitalisasi_Pluralisme_Agama.html (accessed 3 October 2011).
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The head office of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Jakarta
(Advisory Council) and current member of the Dewan Mustasyar
(Supreme (Advisory) Council), he also has serious nu credentials.
After the nu’s leadership congress in 2010, Martin van Bruinessen, a
longtime observer of the organisation, wrote:
[w]ith this new board, nu is poised to seek a new balance between
the conservatism and politicisation of the past period and the search
for a new religious discourse of the 1990s. … The slide towards
fundamentalist and anti-liberal religious views is unlikely to continue
under the new board and it may even be reversed.³⁹
In this light, it is a case in point that the nu sent kh.Masdar FaridMasʾudi
as its representative to a meeting with Commission viii on 17 February
2011. Masdar is one of the most liberal thinkers at the top of the nu. He
is considered one of the seniors of liberal Islam in Indonesia⁴⁰ and is
currently chairman (rais) of the Dewan Syuriah.
 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘New leadership, new policies?’, Inside Indonesia 100
(April–June 2009), www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles-100-apr-june-2010/
new-leadership-new-policies-16061866 (accessed 16 March 2012).
 Budi Handrianto, 50 tokoh Islam Liberal Indonesia. Pengusung ide sekularisme,
pluralisme, dan liberalisme agama (Jakarta: Hujjah Press, 2007), 145–146.
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At the dpr, Masdar said the main way to get followers of the jai back
into the fold of mainstream Islam is to open up a peaceful dialogue
and refrain from forcing conventional beliefs upon them. ‘Gently
straighten them out. As is mentioned in the Qurʾan, invite those whose
understanding differs from ours, with dakwah, with good advice. If that
doesn’t work, argue with them politely. If you hit a wall, then so be it –
leave it to Allah’, Masdar told the lawmakers.⁴¹ In the hearing, Masdar
was reluctant to label Ahmadiyah a deviant sect. ‘Humans do not have
the right to determine whether a person’s beliefs are heretical or not’, he
said. ‘When it comes to religion, there is indeed such a thing as deviance.
But if [this concept] is being used as a social norm, this will destroy our
social life.’⁴²
Years earlier, in a reaction to the 2005 mui fatwa labelling Ahmadiyah
deviant, Masdar had already raised his objections to the confrontational
approach, predicting that it would only lead to more violence.⁴³ He
believes that radical beliefs imported from the Middle East are to blame
for theAhmadiyah-related trouble in recent years.⁴⁴ According toMasdar,
the reason why the nu never officially labelled Ahmadiyah deviant but
merely ‘different’ is that such a label could be used as a licence to kill,
or at least provoke violence. On a more personal level, he said it would
be arrogant to make a decision on a matter that is only God’s to decide.
Although Masdar himself does not agree with Ahmadiyah beliefs about
prophethood, he said the debate about religious interpretation should be
open. In fact, crucial to his position is the belief that Muhammad was
indeed the final prophet: ‘[t]he doctrine about the finality of prophethood’,
he said, ‘basically leads to the doctrine of freedom of thought.’⁴⁵ Key to
Masdar’s argument is that because it is clear that there will not be any
other prophets, it is up to the ummah to decide how to fulfill religious
requirements: ‘[w]e no longer have to be afraid that [our interpretation
 ‘Luruskan Ahmadiyah dengan kelembutan’, Kompas, 17 February 2011, http://
nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/02/17/22493848/NU.Luruskan.Ahmadiyah
.dengan.Kelembutan, (accessed 16 March 2012).
 Ibid.
 Ahmad Subakir, Ilham Mashuri and M. Asror Yusuf, ‘Respon tokoh Islam atas
fatwa mui tentang Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia’, http://ern.pendis.kemenag.go
.id/DokPdf/ern-III-06.pdf (accessed 21 September 2011).
 Interview with kh. Masdar Farid Masʾudi, Jakarta, 6 October 2011.
 This is a position derived from the works of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938),
particularly the concept of ‘inductive intellect’: see Iqbal, ‘The spirit of Muslim
culture’, the fifth in his compilation of lectures entitled The reconstruction of
religious thought in Islam (1930).
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of Islam] will be blocked by someone with absolute authority [i.e., a
prophet].’ ‘The only absolute truth that is left, is the Qurʾan’, he added.
The way out of the Ahmadiyah controversy, according to Masdar,
would require two separate developments: the state should protect the
basic rights of all citizens and mainstreamMuslims should become more
mature, with the faithful realising that it is not their responsibility to
homogenise society. The two steps should remain separated, Masdar
said, as ‘[t]he state does not have the right to judge whether beliefs are
right or wrong’.
The general chairman of the nu, Said Aqil Siradj, although quick to
denounce the Cikeusik violence and to call for harshmeasures against the
perpetrators, in his public statements stressed that Ahmadiyah teachings
are not in line with those of the nu. However, he has been careful not to
use the word ‘deviant’. ‘The Ahmadiyah teachings are rejected by all of
Islam, that is true. But we cannot abuse them [Ahmadis]’, he explained.
He also said violence would only increase the distance between Ahmadis
and mainstreamMuslims, so the only solution to the problem would
be a civilised dialogue to bring Ahmadis back on the right track: ‘I,
from nu, am ready for a discussion, a dialogue with Ahmadiyah. An
objective discussion, not one to berate or harrass.’ With talks, Said Aqil
said, Ahmadis could accept the offer to return to the true teachings.
‘Insya Allah, if the result is that a part of the Ahmadiyah community
returns to Sunni Islam, alhamdulillah. I am not aiming for all of them to
return to Sunni Islam.’⁴⁶ When asked about the possibility of disbanding
Ahmadiyah, Said Aqil said such a step fell within the domain of the state,
and therefore was beyond the nu’s reach.⁴⁷ He also called acts like those
in Cikeusik ‘signs of a society that is uncultured and unethical’.⁴⁸
The nu’s Dewan Syuriah in an official explanation of its stance on
the issue (taushiyah) said in relation to the Cikeusik incident that ‘the
teachings about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood that are followed
by Ahmadiyah are not in line with the creed of ahlu-sunnah wal-jamaʾah
[mainstream traditionalist (non-modernist) Sunni Islam]’. It also said
 ImamMaruf, ‘pbnu: Penyerangan Ahmadiyah adalah tindakan biadab’, Kabar
Haji, 7 February 2011, http://kabarhaji.com/kabar/1716/pbnu-penyerangan
-ahmadiyah-adalah-tindakan-biadab (accessed 3 October 2011).
 Edy M. Yaʾkub, ‘nu, Ahmadiyah, dan fpi’, Antara, 5 March 2011, www.antaranews
.com/berita/248702/nu-ahmadiyah-dan-fpi (accessed 3 October 2011).
 ‘Penyerangan terhadap Ahmadiyah: Membenturkan Umat Islam kepada Negara’,
Al Kisah Magazine, 16 February 2011, http://majalah-alkisah.com/index.php/
component/content/article/799-penyerangan-terhadap-ahmadiyah
-membenturkan-umat-islam-kepada-negara (accessed 23 November 2011).
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that differences in religious understanding can never be used to justify
violence, and that the government is constitutionally responsible for legal
enforcement and the protection of ‘all citizens regardless of their religion
or beliefs’.⁴⁹ However, a colleague of Masdar at the Dewan Syuriah,
kh. Hasyim Muzadi, one of the more purist and political-minded people
at the top of the nu, was quoted as saying in March 2011 that Ahmadiyah
activity and proselytisation should be outlawed, as was stipulated in
the skb. Hasyim Muzadi believes the issue should not be framed in
terms of freedom of religion: ‘Ahmadiyah teachings really have to be
brought to a halt, because they make the Islamic ummah vulnerable,
except when Ahmadiyah becomes a religion of its own and not [claims
to be part of] Islam. This has no relation to the freedom of religion, but
only with desecration of religion’, said the former pbnu general chairman
(2000–2005 and 2005–2010).⁵⁰
The current position of the nu, under the general leadership of
Said Aqil, is thus more accommodating toward Ahmadiyah than the
organisation’s stance under the lengthy leadership of HasyimMuzadi.
During those eventful years, the Ahmadiyah issue was portrayed as
a problem of desecration of religion rather than freedom of religion.
‘Pancasila provides freedom of religion and belief to every citizen. But
that does in no way mean it provides freedom to tarnish a religion
that is considered legitimate in Indonesia’, Hasyim Muzadi said after
the issue of the skb in June 2008.⁵¹ The pbnu leader at the time also
called the skb an appropriate step to prevent Ahmadis from spreading
their beliefs.⁵² More interesting, however, is that there was a meeting
of nu leaders in Bogor in September 2005, presided over by Maʾruf
Amin, Said Aqil Siradj, Masdar F. Masʾudi and Rozy Munir, to discuss
the nu’s formal stance in the Ahmadiyah debate. The results of the
meeting – calling Ahmadiyah ‘deviant and outside Islam [sesat dan
keluar dari Islam]’ – were placed on the official nu website in May
 ‘Seruan anti kekerasan Syuriyah pbnu’, 16 February 2011, www.nu.or.id/a,public-m
,dinamic-s,detail-ids,6-id,26888-lang,id-c,taushiyah-t,Seruan+Anti+Kekerasan
+Syuriyah+PBNU-.phpx (accessed 19 May 2012).
 Edy M. Yaʾkub, ‘nu, Ahmadiyah, dan fpi’.
 ‘pbnu: Pancasila jamin kebebasan beragama, tidak kebebasan menodai agama’,
nu website, 12 June 2008, http://nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/1/12741/Warta/
PBNU__Pancasila_Jamin_Kebebasan_Beragama__Tidak_Kebebasan_Menodai
_Agama.html (accessed 20 November 2011).
 ‘pbnu minta Ahmadiyah tak lagi kembangkan ajarannya’, nu website, 11 June
2008, http://nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/1/12736/Warta/PBNU_Minta
_Ahmadiyah_Tak_Lagi_Kembangkan_Ajarannya.html (accessed 20 November
2011).
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2008, right when pressure on the government to do something about
Ahmadiyah was mounting. In the statement, the government was asked
to ‘take a firm and consistent stand in dealing with Ahmadiyah in
Indonesia [memiliki sikap yang tegas dan konsisten dalam menyikapi
keberadaan aliran Ahmadiyah di Indonesia]’.⁵³ However, according to
Masdar this statement was in fact a draft version that was never accepted
by a majority of the ulama attending the meeting.⁵⁴ His position was
confirmed by one of the chairmen of the nu’s executive board, Imam
Aziz, who stressed that the nu has never officially labelled Ahmadiyah
a deviant sect. ‘nu would never call another group deviant [sesat], infidel
[kafir] or heretic [bidʿa]. That’s an official decision. nu’s basic attitude
is like that’, Imam said, adding that Ahmadis have a constitutional right
to worship, and that nobody can take that away.⁵⁵ kh. Malik Madani,
secretary general of the Dewan Syuriah, after the Cikeusik incident also
made clear that for the nu the disbandment of Ahmadiyah was not an
option.⁵⁶
According to Imam Aziz, one of the founders of the Yogyakarta-
based ngo LKiS, which is aimed at promoting inclusivist and tolerant
understandings of Islam, the main problem in Indonesia is a lack of
understanding – among the general population but also at government
level – of the issue of minority rights. People have to stay within certain
cultural or religious boundaries, Imam Aziz explained, and if they step
outside those boundaries they are seen as deviant. ‘And that is a problem,
an ontological problem’, he said. ‘Ahmadiyah is seen as an aberration, and
to cure it, they should come back to the mainstream.’ For these reasons,
Imam Aziz said the use of a human rights discourse – as opposed to
dealing with the issue from a religious perspective – would be very useful.
‘No matter how different they are from us, they still have rights.’
The nu’s vantage point in the Ahmadiyah controversy has been the
prevention of violence, Imam explained. He too said that he does not
agree with the Ahmadis’ ideas about prophethood, but added that violent
 ‘Taushiyah: Sikap pbnu tentang Ahmadiyah’, nu website, 9 May 2008, www.nu.or
.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/6/12315/Taushiyah/Sikap_PBNU_tentang_Ahmadiyah
.html (accessed 20 November 2011).
 Masdar explained this in the 6 October 2011, interview in Jakarta. The question
remains how the 2005 Bogor statement – including the crucial word ‘deviant’ –
ended up on the nu’s website in 2008, at such a politically expedient moment.
 Interview with Imam Aziz, Jakarta, 15 November 2011.
 ‘pbnu Tolak Pembubaran Ahmadiyah’, kbr68h, 4 March 2011, www.kbr68h.com/
berita/nasional/3169-pbnu-tolak-pembubaran-ahmadiyah (accessed 23 Novem-
ber 2011).
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confrontation should be avoided at all costs. Instead, dakwah is the
highest duty, he said, without a time limit. ‘It is possible that other
people are flawed, but the flaws have to be overcome gradually and
by way of persuasion. If we beleaguer them, the distance will only
increase.’ ‘All that the nahdliyin – the followers of the nu – can do
is put across their message, and it is up to others to decide what they
want to do with that message. And when people do have recourse to
violence, then the state should get involved, for it is the task of the state
to protect people’s civil rights (but not to interfere in matters of faith).’
In this sense, Imam said, actions by the nu’s youth movement Gerakan
Pemuda Ansor to promote religious tolerance should be seen as merely
symbolic.
In mid-July 2011, the website of gp Ansor⁵⁷ featured a photograph of
members of its paramilitary subdivision called Banser gp Ansor clearing
the streets of Temanggung of rubble after the riot there.The organisation,
at least under its current leader, Nusron Wahid, has been very outspoken
on several issues pertaining to religious pluralism. On 8 February 2011, for
instance, right after Cikeusik and Temanggung, Nusron said that places
of worship are holy and need to be protected from disturbances from
anyone, anywhere.⁵⁸ He said the destruction of churches in Temanggung
could lead to national disintegration and called the incident ‘barbaric’
and ‘legally and morally unacceptable in Indonesia’. For that reason, in
relation to the Cikeusik incident, Nusron said the central leadership of
Ansor had instructed its Banten branches to send out Banser units to
protect Ahmadis there.⁵⁹
4.2 Modernists: Separating Society and State
The 45thmuktamar (leadership congress) of Muhammadiyah in 2005
marked the end of Ahmad Syafiʾi Maʾarif ’s leadership and the beginning
of a turn to conservatism within what is probably the biggest modernist
Muslim organisation in the world. Maʾarif was replaced by Sirajuddin
‘Din’ Syamsuddin and, with the latter at the helm, many progressive –
mostly young – Muhammadiyah intellectuals felt marginalised from
 http://gp-ansor.org/.
 ‘Rusuh Temanggung: Ansor bantu renovasi gereja’, PolitikIndonesia, http://
politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=politik&i=18238 (accessed 9 December 2011).
 ‘Penyerangan terhadap Ahmadiyah: Membenturkan Umat Islam kepada Negara’,
Al Kisah Magazine, 16 February 2011, http://majalah-alkisah.com/index.php/
component/content/article/799-penyerangan-terhadap-ahmadiyah
-membenturkan-umat-islam-kepada-negara (accessed 22 November 2011).
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the start.⁶⁰ The emergence of the informal Jaringan Intelektual Muda
Muhammadiyah (Network of Young Muhammadiyah Intellectuals,
jimm) under the mentorship of the late Moeslim Abdurrahman and
the founding of the Maarif Institute should be seen as the progressive
intellectuals’ answer to the rise of conservative functionaries. However,
as Pradana Boy ztf argues, Muhammadiyah’s ‘left wing’ starting to
organise itself led to even stronger resistance from the right and mutual
entrenchment, instead of the hoped for accommodation of liberal thought
and a move back to the middle.⁶¹
As Herman L. Beck shows,⁶² the history of Ahmadiyah–Muhamma-
diyah relations is an interesting one. In the early years of Ahmadiyah
missionary activity in the Dutch-controlled Java of the 1920s, namely, the
organisation’s Lahore branch developed cordial relations with represen-
tatives of the Indonesian modernists. This was able to happen because
the organisations shared a modernist outlook, stressing Islam’s compati-
bility with modernity, rationality and science. However, Muhammadiyah
decidedly broke with the Ahmadiyah at its 18th congress, held in Solo in
1929.
At Muhammadiyah’s 2010 muktamar, Din Syamsuddin was re-elected,
but self-professed anti-liberals such as Adian Husaini⁶³ did not return
to the organisation’s Central Leadership Board (pp Muhammadiyah).
Din seems to have a well-developed sense of political reality: in a period
characterised by emboldened hardline religious activism in wider society,
it might not have been a bad idea to coopt, in a way, some of the figures
who shared such a train of thought. With regard to Ahmadiyah, Din
Syamsuddin also seems to have been choosing his words carefully.
Interestingly, Din Syamsuddin had been one of the people to sign the
2005 fatwa placing the sect outside Islam, as he was then the secretary
general of the mui. After the skb was issued in 2008, Din Syamsuddin
said the government had acted because Ahmadiyah had strayed from
mainstream Islam and that the next step should be ‘efforts to persuade
 Pradana Boy ztf, Para pembela Islam. Pertarungan konservatif dan progresif di
tubuh Muhammadiyah (Depok: Gramata Publishing, 2009), 1.
 Ibid., 185.
 Herman L. Beck, ‘The rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya’,
in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 161–162 (2005), 210–246.
 Adian Husaini, who has been active in organisations like kisdi and ddii, was a
member of Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tabligh in 2005–2010. He is best known
for his column ‘Catatan Akhir Pekan’ (Weekend Notes) in the magazine Suara
Hidayatullah, in which he promotes what Pradana calls an ‘ultra-conservative
explanation of Islam’: see Pradana, Para pembela Islam, 10.
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Ahmadiyah followers to return to mainstream Islamic teachings’.⁶⁴ After
the Cikeusik incident he urged the central government to be firm on
Ahmadiyah, saying its hesitant stance ‘could lead to unrest and could
open up opportunities for a group of people to take matters into their
hands in dealing with this issue’. He also said, ‘the state has the power to
disband Ahmadiyah or to give it a choice to form a new religion outside
Islam’, but urged Ahmadis to embrace the teachings of mainstream Islam.
Din Syamsuddin also stressed that violence was not the right way to
bring Ahmadis back into the fold, but that there should be dialogue and
dakwah.⁶⁵
Another senior Muhammadiyah leader, Syamsul Anwar – the chair-
man of the Tarjih and Tajdid Council, tasked with ruling on legal matters
in the religious domain – explained that there should be a distinction
between the religious side of the Ahmadiyah controversy and its social
dimensions.⁶⁶ ‘There is no statement [within Muhammadiyah] about
whether or not it is necessary to ban [Ahmadiyah]. There just isn’t’, he
said. ‘The teachings [of Ahmadiyah] are unacceptable. That is clear. And
we reject the spreading of those teachings. But we also reject violence
against Ahmadiyah.’ Syamsul Anwar used the analogy of a house in
describing mainstreamMuslims’ problem with Ahmadiyah. ‘For us it’s
like an attack on our teachings. Our teachings are being distorted. We
live in a house, then someone comes in and starts making changes to our
house. That’s how we feel – because they say they are part of Islam, and
share our faith. So that means we share the same house. They live in the
same house, but they start making changes without permission.’
When asked about possible solutions, Syamsul Anwar said it was
important to keep the dialogue going, as it was preferable that people
keep living in the same metaphorical house. And with dialogue, the
Ahmadis might be persuaded to return. A human rights discourse can
be useful, but only when dealing with violence and destruction, not in
relation to matters of faith. ‘Human rights are good, but they don’t always
solve the problem’, Syamsul said, adding that the Ahmadiyah controversy
had already become a political problem, thus was in need of a political
solution.
One of the representatives of the young, progressive wing of Muham-
madiyah is Fajar Riza Ul Haq, the executive director of the Maarif
 Budiwanti, Pluralism collapses, 16.
 ‘Din Syamsuddin: Kafir meyakini ada nabi baru’, Hidayatullah.com, 18 February
2011, www.hidayatullah.com/read/15420/18/02/2011/din-syamsuddin3A-kafir
-meyakini-ada-nabi-baru.html (accessed 18 March 2012).
 Interview with Syamsul Anwar, Yogyakarta, 9 November 2011.
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Institute, which has no formal ties to the organisation. He urged people
after the Cikeusik incident not to be provoked into taking violent action
over religious affairs, because in doing so they would only serve political
interests.⁶⁷ For Fajar, the way out of the Ahmadiyah controversy is for the
government to take a firm stand against vigilante groups to prevent fur-
ther violence.⁶⁸ ‘The government must rule the public domain, because
that’s the state’s authority. When civil society actors come to the public
sphere they should obey the law … And the government at the same
time should respect the rights of civil society – at the private level. … If
the nu and Muhammadiyah decide that Ahmadiyah is not Islamic, for
example, the government should respect that. But [in the public sphere]
both Muslim organisations should respect the government’s rule.’
However, it is important to note that not all aspects of Fajar’s vision are
shared byMuhammadiyah’s old guard, and the views of Agus Sukaca offer
some interesting contrast. This general chairman of Muhammadiyah’s
Tabligh Council is in charge of matters pertaining to the implementation
and socialisation of decisions taken by the previously mentioned Tarjih
andTajdidCouncil which has long been led by SyamsulAnwar. According
to Agus Sukaca, ‘It is clear that Ahmadiyah is deviant: Muhammadiyah
said so decades ago and in recent years mui has confirmed it’.⁶⁹ For
Agus Sukaca the problem would be solved if Ahmadis declared a new
religion. But, ideally, Ahmadiyah would return to the straight path of
Islam. ‘If they come back that would be the best solution. If they don’t
want that, they have to create their own religion. And if they don’t want
that, the government has to disband them’, Agus Sukaca said when asked
whether he thought the skb was an appropriate measure. ‘Actually it is
not enough. Unless a statement were added that this group is outside
Islam’, he added. According to Muhammadiyah’s top tabligh (outreach)
official, the Ahmadiyah issue is not a matter of a violation of human
rights. ‘As long as they claim to be part of Islam, I am of the opinion that
the Islamic ummah has the right to have an opinion, or to take steps, to
prevent the deviance from being spread. I think this is part of the Islamic
effort to keep the faith pure. Because of that, this is not a human rights
issue. It is a problem of truth’, he said, stressing however that violence was
not the solution for this type of problem. In fact, if only the government
would act decisively, further clashes would be prevented, he argued.
 ‘Maarif Institute: Masyarakat jangan terprovokasi’, PolitikIndonesia, 17 Febru-
ary 2011, http://politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=politik&i=18654 (accessed
9 December 2011).
 Interview with Fajar Riza Ul Haq, Jakarta, 23 August 2011.
 Interview with Agus Sukaca, Yogyakarta, 7 November 2011.
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4.3 Tarbiyah Activists
Although the student movement kammi shares the goals and strategies
of the pks – leadership based on Islamic values through elaborate
Islam-based education of cadres – the two are not formally tied. The
movement that claims to have 15,000 members at over 300 campuses
from Sabang toMerauke is thus not the pks’s official student organisation.
It is however a representative of the unofficial tarbiyah movement that
also spawned the pks. Because of that, it should come as no surprise
that Fahri Hamzah, a founder of kammi, is now a senior pks lawmaker.
Mahfudz Siddiq, chairman of Commission i at the dpr on behalf of the
pks, also has a kammi background.
Amonth after the Cikeusik incident, the then-chairman of kammi told
media that the Ahmadiyah issue was clear. ‘We want the government to
take firmaction’, saidRijalul Imam, adding that the government should act
as the leader of the ummah and that further clashes should be prevented.⁷⁰
For kammi, Rijalul Imam continued, there were three options: (1)
Ahmadiyah declared itself to be a new religion (‘the best solution’);
(2) the Ahmadiyah organisation was outlawed; and (3) Ahmadis returned
to the true teachings of Islam.
In March 2011, kammi elected a new general chairman, Muhammad
Ilyas, a lipia⁷¹-educated 30-year-old from an nu family in Sidoarjo,
East Java. According to Ilyas, it is important to take into account the
first principle of the state ideology of Pancasila to find a solution for the
Ahmadiyah controversy: belief in the one and only God.⁷² For Ilyas, this
means that there is only limited room for deviance. In the case of Islam,
he said, it is clear that Muhammad is the final Prophet: ‘[w]hen there is
someone who says that there is another prophet after Muhammad, that
means that person is not a Muslim. And Ahmadiyah has to be found
in that area. They have their own prophet, their own book; Ahmadiyah
cannot claim to be part of Islam.’ For this reason, Ilyas said he supported
the mui fatwa declaring Ahmadis to be outside Islam. The solution
 ‘kammi: Persoalan Ahmadiyah sudah jelas’, Republika Online, 13 March 2011,
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/11/03/13/169036
-kammi-persoalan-ahmadiyah-sudah-jelas (accessed 11 October 2011).
 The Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, or lipia, is a Saudi-affiliated
institute of higher education focusing on the Arabic language and Islam, based
in South Jakarta. It is generally seen as promoting conservative values, but also
counts progressive activists like Ulil Abshar Abdalla, a founder of the (Liberal
Islam Network), among its alumni.
 Interview with Muhammad Ilyas, Jakarta, 25 November 2011.
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Ilyas preferred was that Ahmadis returned to the true faith. He stressed
however that violence was never an option. But if Ahmadis refused to
repent, they would have to declare a new religion. ‘But I am an optimist’,
Ilyas said. ‘Rapprochement would be better. The solution is dakwah.’
Asked whether disbandment of the organisation would be of any help,
the kammi chairman said he did not think that would solve anything.The
skb in itself also was not enough, as there always needed to be dialogue:
‘[t]here have to be laws, but the rapprochement has to be facilitated
through dialogue. Don’t keep repeating the same history, until we end up
with violence.’
With regard to human rights discourses in the ongoing controversy,
Ilyas said it was difficult to draw the line, as mainstreamMuslims also
had rights. ‘People can choose whatever religion they want to follow, that
is their right. We cannot force them. But we have to teach people our
understanding. If they want to accept it, that’s great. If not, go ahead. But
then they cannot lay a claim to Islam, because there are rules.’
5 Conclusion
The Ahmadiyah controversy over the past few years has given rise to an
interesting interplay between ideological considerations and political
pragmatism. This can be seen from the variety of arguments used,
solutions proposed and references made to such notions as the rule of
law, human rights, religious pluralism and social stability. The framing of
rights discourses is a crucial element in this ongoing debate, particularly
the relation between various conceptualisations of the rights of believers,
the rights of citizens and the rights of human beings. Such rights are seen
by some as one and the same, by others as complementary to each other
and yet other people consider them to be in outright contradiction.
There is an overwhelming rejection of Ahmadiyah teachings within
mainstream Indonesian Islam, among both politicians and civil society
activists. Practically nobody agrees with Ahmadis’ religious beliefs, and
only a very few people hesitate to call them deviant. For the majority it is
clear: Ahmadis are not proper Muslims and they should either repent
or stop claiming to be part of Islam. However, the almost universal
rejection of Ahmadiyah teachings on the level of religious understanding
does not mean that most people (or even many people) think that
violent confrontation is an option for solving the problem. In fact,
most mainstream Muslim civil society leaders and politicians from
Islam-based parties do consider Ahmadiyah deviant in terms of religious
understandings but still propose a civilised solution in which Ahmadis’
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rights as citizens and human beings are respected in the context of the
Indonesian nation-state. Of course there are also organisations on the
scene that are very outspoken in their rejection of Ahmadiyah and that –
unlike the mainstream organisations – do not shy away from (threatening
with) violence. These are fringe groups, but they have nevertheless been
able to attract a lot of media attention and have proven their capability to
escalate tensions up to the level of bloodshed.
The attack in Cikeusik in February 2011, probably in large part due
to the graphic footage circulating on the Internet since its immediate
aftermath, led to a surge of international criticism and expressions
of concern over the protection of religious minorities in Indonesia.
European governments⁷³ and the European Parliament,⁷⁴ but also the un
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch and others, called for a thorough investigation. But even
though Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights (komnas
ham) said in a preliminary report that the Cikeusik violence was planned
and organised,⁷⁵ and there was video evidence that three people had
been beaten to death, in the end nobody was charged with murder. After
a high-security trial at the State Court in Serang, 12 defendants ultimately
were found guilty of violating articles of the Criminal Code on violence
(160), incitement (170), molestation (351) and willful participation in an
assault resulting in serious injuries or death (358). They were sentenced
to jail terms of three to six months.⁷⁶
The main issue discussed in this chapter is how people define the
limits of the freedom of religion and the role of the state therein. In that
 eu Delegation to Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia, eu Statement on the recent
attack and killings of Ahmadis in Banten, 8 February 2011, http://eeas.europa.eu/
delegations/indonesia/documents/press_corner/20110208_en.pdf (accessed 15
March 2012).
 European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2011 on Indonesia, including attacks on
minorities, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT
+TA+P7-TA-2011-0341+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed 13
August 2011).
 ‘Komnas ham: Rusuh Cikeusik Terencana-Terorganisir’, PolitikIndonesia,
23 February 2011, http://politikindonesia.com/index.php?k=hukum&i=19013
(accessed 15 March 2012).
 ‘12 terdakwa Cikeusik divonis 3–6 bulan’, Kompas 29 July 2011, 5. Later, on 15
August 2011, Deden Sujana, the Ahmadis’ head of security who was said to
have had travelled to Umbulan to help protect Ahmadiyah interests there, was
sentenced to six months in jail for obstruction of justice (as he had ignored a
police order to leave the premises ahead of the attack) and violent assault (because
he had punched one of the men who were later convicted over the incident).
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sense, the Ahmadiyah controversy in Indonesia is part of a wider debate
on secularism and the state – normal in any democracy – and should
not merely be seen in terms of ‘religious radicals’ targeting minority
groups. Sadly, however, the Ahmadiyah controversy in Indonesia is also
an excellent example of how democratisation can become a victim of its
own success. This is the case for more than one reason. Without access to
a wide range of print and online publications susceptible to their ideas,
religious hardliners would never have been able to set the terms of the
debate on Ahmadiyah to the extent they have done since at least the
2005 mui fatwa on the matter. The objections against Ahmadiyah beliefs
that are mentioned in the mui fatwas are used time and again by most
people who have publicly aired their views on the matter: Ahmadiyah
claims that its founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet, so the sect is
deviant because there is no prophet after Muhammad. Standing up for a
group like Ahmadiyah, which even mainstreamMuslim organisations
and political parties at the national level see as clearly having crossed the
line, is politically not very attractive.
Thus, there is a large degree of consensus on who is to blame in the
Ahmadiyah controversy, but when talking about solutions the issue
becomes a lot more complicated. Some say Ahmadis are the problem
and thus hold the key to the solution. Others argue that the state should
interfere – with some saying it should do so for religious reasons and
others highlighting civil rights. The form of proposed state intervention
varies, too. There are those who maintain that the state should outlaw
Ahmadiyah and there are those who instead want the government
apparatus to protect all citizens, including Ahmadis.Whereas civil society
activists – from the traditionalist, modernist and tarbiyah camps – all
stressed the need for continued dialogue, lawmakers – not entirely
unexpectedly – advocated a legal solution. Representatives from the
liberal and the conservative camps within traditionalist Muslim politics,
former Commission viii chairman Abdul Kadir Karding (pkb) and
Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali (ppp) respectively, have both
stated their support for a legal solution to settle the Ahmadiyah dispute
once and for all.
For organisations like the nu and Muhammadiyah, it is important
to note that although they are not officially political in outlook, their
decisions – or lack thereof – do have a political impact.
When we look at Muslim leaders’ reactions to the Cikeusik incident,
any assumed schism between Indonesia’s modernists and traditionalists is
not that clear. In fact, themajor line of divisionwhenwe look at the variety
of approaches to the Ahmadiyah controversy is not between modernists
and traditionalists, but between civil society groups and politicians.
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Lawmakers adopted a far more idealistic stance on the issue than civil
society leaders. The politicians seemed to be a lot more concerned
about perceived threats to the ‘purity of Islam’ than the functionaries of
organisations like the nu and Muhammadiyah, who overall proved to be
pragmatic in their approach.
One crucial aspect of Indonesian society to keep inmindwhen looking
at such cases as Cikeusik is that – borrowing a view on corruption put
forward by Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken⁷⁷ – freedom of
religion in Indonesia should be seen as a political process instead of an
abstract concept devoid of political causes and implications. This view
should be combined with a realistic understanding of the role of the law
in Indonesian society, as presented by Robert Cribb in the same edited
volume: ‘[a]ll this illegal activity leads some observers into the impression
that law matters little in Indonesia. This is a mistaken impression. The
central characteristic of the Indonesian system is that law matters, but
only to some people and only in some circumstances. Indonesia is not a
lawless society, but rather one in which law is unevenly implemented.’⁷⁸
In this context it is worth noting that throughout the Ahmadiyah
controversy in 2011, pks lawmakers more than other parliamentarians of
Islam-based parties tried to push the issue into the judicial sphere by
stressing the law enforcement implications of Cikeusik and downplaying
its religious dimensions.⁷⁹ The latter part of the story was sufficiently
covered by the ppp, and it seems that the pks – despite its fundamental
objections to Ahmadiyah beliefs on religious grounds – used the
controversy to boost its credentials as a mature, law-abiding party for all
citizens. In doing so, it took up a position quite in line with that of the nu
and Muhammadiyah, as these socio-religious organisations also stressed
the need for the state to focus on law enforcement and not religious
matters. The ppp at the dpr called for an outright ban on Ahmadiyah,
while from within the pkb there was both a denunciation of the Cikeusik
violence in terms similar to those in which the nu condemned the killings
and a push for a legal solution. pan lawmakers stressed that Ahmadis
 Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken, ‘The state and illegality in Indonesia’,
introduction to Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (eds.),The state and
illegality in Indonesia. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-,
Land- en Volkenkunde No. 269 (Leiden: kitlv Press, 2011), 28.
 Robert Cribb, ‘A system of exemptions. Historicizing state illegality in Indonesia’,
in Aspinall and Van Klinken (eds.),The state and illegality in Indonesia, 33.
 At the same time though, the pks, through its 2008 bayan on Ahmadiyah, had
warned its followers in great detail about the practical implications of Ahmadiyah’s
perceived deviance.
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have the right to live in Indonesia as citizens but also saw a need for
dialogue to bring Ahmadis back to the straight path.
Even though there are plenty of laws that could have been invoked to
offer Ahmadis protection from persecution (the 1945 Constitution, to
name but one example), there was only very little to be gained politically
from taking their side in a dispute that has successfully been cast in a
religious light by hardline activists. For many, the responsibility for the
conflict and violence lies squarely with the Ahmadiyah. As a result, the
law did not matter so much – either on that fateful day in early February
2011 or later in court.

part 2
SHARIA-BASED LEGISLATION AND THE LEGAL
POSITION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Kees van Dijk
In the closing years of the New Order the Indonesian government
made a number of gestures to show that it had the aspirations of the
Islamic community at heart. One was the promulgation of the Religious
Judicature Act of December 1989, which gave Islamic courts their own
well-defined independent place in Indonesia’s legal system. Muslims no
longer had to worry, as they had done in the past, that the state might aim
at dissolving the religious courts, while their decisions could no longer
be challenged in secular courts. Their scope was also extended. Until
then, the authority of the religious courts had been limited to matters
concerning marriage and divorce. From now on, decision-making on
inheritance cases was added to their power.¹ As a result, a decision
from 1937 to remove inheritance from the competence of Islamic courts
operating within the Dutch legal system (which at that time only existed
in Java, Madura, and South Kalimantan and had led to much protest
amongst Muslims) was overruled. The colonial authorities, obsessed
with the study of adat (customs) and certainly not with the study of
Islam, had decided on this because they had come to the conclusion that
inheritance rules in Java were based on customary law, not on Islamic law.
A second gesture was to provide the Islamic courts and their judges with
a ‘Compilation of Islamic Law’ in the fields of marriage, inheritance and
endowment. Published in 1991 as a Presidential Instruction, it generally
came to be referred to as the Kompilasi. As Euis Nurlaelawati has argued
in her PhD thesis about the Kompilasi, it brings together the relevant
traditional legal texts and Qurʾanic quotations, while the influence of
customary law and the wish to bring the Islamic legal system in Indonesia
in line with modern times can also be discerned.
 Reflecting the growing popularity of Islamic economics, in 2006 the authority of
the religious courts also came to include certain economic transactions concluded
in accordance with Islamic law.
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After 1998, when the Reform Era started, the role of the central and
regional government in promoting Islam changed. What came to the
fore can best be described as an effort to promote decency and morality
by stressing religious values. As is pointed out in this section of the book,
the resulting stated intentions and regulations are at times vehemently
contested by part of the Islamic community (and in a number of instances
also by non-Muslims) because of their impact on the lives of Indonesians.
At the national level the original draft of the Anti-Pornography Act of
2008, inspired by puritan Islamic moral perceptions, is one example.
Its wording led to protests by feminists, artists, Hindus and Christians,
fearing that their way of life might be affected. Another is the plan
revealed in March 2013 to amend the criminal code, among other things,
tomake living together outside wedlock punishable by law and to increase
the sentences for adultery.
The same intention of creating a society governed by high moral stan-
dards is reflected in a specific category of regulations issued by regional
representative bodies and heads of administration. All issued after 1999,
when the central government allowed greater regional autonomy, they are
lumped together as Sharia Regional Regulations because of the religious
motivation underlying their drafting. Their promulgation is the result of
the interplay between the religious sentiments of local politicians and
administrators driven by national and local Islamist pressure groups, the
desire for political gain by playing the religious card, and the give and
take game of coalition politics; and, not forgetting social pressure and
a (wish for a) wider and stricter adherence to Islam and its prescripts
and rituals in society. Upholding the byelaws is a matter for the secular
authorities. Except for Aceh, there is no Sharia police and the powers of
the religious courts, again with the exception of Aceh, do not pertain to
matters dealt with in the byelaws.
Some of the regional regulations have come under scrutiny because
they limit women’s options with regard to dress and restrict their freedom
of movement. A number of them, their history and reception, are
discussed in this section. Examples include regulations in Cianjur in
West Java presented by Euis Nurlaelawati, in Bantul in Yogyakarta, and in
Bulukumba in South Sulawesi reported on by respectively Muhammad
Latif Fauzi and Stijn van Huis. (Aceh, where such regulations have also
been promulgated, has a separate section in this book). All, in one way or
another, are an attempt to combat anti-social behaviour inspired by the
conviction that Islam and religiosity provide the means to accomplish
this.
Some of these byelaws prescribe Islamic dress codes for civil servants
(and in an exceptional case non-Muslim civil servants have to conform
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as well). In Bulukumba women visiting government offices and the
religious court also have to wear a headscarf. A headscarf, which leaves
the face visible, has become a widely accepted accessory of female dress
in Indonesia, and, as Euis Nurlaelawati’s research in Cianjur indicates,
not many of the female civil servants concerned seem to mind, but it is
striking that female police officers in Cianjur, employed by a national and
not a regional institution, refuse to wear one. Other regional regulations
issued or announced but never implemented concern the freedom of
women to be alone out in the streets in the evening, usually promulgated,
it appears, as part of the effort to root out prostitution.² One of these
was issued in Tangerang. Because both the stereotyping of women being
out on their own in the evening (and using makeup) and probably the
various references to traditional Islamic restrictions on women travelling
alone influenced its implementation, the byelaw resulted in the arrest of
non-prostitutes – and the fear is that this may happen again. Similarly
wrongful arrests were made in Bantul.
The reasoning behind such rules, and behind the wider campaign to
have women cover their heads and to discourage them from wearing
‘revealing’ clothes, indicates that (and Indonesia is no exception on this
point) conservative or male chauvinist ideas still prevail about the sexual
needs of men and their difficulty in controlling their sex drive. Euis
Nurlaelawati’s analysis shows that they also influence the decisions of the
Islamic courts. The failure of a wife to fulfill the high sexual desire of her
husband is an important stated reason in pleas of husbands to get the
required permission of a religious court to enter a polygamous marriage.
Both Euis Nurlaelawati and Stijn van Huis also investigate access to
justice for women provided by religious courts and whether judges are
sensitive to their interests. Both are positive about the granting of a divorce
to women petitioning the court to do so (though Euis Nurlaelawati
notes that in such instances judges tend to follow classical rules not
allowing a post-divorce allowance, unlike the Kompilasi which does).
Both also point to problems arising after a divorce has been granted.
From Euis Nurlaelawati’s discussion about the courts in Tangerang,
Serang and Cianjur it becomes clear that when custody over and alimony
for children after divorce are concerned, religious courts lack the power
and instruments to enforce their decisions outside court and are unable
to take action when the former husband disregards the judgment. In his
research about divorce cases in Islamic courts in Bulukumba, Stijn van
 In Padang in 2001, the local authorities contemplated introducing a regulation
which would forbid women not accompanied by a close male relative or husband
to leave the house after 21:00 hours, but no regulation was issued.
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Huis also touches upon problems women may encounter when it comes
to their post-divorce rights with respect to alimony, child support and
the division of communal marital property among the former spouses.
Besides the lack of a proper follow-up after the court has pronounced
its judgment as a result of which divorced women may not get what
they are entitled to, he also points to the procedure followed in reaching
a decision. Judges prefer to settle complicated matters by an informal
out-of-court compromise, which is not mentioned in the final sentence.
As Stijn van Huis states, ‘[t]he Islamic court personnel have a preference
for informal agreements, and push claims of women outside the realm
of the court. Even when the claim is formally made in the court, the
judge will attempt to negotiate an agreement with both parties.’ Van Huis
identifies the enforcement of court decisions as the weakest element in
rulings about child support. There are no formal mechanisms at all in
place to force the former husband to fulfill his obligations.
From the contributions presented in this section it can be surmised
that traditional Islamic legal doctrines and notions are still prevalent. A
telling example of this is provided by Euis Nurlaelawati’s analysis of the
decisions taken by religious courts in Cianjur, Tangerang and Serang
(Banten) regarding polygamy. While existing secular legislation and
the section of the Kompilasi limiting the practice are disregarded, the
judges give priority to classical religious arguments allowing polygamy.
It seems that, to use an Indonesian expression, much ‘socialisation’ of the
Kompilasi still has to be done before judges will base their decisions on
those aspects that have been included to further the interests of women
and children.
4 Sharia-Based Laws
The Legal Position of Women and
Children in Banten and West Java1
Euis Nurlaelawati
1 Introduction
Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, calls for the introduction of Sharia
have become more widespread. This does not mean that prior to 1998
no developments in this area occurred. A well-known example is that
of Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991, the Kompilasi Hukum Islam
(Compilation of Islamic Law), henceforth called Kompilasi, issued in
1991, which is considered to be a step towards further codification
of Islamic law at the national level. Not only at the national level,
but also at the local level there are many ongoing developments in
this field. Indeed, as an effect of the policy of decentralisation that
was implemented in 1999, the ways in which the introduction of
Sharia manifests itself at the local level can vary greatly from region to
region.
Decentralisation did not concern religious affairs and, apart from in
Aceh, which was granted self-government after the Helsinki Agreement
of August 2005, regional administrations are not allowed to issue religious
regulations. As a consequence, the introduction of Sharia at the local level
is limited, in an Islamic sense, to the public sphere and mostly concerns
ritual and morality.² This does not mean, however, that the initiatives
taken are insignificant. An example is the (demand for) curtailment
of the freedom of movement of women under Sharia-based local
regulations by, for instance, requiring them to wear a headscarf ( jilbab) in
 This is a shortened version of the report submitted to the Islam Research
Programme Jakarta. See Regime Change, Democracy and Islam. The Case of
Indonesia. Final Report Islam Research Programme Jakarta (Leiden, 2013).
 Arskal Salim, ‘Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratisations: The Religious
Majority andThe Rights of Minority in the Post-New Order Era’, in R.H. McLeod
and A. MacIntyre (eds.), Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good
Governance (Singapore: Southeast Asian Studies, 2007).
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government offices and educational institutions and restricting their
freedom to leave the house at night.
In a society biased in favour of men injustice and inequalities
are common. Gender prejudice may lead to violence against women
and their political and economic marginalisation. Children may be
discriminated against by parents or other parties. In courts, these
inequalities may manifest themselves in judgments that appear to be
unfair, and which emanate from subordination and gender-biased
perspectives and decision-making methods.
Generally speaking, continuous efforts have been made in Indonesia
with regard to legal improvement and legislation to defend the rights
and equal status of women and children. Several articles in the Marriage
Law (Law No. 1 of 1974) and in the Kompilasi, for example, try to
provide protection to women and children. Furthermore, laws ratifying a
number of international covenants have strengthened the empowerment
and protection of women and children. In addition, judicial system
reforms have been introduced by religious courts as a result of close
cooperation with international donors. While, to some extent, the
position of women has somewhat improved and women now receive
more justice in some cases, the expectations and intentions have not
entirely been fulfilled, and this has brought about continuous demands
for revision and refinement of these legal products in order that they
may mould with the many social changes that have occurred and that
affect the interests of children and the relations between women and
men.
This contribution is based on research that examined court decisions
and narratives of hearings, and investigates how laws on familial issues,
particularly those that relate to women such as the Law of Marriage and
the Kompilasi, are applied.³The cases that were observed include divorce,
custody, spousal alimony and alimony for children, and polygamy in
three courts: in Cianjur in West Java, and Serang and Tangerang in
Banten. The research also looked at the national laws from a practical
level by observing women’s responses, and their application by judges of
religious courts. A number of court hearings were attended, judges – in
particular female – and litigants were interviewed and court rulings were
analysed. The research was undertaken over six months in three periods
in 2010; the first lasted fromMay to June, the second from August to
October, and the last took place in December. In 2011, in order to better
 I collected 158 decisions issued by the three courts being surveyed. Excluding
decisions on inheritance cases, I analysed 42 decisions issued by the court of
Tangerang, 49 by that of Serang, and 24 by the court of Cianjur.
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understand the legal knowledge and awareness of women in general,
I interviewed 12 women and distributed questionnaires to 100 women
in three different areas in Tangerang. With regard to women’s issues
in the public sphere, one regulation was studied in closer detail: the
Cianjur Sharia-based local regulation on the requirement for female
Muslim civil servants to wear a jilbab. To gain a picture of the response
to it I interviewed women, distributed questionnaires and visited the
offices of the regional administration, the local police and the local public
hospital.
Presenting a number of court cases, this contribution argues that the
legal position of women has strengthened in cases only where technical
judicial reforms have been introduced. It also suggests that women still
face inequalities in court decisions on familial cases and that a number
of local regulations have restricted women’s freedom of choice in the
public sphere.
2 Women in Indonesia’s National Statutory and Local
Regulations
Women have long been an important topic in legal discourse in Muslim
countries. Under Sharia, women are treated differently from men. In
light of the fact that many classical Islamic family laws placed women
in a subordinate position, the Indonesian government initiated legal
reforms and introduced new rules at the national level, included in the
1974 Law of Marriage and the Kompilasi, to improve women’s standing in
family law. This section discusses women and the legal rules that apply
to them under Islamic family law and local Sharia regulations.
2.1 Personal or Family Laws
Following the trend to codify Islamic family law in a number of Muslim
countries, Indonesia issued the so-called Kompilasi Hukum Islam in 1991.
Keeping pace with the growing demand by society for gender equality,
Indonesia has used the Kompilasi to take notice of women’s interests,
paying special attention to polygamy, divorce, marital property and
post-divorce rights for women. Here, I will discuss briefly the rules on
these issues laid down in the Kompilasi. I refer to the Kompilasi, but
am aware of its low legal standing as it was issued only as a presidential
instruction. The Kompilasi is a regulation that applies specifically to
Indonesian Muslims and legal issues relating to the Kompilasi are dealt
with by judges in the religious courts.
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When looking at legislation on polygamy introduced in Muslim
countries, two trends emerge. The first is for polygamy to be entirely
abolished and considered a crime; and the second is for it to be permitted
but, in order to avoid the abuse of its practice, to be governed by
strict regulations.⁴ In the latter case polygamy requires the court’s
permission and is dependent on husbands meeting certain requirements
and conditions. By including these restrictive conditions, Qurʾanic
standards of ‘equal justice’ are no longer a matter for themoral conscience
of the individual, but rather a legal matter to be decided by the court.
Indonesia has taken the second approach, allowing polygamy. Articles
55, 56 and 57 of the Kompilasi thoroughly administer polygamy and list
the required conditions and qualifications. These articles insist that a
polygamous marriage can be solemnised only if all these conditions
are fulfilled, and only if one of the reasons mentioned in the legisla-
tion allowing it exists. Failure to fulfill the requirements results in its
prohibition. Above all, the approval of the court is absolutely essential
and this means that such a marriage can be legally recognised only if
it is approved by the court. However, Articles 58(3) and 59 abolish the
necessity for the wife’s consent. Article 58(3) regulates the condition
when wives are absent and their whereabouts are unknown, preventing
them from being involved in the case. It states that the consent of a wife
or wives does not have to be taken into account if she or they could not
be consulted, or if her or their whereabouts have not been known for two
years, or if other conditions prevent her or them from being involved
in the case that is being reviewed by the judge.⁵ Further, Article 59 lays
down rules for situations where husbands have presented grounds for
divorce, but wives have refused to give their consent. In such instances,
the courts have superior authority. It states that:
In cases where wives are reluctant to give her or their consent and
the husbands’ proposal for polygamy has met one of the specified
reasons as ruled in Art. 55 (2), the religious court has the right to make
a decision on the proposal, after they have heard the wives’ argument
and clarifications in court.⁶
 For a detailed discussion of the legal reform on polygamy in a number of Muslim
countries see JanMichiel Otto (ed.), Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview
of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden:
Leiden University Press, 2010). See also John L. Esposito,Women in Muslim
Family Law (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 92.
 Article 58 of the Kompilasi.
 Article 59 of the Kompilasi.
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Wife and husband can appeal to a higher court.
Polygamy is also regulated by two governmental regulations, i.e.
Peraturan Pemerintah (pp) No. 10/1983 and pp No. 45/1990 that apply
to civil servants. pp No. 10/1983 regulates the procedure for a male civil
servant entering into polygamy. It states that a male civil servant can
become polygamous only if permission is obtained from his superior
and prohibits female civil servants from being second wives to male civil
servants. pp No. 45/1990 lays down stricter rules prohibiting female civil
servants from marrying not only married civil servants, but also married
non-civil servants.
Concerning divorce, Indonesia, like other Muslim countries, has
limited the practice of divorce by requiring both husband and wife to
bring a petition for divorce to court. The Kompilasi includes detailed
rules on divorce and specifies grounds for it to be permitted. A reform
which strengthens the rights of wives in divorce proceedings con-
cerns the wife’s petition, which is known in Indonesian as gugat cerai.
The Kompilasi mentions two varieties of such divorce proceedings, as
regulated by Article 148. The article does leave some room for inter-
pretation, but states that in cases where the woman wishes to petition
for a khuluk divorce – where the woman pays financial compensation
to the man – the judges of a religious court must explain to husband
and wife the consequences of khuluk. After both parties agree on the
amount of financial compensation (iwadl), the religious court issues
a decision granting the husband permission to pronounce the divorce
formula. There is no appeal from this decision. However, when no
agreement is reached on the amount of compensation, the religious
court judges are required to hear and treat the case as a ‘common
case’. In other words, in that case the divorce cannot proceed as khu-
luk.
From this article, I understand that not all divorces under wives’
petitions or gugat cerai can be treated as khuluk. The Kompilasi has
therefore gone beyond fiqh or Islamic classical legal doctrines and
introduced an important reform, giving wives the right to petition for
divorce without always having to pay financial compensation.Thismeans,
therefore, that a wife also has a right to spousal alimony if her petition
for divorce was made using non-khuluk proceedings.
The issue of custody after divorce is regulated by Article 105. It grants
custody of children younger than 12 years to their mothers, and gives
freedom to those aged 12 years or older to choose either of the parents to
be their guardian.
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2.2 Perda Sharia and Women: Morality and Ethics
Sharia is not only accommodated by laws at the national level, but
it is also taken as a basis for regulations issued at a local level. The
second amendment of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution by the People’s
Consultative Assembly established during the reforms of 1998 prompted
the rise of the enactment of Sharia-based local regulations. Article 18
of the Constitution opened up the possibility for a local government to
issue such Islamic regulations. The article provides a legal basis for the
districts that are endowed with regional autonomy to manage their own
regional affairs. Regional autonomy itself is mandated by the Regional
Autonomy Laws No. 22/1999 and 25/1999 which were implemented in
2001.⁷
The primary objective of these laws is to offer more authority and
power to regions to manage their own affairs. The enactment of local
regulations (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) has become one of the local
government’s main tools for developing their respective regions.⁸ It
is in this context that Sharia-based byelaws have begun to be enacted.
Apart from Aceh, a number of regions and cities have enacted such
regulations, including Bulukumba (discussed in this book by Stijn
Cornelis van Huis), Bantul (discussed by Muhammad Latif Fauzi), and
Cianjur. Although the majority of Sharia-based regulations enacted
apply to both men and women, it is the position of women that is most
affected.
There are at least two areas in which these regulations may affect
women. These two areas, if we follow Salim’s categorisation, may fall into
either the category of public order and anti-vice regulations, including the
banning of prostitution and alcohol, or that of religious symbolism, which
includes the obligation to wear Muslim clothing,⁹ and relate primarily
to morality and ethics. Such regulations are partly a response to the
claim by Islamists that Indonesia faces serious problems as a result of
moral decline in society. Such Islamists argue that women are the source
of a number of such problems.¹⁰ And they believe that such problems
 Nur Rifah and Honest Dody Molasy, ‘Questioning Women Security in Perda
Syariah (Critics to Indonesian District Policies)’, a paper presented at the Human
Security Conference organized by seas in 2010.
 M.B. Hooker, Indonesian Syariah: Defining a National School of Islamic Law
(Singapore: iseas, 2008), 244.
 Salim, ‘Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratisations’, 115–137.
 Karni, Budiarti, and Barus, ‘Batas Niat Baik dan Komoditas Politik’, Nasional,
www.gatra.com, 2006.
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would be solved if there were legislation in place which obliged women
to amend their attitudes and behaviour.
In Cianjur an association of Muslims called simlui (Silaturahmi dan
Musyawarah Umat Islam/Good Relationship and Consultation in the
Islamic Community) urged the implementation of Sharia, and con-
vinced the people of Cianjur that Sharia is the solution to social ills
and could improve the morality of Cianjur society. Members of sim-
lui therefore promoted a number of regulations inspired by Islamic
doctrines which called for the adoption of Islamic dress codes, requir-
ing that Muslim women wear a jilbab. To give substance to local
byelaw No. 3/2006 on the Movement to Create a Pious Society/Gate
to Love and Peace (Gerakan Pembanguan Masyarakat Berakhlaqul
Karimah/Gerbang Marhamah) the bupati (regent) of Cianjur required
Muslim civil servants to conform to Muslim dress codes in govern-
ment office. However, while the Bulukumba regulation on the jil-
bab applies to all women, the Cianjur regulation is only in force for
Muslim civil servants. Male civil servants are also expected to follow
Muslim dress rules and have to wear a so-called baju koko when in
office.
As is the case also elsewhere in Indonesia, the Cianjur regulation was,
according to its proponents, issued to provide security for women and
protect their dignity. However, opponents of these regulations argue
that the way women are protected has in fact marginalised them and
confined them to domestic life; according to them, women have become
the victims of these Sharia-based regulations.
3 Women at Religious Courts: Judges’ Legal Discretion
This section observes the outcomes for women of legal cases in the
courts and the factors contributing to these outcomes. The key points
that are investigated relate to how religious court judges regard and
position women who are involved in legal disputes and the degree to
which women’s interests are served in court.
3.1 Remaining Subordinate: In Which Case(s) and Why?
Despite many reforms, women continue to have a weak position in
court in cases of polygamy, custody and post-divorce alimony for their
children. There are a number of factors that contribute to this.
144 islam, politics and change
3.2 Polygamy: Loose Application of Law and Traditional
Interpretation
In the case of polygamy, women are often not able to negotiate or indeed
influence the judges’ judicial discretion. Although polygamy is regulated
in the Kompilasi and in ppNo. 10/1983, which was amended in 1990 by the
pp No. 45/1990 to make the practice of polygamy more difficult, judges
in the three courts observed remain gender-biased and unreceptive to
women in this matter.
What does current research say about this matter? Pusat Studi Hukum,
Konstitusi dan Hak Asasi Manusia, puskumham (the Centre for the
Study of Law, Constitution, and Human Rights, State Islamic University,
Jakarta), concluded that a number of judges have been sensitive to gender
issues, as can be demonstrated by their attitude when resolving cases of
divorce, joint property and polygamy. It also reported that some judges
in the court of Aceh have been very much concerned with protecting
women’s rights and are receptive to gender issues.¹¹ Hearings of cases of
polygamy during which judges required husbands to reconsider their
decision, and reminded husbands of the sanctions in the event of unfair
or unequal treatment of co-wives, for example, illustrate that gender
sensitivity in courts in Aceh has increased. Another case from Aceh on
divorce, in which judges awarded a greater portion of joint property to
the wife – the reason for the divorce being the husband’s polygamy –
also demonstrates that judges can be quite sensitive to gender issues.
It must be mentioned, however, that judges only started to become
more aware of gender issues following the introduction of a number
of training programmes by several centres of women’s studies targeted
at strengthening gender sensitivity in court. Through these training
sessions, principles of equality, justice and fairness were introduced.¹²
The results of my research, however, differ from the findings of
puskumham. I found that most of the judges in the three courts featured
in this research seemed to remain biased or unreceptive in respect of this
issue, despite having received training on gender sensitivity. They often
refer to the Qurʾanic verse that allows polygamy. Although the Qurʾan
stresses justice and a number of verses – Al Nisa (4) verse 3 and Al Nisa
(4) verse 129 – tend to discourage polygamy, many judges are of the
view that polygamy is acceptable and does not deviate from the Qurʾan.
 See Arskal Salim (ed.), Demi Keadilan dan Kesetaraan: Dokumentasi Program
Sensitivitas Gender Hakim Agama (Jakarta: puskumham, 2009).
 For the curricula and materials of the training see Salim, Demi Keadilan dan
Kesetaraan, 22–26.
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One of judges said that polygamy is allowed according to the firm law,
the Qurʾan, and no law can be made to violate it.¹³ It seems, then, that
gender sensitivity training does not always have the desired and full
effect, and certainly as a single factor is incapable of changing the minds
of judges on these sensitive issues. Indeed, a number of other factors
are also relevant: the judge’s personality and educational and family
background also contribute to whether or not the judge is receptive to
training on gender sensitivity.¹⁴ The way training is conducted may also
play a role. puskumham found that the judges of these three courts were
trained by a centre for women’s studies (Pusat Studi Wanita, psw) with
an approach and a method quite different from the method employed by
centres in Aceh.¹⁵
I collected nine decisions on requests for polygamy in the period
2007–2009 made by the religious court of Cianjur. The court approved
of all nine. The reasons for approval vary according to the reasons put
forward by the petitioners (husbands), ranging from the inability of their
wives to provide descendants or them being serious ill, to a sexually
dissatisfied husband. It is worth mentioning that, although this is not
always explicitly stated, high sexual desire is the dominant motive for
these petitions. Indeed, in four of the nine cases polygamy was requested
on the grounds that the wives could not satisfy their husbands’ sexual
desires. That the requests were granted indicates that judges in this
court remain open to polygamy and are not particularly strict about the
rules, often accepting invalid reasons presented by husbands as sufficient
grounds for polygamy.¹⁶
The court of Cianjur is no exception. Judges in the other two courts in
my research made very similar decisions. From the 45 judgments issued
by the court of Serang on various cases, six are on polygamy; out of the 72
cases collected from the court of Tangerang, five.¹⁷ Although the reasons
 Interview with the head of the religious court of Tangerang, May 2011.
 For a discussion on the influence of these on the gender sensitivity of people,
including judges, see Geeta Sarma and Deepa Sonpal, ‘Gender Awareness and
Sensitivity Applications’, Unnati Organisation for Development Education,
Gujarat, India, 2008. See also Karen Czapanskiy, ‘Gender Bias in the Courts:
Social Change Strategies’, Journal of Legal Ethics (4)1, 1990.
 See Salim, Demi Keadilan dan Kesetaraan, 32–35.
 I have copies of all nine judgments. Some of them are identified as Decisions
No. 255/Pdt.G/2008/PA.Cjr, No. 290/Pdt.G/2008/PA.Cjr, No. 393/Pdt.G/2007/
PA.Cjr, and No. 358/Pdt.G/2007/PA.Cjr.
 hukumonline, Indonesia’s leading source of legal news, found that of 1,016
applications for permission to marry polygamously lodged in religious courts
in 2004 800 were approved, as were 776 out of 1,148 in 2006. Quoting these
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given in the decisions issued by the court of Tangerang include religious
observance (ibadah)¹⁸ in two cases, wives’ failure to satisfy the sexual
desire of their husbands in two cases, and the husband’s high mobility
in one case, all five of the petitions, plus two petitions in the court of
Serang, were basically approved in order to fulfill the high sexual desire
of the petitioners (husbands).¹⁹
To give an example, a housing contractor (with one wife) who had
been living in Serang for a year for his work while his wife and four
children had stayed behind in Bandung, had asked the court of Serang to
allow a polygamous marriage after he had met a woman in Serang and
had fallen in love with her. To avoid extra-marital sexual intercourse
(zina) he wanted to marry her. The reason he advanced was that his
wife could not fulfill his sexual needs as she was living far away. The
judges agreed on the condition that his wife gave her consent and that the
husband had sufficient financial resources. The judgment also stated that
it was feared that the husband would be tempted into extra-marital sexual
intercourse unless his request were granted. The reason put forward by
the husband is not specified in the law. He simply stated that his wife had
figures Butt remarks that, given Indonesia’s large population, the numbers seem
quite small. Nonetheless, he suggests that the proportion of approvals may sup-
port his and other researchers’ claims of a relatively permissive approach by
judges to polygamy, with which I agree. See Simon Butt, ‘Islam, the State and the
Constitutional Court in Indonesia’, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, 19 (2),
2010, 291. For details on the number of polygamy applications and approvals
in those years see Menguak Sisi Gelap Poligami, hukumonline, 23 Decem-
ber 2006, www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol15941/menguak-sisi-gelap
-poligami (accessed June 2011); SyaratPoligami akan Diperkuat, hukumonline,
19 February 2009, www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol21230/syarat-poligami
-akan-diperketat (accessed June 2011).
 Muhammad Insa, an Indonesian Muslim who considers polygamy a religious
observance (ibadah) to be upheld by Muslims, challenged the stipulations on
polygamy in the Law of Marriage and the Kompilasi. He protested that these were
in violation of the right of religious freedom and petitioned for judicial review by
the Constitutional Court rather than applying for polygamy at the religious court.
He argued that polygamy is a matter of ibadah and the state has to allow Muslims
to practise it. Arguing that the rules on polygamy do not violate people’s rights,
the Constitutional Court dismissed Insa’s application. For a further discussion
on this issue see Faye Yik-Wei Chan, ‘Religious Freedom vs. Women’s Rights in
Indonesia: The Case of Muhammad Insa’, Archipel 83, Paris, 2012, 113–145. See
also Butt, ‘Islam, the State, and the Constitutional Court in Indonesia’, 2010.
 Some of these judgments are identified as Decisions No. 280/Pdt.G/2009/PA. Srg,
No. 526/Pdt.G/2009/PA.Srg, No. 322/Pdt.G/2009/PA.Srg, No. 211/Pdt.G/2008/
PA.Tng, and No. 164/Pdt.G/2008/PA.Tng.
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not moved with him to his new place of residence and that he intended
to avoid extra-marital sexual intercourse with the other woman.The wife
gave her consent, but, according to the law, she should only have done so
after the husband had presented a legitimate reason, one specified in the
law.
In another case, a woman with four children could not but consent
when, after 20 years of marriage, her husband asked the court of Cianjur
to allow him to marry a second wife, a widow, on the ground that his
wife was no longer able to satisfy his sexual needs. He promised to treat
his co-wives justly and declared that he was capable of supporting them
financially. Unlike in other cases, the wife appeared in court to announce
that she had no objections. The judges gave their permission without
making any further statements or requiring evidence to support the
husband’s claim.
The two cases are striking in view of the comprehensive rules
regulating polygamy in Indonesia. The rules should lead to stricter
control of polygamy and ensure that arbitrary polygamous marriage
cannot legitimately be concluded unless the arguments put forward in
such cases are those specified in the laws. These examples suggest that, in
fact, the contrary is true: judges do not always seem to adhere to the rules
and, in contrast to divorce, polygamy seems difficult to control and to be
‘vernacularised’ (interpreted according to modern legal discourse). A
number of judges believe that polygamy has a clear Islamic legal rationale.
Some of them frankly admitted that if they were to reject polygamy, they
would be deviating from Sharia.²⁰ These factors combined lead judges to
a loose application of the state law.
Such a tendency can also be seen from the judges’ argument that
they are not required to see whether the consent of the wife is sincere
or not. Equally, they are not required to check whether the wife is
genuinely unable to satisfy the husband’s sexual desire or unable to
have children, when husbands present such reasons to support their
request for polygamy.²¹ Above all, in their judgments, most of the
judges looked at and stressed the qualifications to be met by husbands,
rather than the reasons why husbands request a polygamous marriage.
Consequently, they can accept any reason the husbands present, even
 Based on interviews with six judges of the religious courts of Serang and
Tangerang, 2011.
 Interview with judges of Tangerang religious court, July 2011 and based on content
analysis of decisions on several petitions for polygamy. See also M.B. Hooker,
Indonesian Syariah: Defining National School of Islamic Law (Singapore: iseas,
2008), 12–13.
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those not mentioned in the relevant legislation. Rather than stressing
justice in their legal reasoning, the emphasis appears to be on the
concept of maslahat (public interest). Also, rather than considering
the consequences of their decision for the first marriages (judgments
in my collection tend to indicate that polygamy is detrimental to first
wives and that many first wives petition for a divorce on the grounds
of continuous disputes resulting from the husband’s polygamy), judges
focus on the potential zina of husbands with their new female partner.
Interestingly, many judges interviewed admitted to having received
training on gender sensitivity; indeed, many felt that they were receptive
to gender issues. In practice, however, they appeared to have misunder-
stood the issue. This lack of gender sensitivity clearly came to the fore
during an academic forum at which I presented a paper and which a
number of judges from the three courts attended. The forum discussed
access to Islamic justice, and one of the sessions was devoted to women’s
issues. When the issue of polygamy came up and one of the speakers,
Maria Ulfah, expressed her disapproval of this practice, one of the judges
present stood up and declared his unwavering support for polygamy,
arguing that permission for polygamy is clearly stated in the Qurʾan.
He was supported in his view by a female judge who offered a more
reasonable and practical argument. She admitted that she and other
colleagues were often faced with requests to allow polygamy and that
she often saw first wives being treated badly by their husbands if they
refused to consent. She assumed that if a petition was not approved, a
wife might be worse off. Giving permission for polygamy was therefore a
way to protect these women.
3.3 Custody and the Notion of ‘Best Interests of the Child(ren)’
With regard to custody and post-divorce alimony for children, women
are also often in a weak position. In the classical legal doctrines, the rules
relating to custody vary according to the different schools of Islamic law.
However, they all agree that the age of the children determines who has
the right to custody when parents separate.²²
Custody refers to the physical care and control of a minor. In other
words, custody is the right to the physical presence of the child. ‘Custody’
can exist only in relation to the minor’s person, not over his or her
 See Wahbah al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islamiyy wa Adillatuhu (Damaskus: Dar al-
Fikr, 1984), Vol. 10, 4th edition, 7306. See also Al-Jaziri, Al-Fiqh ʿala al-Madhahib
al-Arbaʾa, 596–598; Dimsaqy, Kifayat al-Akhyar, Vol. ii, 152, and Bajuri, Hashiya
Kifayat al-Akhyar, Vol. ii, 198 and 203.
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property. The person who is granted this right is called a custodian.
Custody differs from guardianship and a custodian has narrower duties
than a guardian, who has rights and duties with respect to the care and
control of a minor’s person or property. With regard to guardianship,
which includes financial maintenance for children, fathers and their
relatives are given more rights. Decision-making about the persons and
property of children under the legal age (21, when a child is not married)
is consistently vested in the father and, in cases where he is absent,
in one of his relatives.²³ While physical care of the children can be the
responsibility ofmothers or fathers, mothers have superior rights in terms
of the custody of children under the age of puberty (ghayr mumayyiz).²⁴
In Indonesia, the rules on custody modify those of the classical
legal doctrines (fiqh) and do not follow Shafiʾite legal opinion to which
Indonesians Muslim adhere for the majority of legal issues. Shafiʾites
define the age of puberty as seven.²⁵ In the Kompilasi, it is ruled that
custody of children aged 11 and under is to be awarded to their mothers
and children aged 12 and above can choose which of the parents they
want to stay with.²⁶
In Indonesian religious courts, a custody case can be resolved by
filing a separate case or as part of a divorce case. Cases of custody are
mostly brought by women. In custodial cases a woman can face two
challenges: one is to gain the right to custody, the other actually to be
able to exercise that right after it has been awarded to her by the court.
In the first instance, problems can arise when the husband argues that
the divorce petition is motivated by his wife’s behaviour. For example,
husbands seeking custody may argue that the wife is not fit to bring up
the children because she leaves home for work or because of her religious
impiety. After a woman has been given custody, it can happen that the
former husband refuses to hand over the children, or that the alimony
for children is paid irregularly or not at all.
The decisions of Indonesian religious courts relating to custody cases
generally emphasise the best interests of the child(ren), as is stressed in
the Kompilasi. However, these rulings rest on the perception of individual
judges as to what constitutes the ‘best interests’, which is, as also concluded
 Asha Bajpai, ‘Custody and Guardianship of Children in India’, Family Law
Quarterly 39 (2), 2005, 441–457.
 Wahbah al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islamiyy wa Adillatuhu, 7308. See also Al-Jaziri,
Al-Fiqh ʿala al-Madhahib al-Arbaʾa, 597–598.
 Wahbah al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islamiyy wa Adillatuhu, 7322.
 Art. 105 of the Kompilasi. See also Euis Nurlaelawati,Modernization, Tradition
and Identity, 144–145.
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by Bajpai in his research,²⁷ a highly abstract notion. A number of decisions
in the cases I studied indeed stated that they were made in ‘the best
interests of children’. However, since every case has a different character
and nature, it is difficult to draw general conclusions about this underlying
reason. Judges domention a number of factors or reasons for awarding or
rejecting custody. However, what is clear is that decisions often favour the
party that was able to negotiate or influence and change a judge’s decision
most effectively and that children lack legal representation in court.
Of the 13 custody cases heard in the courts of Tangerang, Serang and
Cianjur whose decisions were either integrated in decisions on divorce
cases (petitioned by wives) or separate custody cases, five decisions
rejected the former wives’ rights to custody. Two of the five women who
were refused custody by the judges in the courts of first instance did
not negotiate their cases or file an appeal with a higher court. In her
divorce petition, one of the women asked for custody of her four-year-old
son, but this was refused on account of her working outside the home.
Although working mothers have negotiated and been awarded custody in
the past, this instance indicates that in custody cases it is not uncommon
for a judge to question the women concerned to be the right person
to raise the child(ren).²⁸ In this case, the principle of the ‘best interests
of the children’ is not very clear or well-defined. The reason presented
in the second case was the ‘bad character’ of the woman, apparently
demonstrated by her husband’s accusation that she had cheated on him.
The judges agreed with the husband’s allegation that she was not a good
and pious mother and emphasised that they had taken into account the
child’s best interests: a custodian should be able to raise a child physically,
mentally, spiritually and socially in a ‘normal’ manner. They assumed
that if they awarded custody to the mother, the boy might grow up well
physically but not spiritually.²⁹
 Bajpai, ‘Custody and Guardianship of Children in India’, 447.
 Seto Mulyadi, a senior consultant of the National Commission on Children
Protection (Komisi Nasional Perlindungan Anak/Komnas Anak) and a former
chairman of the Commission, mentioned that the committee received a number
of complaints made by women who lost custodial rights over their children under
the age of 12 and reported the cases they received to the Judicial Commission. He
mentioned that in 2012 it received 12 custody cases in which women (mothers)
were deprived of their rights by judges on various grounds. See Cornelus Eko
Susanto, ‘Kak Seto Adukan Masalah Hak Asuh Anak ke ky’, micom, 31 October
2012, http://article.wn.com/view/2012/10/31/Kak_Seto_Adukan_Masalah_Hak
_Asuh_Anak_ke_KY/ (accessed 12 December 2012).
 Personal interview with yl, Tangerang, 2010. See judgement No. 484. Pdt.G/2010/
Tgr.
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3.4 Achieving Better Justice: In What Cases and How? Legal
Assistance and Better Service
Women’s centres have helped Indonesian women to become more aware
of their legal position. Funded by and cooperating with national and
foreign donors, these centres provide advocacy to society. In addition,
the Ministry of Religious Affairs has, since 2006, run a special Course
on Islamic Legal Knowledge for Brides and Grooms (Kursus Calon
Pengantin/Suscatin) held at the Offices of Religious Affairs (Kantor
Urusan Agama). Significant and influential are the legal aid posts
(posbakum) operating since 2011 inside court buildings and run by
the government, and pekka (Perempuan Kepala Keluarga, Female Heads
of Households), an ngo supporting the empowerment of female heads of
households in respect of gaining their legal rights.³⁰ For example, since
its establishment in 2012, in its first four months of operation Cianjur’s
legal aid post provided legal assistance to more than 220 people,³¹ the
majority of whom were women seeking legal aid.
Apart from the increase in legal assistance, better services in court
also lead to greater access to justice for women. Supported by the
wider international community, including the Australian Family Court,
Indonesia’s religious courts are trying to develop their services. The
courts received an increased budget from the national treasury in 2008
and 2009 and, subsequently, have run ‘Prodeo’ (courts for the poor/fee
waivers) and ‘courts on circuit’ (sidang keliling) programmes, which are
largely aimed at helping poor women. ‘Prodeo’ services have been widely
and well utilised by women. In the ‘courts on circuit’ programme, judges
travel to remote areas to collect and hear cases. This programme was
initiated due to the fact that Indonesia has many remote areas where
transport is a problem, preventing people living there from coming
to court. In its annual report for 2012, the court of Cianjur reported
that between January and April it had heard 183 fee waiver (prodeo)
cases and 133 cases on circuit,³² including cases for divorce and marriage
legalisations. In addition, judges in the three courts are often lenient
about the hearing schedule, and are often willing to re-open day hearings
for late-comers.
 Cate Sumner and Tim Lindsey, Courting Reform: Justice for the Poor (Lowy
Institute, 2010), 42–44.
 ‘Laporan Pelaksanaan Sidang Keliling, Prodeo dan Posbakum Tahun 2012 Bulan
Januari s/d April 2012’, Pengadilan Agama Cianjur. 8 May 2012.
 ‘Laporan Pelaksanaan Sidang Keliling, Prodeo dan Posbakum Tahun 2012 Bulan
Januari s/d April 2012’, Pengadilan Agama Cianjur, 8 May 2012.
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3.5 Gender Sensitivity Among Judges: Spousal Alimony after Talak
Gender sensitivity among judges constitutes another factor in terms
of gaining better access to justice for women. Although I mentioned
above that judges have not been receptive towards women in the case of
polygamy, partly thanks to training sessions held by a number of centres
in cooperation with international donors, such as the Embassy of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Asia Foundation, a number of
judges from the courts of Serang, Tangerang and Cianjur, have become
more sensitive to gender issues, particularly in respect of divorce. Almost
all divorce cases initiated by wives heard in these three courts have
resulted in approval.
The gender sensitivity of judges can also be seen in their attempts to
implement the ruling that wives should receive spousal alimony after
divorce. In all 18 cases heard in the courts of Tangerang and Serang,
the judges stated that husbands were required to pay to the clerk the
spousal alimony for three months and themutʾah (gift of consolation)
before they were permitted to pronounce the divorce formula in court.³³
However, judges can also make a different decision and take the financial
circumstances of a husband into account, allowing him to pronounce the
divorce formula without making the payment into court. This usually
comes with a warning from the judge that husbands are expected to
fulfill their obligations later. The judges would argue that such a decision
prevents wives from waiting for a long period for clear legal status, i.e.,
being divorced.
The financial circumstances of the husband may also make judges
decide on a lesser amount of maintenance than demanded by wives.³⁴
In one case in Tangerang, for instance, spousal alimony was fixed at
700,000 rupiah per month for a period of three months and themutʾah
at 500,000 rupiah. There was no agreement on alimony for children
as they had none. After the wife and husband had agreed on the sum,
during the session in which the husband would pronounce the divorce
formula, the court asked the husband if he had the money ready; the
husband said he had. Without being asked, he gave the money to the
clerk who, after checking that the amount was correct, passed it on to
the wife. She received the money in a casual fashion and did not do
what the chief judge asked her to do; that is, to check the amount of
 Based on notes of hearings held in courts of Serang and Tangerang and interviews
with judges in Serang and Tangerang, September, October and November 2010.
 Based on notes of hearings held in courts of Serang and Tangerang and analysis
of a number of judgments issued by these two courts.
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money received. Consequently, having verified that the wife was not
menstruating as demanded by Islamic law, the chief judge permitted the
husband to pronounce the divorce formula. The hearing was then closed
and the litigants shook the judges’ hands and went.³⁵ After two other
cases had been heard the ex-wife approached the chief judge. She tried
to verify what had been decided on the alimony and admitted that only
now did she realise that the amount she had accepted was less than she
had originally asked for and that she would only agree to a divorce if
her financial request was met. The chief judge responded in a relaxed
fashion and said that he indeed remembered the amount requested by
her, but had considered it too much and not realistic. The judge had
taken into account the financial circumstances of the husband and had
decided to lower the amount of alimony that the wife would receive. To
stop her complaining, the chief judge said that judges could fulfill either
the whole petition or part of it and reminded her of her right to appeal
before the final hearing on the declaration of the divorce formula.
Another case involved a woman who was being divorced by her
husband and aware of her post-divorce rights. One of her demands was
dismissed, as it was, according to the judges, excessive, illogical and
unlawful, i.e. uang sakit hati (financial compensation for a broken heart).
However, the judges met her other demands on spousal alimony and a
gift of consolation and asked the husband to make the payments in the
courtroom, which he did. Given these cases, there is some evidence that,
although many husbands do not fulfill their financial obligations due to
insufficient financial means, changes in judges’ attitudes in this area have
helped to improve justice for women to some degree.
4 Sharia-Based Local Regulations: Jilbab Requirement in
Cianjur
The requirement in Cianjur for civil servants to conform to Islamic
dress codes when at work constituted a further implementation of the
local byelaw of 2006 on the intention to establish a pious society. It is an
example of the effort to control the conduct of women in public areas, and
has – like other such efforts elsewhere in Indonesia – led to widespread
debate and criticism. Both those who support the obligation to wear
a jilbab and those who oppose it base their arguments on the concept
of ‘maslahat’ (general well-being) of women, understood as women’s
security and the protection of dignity.
 Based on notes of a hearing held in a court of Tangerang, 5 October 2010.
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Themeasures taken in Cianjur, also known as Kota Santri (City of
Devout Muslims), were presented as a response by the local administra-
tion to tackle moral hazards confronting young men and women. To
promote moral behaviour, the Cianjur administration, on the initiative
of the bupati, Warsidi, formulated a number of intentions, starting with
the Gerbang Marhamah programme, to revive Islamic norms.³⁶ The
programme is promoted all over Cianjur and is therefore well-known.
A large gate as you enter the city of Cianjur has the words ‘Gerbang
Marhamah’ written on it.
A number of regulations were issued to support its implementation,
one of which is the regulation on clothing. Although only female civil
servants have to wear a jilbab, the main Gerbang Marhamah project
aims at all Muslim women. The word akhlak, meaning ‘good conduct’, is
frequently used in official documents and regulations. It is mentioned in
the overall ‘vision’ of Cianjur city – Cianjur Healthier, Smarter, More
Prosperous, and Better Behaved – and in its ‘missions’, one of which is to
intensify ‘the building of a better morality in society, the nation, and the
state’. Akhlak is also used in a number of slogans. One, displayed on large
billboards in the city, urges the people in Cianjur to improve their moral
conduct and become model Muslims: ‘[i]mprove your morality, and
your faith becomes perfect’. While such slogans are directed at Cianjur
citizens of both sexes, one slogan on another giant billboard specifically
urges Muslim women to cover their heads, as this is considered to be a
sign of piety. The slogan reads, ‘Veiling is a distinguishing mark of pious
Muslim women’.
Earlier research by Komnas Perempuan (Women’s National Com-
mission), the Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture (csrc) and
the Wahid Institute has drawn attention to three cases in which three
non-Muslim women, working at a post office, as a school teacher, and
teaching at the State Senior High School, were forced to wear a jilbab. It
was claimed that while a non-Muslim student does not have to cover her
head, a non-Muslim teacher has no choice but to follow the regulation,
as teachers should set an example for their students.
In fact, there does not seem to be much opposition to the jilbab rule.
An increasing number of women see covering the head as a religious
obligation. Most of the Muslim women in Cianjur I interviewed appear
to regard the jilbab policy as positive, while in government offices,
 Jaih Mubarak, ‘Gerakan Pelaksanaan Syariah Islam di Cianjur’, a paper presented
at theAnnual Conference (Konferensi Tahunan) Pascasarjana ptain se-Indonesia,
held by the Graduate School of iain Ar-Raniry Banda Aceh and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, 1–4 December 2004, Banda Aceh nad.
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such as that of the local administration and the Regional House of
Representatives, and in police stations and the public hospital, the
regulation is widely accepted. Of the 14 female officials of the regional
administration I interviewed, only four did not agree with the regulation.
At the hospital the four senior staff members I talked to all agreed with
the jilbab policy. According to one of them all Muslim female employees,
including nurses and doctors, wear a jilbab.³⁷ At the police station it was
the same, but with one important difference. All female civil servants
who worked there wore a jilbab, but the majority of female police officers
did not. They are employed by the national police, not by the Cianjur
administration and said they were therefore not bound by Cianjur’s local
regulations. Public servants treated all women coming to their office
equally, whether they wore a headdress or not, but women who did not
cover their heads were reminded of the Gerbang Marhamah programme
and asked to wear a jilbab on a next visit.
The religious court is another state institution in Cianjur where the
female staff have to wear a jilbab. They treat female litigants coming to
court without one well, but often recommend wearing a jilbab upon
their next attendance.³⁸ Only a few judges appear to be aware of the
regulation. One reason could be that many of them come from outside
Cianjur. Judges are selected and are consequently placed at courts where
there is a vacancy and are often transferred from one court to another.³⁹
That said, all female judges wear a headdress.
5 The Relevance of Sharia-Based Laws in Indonesia to
International Treaties: Some Voices and a Critical Analysis
In this section the Kompilasi and the local Sharia-based regulations will
be analysed from two perspectives. The first takes into account a number
of international covenants that Indonesia has ratified: the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (cedaw),
 Interview with dk, the head of the Department of Information and Public
Relations Department of the public hospital of Cianjur, Cianjur, 17 December
2011.
 This differs from the court of Ciamis which, according to one of my correspon-
dents, has spare jilbabs in the office for female litigants who arrive at hearings
without one.
 See Euis Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi
Hukum Islam and Legal Practices of the Indonesian Religious Courts (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2010).
156 islam, politics and change
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), and
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc).⁴⁰ crc is
an international treaty that affirms the basic rights of children.⁴¹ cedaw
first came into force in 1981 and requires all state signatories to eliminate
discrimination on the basis of gender in public and private spheres.⁴²
The iccpr stresses that men and women should enjoy equal access to all
civil and political rights⁴³ and it requires the settlement of principles of
legal certainty for any legal action.⁴⁴ The second perspective concerns
the opinions of gender activists and other women’s voices.
5.1 Polygamy: Rules and Actual Practice
Right to Legal Certainty
Indonesia has made a serious legal attempt to restrict polygamy. However,
most Islamic court judges basically accept the practice and allow that the
disapproval of wives can be ignored in certain instances.The fact that local
ulama continue to help husbands to practise polygamy also demonstrates
that the state has so far failed to create legal certainty. Moreover, judges
often rule that polygamy is better than leaving husbands vulnerable to
committing zina.The continued acceptance and approval of polygamy by
judges and by local ulama in Indonesia violates international regulations.
The laws and regulations on polygamy and their application, therefore,
must be reviewed, as they have prevented women from obtaining legal
certainty, a right that is and should be protected by cedaw and the
Indonesian state. Such a review should address the question whether
proponents of polygamy consider it a religious right or doctrine or a legal
right of men. This question needs an exact answer in order to establish
legal certainty, as many women in Indonesia are uncertain about whether
or not they have a right to speak out against polygamy.The review should
also focus on the protection of the first wife’s standard of living. It is not
uncommon for first wives to be forced to accept a lower standard of
living or to end their marriage because of their husband’s polygamy.
 cedaw was adopted on 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 September
1981, and Indonesia ratified it in 1984. The iccpr was adopted on 16 December
1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976, and was ratified by Indonesia in 2006.
 The crc was adopted on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September
1990, and was ratified by Indonesia in 1990.
 cedaw Article 2.
 iccpr Article 3.
 iccpr Article 15.
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Right to Equality
The laws and regulations on and the practice of polygamy also violate
the articles of cedaw regarding equality. cedaw affirms equality to all
people, men and women, within marriage. Article 16 of cedaw states
that:
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; (b) The same right freely to
choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full
consent.
Article 59 of the Kompilasi states that the consent of a wife can be
dispensed with when certain conditions, which often do not concern the
wife, are met. Moreover, even in the case of the absence of any stated
criteria, judges are not required to see whether or not the consent of the
wife is given sincerely. Although almost all of the women interviewed said
that they agreed with the laws that allow polygamy, they also stated that if
their own husband wanted to marry an additional wife they would object.
This suggests that although not many wives would sincerely consent to
their husband’s proposal for polygamy, husbands can in court still obtain
the required consent from their wives. This illustrates an inequality.
In practice, polygamy seems to be considered as a man’s right, leaving
women little choice but to agree. Saying ‘no’ can mean the end of the
marriage on which they are often financially dependent.
In this context, the Law on the Elimination of Domestic Violence (uu
Penghapusan Kekerasan dalam Rumah Tangga No. 23/2004) needs to be
mentioned. It provides detailed rules in relation to domestic violence
and categorises violence into four types: physical, mental, sexual and
neglect (penelantaran) of financial support and childcare.⁴⁵ A polygamous
marriage that results in a wife suffering can be considered as a form of
mental violence. Researchers such as Nurmila and Brenner have pointed
to polygamy having such effects on existing marriages.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, it
 See Arts. 5, 6, 7, and 8 of uu pkdrt. See also Ratna Batara Munti, Advokasi
Kebijakan Pro Perempuan: Agenda Politik untuk Kesetaraan dan Demokrasi,
(Jakarta: Yayasan tifa dan pskw Pasca Sarjana ui, 2008).
 See, for example, Nina Nurmila,Women, Islam and Everyday Life: Renegotiating
Polygamy in Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Syzanne Bren-
ner, ‘Holy Matrimony? The Print of Politics of Polygamy in Indonesia’, in Andrew
N. Weintraub, Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia (London
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seems that rather than referring to and considering such conventions
and Law No. 23 and viewing polygamy as a form of domestic violence,
judges in the cases I studied tend to consult fiqh doctrines and Qurʾanic
verses, and apply the rules in the Kompilasi loosely.⁴⁷
5.2 The Requirement to Wear a jilbab
If we refer to cedaw and iccpr, the requirement by the state to wear
a jilbab may violate human rights. The violated rights include, at the
very least, the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom of
expression and equality.
Right to Freedom of Religion
The iccpr, which was ratified by Indonesia in 2006, states that no one
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his (or her) freedom to
have or adopt a religion or belief of his (or her) choice (iccpr Art. 18).⁴⁸
The un hrc’s (Human Rights Committee) general comment No. 22 was
issued to clarify the article and states that governments can limit the right
of freedom of religion only when it is necessary to protect public safety,
public order, health or the fundamental rights and freedom of others.
Any restriction must be non-discriminatory and proportionate.⁴⁹ The
requirement to wear a jilbab violates the right of freedom to religion, as
the state has limited the right to freedom of one’s religious conviction. In
this respect I agree with Asma Jahangir, who argues that in Aceh the state
has forced its citizens to conform to one religious interpretation of proper
attire without the freedom to choose.⁵⁰ However, even within Islam
opinions differ about the obligation to wear a jilbab because the Qurʾanic
and New York: Routledge, 2011), 212–234; and, Naoko Yamada, ‘Intertwining
Norms and Laws in the Discourse of Polygamy in Early Twentieth Century West
Sumatera’, in Yoko Hayami (ed.),The Family in Flux in Southeast Asia: Institution,
Ideology, Practice (Japan: Kyoto University Press, 2012), 63–86.
 See Euis Nurlaelawati,Modernization, Tradition and Identity, 178–179.
 iccpr Article 18.
 General Comment No. 22, un hrc.
 As quoted in Human Rights Watch’s report on the application of Sharia in Aceh,
the un special rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief, Asma Jahangir, is of
the opinion that the state has violated international human law when handing
out religious sanctions to people that do not abide by religious doctrines. He
stated that ‘the use of coercive methods and sanctions applied to individuals who
do not wish to wear a religious dress of a specific symbol seen as sanctioned by
religion is generally in violation of international human law’. See Human Rights
Watch, Policing Morality (2010), 64–65.
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verses regarding the requirement to wear a jilbab can be interpreted in
different ways.⁵¹ Muslim women, therefore, should be able to choose
what to wear according to their own religious beliefs. The state has an
obligation to protect women’s right to choose.⁵²
Right to Freedom of Expression and Equality
Article 3 of the iccpr states that men and women should enjoy equal
access to all civil and political rights.⁵³ It affirms the equality of all people.
It also protects freedom of expression through symbolic signs, including
through clothes, and the freedom to appear in public without fear. cedaw
also deals with these matters and states that the state must ‘refrain from
engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women’.⁵⁴
Even though, and in contrast to cases in Aceh, the regulation
on wearing a jilbab in Cianjur applies only to civil servants and its
application is not as strict as that in Aceh, controlling the ways women
dress is a violation of human rights. The state should protect every
citizen’s behaviour as long as it does not harm public life. The view that
‘inappropriate’ women’s dress constitutes a moral hazard is weak and
lacks evidence; it cannot be taken as a basis for controlling the bodies
of citizens, i.e. women. The state requiring women to hide their bodies
constitutes female oppression, discrimination and gender inequality, and
disadvantages thosewho do not abide by the rules. Furthermore, although
there is no clear evidence of resistance from women in Cianjur, the state
controlling ways people dress is a violation of their right of expression
in the public sphere. Mulia, for example, highlights this and states that
Sharia-influenced local regulations ‘strengthen the subordination of
women, limit their right to choose how they dress, limit their room to
move freely and mobility, and limit their activities at night’.⁵⁵
 For the discussion of different views on the jilbab see generally Jamal A. Badawi,
‘The Muslim Woman’s Dress According to the Qurʾan and Sunnah’, Islamic
Propagation Centre International, 1998. See also S. Mutawalli ad-Darsh, Hijab or
Niqab: Muslim Women’s Dress, Islamic Book Trust, 1997. In Indonesia, different
views also exist among Muslim scholars. Quraish Shihab, for example, is of the
opinion that the jilbab is not an obligation. See Quraish Shihab, Tafsir al-Misbah
(Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2002), 32, andWawasan al-Qurʾan (Bandung: pt. Mizan
Pustaka), 228.
 iccpr Article 18(1). For a good discussion of this see C. Evans, The Right to
Freedom of Religion under International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001).
 iccpr Article 3.
 cedaw Article 2.
 SeeMusdahMulia, ‘Perda Shariat dan Peminggiran Perempuan’, a paper presented
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5.3 Recent Legal Developments, Human Rights and Gender Notions:
Judicial Review to Protect the Rights of Women and Children
Gender and women’s rights activists affiliated to a number of institutions
and ngos, such as Rahima, Fahmina, Puan Amal Hayati, the Komnas
Perempuan (Women’s National Commission), and the lbh apik (Legal
Aid Centre for Women), have struggled to improve women’s legal status.
They have directed their activism not just at the state, but also at their
own Islamic communities. As White notes, they have sought to change
gender attitudes at both the intellectual and the grassroots level.⁵⁶ They
hold seminars to disseminate ideas on gender equality and to challenge
traditional interpretations of Islamic teaching, and they train men and
women to be ‘gender sensitive’ in their actions and ideals.⁵⁷ With the
same aim, they also publish journals focusing on gender issues. In doing
so, they attempt to contribute to the public debate and public policy on
women and gender issues.
Among the significant attempts made by these women’s rights
activists were the proposal for a Counter Legal Draft of the Kompilasi
and a proposal for a law on the elimination of domestic violence.
Unfortunately the Counter Legal Draft was dismissed. Its provisions were
too controversial.⁵⁸ The draft on the elimination of domestic violence
was issued in 2004 as Law No. 23/2004.
Recently two well-known Indonesian women have sought judicial
review in response to what they consider to be a gender bias and the
subordination of women in the decisions of judges. One judicial review is
sought by Halimah, the ex-wife of Bambang Trihatmojo, one of the sons
of former President Suharto. She felt that she had been treated unfairly
in court after she rejected her husband’s petition to divorce her on the
grounds of continuous dispute. She believed that the decision made by
the religious court to approve her husband’s petition had no appropriate
legal basis and had harmed and subordinated her. She therefore appealed.
at an Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace, dated 11 August 2006,
www.icrp-online.org (accessed 25 October 2012).
 Sally White and Maria Ulfah Anshor, ‘Islam and Gender in Contemporary
Indonesia’, 139.
 See ibid. See also Arskal Salim, Demi Keadilan dan Kesetaraan, 23–40, and
Burhanuddin and Oman Fathurrahman, Tentang Perempuan Islam: Wacana dan
Gerakan (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka/ ppim, 2004), 113–152. See also a number of
policy reports written byThe Asia Foundation on the programme of women’s
empowerment at http://asiafoundation.org/.
 See Euis Nurlaelawati,Modernization, Tradition, and Identity, 125–130. See also
White and Anshor, ‘Islam and Gender in Contemporary Indonesia’, 146.
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The appellate court accepted her arguments and overruled the decision of
the first instance court. After Halimah had won her case in the appellate
court, Bambang filed a case with the Supreme Court, which rejected
his appeal. He did not give up and asked the Supreme Court to review
the decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court decided to revise its
decision and approved the petition to divorce Halimah. Yet, Halimah
did not give up either. She scrutinised the legal arguments used by the
judges and decided to appeal to the Constitutional Court. She referred to
Article 39(2f) of the Marriage Law No. 1/1974, which is in accordance
with Article 116 of the Kompilasi. Both regulate the procedures and
grounds for divorce and stipulate that one of the grounds on which
a petition for divorce may be approved is a protracted or continuous
dispute between spouses. Halimah argued that nowhere is it specified in
detail what the conditions for a continuous dispute are. In other words,
she questioned the type of dispute that the judges might consider to be
valid grounds for divorce.⁵⁹ Halimah admitted that she had had several
disputes and arguments with her husband, but insisted that the source of
their discord was the fact that her husband had married another woman,
Mayangsari, a famous singer.⁶⁰ She requested the annulment of the article
that laid down protracted or continuous dispute as a valid basis for
divorce. However, Halimah’s attempts were unsuccessful as, after several
hearings and discussions, the Constitutional Court rejected her request.⁶¹
According to Mahfud md, the chairman of the Constitutional Court, the
article should be retained to provide a legal recourse for couples who, due
to continuous disputes, cannot achieve the sacred purpose of marriage.⁶²
The other judicial review was sought by Machicha Muchtar, the
unofficial ex-wife of Murdiono, a former state secretary (Sekretaris
Negara). The intention of her request was to protect, besides the rights
of women, the rights of children. For a long time Machicha had not
been able, despite many attempts, to obtain legal documents for her
son, born during her unofficial marriage with Murdiono, that stated a
legal relationship to his biological father. She was married to Murdiono
in 1993 without registration and bore him a baby, named Muhammad
Iqbal Ramadhan. At the time, Murdiono was tied by the marriage to his
first wife. Having married informally, Machicha was not considered a
 ‘Halimah Kamil Files Judicial Review’,The Jakarta Post, 11 July 2011.
 ‘Halimah Agustina Kamil Gave Evidence in Judicial Review of Act of Marriage’,
www.mahkamahkonstitusi, 21 July 2011 (accessed 7 August 2012).
 Ibid. See also ‘Gugatan Ditolak mk, Halimah tak Akan Rujuk’, Kapanlagi.com, 27
March 2012 (accessed 12 August 2012).
 ‘Gugatan Ditolak mk, Halimah tak Akan Rujuk’, 27 March 2012.
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legitimate spouse and had difficulty obtaining legal documents for her
son, including a birth certificate. Worse still, later Murdiono divorced
Machicha according to Islamic law and refused to recognise Iqbal as
his son. He paid no financial support for Iqbal. Machicha turned to
a religious court in 2008 to ask for an isbat nikah (a legal and official
confirmation of her marriage) and for legalisation of the status of her son.
She was not able to prove the existence of the marriage contract, since
Murdiono refused to appear. Hence, she failed to obtain the certificate of
marriage confirmation and to obtain formal recognition of her child’s
legal relation with his biological father.⁶³ The court can provide an isbat
nikah only if both parties agree of their own free will that they have
concluded an Islamic marriage.
Machicha decided to turn to the Constitutional Court for judicial
review of Article 43 of the Marriage Law that, according to her, harmed
her and her son’s interest, and which regulates the legal status of children
and their relations to their mother and father. It states that children
born out of wedlock only have a legal relationship with their mother
and their mother’s relatives. In relation to this issue, Article 4 should
also be mentioned, which states that a legal child is a child born during
the existence of an official marriage, has been conceived during such a
marriage even if the birth takes place after the dissolution of themarriage,
or if he or she is born as a result of technological reproduction such
as in vitro fertilization. Machicha won her case. The Constitutional
Court decided to amend Article 43 to the effect that children born out of
wedlock also have a legal relation to their biological father if medical
technology can convincingly prove his biological paternity.⁶⁴ The court
took the position that it is not fair and proper to pronounce or decree that
children born out of wedlock have a legal private relationship with only
their mothers and thus to free men, who have had sexual intercourse
that resulted in a pregnancy, from financial or custodial responsibilities
to their children.
This decision gave rise to many negative reactions, since it was
considered to deviate from classical Islamic jurisprudence. Machicha’s
legal expert, Nurul Irfan, who is a lecturer at the Faculty of Sharia and
Law of the State Islamic University, Jakarta, was criticised by his senior
colleagues, who accused him of having gone far beyond fiqh.⁶⁵ Muslim
organisations such as the mui (Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars)
 Interview with Nurul Irfan, Jakarta, May 2012.
 ‘mk Sahkan Status Anak di LuarNikah Resmi’,Kompas, 19 February 2012 (accessed
11 July 2012).
 Interview with Nurul Irfan, Jakarta, May 2012.
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also opposed the decision. The commission of law and legislation
of the mui claimed that adultery was being legalised because of the
Constitutional Court’s decision, which stressed that the words ‘out
of marriage’ not only referred to unregistered Islamic marriages but
also to adultery. It also asserted that the court had gone beyond Sharia
and beyond what was actually being appealed by the petitioner. While
Machicha had asked for recognition of the legal status of her son born
out of her unregistered marriage, the Constitutional Court had dealt
with a broader issue, the legal status of all children born out of wedlock.⁶⁶
The mui decided to issue a fatwa. Although the basic references of the
fatwa are the Qurʾan, Hadith, and fiqh doctrines, and the fatwa affirms
the absence of a legal relationship between children and their biological
fathers, it introduced a new element to accommodate the interests of the
child. The fatwa mentions that the government is entitled to force male
adulterers to provide proper financial support for their children, and to
award property or estate through a wasiat wajiba (obligatory bequest)
after their death. The mui took care to add that this did not mean the
legalisation of relations between children and their biological fathers, but
that the provision was merely intended to protect the rights of children.⁶⁷
In contrast, the National Commission of Child Protection (Komisi
Nasional Perlindungan Anak or Komnas Anak) applauded the decision
and considered it to be a good solution to one of the biggest problems it
regularly had to deal with. Its chairman, Arist Merdeka Sirait, stated that
‘in 2011, there were 38 cases on the legal status of children born out of
wedlock brought to us [Komnas Anak], in which the private rights and
custodial right of the children involved were questioned’. He hoped that
those cases could now be resolved and children would get their basic
rights.⁶⁸
What Halimah and Machicha did, in my view, constitutes the seed of
legal development and demonstrates the awakening of Muslim women’s
legal awareness in general. It also shows how notions of human rights
and gender have gradually started to spread. Their cases demonstrate
that there is a public debate on gender issues in Indonesia.They also send
the message that, following international standards on the principles
of equality and justice, women’s empowerment results in stronger legal
positions.
 ‘Keputusan mk Kebablasan’, Kompas, 9 April 2012 (accessed 23 July 2012).
 See Fatwa mui No. 11/ 2012.
 ‘mk Sahkan Anak Lahir di Luar Nikah Resmi’,Kompas, 19 February 2012 (accessed
11 July 2012).
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Circuit court hearing conducted by the Islamic court of Tangerang (by courtesy of
Islamic court of Tangerang)
6 Conclusion
To address women’s subordinate position as prescribed by classical
Islamic family law, the Indonesian government initiated legal reforms
and introduced new rules at the national level, such as the 1974 Law of
Marriage and the 1991 Kompilasi Hukum Islam, to improve women’s
standing in family law. For example, a husband’s right to unilateral divorce
was limited, polygamy was restricted, and women’s rights to property
were strengthened through the rule of joint property within the marital
bond. There are, therefore, cases related to divorce, post-divorce spousal
alimony and isbat nikah where women have benefited, although these
remain few and far between. The increase in women’s legal knowledge
and better services provided by courts, influenced by both national
concerns and international conventions, have brought women better
access to justice. Almost all their divorce petitions end in approval and
they are now better able to deal with their divorce proceedings because
of recently developed programmes of ‘prodeo’ and circuit courts. Due to
the awakening of judges’ gender sensitivity they can also obtain their
rights to spousal alimony.
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However, despite the reforms, this research on proceedings at three
religious courts in Cianjur and Banten has shown that women continue
to remain subordinate and weak in cases of polygamy, custody and
post-divorce alimony for their children. In the case of polygamy, the
strict interpretation of the Qurʾan by the judges of religious courts and
the lenient application of Islamic law interpreted by the state often
result in decisions which go against the interests of Muslim women.
The ambiguous legal conception ofmaslahat (public interest) and the
absence of a proper mechanism to enforce judges’ decisions can have the
same negative consequences for women in court cases concerning their
right to custody or right to alimony for their children.
The new local Sharia regulations can worsen gender injustice and
substantially harm women in the public sphere. Moreover, from the
perspective of international legal standards, they do not conform to
rights of equality, freedom of religion and expression, protected by
the international covenants that have been ratified by Indonesia. Such
regulations need to be reviewed because they curb women’s freedom to
act and violate the protection of human rights in general.

5 The Islamic Court of Bulukumba
and Women’s Access to Divorce
and Post-Divorce Rights
Stijn Cornelis van Huis
Bulukumba is a kabupaten (district) on the south-eastern edge of
the province of South Sulawesi.¹ The Islamic court is located in the
sub-district Ujung Bulu. From Makassar, the capital city of South
Sulawesi, it is a 153-km and four-hour-ride to the east along a sometimes
bumpy coastal road. In 2009, Bulukumba had 394,746 inhabitants of
whom 394,397 were registered as Muslim. At present, the 1,155 square
km of Bulukumba’s area consists of ten kecamatan (sub-districts) 27
kelurahan (town quarters) and 99 desa (villages). Bulukumba is largely
an agrarian district: 67 per cent of the working population are farmers;
14 per cent are involved in trade; 8 per cent work in (governmental)
services; and 5e per cent in industry.²
1 Introduction
This case study of the Islamic court in Bulukumba, South Sulawesi, is
part of a broader research about the relationship between the state, Islam
and society in Indonesia. It contributes to Dr Nurlaelawati’s research that
concerns the role the Islamic court plays regarding women’s and children’s
rights. Based on field work that I conducted fromMay to August 2011 in
Bulukumba this case study looks at the role that the (state) Islamic court
plays in Bulukumba’s society and focuses on whether women access the
court in divorce and post-divorce matters, in which cases and why (not).
As elsewhere in Indonesia and the Islamic world, Bulukumba has
issued so-called Sharia byelaws that attempt to regulate public morality
and especially (Muslim) women’s dress. Through looking at women’s
 The district of Bulukumba has a long history of Dutch rule, which started several
years after the Bungaya treaty of 1667. Shortly afterwards, the voc erected fortress
Boele Comba.
 Bulukumba dalam Angka 2010, Pemerintah Kabupaten Bulukumba, 2011.
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agency in divorce, I will assess whether those regulations concerning
the public sphere signal a stronger control over women in the private
sphere. A second focus in this study is the relationship between rules
and practice, or in this case rights and practice. Does the fact that,
according to Indonesian family law, Muslim women and their children
have rights to support and marital property also mean that they can
achieve those rights in practice?Through qualitative and quantitative
data acquired during a four-month fieldwork period, I try to answer
this question and place the answer in the social and cultural context of
the women concerned. Finally, this case study looks at the role of the
judge, and especially whether the use of judicial discretion is favourable
or unfavourable to the women and children involved.
Below I will first give a historical background of Bulukumba, its
Islamic court and the Sharia byelaws, before I turn to the main subject of
the study, the contemporary Islamic court of Bulukumba and its role in
providing divorce and post-divorce rights to women.
2 Bulukumba, its Islamic Court and its Sharia Byelaws
2.1 The Islamic Court Formally Established in South Sulawesi
On 17 August 1945 Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the
Republic of Indonesia. To the disappointment of some Islamist groups
the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 was not based on the Sharia but on
the Pancasila which in one of its pillars speaks of ‘the belief in one God’
and did not specifically mention Islam. Nonetheless, the Indonesian
political and legal system is not secular and gives ample room for Islamic
institutions. In 1946 the Ministry of Religion was established which
became a bulwark of politicians of the Muslim parties and a supporter of
Islamic courts.³ Even though a strong faction of non-Muslim political
parties in the national Parliament wanted to do away altogether with
the Islamic court, the Muslim parties succeeded in preventing this from
happening. Eventually a national Islamic court system was set up by the
central government in Jakarta.
In the late colonial period, the Dutch only recognised Islamic courts
in Java, Madura and South Kalimantan and consequently in South
Sulawesi – where Islamic courts had existed,⁴ but were not formally
 Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal
Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
 Regeeringsrapporten over de Mohammedaansche Rechtspraak op de Buitenbezittin-
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recognised by the Dutch; it was adat courts that formally were competent
to adjudicate on cases pertaining to marriage and divorce. Government
Regulation 45/1957 regulated that all districts outside Java ought to set up
an Islamic court – including regions where previously no Islamic courts
had existed – with competence in marriage and divorce matters. The
Marriage Law of 1974 formally and legally established the Islamic court’s
competence in Muslim marriage and divorce, a competence which was
broadened with inheritance and waqf (religious endowments) matters
in 1989 and Sharia economics in 2006. As a result of the Government
Regulation of 1957, Islamic courts were set up in each district in South
Sulawesi.
2.2 The Darul Islam and the Incorporation of the Military in the
Traditional Aristocracy
When the Dutch decided to recognise Indonesia’s independence in
1949, the guerrilla warfare that marked the independence struggle in
South Sulawesi was far from over. The Indonesian national army did not
incorporate all the guerrillas that had fought against the Dutch, meaning
that many dissatisfied fighters roamed the countryside of South Sulawesi.
In 1951, Sukarno turned the Indonesian federation into a unitary republic,
which – especially outside Java – met with strong resistance. Moreover,
contrary to what the more Islamist guerrilla groups had hoped for, the
Indonesian state did not become an Islamic state based on Sharia. When
Kahar Muzakkar decided to join the Islamic rebellion of the Darul Islam
and become its leader in South Sulawesi, he attracted substantial support
from these dissatisfied guerrillas.
In the end, it took the Indonesian forces 14 years to defeat the
Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi. In 1965, Kahar Muzakkar was
killed by Indonesian forces in an ambush. The same year saw the failed
communist coup which was followed by the wiping out of the communist
party and the coming to power of General Suharto. Gradually, a new
military order was installed in Indonesia. In South Sulawesi the new
military elite merged with the old aristocratic elite. As a result, the
old patron–client relations between the aristocracy and their followers
survived the New Order and remained the power base of the ruling clans
of South Sulawesi.
Even so, the imagined local history of the Darul Islam remained
attractive for those regional Islamists who opposed the customary base
gen commissioned by circulair 1876 No. 7276/8576 of the Department of Justice.
Adatrechtbundel i: 225–234.
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for power as well as for those regionalists who opposed centralised power
in Jakarta. As a result, Islamic values increasingly became part of the local
identity of the Bugis and Makassarese in South Sulawesi, and when the
New Order ended and regional identity politics started, Islamic values
increasingly became part of local political discourses.
2.3 Islamisation of Politics in South Sulawesi after 1998
After the fall of Suharto in 1998 Islamist ideas that had been repressed
came to the surface. In 2000, the Preparatory Committee for the
Implementation of the Sharia in Indonesia (Komite Persiapan Penerapan
Syariah se-Indonesia, kppsi) was founded during a meeting in Makassar
with the participation of representatives of allmajorMuslimorganisations
(the nu, Muhammadiyah, the mui, the icmi, the hmi, the ddi and others)
and a variety of prominent figures including Jusuf Kalla (vice-president
of Indonesia between 2004 and 2009), the president of the Partai Islam
seMalaysia (pas), the deans of Universitas Muslim Indonesia and the
Law Faculty of Universitas Hasanuddin, and the infamous Abu Bakar
Baʾasyir.
Not surprisingly, the main point on the kppsi’s agenda was the
incorporation of Sharia-inspired regulations into the legal system of
South Sulawesi. Politically, the kppsi took, and still takes, an anti-New
Order and anti-corruption stance. Sharia will increase law and order, so
the argument goes. Moreover, the kppsi argued that the Sharia policy for
Aceh has opened up the legal possibility for a further ‘shariatisation’ of
regions with a traditionally strong Islamic character.⁵
The members at the first meeting agreed to establish the Laskar
Jundullah, a paramilitary organisation that could be used to pressurise
politicians to adopt Sharia-inspired regulations and to oversee their
enforcement. Furthermore, in an act of symbolism, Abdul Azis Kahar
Muzakkar, the son of the executed Darul Islam leader of South Sulawesi,
was chosen as head of the executive board of the kppsi.
The kppsi lost its political legitimacy due to terrorism allegations
against some of the members of Laskar Jundullah after several bomb
attacks hit Makassar in the years 2000 to 2004, as well as the latter’s
alleged involvement in the interreligious conflict in Poso in the same
period.⁶ The Sharia agenda of the kppsi, however, was taken up by the
 Michael Buehler, Democratization and Islamization: Indonesia’s non fundamental-
ist sources of Shariʾa law. Paper presented at the aas Annual meeting, Atlanta,
usa, 3–6 April 2008.
 Ibid.
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mainstream political parties in South Sulawesi that typically are headed
by members of the local aristocracy.
Michael Buehler sheds light on the possible political motives for the
Islamic turn of the nobility.⁷ First, the Sharia agenda includes regulations
concerning the management of zakat (mandatory charity). Those zakat
regulations introduced a fixed zakat tax on the salaries of civil servants,
which ensures a steady flow of money intended for Islamic charity.
Through the distribution of Islamic charity money, the district heads
can play their traditional role as patrons by creating and capitalising
on pyramidical hierarchies in the Islamic networks. In return for the
prioritisation of Islamic matters and an increase in funds the religious
figures (ustadz(a) and ulama) are expected to act as brokers for those in
power. As of 2007, all Buginese and Makassarese majority districts had
enacted Sharia-inspired regulations, Bulukumba being one of the first.⁸
2.4 Bulukumba’s Sharia Byelaws
Thedistrict head of Bulukumba for the years 1995–2005, Patabai Pabokori,
a high noble and kppsi member since its establishment in 2000, has
actively promoted and introduced Sharia byelaws in Bulukumba. Since
2002, Sharia byelaws have been introduced concerning prohibitions on
alcohol,⁹ the management of Islamic charity (zakat, infaq and sedekah),¹⁰
Muslim dress-codes in governmental buildings¹¹ and the ability to recite
the Qurʾan set as a requirement for marriage, secondary school and
certain positions in the bureaucracy.¹²
In addition to that, 12 desa percontohan (model villages) or desaMuslim
(Muslim villages) were established (at least one in each sub-district), the
apparatus of which is expected to encourage ‘adherence to the Sharia in
every day life of the inhabitants of the village’ and to set the example for
other villages in the sub-district. The introduction of Sharia byelaws in
Bulukumba has attracted media attention,¹³ and the move by the Muslim
 Michael Buehler, ‘The rise of shariʾa by-laws in Indonesian districts: an indication
for changing patterns of power accumulation and political corruption’, South
East Asia Research, 2008, 16 (2): 255–285.
 Michael Buehler, ‘The rise of shariʾa by-laws in Indonesian districts’, 2008.
 Local regulation No. 3 of 2002.
 Local regulation No. 2 of 2003.
 Local regulation No. 5 of 2003 and local regulation No. 6 of 2005.
 Local regulation No. 6 of 2005.
 See for example Gamal Ferdhi, Nurul H. Maarif, ‘Depancasilaisasi Lewat Perda
si’,TheWahid Institute edisi vii, in: Gatra, edisi 24/xii, 29 April 2006; Subair
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village council of Padang – as one of the first places outside Aceh – to
implement caning as a penalty for close proximity with the opposite
sex (khalwat) in 2005 was even taken up by the National Commission
for the Elimination of Violence against Women (Komisi Nasional Anti
Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan, Komnas Perempuan) in 2009.
In 2007, Bulukumba’s Sharia politics reached the national newspapers
once again when desa Padang wanted to introduce the punishment of
amputation for theft. This time, the district government intervened and
declared that caning and amputations are illegal under Indonesian law
and the deputy-bupati stated that since ‘Bulukumba is not an independent
republic’ the practices are illegal in Bulukumba.¹⁴ According to a female
activist from the village, who had testified for Komnas Perempuan in one
of the caning cases, no new caning punishments have taken place since.¹⁵
Students of the Teachers Academy for Islamic Studies (Sekolah Tinggi
Agama Islam, stai) Al-Gazali, who have assisted me with my field
work, told me that district head Patabai Pabokori’s successors (am Sukri
Sappewali (2005–2010) and Zainuddin Hasan (2010–present)) indeed are
more moderate with regard to Sharia policies, even if the Sharia byelaws
remain in force. They explained to me that this can be partly explained
by the collapse of the Laskar Jundullah who used to act as some kind of
‘Sharia police’. Although I had not been in Bulukumba before 2010 and I
cannot compare the situation with that in 2005, I did notice that in at
least one Muslim village there were Muslim women who did not wear a
veil in public and, moreover, did not object to being interviewed by a
male Western researcher and a male research assistant without a male
relative being present – acts which can be considered to be contrary to
the aim of Muslim villages implementing Sharia values in the every day
life of the villagers.¹⁶
Such experiences give the impression that the height of the syariasasi
(shariatisation) in Bulukumba is behind us. Moreover, if Michael
Buehler’s analysis is right, then the local elite was interested not so
much in the syariasasi itself, but more in the patronage networks they
could build through the process. This is not to say that the Sharia byelaws
Umam, ‘Formalisasi Syarat Islam Perjuangan Ahistori: Belajar dari Bulukumba
dan Luwu’, the Wahid Institute, Edisi 1, November 2005–February 2006.
 AbdulManan and Irmawati, ‘BukanRepublik Bulukumba’,Tempo, Edisi 41/xxxvi/
03, 3–9 December 2007.
 Interview with Bu Esse of the local women’s organisation Sipakatua Sipakalebbi,
9 November 2010, Bulukumba.
 My own observation during an interview with Bu m in desa Muslim Balong,
kecamatan Ujung Loe, Bulukumba, 23 July 2011.
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Islamic Court of Justice, Bulukumba
are without effect. Government offices implement the veiling obligation
in government buildings and refuse to help unveiled Muslim women.¹⁷
Due to public pressure, the abovementioned female activist from desa
Muslim Padang, currently always wears a veil in public, whilst before
2003 she never did so.
2.5 The Islamic Court and the Sharia Byelaws
The Islamic court of Bulukumba also implements the veiling regulation,
although no visible signs are displayed explicitly instructing women to
do so. Pak Muhammad Rusydi Thahir, the head of the Islamic court
of Bulukumba in 2010–2011, is an outspoken proponent of the Sharia
byelaws. According to him, they will bring benefit to the community
(kemaslahatan) as Allah will reward good conduct. He did not look
favourably on gender activists and the researchers of Komnas Perempuan,
who, he said, came to Bulukumba for a few days in 2009 and, based on
very little knowledge, wrote a long and judgemental report.¹⁸
 Interview with Nurlaila Umat, an official of KemenAg Bulukumba, Urusan
Agama Islam, 3 August 2011.
 Interview with Pak Muhammad Rusydi Thahrir, the head of the Islamic court of
Bulukumba, 9 November 2010.
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As a consequence of the veiling policy, women who do not wear a veil
on a daily basis will put on a veil before entering the court and take it
off again on leaving. In the 100 plus hearings studied for this research, I
observed only one occasion when an unveiled woman was able to enter
the courtroom. It concerned a woman of high status whom the clerks
(and the judges) clearly did not dare to correct. On another occasion, an
unveiled woman who came to the Islamic court as a witness and had not
brought a veil with her was requested by the assistant-clerk to put on a
mukenah (praying dress for Muslim women) instead, before entering the
court room.
3 The Islamic Court of Bulukumba and Women’s Divorce Rights
3.1 Divorce in Bulukumba: Rights Awareness and Women’s Agency
in Divorce
Although it perhaps seems to make sense to start with marriage and
proceed with divorce, I will focus on divorce in Bulukumba first, as
divorce is the research object through which the position and functioning
of the Islamic court is assessed. Marriage, on the other hand, is made
subsidiary to divorce and is only examined in so far its local characteristics
are relevant to divorce and post-divorce rights in Bulukumba.
There are no statistics about the divorce rate in Bulukumba and a
short fieldwork period does not provide enough data to calculate the
probability in a given year that a marriage will end in divorce. Therefore
I use an alternative way to calculate the divorce rate, that is by dividing
the number of divorces in a given year with the number of marriages in
the same year. According to the annual report of the Islamic court of
Bulukumba of 2008, 426 divorce requests were registered that year. The
same year, 3,700 marriages were concluded and, thus, the divorce rate of
Bulukumba in 2008 was about 11.5 per cent, which is slightly higher than
the national divorce rate of 10 per cent for that year.
In the year 2008, 345 of the divorce cases were gugat cerai cases, i.e.
divorce cases filed by the wife. This means that 81 per cent of the divorces
were petitioned by the wife, which is a high number considering the fact
that the Marriage Law of 1974 stipulates that male divorces also require
court permission and that the talak (repudiation) has to be uttered before
a judge. In fact the Marriage Law turned the male talak right into a
judicial divorce, meaning that both men and women have to petition the
Islamic court in order to obtain a legal divorce and that the same divorce
grounds apply to both. In 2009, 447 divorces took place, of which 364
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(or 81.4 per cent) were filed by the wife. A total of 3,982 marriages were
registered that year, setting the divorce rate at 11.2 per cent. In 2010, the
numbers were 519 divorces of which 392 (75.5 per cent) were filed by the
wife.
In fact, in South Sulawesi women’s agency in divorce seems to go far
back.Matthes paraphrases the hoofdpriester or penghulu (the highest local
official on Muslim affairs in colonial times) of Makassar who asserted
that during his career he had received dozens of men, but hundreds of
women who had come to him seeking divorce.¹⁹ Although there is a
possibility that manymen at that time did not go to the penghulu because
under Islamic law they had the right to divorce their wife without the
involvement of anyone else, the large difference between male and female
clients in this anecdote indicates that, indeed, more women divorced
their husbands than vice versa.
The outcomes of a Divorce Survey indicate that women in Bulukumba
indeed do not consider divorce to be a male thing.²⁰ To the statement,
‘the right to divorce is with the husband’ an overwhelming 76 per cent
of respondents did not agree and an additional 10 per cent did not
agree at all, compared with a mere 8 per cent that agreed with this
statement. Conversely, women in Bulukumba know that they have
the right to divorce their husbands as 60.8 per cent agreed and 36.7
per cent very much agreed with that statement. Most of the women
(66.7 per cent) believe that they do not have to ‘buy’ a divorce through
the khul procedure (a consensual divorce procedure in Islamic law in
which women can offer (part of) the bride price to their husband in
return for a divorce), compared to 16.6 per cent that believed returning
(part) of the bride price (mahar) is the correct means for a woman to
secure a divorce if the husband initially does not agree to ending the
 B.F. Matthes, Bijdragen tot de ethnologie van Zuid-Celebes (’s Gravenhage:
Gebroeders Belinfante, 1875), 45.
 A survey concerning divorce and divorce rights was conducted among 120
respondents in four subdistricts. In order of distance from the courts they are:
Ujung Bulu, Gantarang, Bonto Bahari and Bulukumpa, spread over four villages
and four kampung (town quarters). The targeted sample group consisted of
divorced Muslim women, preferably with children, but not necessarily divorced
formally at the Islamic court. Unfortunately, in some villages in Bulukumba it
was difficult for the surveyors to find the targeted number of divorced women
with children (15 respondents per village or hamlet). To be able to reach the
target of 15 respondents a number of married women (21) who had experienced a
divorce from a previous marriage were included as well as a number of divorced
women who did not have children. The latter respondents had to skip some of
the questions regarding child support.
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marriage. Women are thus well aware that they can divorce on legal
grounds bypassing Islamic or adat procedures.
The picture above demonstrates a strong awareness of women’s rights
to divorce. However, that awareness does not correlate with a perception
of the equality of the sexes. Patriarchy is the norm. A staggering 97
per cent of (all female) respondents agreed with the statement that the
husband is the leader of the family. The public role of men, including as
the head and provider of the family, however, can backfire, as the next
example will demonstrate.
One of the divorced women whom I interviewed as part of the
qualitative research very much resented the passive and unambitious
behaviour of her husband. After marriage she and her husband had to
live in the house of her parents-in-law as they were still incapable of
maintaining a household of their own. She was eager to move out some
day, but her husband did not put much effort into establishing their
financial independence. The couple lived mostly on the support of her
husband’s parents and, to make matters worse, her husband liked to
gamble and drink ballo (a local-brewed palm wine). She had warned her
husband that if he did not give up these money-wasting habits she would
leave him. When, one night, he came home late, smelling of alcohol she
exploded. ‘Saya cambuk dia, pake tongkat’ (I caned him with a stick),
she said proudly. Not long after this incident, she filed for divorce at the
Islamic court.
The story above indicates that women in Bulukumba possess a lot of
authority and independence within the family, although a clear division
of roles is still the norm. A good Buginese or Makassarese husband is
expected to be ambitious and to do all he can do for the improvement of
the family’s status and position.²¹ Women, on the other hand, are the
main decision-makers of the household and the family, especially in
conflict situations.²² If the husband does not act as he is supposed to do,
the wife will stand up to him, often backed by her kin, and, ultimately,
she will even leave him.
Moreover, in the Buginese-Makassarese bilateral kinship system,
women do not have to depend economically on their husband in divorce
situations because they can always rely on support from their own
 Nurul Ilmi Idrus, ‘To take each other’: Bugis practices of gender, sexuality and
marriage, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2003; H.Th. Chabot,
Kinship, status and gender in South Celebes (Leiden: kitlv Press, 1996).
 Birgitt Röttger-Rössler, ‘Shared responsibility: Some aspects of gender and
authority in Makassar society’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde,
2000, 156 (3): 521–538.
the islamic court of bulukumba 177
kin and their own inheritance. Since women are considered to be the
status-bearers of the kin group, in the middle and higher classes the
husband’s status and position may in fact be jeopardized by divorce as
his status and career, for a large part, has been built through his wife’s
status and family network.²³
The latter dependence on the wife’s network will only apply when
the husband is not a member of the same kin group. Although I
cannot present figures here, I have observed during the interviews and
courtroomobservations that today a considerable number ofmarriages in
Bulukumba are marriages between (second, third, etc.) cousins, arranged
by the parents or other family members. Marrying within the kin group
traditionally assures the parents that there is no difference in status
between the spouses and that land remains within the extended family.
In the words of H.Th. Chabot, the goal of cousin marriages is ‘keeping
the blood pure and the goods together’.²⁴ Moreover, arranged marriage
demonstrates that parents have an obedient daughter, a characteristic of
a woman looked upon favourably.²⁵ That said, arranged marriages in
South Sulawesi do not appear to be more stable than other marriages.²⁶
In the nineteenth century, B.F. Matthes gave an account of the penghulu
of Makassar who observed that arranged marriages without consent of
the spouses often led to unhappy marriages, adultery and divorce.²⁷
The arranged marriages I have observed were concluded at a very
young age, thereby increasing the instability of the marriage. One of the
women I interviewed had been married off to her first cousin just after
she had finished primary school. Her husband was only a few years older.
Although clearly she was a minor at the time of the marriage, the imam
desa provided her with an official marriage certificate. The marriage only
lasted a year, according to her, because her husband ‘still acted as a child’
(‘Alasannya kayak anak-anak dulu, suamiku’) and was always going out
with his friends leaving her at home alone. She being only 13 years of
age, she and her family decided to go to the Islamic court to divorce.
She did not have to return half of the mahar as is required by law in
unconsummated marriages. Indeed, her husband had not asked her to,
because ‘she was still family’.
To summarise, in the patriarchal society that is Bulukumba, female
agency in divorce, as reflected in the outcomes of the survey, can be
 Ibid.
 Chabot, Kinship, status and gender in South Celebes, 1996: 230.
 Idrus, ‘To take each other,’ 2003: 236–237.
 Idrus, ‘To take each other,’ 2003.
 Matthes, Bijdragen tot de ethnologie van Zuid-Celebes, 1875.
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explained by cultural factors. Those cultural factors ensure a larger
socio-economic independence of married women than one would expect
from the traditional roles most women play – even in arrangedmarriages.
3.2 Women’s Reasons for Divorce
Let us now turn to the reasons for divorce. Women’s reasons for divorce
do not necessarily correspond with the legal grounds for divorce in the
statistics of the Islamic court. The statistics are made by the clerks on the
basis of a short screening of the court files. ‘Continuous quarrelling’ is the
easiest legal basis for divorce to be established.²⁸ Case law even holds that
a divorce action in itself is proof of marriage breakdown.Therefore, most
clerks will not bother to register other reasons women had to divorce if
there is no legal reason to do so (an example of the latter is questioning
the husband’s moral behaviour in a child custody dispute). Therefore, in
court statistics the legal ground of ‘continuous quarrelling’ absorbs many
other reasons women had to divorce.
The survey I held among 120 respondents provides a more reliable
picture of the main reasons for divorce. In the questionnaire I adopted
a set of reasons for divorce that are similar to the standard grounds
in the annual reports of the Islamic court. They are: ‘no harmonious
relationship’, ‘my husband had another woman orwife’, ‘economic reasons’,
‘domestic violence’, ‘no offspring’ and ‘pressure from a third party’. The
respondents were asked what the real reasons for divorce were and,
unlike the statistics of the grounds for divorce in the annual reports of
the Islamic court, they could give multiple answers to make sure that the
specific reasons women had for divorce were not simply absorbed by the
broad reasons for divorce.
As the outcomes suggest, many women provided multiple answers
and, in particular, many combinations occurred with the answer ‘no
harmonious relationship’. ‘No harmonious relationship’ tops the list with
36.7 per cent of the respondents giving it as their single answer. A further
40 per cent mentioned it as one of their answers. ‘My husband had
another woman or wife’ was given by only 5 per cent as the sole reason for
divorce. However, another 26.7 per cent mention it as one of the reasons,
mainly in combination with ‘no harmonious relationship’. ‘Domestic
violence’ is mentioned by 8.3 per cent, the same number as ‘economic
reasons’ and ‘pressure from a third party’. Finally, ‘no offspring’ is at the
bottom of the list of reasons and is mentioned by only 7.5 per cent of
 Article 19 (f) of Government Regulation 45/1975.
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the respondents. Thus, the main reason for divorce is a lack of harmony
between the spouses, followed by adulterous behaviour.
Research in Indonesia and elsewhere has indicated that a young
marriage age increases the chance of a divorce occurring.²⁹ Hence, the
survey assessed the age of the respondents when they married for the first
time. In Bulukumba, 12.5 per cent of the respondents had been married
before the legal age for women to marry, i.e. 16 years. More than half of
the respondents had been married before the age of 20. Almost 90 per
cent of the respondents were married at the age of 25 years or younger.
The mean age for the first marriage of the respondents in Bulukumba is
22.4 years, which is lower than that in South Sulawesi (23.6 years).³⁰
When people in Bulukumba marry below the legal age, they do
not seem to go to the Islamic court to ask for dispensation (dispensasi
kawin). In 2010, no such cases were listed. This is rather surprising
as 12.5 per cent had been married below the legal age, whilst 98.3 per
cent of the respondents answered that the marriage had been officially
registered. There are three possible explanations: under-age marriages
remain unregistered until the legal age is reached, they are registered
by the Offices of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama/kua) the
institution under the Ministry of Religion which is responsible for
Muslimmarriage registrationwithout prior dispensation from the Islamic
court, or they received a fake marriage certificate but were unaware of
that.
An isbat nikah (a court’s confirmation of the legality of a marriage)
provides a legal means to register informal marriages that were concluded
in accordance with religious requirements. In 2010, the Islamic court of
Bulukumba received 43 isbat nikah requests (compared to 499 divorce
cases). Most isbat nikah cases are related to rights of wives of civil
servants: spousal support after a divorce or pensions of widows after their
husbands have passed away. Most of these informal marriages had been
concluded before the Marriage Law of 1974 came into force. Nonetheless,
registration of informal marriages concluded after 1974 also occurs and
in some cases under-age marriages are legalised in order to make the
legal consequences of the divorce formal, and more specifically the legal
rights of the wife and children born out of the unregistered marriage.
 Gavin W. Jones, ‘Which Indonesian women marry youngest, and why?’, Journal
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, 32 (1): 67–78; Philip Guest, ‘Marital dissolution
and development in Indonesia’, Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 1992, 23
(1): 95–113.
 Gavin W. Jones,Marriage and divorce in Islamic South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1994), 80.
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In addition to young marriage, the practice ofmerantau, or husbands
who migrate for work, seems to contribute to the divorce figure. In the
interviews I held in desa Tamatto in the Ujung Loe subdistrict, several
divorced women informed me that the reason for divorce had been that
the husband had left South Sulawesi to work and had never sent any
money back. In two cases the husband had also informally married a
second wife. When the women found out about this they divorced their
husbands.
Finally, women’s agency in divorce may also be related to sirri (honour,
status, shame). Confronted with the high percentage of women filing
for divorce, Prof. Nuril Ilmi Idrus of Hasanuddin University in Makassar
explained to me that it is indeed the custom that women file for divorce,
since in Buginese culture women are considered the honour-bearers
of the family. If a husband cannot keep up her standard he will be
divorced. Moreover, according to Prof. Idrus a Buginese woman will
avoid being divorced by her husband and try to convince him to let
her divorce him, so that her sirri and also that of her kin remains
intact.
To summarise, we have seen that in Bulukumba 75–80 per cent of
divorces are filed by women. Divorce is usually caused by intimate,
rather than material or economic, reasons. An underlying reason
for the problems in the intimate sphere might be the young age of
marriage, although in Bulukumba the mean marriage age is above
the Indonesian average. Most divorces occur because of the fact that
the spouses do not connect well, resulting in quarrels. Those quarrels
in many cases are worsened by adultery, (unregistered) polygamy or
economic conditions and can even turn violent. However, as the caning
example demonstrates, the passivity and socially negative behaviour
of the husband have an economic component. Drinking and gambling
by the husband costs money and has financial consequences for the
family. Women in Bulukumba, being assigned the role of honour-bearers,
household managers, and being supported by their kin, are generally
sufficiently empowered to break out of an unhappy or disgraceful
marriage.
3.3 Judicial Divorce: The Only Socially Accepted Divorce in
Bulukumba
The introduction of the Marriage Law in 1974 meant that a divorce must
be brought before the court to be formally recognised. Through the
Divorce Survey I could assess to what extent the state has managed to
put this message across to its citizens in Bulukumba. The results indicate
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that in Bulukumba there is sufficient awareness that divorce requires
a judicial process and that most divorces are indeed concluded at the
Islamic court.
Seventy-two per cent of the respondents had divorced at the Islamic
court, compared to 25 per cent who had not.The surveyors have indicated
that at least some respondents among this 25 per cent had not divorced
in the Islamic court, but their husbands had – sometimes without their
knowing. In reality, the percentage of formal divorces may be even higher
as the question concerned was probably too ambiguously formulated in
terms of discerning whether the women themselves physically went to
the court to divorce. However, the figure of 72.5 per cent already indicates
that Bulukumba has a relatively low number of informal divorces as
compared to the 50 per cent of informal divorces estimated for the whole
of Indonesia.³¹ To be able to divorce formally, you have to be formally
married first. In Bulukumba formal marriage is the norm. A total of
98.3 per cent of the respondents answered that they had registered their
first marriage at the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama,
kua).³²
The numbers above indicate that both the right to divorce and the
fact that divorce has been turned into a judicial proceeding are publicly
known. This is reflected in the figure of 91.7 per cent of the respondents
that were aware that one needs to obtain a divorce certificate (akta cerai)
to be formally divorced. Twenty-five per cent of respondents however,
think that a formal divorce can also be arranged at the kua. Perhaps
this reflects the local reality in which kua or village officials provide
mediation and ‘legal aid’ services and help with the paperwork of a
divorce process. The main sources of knowledge about the Islamic court
as the place to file a divorce are family and friends (38 respondents),
the neighborhood head (Ketua rt) and village officials (aparat desa) (14
respondents), the kua (12 respondents), or they knew it themselves (ten
respondents).
Semi-structured interviews with 15 divorced women also confirmed a
high level of awareness. Bringing a case to the Islamic court is considered
the only way to divorce by most informants. This is reflected in the
following answer to the question why the informant went to the Islamic
court to divorce and did not divorce informally: ‘[t]he reason [to divorce]
 R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack, Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia:
ideas and institutions (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007).
 Non-Muslims have to register their marriages at the civil registry offices (Kantor
Pencatatan Sipil) which fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice
and Human Rights.
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is that I wanted to be unstained (bersih), if you only separate like that you
will not be clean’ (‘Maksudnya kan mau bersih, kalau cuma pisah-pisah
begitu saja kan tidak bersih namanya’). The divorce must be ‘black on
white’ (hitam di atas putih), otherwise ‘it will be difficult to remarry’.
Another woman relates divorce at the Islamic court with custom
(adat-istiadat):
Researcher: Why did you divorce at the Islamic court and not
outside? I ask this question because in a number of areas in
Indonesia it is common (cukup biasa) to divorce [elsewhere,] not
before the Islamic court.
Informant: Do you mean divorce in the village (cerai di kampung
saja)?
Researcher: Yes.
Informant: Because here that is not customary (karena adat-
istiadatnya disini kan ga begitu). Here you have to divorce before
the court. …
Researcher: Thus in the village there are no people who are willing to
divorce a couple?
Informant: No, they would not dare (Gak mau, takut).
Even if the marriage had an informal status, women prefer an official
divorce in order to obtain a clean status. Bu Karmila had been married
for nine years and two children were born of the marriage. The marriage
had an informal status because the kua refused to provide the couple
with a marriage certificate, since her husband was still registered as
married to someone else. Bu Karmila clarified that her former husband
had indeed been married before, but had been divorced by his first
wife through the Islamic court. According to Bu Karmila, the first wife
did not want to cooperate with the remarriage and kept the divorce
papers to herself. When, after nine years of marriage, Bu Karmila found
out that her husband had been adulterous she wanted to divorce him
formally so that she might obtain official divorce papers and be free to
remarry formally in the future. The Islamic court advised an isbat nikah
procedure, through which the marriage is formally recognised first, after
which the divorce can take place.
It remained unclear why the husband had not received a divorce
certificate before. To go deeper into this problem would be speculation
and beyond the point I want to make: that formal divorces through
the Islamic court seem to be the norm in Bulukumba, and informally
divorced women are stigmatised. Women are very much made aware
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that they had better divorce at the Islamic court, or else they will be
considered ‘stained women’ and not suitable for remarriage.
Because of this stigma and in addition to its judicial role, the Islamic
court of Bulukumba is able successfully to fulfill two important roles
with regard to divorce: first, the role as registrar of divorces, as part of
civil registration of the state; second, providing clear, ‘uncontaminated’,
legal identities to women, so that they become appropriate marriage
candidates in their communities. The stigma on informal divorce seems
to have a cultural component, but probably is mainly caused by the fact
that governmental institutions such as the kua implement the regulations
with regard to divorce and polygamy. That is to say, they are strict on
issuing marriage certificates to men (and women) who are still registered
as married. Through the stigma on informal divorce, a chain of formality
is promoted: formal divorce enables a formal remarriage, which in turn
facilitates birth certificates for children born out of a second marriage,
making the latter formal heirs, etc.
4 The Islamic Court of Bulukumba and Women’s Post-Divorce
Rights
Above I have established that the Islamic court is the main forum for
divorce in Bulukumba, making divorce very accessible to women. The
Islamic court plays an important role in civil registration and endows
women and children with a clear marital status as part of their legal
identity. Good access to the Islamic court does not automatically mean
that post-divorce rights are just as accessible for women. As I have argued
elsewhere the role of the Islamic court in settling disputes concerning
post-divorce rights is seldom fully assessed.³³ In this section I will look
into the role of the Islamic court of Bulukumba in providing access to
post-divorce rights.
The focus here is on the frequency of post-divorce cases that have
been brought before the court and the reasons for a woman to take or
not take a case to the court. Therefore, this part represents research on
access to justice, rather than a legal analysis of post-divorce cases. To
start with, the number of post-divorce cases that are brought before court
is difficult to establish. Most of the post-divorce cases registered by the
Islamic court are part of, and filed as, divorce cases. Thus, such cases are
 A.W. Bedner and S.C. van Huis, ‘Plurality of marriage law and marriage
registration for Muslims in Indonesia: a plea for pragmatism’,Utrecht Law Review,
2010, 6 (2), 175–191. http://hdl.handle.net/1887/15745.
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Waiting in front of the courtroom, Bulukumba
not registered as post-divorce cases and it would require going through
the divorce register books to establish case-by-case whether post-divorce
(counter)claims were part of the petition. Having said that, the number
of cases at the Islamic court of Bulukumba that include post-divorce
claims for the years 2008 and 2009 are as follows:
4.1 Spousal Support Rights
First of all, the spousal support rights can be subdivided into three
components: unpaid due maintenance (nafkah yang lampau), the gift of
consolation (mutʾah), and maintenance during the three-month waiting
period for the wife (iddah) in which the wife may not remarry in order
to establish whether she is pregnant (nafkah iddah). Nafkah iddah in fact
constitutes the wife’s right to maintenance during the iddah after her
husband’s talak. During those three months, the marriage can still be
reconciled (rujuk) without a newmarriage ceremony having to take place,
provided the status of the divorce is non-final (rajiʾi).³⁴ In contrast, under
Indonesian Muslim family law, all women-filed divorces are immediately
final (baʾin) meaning that the wife has no rights to maintenance in the
 A third talak that takes place within the same marriage is immediately a final
divorce.
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three-month waiting period (which still applies in order to establish
whether or not the woman is pregnant by her now ex-husband).
According to the register of the Islamic court in Bulukumba, in 2008
a total of 14 women made spousal divorce claims in a total of 426 divorce
claims (3.3 per cent). However, it is more sensible to compare spousal
post-divorce claims with the number of male talak divorce cases since
women lackmutʾah and nafkah iddah rights in women-petitioned divorce
cases. Thus, in 2008 14 claims divided by 81 talak divorces multiplied
by 100 per cent means that 17.3 per cent of women claimed spousal
post-divorce rights in talak cases. The percentage of women making
spousal divorce claims at the Islamic court for 2009 is thus 3.1 per cent
of the total number of divorces and 16.9 per cent of the total of talak
divorces.
When the spousal post-divorce rights are subdivided the picture is as
follows: in 2008 there were 12 and in 2009 seven nafkah yang lampau
claims. In 2008 there were six, and in 2009 seven nafkah iddah claims.
Finally, in 2008 there were two, and in 2009 six, mutʾah claims.
The Divorce Survey also assessed the claiming behaviour of women
during the divorce process. In the Divorce Survey 19 of the 87 respondents
that had divorced at the Islamic court answered that they had claimed
spousal divorce rights. Sixteen of the 19 claims made by the respondents
were endorsed by the court, although only five entirely and 11 not entirely.
The survey thus indicates a much higher percentage (22 per cent) of
women claiming spousal post-divorce rights than appears from the
analysis of the 2008 and 2009 court registers (respectively, 3.3 and 3.1
per cent). It can be an indication that in the past it was more common
to claim spousal post-divorce rights. The age of the respondents in the
Divorce Survey varied from 18 years to 72 (median age 33.5 years) and
they were not necessarily divorced recently. However, this explanation is
unsatisfactory.
Themain explanation for the large discrepancy between the number of
formally registered claims and the number of claims that the respondents
had stated they had made can be largely explained by the tendency
of judges to settle disputes informally during the divorce process. As
I have observed in the courtroom on numerous occasions, informal
settlements are not only reached during the (since the Marriage Law of
1974) mandatory mediation session, but also at every other stage of the
divorce process. Such agreements between the parties are not registered
in the court files, but often have been reached after the involvement of a
judge. Therefore, it is likely that many of the respondents had made a
claim during a divorce hearing at the Islamic court which was informally
negotiated by the judge and which led to an agreement between the two
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parties, but which was not formally part of the court judgment and not
registered in the register books.
The Divorce Survey also assessed the reasons why respondents had
not claimed their spousal post-divorce rights. Forty-six respondents
had not claimed spousal rights and 35 of them gave a reason for this.
The reasons for non-claiming can be divided into five categories. The
first category is ‘no need for support’. Nineteen respondents gave an
answer that can be put into that category. Seven answers can be put into
the category ‘I did not want to delay the divorce process’. Four answers
can be categorised as ‘I did not want to go through the trouble’. Four
respondents gave as a reason ‘the claim would not have been endorsed’.
Finally, in the category ‘others’, one of the respondents was in absentia
during the divorce process at the court.
A respondent whom I interviewed as part of the qualitative part of the
research provided insight into why she did not claim any post-divorce
rights. According to her, one of the clerks (panitera) who had assisted her
during the process had dissuaded her from claiming any post-divorce
rights:
There was a woman there, a clerk, she said it would be [a] long [process],
since it had to be arranged first with the husband, [to know] whether
he approved [to the claim] or not. We would have to meet each other
first to mediate how much [support] I would want. If we would differ
then it will become cumbersome. If there is no point of agreement, he
wants 300 and I want 500, the process will take much longer. It would
constantly have to be dealt with, [and I would have to go] back and
forth, back and forth [to the court].
4.2 Child Support
The second post-divorce right I will deal with here is child support
(nafkah anak). In Indonesia, the father remains legally responsible for
the maintenance of his legal children, no matter who has custody over
them. Women can make child support claims in divorce cases filed by
themselves or their husbands.
In 2008, seven women, or 1.6 per cent of the total, claimed child
support. In 2009, the numbers are slightly lower, six child support claims
or 1.3 per cent. One must realise that those percentages are based on
the total number of couples that were divorced at the Islamic court of
Bulukumba. Of course, not all of them had children. Still, I think the
numbers will give a good indication of the number of women who make
child support claims, since in Indonesia it is normal to have children
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shortly after marriage, usually within two years after marriage.³⁵ The
percentages of 1.6 in 2008 and 1.3 in 2009 do not reflect actual numbers,
but rather indicate that few women make formal child support claims at
the Islamic court.
The Divorce Survey reveals much higher numbers of women who
claim child support rights. Twenty-three of the 64 respondents who had
addressed the Islamic court to divorce and had children answered that
they had claimed child support from the father. According to 21 of the
respondents, their claims had been endorsed by the court, although in
12 cases only partly. The large discrepancy between formally registered
claims and claims that the respondents in the survey had believed they
had made can be explained along the same lines as the discrepancy
above regarding spousal post-divorce rights claims. Judges prefer to
settle disputes informally during the divorce process and strive for an
agreement between the parties, since they hope that such agreements
will be better implemented. Those agreements are not formalised into
court orders and are not part of the formal judgment of the court.
In the Divorce Survey, 33 respondents gave a reason for their non-
claiming behaviour. Eight respondents gave an answer that can be
categorised as ‘no need for support’. Four respondents thought that
the claim ‘would not be endorsed’. Four respondents ‘did not want to
go through the trouble’. Three respondents ‘did not want to delay the
process’. Falling into the category ‘others’, three respondents did not make
a child support claim because the husband had custody of the children
and one was in absentia during the divorce process.
The examples above indicate that the advice and interventions of
actors within the Islamic court play an important role in the claiming
behaviour of women with regard to post-divorce rights.The Islamic court
personnel have a preference for informal agreements, and push women’s
claims outside the realm of the court. Even when the claim is formally
made in the court, the judge will attempt to negotiate an agreement with
both parties.
4.3 Communal Marital Property
The third post-divorce right I have assessed is communalmarital property
(harta bersama). In Bulukumba the Islamic court registered seven harta
bersama claims in 2008 and nine in 2009. This denotes a percentage of
1.6 per cent in 2008 and two per cent in 2009. All but one of those harta
 Minja Kim Choe, ShyamThapa, and Sulistinah Irawati Achmad, Early marriage
and childbearing in Indonesia and Nepal (Honolulu, hi: East-West Center, 2001).
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bersama claims are included in the divorce action itself, rather than filed
as a separate action after the divorce has come into effect.
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to encourage people who
want to claim harta bersama to start an action after the divorce has been
recognised. It issued an instruction in 2010 (Petunjuk Teknis, Juknis)
in which the Islamic courts were requested to convince claimants to
reach an agreement during the mediation stage or make a separate claim
after divorce. Harta bersama claims potentially postpone the divorce
itself when they become part of the divorce action since the communal
property often still has to be established by the court in the field.Moreover,
when a relatively high amount of property is at stake, the chance of appeal
increases and consequently also of a postponed divorce. Whether the
interventions of the court personnel are successful remains to be seen.
A separate action after the divorce means that one has to pay the court
fees twice. When mediation has been unsuccessful, it remains to be seen
whether the parties are willing to postpone the harta bersama claim and
finish the divorce suit first, before claiming their rights before court.
Outside the realm of the court, only a minority of the divorced couples
in Bulukumba make informal agreements on communal property. The
Divorce Survey reveals that 15 or 12.5 per cent of all 120 respondents had
made an arrangement with their husband concerning marital property
and 64 did not (40 respondents chose not to answer this question).
Forty-six respondents provided reasons for not seeking amarital property
arrangement with the husband. Nineteen respondents answered that they
‘did not need the marital property’. Thirteen respondents said that ‘there
was no marital property’. Seven respondents gave an answer that can be
categorised as ‘I did not want to delay the process’. Three respondents
‘did not want to go up against their ex-husband’. Four claims fell into the
category ‘other reasons’, including a respondent’s reason that her children
would get her part of the marital property in the future.
The latter kind of agreement is illustrative of other cases in Bulukumba
in which the rights of the spouses themselves are subordinate to the
rights of the children. In the following interview with a respondent it
becomes clear that judges sometimes side with the wife and encourage
the husband to refrain from claiming his formal rights to half of the
marital property for the sake of the children who (most commonly)
reside with the mother.
Interviewer: So he turned up and then he asked for, he immediately
asked for, he claimed, communal marital property?
Respondent: Yes, he asked to divide the property. But I resisted,
because I have [custody of] our only child.
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Interviewer: And the property, [consisted of] a house or land?
Respondent: A house.
Interviewer: This house?
Respondent: This one.
Interviewer: Oh, so he wanted to sell this house and divide the
money?
Respondent: Yes, he said he wanted to divide it, he wanted to take
it. But I resisted, persisted, I have our only child. And in court,
eh, what is it (bagaimana), the judge, he said, the judge said it
could not be divided because I have a child. If we would had no
children, then it could have been divided. …
Interviewer: So the marital property was not divided at all?
Respondent: It was not divided.
With this quotation I intend to illustrate two things: firstly, the Islamic
court considers the living conditions of children in its judgments, in this
case whether they have a place to live; secondly, women with children
are more inclined to defend property rights. Property seems to be
considered more essential for the future of their children than child
support arrangements.
4.4 Bride Price (Mahar)
The fourth and last post-divorce right I have looked at is the bride price
or mahar. Mahar is the bride price paid by the groom to the bride.
The mahar remains the property of the wife after divorce, at least if the
marriage is ‘consummated’. When this is not the case because of the
unwillingness of the wife to sleep with her husband, half of the mahar
must be returned. In 2008, 11 women, or those in 2.6 per cent of all
divorce cases, filed a mahar claim. In 2009, 9 or 2 per cent of the women
involved in a divorce case made a mahar claim.
A special feature of Bulukumba and South Sulawesi in general is that
the bride price is often given in non-movable goods (e.g. a plot of land,
standing trees on a plot of leased land, a house) rather than in money or
gold. This makes the mahar cases in South Sulawesi more complicated.
The goods will represent a customary value in ‘Real’, this referring to
the currency of Saudi Arabia. The amount is based on the status of the
bride and is thus traditionally linked with the amount of noble blood
the wife possesses.³⁶ Women often insist that the mahar is handed over
to them, since they need it as mahar for the future marriage of their
 Chabot, Kinship, status and gender in South Celebes, 1996.
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sons. Sometimes the former spouses make an arrangement in which the
father keeps the land in his possession but promises to use it as their
sons’ mahar in the future.
4.5 Enforceability of Court Orders
If you look at the execution and enforceability of court orders, a mixed
picture occurs. With regard to spousal support for the three-month
waiting period, implementation is facilitated by the Islamic court, since
husbands are pushed by the court to pay in advance the entire sum
established in the court order, after which the husband may utter the
talak before the court.
In contrast, child support implementation depends on the ex-
husband’s goodwill. Many women complained that their ex-husbands
did not provide the support established in the court order. Although
there is a legal mechanism for collecting debts in the law, the Islamic
court of Bulukumba has never (yet) enforced a child support court order
through that procedure.
Somewhere in the middle is the enforcement of court orders concern-
ing marital property, which can be effective but is relatively expensive.
According to estimations by the chief clerk, enforcement requires about
1 million rupiah in court fees and, depending on the expected resistance,
additional payments (to police, sometimes military) of at least 4 million
rupiah. The current chief clerk had a good reputation in getting court
orders enforced. According to him, the network of his father, who was a
high ranking officer in the armed forces, helped him to obtain infor-
mation about the expected resistance. Moreover, he combines a tough
appearance (he is a tall, strong man, from the infamous Jeneponto area),
with an understanding for the context.
For instance, he toldme that inmany cases the persons involved would
respond with violence to the threat of force by the police. Therefore, he
said that he tends to give people a last chance, although there is no legal
necessity to do so. Together with someone from the police he will visit
the location in person and try to convince the person who is ordered
to hand over the property concerned to do so voluntarily. He said that
many people respond to the last chance to avoid the shame of a forced
foreclosure. In another case he postponed the enforcement and gave
the person the chance to harvest the rice first. According to the chief
clerk, such a humane approach greatly facilitates enforcement of court
orders.
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4.6 Satisfaction Concerning Support
In the Divorce Survey I asked whether the women concerned were
satisfied with the contribution of the father of their children in terms of
child or spousal support. A mere 8.5 per cent of the respondents were
satisfied with the father’s contribution and 40 per cent were dissatisfied.
The image of post-divorce rights presented above already indicated that
child support is unenforceable and apparently many fathers do not pay
enough support in the eyes of their ex-wives.
Nonetheless, the background of this dissatisfaction appears to be
more of a moral issue than an economic necessity: 72 per cent of the
respondents stated that their economic situation had actually improved
after the divorce. One of the main reasons for this improvement may
be that divorced women and their children generally return to their
parents’ care. If no swift remarriage takes place, divorced women may be
encouraged to leave the area and find employment in the factories of
Makassar or are recruited to work abroad whilst leaving the children in
the care of the grandparents. The working opportunities for divorced
women may contribute to the improvement of the economic situation of
the women concerned (and regional economic development), even for
those women who – if they had the choice – would have preferred to
continue playing the traditional role of housewife.
5 Conclusion
The Sharia byelaws in Bulukumba have a historical component as they
echo the aspirations of the Darul Islam movement in South Sulawesi
(1951–1965). In 2011, the Laskar Jundullah had left the streets (although
with the foundation of a local branch of the fpi this might have changed),
but the Sharia byelaws were still very much upheld in government offices
and – as the veiling incident has shown – in the Islamic court. With
regard to family law issues, the Sharia byelaws seem not to have any
negative influence on women’s rights. The Islamic court of Bulukumba is
effective in making divorce for women accessible since almost all women
who petition for a divorce at the Islamic court are successful. A majority
of the women in Bulukumba divorce formally, through a court decision.
The status of women in informal divorces is considered stained and
they may have difficulties remarrying, whereas remarriage for formally
divorced women is much more accessible.
The lion’s share of divorces – about 80 per cent – are petitioned by
the wife. The reasons for divorce that women mentioned in the Divorce
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Survey are: a lack of harmony (76.7 per cent), adulterous behaviour
or informal polygamy (31.7 per cent), domestic violence (8.3 per cent),
economic reasons (8.3 per cent), pressure by the family (8.3 per cent)
and no offspring (7.5 per cent). The cultural context of a strong bilineal
kinship system facilitates divorce as well. A good husband is expected
to be ambitious and to do all he can to improve the family’s status and
position.³⁷ However, if the husband does not act as he is supposed to,
the wife will stand up to him, often backed or pressured by her kin, and
unless the situation improves, she will eventually leave him.
With regard to the use of judicial discretion, in caseswhere the children
reside with the mother, it appears that judges may pressurise husbands
into agreements which allocate a larger portion of marital property to the
wife. However, the use of discretion can also have negative consequences
for the rights of women. First of all, women are discouraged by judges
from claiming their rights and encouraged to come to an informal
agreement which often remains unenforceable through the court system.
Secondly, the amount of child and spousal support in the court order is
often lower than what was claimed as the judge will tend to follow the
husband’s counterclaim, in order to have more chance of the support
being paid by him.
A major obstacle in achieving post-divorce rights is that, generally
speaking, enforcement of court orders is problematic. Enforcement
of spousal support is well-facilitated, but only when it concerns the
three-month waiting period. Child support orders are considered
unenforceable by the judges and, at the time of writing, no single case
has (yet) been enforced by the Islamic court of Bulukumba. Finally,
enforcement of property cases is relatively expensive due to a mix
of formal court fees and informal payments to police and others.
The execution of child support court orders is problematic and most
women are dissatisfied with the father’s support for their children after
divorce.
Still, women with children can cope economically after a divorce as
they are supported by their kin, mostly their parents, until they remarry.
Additionally, many divorced women who did not work during their
marriage, leave the area to work (abroad) for a period of time, leaving
the children in their grandparents’ care in order to contribute to the
household income. Hence, women in Bulukumba cope with the financial
consequences of a divorce because they have access to the safety net
of their kin and access to labour – much less so because of access to
the Islamic court. Nonetheless, to most of those women access to the
 Chabot, Kinship, status and gender in South Celebes, 1996.
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Islamic court still is essential as a formal divorce is a social necessity if
one intends to remarry in the future and start a new family. Thus, one
may conclude that for most women in Bulukumba access to the Islamic
court is not so much a means to access their post-divorce rights but
much more an essential condition to have access to a potential future
remarriage.

6 Women in Local Politics
The Byelaw on Prostitution in Bantul1
Muhammad Latif Fauzi
1 Introduction
Since the collapse of the New Order in 1998, the Indonesian government
has promoted regional autonomy and decentralisation. This has resulted
in an increasing number of regional regulations. Such regulations do
not limit their reference to national laws, but also draw from religious
doctrines and customs (adat). Several Muslim-dominated districts
and cities, such as Bukittinggi, Bulukumba, Cianjur, and Tasikmalaya,
have given substance to their Islamic political aspirations through the
ratification of so-called Sharia regulations.² Some regulations are linked
to religious skills and religious symbolism, such as the obligation to be
able to read the Qurʾan³ and the wearing of Muslim clothing including
the jilbab (headscarf), while most are related to public morality issues,
such as prostitution and the consumption of alcoholic beverages.⁴
With regard to public morality, in 2007 in Bantul, a district in the
Yogyakarta Special Region (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, diy), a byelaw
was issued attaching a penalty to enticing either in public places or
locations visible from public places others into acts of prostitution.
The regulation was accepted by the Regional House of Representatives
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, dprd) of Bantul on 12 April 2007
 An earlier version appeared in Al-Jamiʾah, Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 50,
No. 1, 2012.
 Robin Bush, ‘Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?’,
in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics
in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 174–191.
 To give an exampe, Solok Regulation No. 10/2001on the obligation on reading
the Qurʾan makes it obligatory for elementary, junior, and senior students and
grooms and brides to be able to read the Qurʾan. The regent or official authorities
issue certicates to validate their ability.
 Arskal Salim, ‘Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratisation’, in R. McLeod and
A. MacIntyre (eds.), Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance
(Singapore: iseas, 2007), 126.
196 islam, politics and change
and subsequently validated on 1 May 2007. It was registered as Regional
Regulation (Peraturan Daerah) No. 5/2007, henceforth referred to as the
regulation. The regulation was presented as an instrument which would
help make Bantul a district where its people could enjoy democracy,
religiosity and welfare. It was also said to be an effort (ikhtiar) to clean
up vice (maksiat) and to reflect the government’s responsibility to attend
to social order, relating to women in particular.
Bantul is located in the southern part of the Yogyakarta region. It has
a population of 831,000. Many of the people earn a living as rice farmers,
craftsmen, factory labourers, civil servants or merchants and most live in
lowland areas and in villages committed to performing religious practices
associated with ‘traditional Islam’. The regional government stresses that
it aims to apply a religious vision for the development of the region,
something, it claims, that cannot be found in other regions in Yogyakarta.
It expects the people to make their everyday life religious.⁵
Bantul is said to be considered a self-proclaimed social and political
asset by Idham Samawi who served twice as its regent, from 1999 to
2004 and from 2004 to 2009. He was born into a noble religious family,
Samawi. Haji Samawi, his father, was one of the founders of Kedaulatan
Rakyat, the first newspaper in Yogyakarta.The nobility of Idham Samawi’s
family fortified his socio-political authority in society. Later, his wife, Sri
Suryawidati, succeeded him as regent. Though her competence to be a
good regent was doubted by many, she won the 2009 election. Her term
in office has maintained the dynastic power of the family.⁶
The rise of Idham Samawi as the regent of Bantul occurred at a
time when the Indonesian government introduced a new approach to
national development through decentralisation and regional autonomy.
The concept of decentralisation was embodied in Law 22/1999 on Local
Government and Law 25/1999 on the Financial Balance between the
Central and Regional Government. Both laws give provinces, districts
and municipalities full autonomy to govern and administer their region
in the interests of local people within the limits set by national legislation.⁷
 See the profile of the Bantul district its website, www.bantulkab.go.id (accessed
16 June 2011).
 ‘Rezim Keluarga di Pilkada’, Kompas, 19 April 2010. The result of the regent
elections on 23 May 2009 was as follows: (1) Sri Suryawidati-Sumarno: 67.77 per
cent, (2) Sukardiyono-Darmawan Manaf: 28.26 per cent, and (3) Kardono-Ibnu
Kadarmanto 3.97 per cent.
 A number of laws, including Law 22/1999 on Otonomi Daerah (Regional
Autonomy) which was afterwards renewed by Law 32/2004 on Pemerintah
Daerah (Regional Government) and Law 10/2004 on Pembentukan Peraturan
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In the spirit of decentralisation, during the Samawi’s period, a number of
local regulations concerning social order were issued, one of which was a
response to prostitution in southern coastal areas of Bantul.
Right-wing Muslim organisations call for the enforcement of this
regulation, stressing that prostitution is degrading to women who are
forced into it, due to either economic discrimination or sexual exploita-
tion. Opposition to the byelaw has been voiced by a number of activists.
According to them, the regulation was drafted in a non-transparent way,
did not include public participation and was merely aimed at wooing
Muslim voters. The regulation has legal weaknesses and violates the
principles of human rights and justice. Yet another argument, mainly
put forward by gender activists, is that prostitution is an acceptable
profession, not disreputable.
This research examines public debates on the subject and addresses the
position of women in its legal implementation. In so doing, in the first part
of this chapter, I describe how the regulation came into being and briefly
deal with the history of Parangkusumo, the centre of prostitution, and the
present state of affairs. In the next section, I look at diverse understandings
of prostitution and the debates between the political parties in the Bantul
Parliament on the bill. In the last part, I present emerging voices, mainly
from ngos on gender, which resist the implementation of such a byelaw
on the ground that it supports the criminalisation of women.
2 From the Cepuri Pilgrim to Sexual Favours
In 1852, the colonial government recognised prostitution in an act
intended ‘to avoid harmful consequences resulting from prostitution’.
Sex workers should operate in brothels to make it easier for the police to
control them. Later, this provision proved to be problematic as the Act
was understood to have legitimised brothels as commercial institutions.
In 1858, another law was issued to clarify the 1852 Act. Brothels were
described as places ‘to limit the harmful effects’ of prostitution by regularly
having medical consultation.⁸
The later growth of the plantation and sugar industries in East and
Central Java, the opening up of Java to private capital, and the significant
Perundang-undangan (Drafting of Laws and Regulations), have served as the
legal basis for regional authorities to promulgate local regulations.
 Gavin W. Jones, Endang Sulistyaningsih, and Terence H. Hull, ‘Prostitution in
Indonesia’, a working paper in demography at the Australian National University,
1995.
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Sanctuary of Cepuri, 28km south from Yogyakarta
migration of male workers to and across Java created a huge demand
for the services of prostitutes. The building of roads and railways had
a similar effect. Cities along rail lines had to cope with an increasing
number of rail passengers, and thus also with a growing demand for
rooms and lodging, and sexual services. In Yogyakarta, the prostitution
centre was initially located in the area of Pasar Kembang, a few metres
from the Tugu railway station.⁹ In the 1990s pimps brought sex workers to
other places, mainly to the southern coastal areas such as Parangbolong
and Parangkusumo.
In addition to the beauty of its beach, Parangkusumo, located 28km
south of Yogyakarta, is well known for a pair of rocks surrounded bywalls,
called Cepuri. Villagers believe the rocks to be sacred and mystical, the
place where Kanjeng Panembahan Senopati, the first King of theMataram
Kingdom,was said to havemeditated.Many people believe that it was here
that the King met with Kanjeng Ratu Kidul, the Queen of the Southern
Sea of Java (Indian Ocean), for the first time. Cepuri is thus considered
an important place for spiritual and cultural events. Visitors cannot freely
enter and leave the complex and must be accompanied by a spiritual
guardian ( juru kunci). Sandals have to be taken off before entering.
Visitors are obliged to be silent inside the site. Rituals in Cepuri can be
performed on all days and at any time. Nevertheless, Tuesday Kliwon
 Ibid.
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and Friday Kliwon¹⁰ are particularly believed to be special moments
to perform a pilgrimage. In addition to the pilgrimage, the offering to
Kanjeng Ratu Kidul (labuhan), a traditional ceremony of letting offerings
and flowers drift into the Southern Sea, is considered a very important
ritual.¹¹ The choice of those two nights relates to a Javanese tradition
which regards them as holy and sacred.¹²
Modernisation and economic development have, however, altered
the adherence to these activities. Since the 1980s, economic activities in
Parangkusumo have come to dominate these ritual practices. Traders
offer goods, such as clothes, traditional medicine and massage services.
People from Yogyakarta and neighbouring areas come there either to
shop or to have a pleasant evening. The rise of economic activities,
mainly on the regular ritual days, as well as the increasing number
of houses in Parangkusumo, amplified the variety of products and
services promoted. The commercialisation of sex has been one eventual
consequence. According to rp Suraksotarwono, the spiritual guardian of
Parangkusumo, the first sex workers came from Pasar Kembang. Some
villagers welcomed this considerable business development as it has
drawn a huge number of costumers from elsewhere.¹³
This success story led to a dramatic increase in prostitution and
attracted hundreds of sex workers from other cities. Sex workers, who
used to be called women lacking morals (Wanita Tuna Susila, wts) and
now are commonly referred to as commercial sex workers (Pekerja Seks
Komersial, psk), head to Parangkusumo regularly to seek customers. Only
a small number of them are from Yogyakarta; most of them come from
districts in Central Java, such as Demak, Magelang, Pati, Purwodadi, Solo
and Sragen. Most are ‘freelancers’ and not attached to pimps. However,
the sex workers have to rent rooms from pimps who earn 10,000 rupiah
for each use.
Initially, sex workers came to Parangkusumo only on Tuesday Kliwon
and Friday Kliwon nights. Later on, considering the income to be earned,
 Kliwon is one of the five Javanese days.
 Maharsi, ‘Varian Keagamaan Masyarakat Pesisir Pantai Selatan (Studi Kasus Desa
Parangtritis, Kretek, Bantul, diy)’, Jurnal Penelitian Agama, 13, 3, September–
December 2004.
 This belief is close to a tradition that a Javanese who performs a 40-day fast
usually ends it on Friday Kliwon or Tuesday Kliwon. However, this tradition is
gradually changing and locals have started to replace the 40 days with a three-day
fast on Wednesday Wage, Thursday Pon, and Friday Kliwon.
 Interview with rp Suraksotarwono, the spiritual guardian of Cepuri in Parang-
kusumo, August 2011.
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they preferred to stay permanently rather than commute. Other residents
also benefit from this situation in many ways. The most obvious places
where such business is conducted are brothel complexes, hotels, massage
parlours, and karaoke rooms. In addition, many villagers have opened
shops selling food, cigarettes and daily provisions. Thus, the relationship
between the sex industry and other economic activities in general cannot
be ignored.¹⁴
The more dominant connotation of prostitution somehow has dis-
placed the meaning of ritual. In daily parlance, sex is also called ritual.
Some people in Parangkusumo have even named both Tuesday Kliwon
and Friday Kliwon hari ibu (Mother’s Day) as many sex workers are
between 35 and 40 years old (and so the age of a mother).
The tariff for purchasing the services of a prostitute varies depending
on how capable a customer is at haggling. In general, young sex workers
would set the tariff at between 70,000 and 150,000 rupiah, while
older sex workers tend not to set a fixed price. Customers usually pay
between 25,000 and 35,000 rupiah. The more beautiful a prostitute
looks, the higher the price. A former prostitute told me that when
she was a sex worker it was common for her to have 20 customers
a night.¹⁵
Anik, a former lady pimp, clarified that her shop might sell five
packages, each containing 144 items, of condoms a month.¹⁶ On the
ritual nights, through renting rooms, the pimps could earn more than
1,000,000 rupiah a night. In addition, owners of karaoke rooms also
made quite reasonable incomes. The price for renting a karaoke room
was 25,000–50,000 rupiah per hour. The owner could provide a karaoke
guide (pemandu karaoke) to join, when demanded. The owner received
no money from the karaoke guide. Usually a customer had to pay
50,000–75,000 rupiah and gave her the money direct. The karaoke guide
offered the customer a karaoke ‘plus’.¹⁷For this service, the customer had
to pay extra money ranging from 100,000 to 200,000 rupiah. Despite
having no income from the karaoke guide, the owner could still benefit
from selling other products, such as food and drinks, and renting out
 Interview with Daru Waskita, journalist, in Bantul, July 2011.
 Interview with Yani, sex worker, in Parangkusumo, July 2011.
 Interview with Anik who says that she looks after sex workers. She used to be a
prostitute, then a lady pimp, but now limits her business to running a karaoke
house, July 2011.
 ‘Plus’, an Indonesian slang word, often referring to additional sexual services. If
people read pijat plus or massage plus, they will understand that it is a massage
with sexual favours.
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Sacred rocks inside sanctuary of Cepuri
rooms for ‘plus’ services.¹⁸ Besides the link between sex workers, pimps
and karaoke owners, others benefited from this connection indirectly.
On the ritual days, bus drivers saw an increase in earnings due to an
increase in passengers, including pilgrims, sex workers, visitors and
traders.
During Ramadan, Cepuri remains open. Parangkusumo does become
quieter however, as the religious atmosphere does still prevail. The Darus
Salammosque, inside the complex of Cepuri, holds a daily iftar (breaking
of the fast). A religious gathering (pengajian) targeting a larger audience
is carried out weekly. All villagers, including the owners of brothels, are
expected to donate food for takjil (fast-breaking meal, commonly called
iftar). Mothers, teenagers and children gather to wait for the coming of
the Maghrib prayer. During that time, guided by the imam, they recite
Islamic chanting (dhikr) and the prayer commonly recited for the dead.
Rituals within the mosque represent the traditional teachings of Islam,
which is institutionally affiliated with the biggest Muslim organisation,
Nahdlatul Ulama.¹⁹ Prostitution is not strongly evident during Ramadan
evenings.
 Interview with Budi, the owner of Hesty Karaoke in Parangkusumo, July
2011.
 Interview with Ahmad, the imam of the Darus Salam mosque on 11 August 2011.
He has been an imam for 17 years. He admitted that his dakwah activity in the
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3 The Making of a Prostitution Byelaw
The discussion on the prostitution regulation commenced in 2002,
though it took until 2007 before the legislation was officially issued.
On 15 March 2007 the regent submitted and read an Introductory Note
(Nota Pengantar), which included a bill on the ban on prostitution,
to the plenary meeting of the Regional House of Representatives of
Bantul. This bill, drafted by the sub-division on law, claimed to rely upon
social aspirations. It is said to have been drafted after three meetings
were held in January 2007 involving state officials, social and religious
leaders, activists and ordinary people.They came to the single conclusion
that prostitution was a serious problem in terms of religious and social
norms.
During the two days after this meeting, the parties represented in the
Regional House of Representatives²⁰ prepared for a general debate on
the regent’s Introductory Note. On 20 March 2007 the plenary meeting
heard, for the second time, the opinion of the parties. The majority of
them asserted the necessity of the regulation and recommended the
establishment of the special commission to discuss and examine the
bill.²¹ The setting up of the special commission is a compulsory step in
the legislation process and offers the only opportunity for members of the
Regional House of Representatives to bargain their political interests.The
final report represents the voices of all factions. It also plays a decisive
role in determining the outlook of a bill. The head of the commission,
Edy Susila, represented an Islamic party, the ppp, while the secretary,
Jupriyanto, was from another Islamic party, the pks.²² At the same time,
the regent formed an executive team whose main task it was to ensure
that the draft was accepted.
The bill was eventually accepted by the Regional House of Represen-
tatives of Bantul on 12 April 2007, registered as regulation No. 5/2007
and validated on 1 May 2007. Health, public safety, legal instruments and
area of Parangkusumo was not hampered by the prostitution. He tended to call
sex workersmbak-mbak nakal (naughty women) as he argued that the naughty
women meet men’s need for sex while the good women meet men’s need for
building a family.
 pdi-p, pan, pkb, pks, Golkar, and Kesatuan Baru (a coalition of Partai Demokrat,
ppp and Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa).
 Taken from the Official Proceeding of the 15th plenary meeting of the dprd
Bantul in 2007.
 Keputusan dprd Bantul No. 08/kep/dprd/2007 on Pembentukan Panitia Khusus
(the dprd Bantul’s Decree on the Establishment of a Special Committee).
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social harmony, violation of God’s law, immorality and akhlak karimah
(good behaviour) were mentioned as reasons for it being issued. In the
section on punishment, it is stated that anyone acting in violation of this
byelaw can be sentenced to a maximum of three months’ imprisonment
or a fine of a maximum of 10,000,000 rupiah. As mentioned before,
the regulation was intended to make possible the arrest not only of sex
workers but, more importantly, of pimps and brothel owners. Many
people doubt however that the regulation will be fully implemented as, in
many cases, pimps appear to be immune to the law because they usually
behave as strongmen and have social power in society. It is commonly
known that they have a close relationship with key members of the local
administration, including the law apparatus, which can protect them
from the power of the law. The law does, however, affect those at the
lower level, predominantly sex workers. In prostitution actions in the
Bantul court defendants are mostly sex workers, not the pimps or the
brothel owners.
The byelaw has led to criticism not only by sex workers, but also by a
number of other groups. Negative reactions were voiced by communities
whose financial resources were affected by the implementation of the
regulation. Community and women’s groups also have strongly criticised
the regulation, saying the ordinance is vague and dangerously ambiguous,
leaving all women vulnerable to accusations of prostitution. In the plenary
session of the Bantul Regional House of Representatives on discussing the
regional budget of 2008, all political parties reemphasised their support
for enforcement of the regulation aimed at preserving good religious
conduct.
While the position of prostitution in society was problematic, this
did not apply to the remarkable speed of the legislation process, which
took only 20 days. It demonstrates that the Bantul authorities faced few
complexities, both sociological and political, in making this law possible.
Muslim organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and
the mui were invited to write an official letter expressing their support.
More significantly, every single party, either Islamic or secular, supported
the regulation.
The fact that all parties shared a religious outlook in their opinions
about prostitution was undeniable. They spoke the same language, i.e.
preserving good behaviour and saving a generation, and a few of them
placed prostitution in a wider social economic context, looking at issues
such as poverty and job opportunities. A slightly different reason for
supporting the bill was given by the pkb. It argued that prostitution
has to do with the free market mechanism of supply and demand.
Finding a solution is about how to sever the ties between the seller
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(prostitute) and the customer. Enforcing the law only with respect to the
former would not solve the problem.²³
This case shows that differentiating between religious and secular
parties is no longer relevant. This can be explained by looking at the
balance of parties when the bill was accepted which changed by the
decline of one secular party, the pdi-p and the rise of another one, the pd.
Of the 45 seats in the Bantul legislature, the pd had one seat (2.2 per cent)
in 2004 and five in 2009, a significant increase. On the other hand, the
pdi-p won 16 seats (35.5 per cent) in 2004 but dramatically lost five seats
(24.4 per cent) in 2009. Another important party, the Islamic pks had
five seats (11 per cent) both in 2004 and 2009 (see Appendix, Table 1).²⁴
In view of this it is safe to argue that the transformation of the so-called
politik aliran (aliran politics) after the fall of Suharto still continues.²⁵
This can be seen from the fact that the current political situation in some
local areas in Indonesia presents a picture of people’s loose attachment to
political parties, particularly in terms of declining membership figures
and increasing numbers of swing voters.²⁶ This phenomenon refutes
the premise that politics has become polarised between Islamic and
non-Islamic parties. Moreover, the contradiction between urban-based
parties and rural-based parties has become blurred. Both religious and
non-religious streams are following the same direction. They tend to
neglect their political ideologies, while rather pragmatic interests appear
to drive their agendas.
The vast majority of Muslims in Bantul, about 95 per cent of the whole
population, mostly living in rural areas, are a captive political market.
Both secular and Islamic parties have to compete over their influence in
that domain. The pdi-p, which usually avoids exploiting religious issues
or speaking out in favour of the introduction of Sharia-based byelaws
such as those relating to pornography and the wearing of a hijab by
women, acts differently at the regional level. This observation leads me
to conclude that presenting an Islamic image, in fact, is used by parties
as a strategy to win over Muslim voters. It is, hence, relevant to consider
Ufen’s note on the dynamics of politik aliran in the Reformasi era. He
 Pendapat Akhir Fraksi pkb atas Enam Raperda Kabupaten Bantul (The Final
Opinion of the pkb’s faction on Six Bills of Bantul), 12 April 2007.
 Based on the data of both theCentral and Bantul Commission ofGeneral Election.
 R. William Liddle, ‘New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia’,
Asia Program Special Report (WoodrowWilson Center International Center for
Scholars), no. 110, April 2003, pp. 4–13.
 Andreas Ufen, ‘The Evolution of Cleavages in the Indonesian Party System’,
Working Paper at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, April 2008.
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said ‘parties are not “organic” aggregations of social interests, but are
characterised by all kinds of deficiencies. Most of them are riddled with
internal conflicts, their financing is often shady, their platforms are vague
and party elites tend to monopolies decision making.’²⁷
4 Contestation over the Meaning of Prostitution
When defining prostitution, the fact that a prostitute receives money
for her services is usually an essential element. However, simultaneously,
in addition to being labelled immoral, sex workers are generally not well
paid, though, according to a report byThe Economist, an exceptional few
of them earn a lot of money.²⁸ Therefore, there are many ways to perceive
prostitution. Edlund and Korn, referring to the 1969 edition of the Ran-
dom House Dictionary of the English Language, defined prostitution as an
‘act or practice of engaging in sexual intercourse for money’.²⁹ Another
definition rejects the point of selling one’s body to distinguish between
prostitutes and common women. As Ellis has argued, a prostitute can-
not simply be a woman who sells her body because that is also done by
womenwhomarry in order to secure a home and a livelihood.³⁰ Unable to
avoid a simplification, Edlund and Korn argue that a prostitute sells non-
reproductive sex, ‘commercial sex’, whereas a wife sells reproductive sex.³¹
Likewise, in the discussions in the regional Parliament the most
controversial debate had been about what prostitution is and what
definition should be used. Some made a categorisation dependent
upon the presence of money. The regulation does not. It states that
indecent (immoral) actions with or without financial compensation are
regarded as prostitution. It seems that the regulation ignores compound
definitions of prostitution. It describes prostitution as any action, by a
person or an institution, enticing, facilitating, organising and committing
indecent acts. Because of this definition, the grey area between ‘approval’,
 Andreas Ufen, ‘From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in post-Suharto
Indonesia’, South East Asia Research, 16, 1, 6.
 The Economist in February 1998 reported that an Arabic prostitute could make
2,000 us dollars a night while a Latvian sex worker was reported to get 5,000 us
dollars a month, 20 times the average salary.
 Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn, ‘A Theory of Prostitution’, Journal of Political
Economy, 110, 1, 2002, 183–184.
 Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex (New York: Random House, 1936),
225.
 Edlund and Korn, ‘ATheory of Prostitution’, 184.
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‘acknowledgment’, and ‘prohibition’ of prostitution, which existed in the
past and had been clear to the government, sex workers, brothels and the
public, has disappeared.
Though insisting it was in favour of that position from early on, the
pdi-p was somehow not convinced that prohibition was the best choice.
That is why it held an sms poll on 10 and 11 April 2011 on the Persatuan
radio station, showing that the pdi-p understood the importance of the
mechanism of public participation in the legislative process. Ignoring the
fact that some groups were reluctant to have any form of interference at
all, the public was offered two options: regulation or prohibition. There
was no clear definition of what constituted the difference between the
two. In total 224 messages were received, of which 45 (20.1 per cent)
were in favour of regulation, while the rest, 79.9 per cent, preferred
prohibition.³² This result made the pdi-p decide to approve of the draft;
coming out in favour of prohibition was a reasonable decision to take.³³
Health was another factor brought into play. The Golkar party,
referring to the result of the survey by the Health Office of Bantul,
expressed strong support for the byelaw. A survey of 285 blood samples
in 2004 found seven people who had hiv (Human Immunodeficiency
Virus), the one of 2005 (with a sample of 422), six. A survey of 378 blood
samples held in 2006 found 12 people with hiv, that of 2007 with a wider
blood sampling of 403 people, four. The decrease in people with hiv
in 2007 was claimed to be one of the positive effects of enforcing the
regulation.³⁴
However, religious symbolism served as the main reason for the
rejection of prostitution. Islamic parties explicitly cited a number of
verses from the Qurʾan. The New Unity Faction (Fraksi Kesatuan Baru)
including the ppp related prostitution to God’s prohibition on jollification
and adultery. With respect to the first, verse 64 of the chapter al-ʿAnkabut
(Q. 29; the Spider) was cited, cautioning human beings against jollification
and pleasures in this world and reminding them of the endless happiness
in the hereafter; with respect to the second, they referred to verse 32 of
the chapter al-Israʾ (Q. 17; the Night Journey or the Children of Israel),
which explicitly forbids committing adultery.³⁵
 The Final Opinion of the pdi Perjuangan Faction on the Six Bills of Bantul,
12 April 2007.
 Interview with Tustiyani, the head of dprd Bantul, July 2011.
 The Final Opinion of the Golkar Party Faction on the Six Bills of Bantul, 12 April
2007.
 The Final Opinion of the Fraksi Partai Golkar, the Fraksi Kesatuan Baru, and the
Fraksi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
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The pks was in favor of banning prostitution but harshly criticised the
regulation as it did not define morality in terms of religious norms. It
also regretted the incompleteness of this byelaw as it limited the scope of
prostitution and did not include cheating on one’s spouse (selingkuh)
as an act of prostitution. Machmudi noted that for the pks promoting
Sharia on the national level remains important. The party prefers to
pursue the implementation of Sharia in a bottom-up approach, through
educating Muslims to understand the essence of Sharia. In this way, they
practise such teachings in their daily lives, and only when people accept
Islamic law will they call for its implementation by the government.³⁶
5 Prostitution and Criminalisation of Women
Prostitution, in relation to the Sharia-based local regulations, has become
a heatedly debated topic in recent years. Public attention has focused on
the situation of female sex workers, the influence of prostitution on the
young generation, the rise of economic activities surrounding prostitution
centres and the adequacy of regulations. Much of the debate has simply
been polarised between the so-called liberals and conservatives. The first
demand that prostitution be decriminalised, normalised and humanised,
while the second argue that prostitution should be eliminated. Social
political interests play a major role for the government in determining its
position between the two poles.
Kantola and Squires³⁷ categorised discourses responding to politi-
cal debates on prostitution into four types: public nuisance, traditional
morality, oppression-of-women and sex work. Public nuisance is the
most dominant argument against prostitution. This discourse neverthe-
less remains silent on the marginalisation of street-class sex workers.
Objections to sinful, shameful and evil prostitution are put by the
traditional-morality model. These qualifications have been used for
100 years and are frequently mentioned whenever the topic is discussed.
In the spirit of modernisation and gender-equality mainstreaming, the
oppression-of-women argument does not highlight sin and vice, but the
subordination of women and children.³⁸ The oppression model stresses
 Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and The
Prosperous Justice Party (Canberra: anu e Press, 2008), 195.
 Johanna Kantola and Judith Squires, ‘Discourses Surrounding Prostitution
Policies in the uk’, in European Journal of Women’s Studies, 11, 1, 2004.
 Ronald Weitzer, ‘Legalizing Prostitution: Morality Politics in Western Australia’,
The British Journal of Criminology, 49: 1 (2009), pp. 88–105.
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the notion that prostitution is male domination of women. The model
regards sex workers as victims and relates prostitution to sex trafficking
problems. Those sexually exploited are often economically marginalised
women and children with histories of prior physical and sexual abuse.
The absence of economic alternatives has made them vulnerable to sex
trafficking. The Coalition against Trafficking in Women (catw) in the
‘WhoWe Are’ section of its website proclaims that ‘[w]e must take a prin-
cipled position against the legalization of prostitution and discourage the
demand for commercial sex without penalizing the victims. The wrong
people continue to be arrested; the prostituted should be decriminal-
ized.’³⁹ This model’s favoured term, ‘sexual slavery’, is obviously opposed
by the sex worker paradigm. Legalisation will institutionalise protection
through workers’ rights and the decriminalisation of sex workers.
I argue that the Bantul authorities were inclined to implement the
traditional-morality model. It is stated in the byelaw’s ‘Consideration’
that prostitution is an activity that disparages human dignity and violates
religious tenets, the ideology of Pancasila and morality.⁴⁰ Both the legal
drafters of the bill and most of the Bantul legislatives employed the
oppressionmodel to understand prostitution. In their opinion, the Bantul
regulation on prostitution is aimed at protecting women from being
‘sexual victims’.⁴¹ It seems that the Bantul administration has made a
generalisation about prostitutes. EnikMaslahah, a female activist ofMitra
Wacana, suggested that it should make a classification of prostitutes.
Prostitutes should be divided into three types, i.e. those forced into
prostitution, victims of trafficking, and those offering sexual intercourse
for money. Such a classification can be used as the basis for addressing the
problem of prostitution. It is not right that the prohibition of prostitution
is strictly viewed in terms of eradication, while efforts to prevent, handle
and rehabilitate those engaged in these practices are not undertaken.⁴²
It has been argued that the method chosen by the Bantul adminis-
tration to abolish prostitution through the byelaw is worse than that
undertaken by the Yogyakarta province in 1954 which byelaw was specif-
ically concerned with brothels. This 1954 byelaw was aimed at eradicating
 www.catwinternational.org/WhoWeAre (accessed 17 November 2011).
 Bantul regulation No. 5/2007 on the Prohibition of Prostitution.
 ChristineM. Jacobsen andDag Stenvoll, ‘MuslimWomen and Foreign Prostitutes:
Victim Discourse, Subjectivity, and Governance’, Social Politics, Volume 17
Number 3, (2010), pp. 274–276.
 EnikMaslahah, ‘Penurunanhiv/aids danPerda’, paper presented at the discussion
‘Membangun Sinergisitas Gerakan hiv-aids, Gerakan Perempuan dan Gerakan
ham’, 12 March 2008, Gedung Kepatihan Yogyakarta.
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prostitution and maintaining people’s health and safety. However, this
regulation aimed in the first place at regulating pimps and houses used
as places of prostitution, instead of arresting sex workers. The byelaw
allowed the Yogyakarta administration to seal a house which was proven
to be used as a brothel for three months, but it had to revoke its deci-
sion if the house was no longer used as a prostitution centre after this
period. The definition of prostitution is much clearer in this law and it
distinctively refers to acts of people selling their bodies and committing
adultery for money.⁴³
The repressive approach has been developed by the Bantul adminis-
tration which is of the opinion that the existence of prostitution is a result
of social changes in a capitalist society. This thought clearly appeared in
the government stakeholders’ opinions when asked about the reason
why a woman becomes a sex worker. Female prostitutes, they argued, are
women who wear sexy clothes, lead luxurious lifestyles and feel reluctant
to work hard, and have lost their dignity. Prostitution is understood as
a result of excessive freedom and sexual permissiveness.⁴⁴ In line with
this argument, paying less attention to its causal factors, prostitution
is viewed as dirty, a vice and an immoral act. In many cases, however,
prostitution is a consequence of a poor family economic existence.
The regulation led to quite a few wrongful arrests following the many
raids conducted by the civil police (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja, Satpol
pp) in Parangkusumo. Sriyati, a 34-year-old masseuse, was accused
of behaving in a sexy and provocative manner. While offering an
advertisement of her massage services in front of her house, she was
apprehended for being a prostitute. She could not refute the accusation
and, therefore, was fined 500,000 rupiah. Instead of being sent to prison,
she preferred to pay the fine by borrowing money from a friend. Being
an elementary school graduate, she had to work hard to pay off the debt,
since Sriyati could usually only earn 15,000 rupiah a day. The fine meant
a downward spiral for her.⁴⁵ Another wrongful arrest occurred a couple
of weeks after the regulation was issued. On 16 July 2007 the civil police
detained 134 women. The story was that among them was a mother, who
in the evening sat in front of her small shop (warung), was arrested and
was charged with being a prostitute. The woman was in fact the wife of
the head of Mancingan village, in Parangtritis. She failed to prove that
 Peraturan Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta No. 15/1954 tentang Penutupan Rumah-
rumah Pelacuran.
 Komnas Perempuan, Atas Nama Otonomi Daerah, 40.
 Interview with Anik, the owner of a karaoke house in Parangkusumo, 20 July
2011.
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she had not violated the law and, hence, was taken to the police station.
However, before her appearance in court, her husband came with the
necessary proof to secure her release.⁴⁶
The regulation has created the impression that the Bantul admin-
istration is keen to eradicate prostitution, but that it continues to be
practised.The administration upped the number of police raids on Friday
Kliwon and Tuesday Kliwon to as many as two or three times a day.
However, the prostitutes preferred to leave the centre and moved to the
village residential areas. Residents are hardly keen to stop them, as the
prostitutes provide income by renting rooms. In view of this, activists
condemned the way the regulation was enforced. The above cases show
the existence of institutionalised discrimination and criminalisation of
female sex workers.⁴⁷ Criminalisation lies primarily in the principle of
legal moralism and, secondarily, in the harm, legal paternalism, and
offence principles.⁴⁸These principles relate to the view that individual lib-
erty is justifiably limited to prevent harm to oneself and others, immoral
behaviour, and offence to others. In other words, these principles have
been referred to in advance in order to justify legal restrictions on the
liberty of individual adults.⁴⁹
Harsh criticism was motivated by the fact that the regulation is aimed
at catching the sex workers, not the pimps. Based on the records of the
Bantul court, in addition to prostitutes and their customers, a number
of young couples were arrested. Their cases are categorised as minor
crimes (tindak pidana ringan). The records show that two months after
its launch 127 sex workers were arrested in a month.⁵⁰ The fines varied
and were dependent upon the judge’s discretion. From 2007 to 2009,
fines ranging from 300,000 to 500,000 rupiah were paid. In 2010, the
fine declined to 100,000 rupiah. This considerable decrease was because
 ‘Polres Bantul Rasia 134 psk di Parangkusumo’, Suara Merdeka, 17 July 2007.
 Criminalisation is an act of controlling or restricting someone’s actions and/or
talk by making threats of criminal laws or an act of indentifying a legal activity as
a crime. This approach has been used to relate prostitution to female morality,
instead of poverty.
 Rosemarie Tong,Women, Sex, and the Law (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 1984), 39–43.
 See Thomas Mappes and Jane Zembaty (eds.), Social Ethics: Morality and Public
Policy (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002); Thomas A. Mappes, ‘Sexual Morality and
the Concept of Using Another Person’, in Alan Soble and Nicholas Power (eds.),
The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield,
2002), 207–223.
 For a complete record of prostitution actions in the Bantul court from 2007 to
2011 see Appendix Table 2.
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of one judge’s belief that prostitutes were often mothers trying to earn
money for their family. He believed that using the law as a deterrent and
a sanction is therefore not necessarily the correct way to proceed in this
context.⁵¹
Watin, the Coordinator of the People’s Alliance Rejecting Land
Evictions (Aliansi Rakyat Menolak Penggusuran, armp) stated that
Parangkusumo people rely on tourism for their financial income.
Following the issue of the regulation, traders suffered an economic
decline of up to 90 per cent as Parangkusumo saw a significant decline
in the number of visitors. People worried about raids and were fearful of
being arrested and accused of violating the law.⁵² The decreasing number
of sex customers had an impact on the income of food shops and those
hiring out rooms. They condemned the regulation as having made their
lives difficult. The regulation also hit the transport sector.⁵³
This situation triggered organisations attached to the Solidarity
of Combating aids of Yogyakarta (Solidaritas Penanggulangan aids
Yogyakarta, spay) to issue a press release criticising the regulation,
which they claimed harmed and discriminated against women. These
organisations held intense discussions involving social activists and
prostitutes and agreed collectively that the regulation had to be rejected.
The result was the establishment of an alliance, called the Alliance for the
Rejection of the Bantul Regulation Banning Prostitution (Aliansi Tolak
Perda Larangan Pelacuran di Bantul, atplp). The Indonesian Planned
Parenthood Association (Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia,
pkbi) served as the coordinator while the Institute for Islamic and Social
Studies (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, LKiS) was asked to appoint a
campaign team.⁵⁴
This regulation was accused of contradicting higher laws, such as
the Indonesian Penal Code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana,
kuhp). In the kuhp, mainly chapter iv ‘assault on chastity’ including
Articles 295, 296, and 506, the main point in prostitution regulation
is the criminalisation of pimps who make money from selling women
 Interview with Sri Sugiarti, law clerk of the Bantul court, 12 August 2011.
 ‘Prostitusi Dipicu Kemiskinan, Tega Tarik Denda Ketua Dewan Tak Peka Realitas
Sosial’, Radar Jogja, 6 May 2011.
 InterviewwithMulyono, the owner of a karaoke and rooms business, July 2011. See
also Fisqiyyatur Rohmah, ‘Politik Peka Perempuan: Kajian Terhadap Peraturan
Daerah No. 5 Tahun 2007 tentang Larangan Pelacuran di Kabupaten Bantul
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta’, uin Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2008.
 AchmadRiza, ‘Sejarah PerjalananAliansi Tolak Perda Larangan Pelacuran Bantul’,
www.ihap.or.id (accessed 26 February 2011).
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as prostitutes. In addition, the content of the Bantul regulation was
deemed vague and to be generalising prostitution problems in a too
simplistic a way. Asmentioned, Article 4, concerned with the definition of
prostitution, is ambiguous. Descriptions of prostitution, such as ‘enticing
others in word and gesture to act obscenely’ are unclear. Any couple, even
a husband and a wife, found in a contiguous position would be liable
to arrest for committing pornography. This is because the definition of
prostitution is identical to that of pornography and does not acknowledge
the presence of money to differentiate between sex workers and others.⁵⁵
For this reason, the atplp sought judicial review of this byelaw from
the Supreme Court in October 2007. The atplp drew attention to a
number of problems in the implementation, as reported in the judicial
review manuscript.⁵⁶ The request was, however, rejected by the Supreme
Court for the reason that the time frame for such a request had expired.
In 2010, the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komisi
NasionalAnti Kekerasan terhadapPerempuan) reported that the rejection
of judicial review of the Bantul regulation on prostitution was based
on technical administrative reasons, i.e. that, according to the Supreme
Court Decree 1/1999, an application for judicial review must not be filed
more than 180 days after the issue of the regulation. Here, the Supreme
Court is seen as failing to exercise its authority to annul discriminatory
local regulations. The time limit set to apply for judicial review hampers
people’s rights to access to justice.
In a discussion held by the atplp on 24 June 2008, kh. Husein
Muhammad, the leader of Pesantren Dar al-Tauhid in Cirebon, argued
that good objectives should be achieved through good ways. He referred
to the concept of Islamic law, declaring that one affliction cannot be
removed by creating another one. He denied the position of this byelaw
as a legal norm.⁵⁷ Likewise, kh. Nur Jamil, the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama
 See ‘Permohonan Uji Materiil terhadap Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Bantul
no. 5 Tahun 2007 tentang Larangan Pelacuran di Kabupaten Bantul’, (Judicial
Review’s Petition on Bantul Regulation No. 5/2007 on the Ban on Prostitution),
submitted by the atplp, October 2007.
 The atplp identified seven problems in the implementation of the byelaw, i.e.
1) women would be subject to a curfew; 2) the raids disregard the principle of
‘presumption of innocence’; 3) the victims of wrongful arrest are not rehabilitated
and do not receive financial compensation; 4) raids violate the right not to be
arbitrarily treated; 5) raids are contrary to the right not to be treated in a way
which humiliates human dignity; 6) house searches took place without permission
of the local court; and 7) raids violated the right to freedom of religion.
 ‘Perda Bantul No.5 Tahun 2007 Tidak Layak Sebagai Produk Hukum’, www.pkbi
-diy.info (accessed 28 May 2011).
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in Kretek, Bantul, acknowledged that the regulation is not a long-term
solution and reminded people of the importance of strengthening the
function of social capital in order to limit the effect of prostitution on
the younger generation. He criticised the use of religious symbols to
legalise the regulation and the fact that the government was not able to
alleviate poverty. He encouraged the involvement of religious leaders in
implementing the law, in addition to the civil police who tend to use
repressive power to enforce it.⁵⁸
The Alliance faced a number of challenges and obstacles when the
government obstructed its campaign in several ways. First, not only
did the Bantul administration ally with the ulama and the mui, it also
publicised the report of the District Health Office that the number
of hiv infections had decreased as a result of the regulation. Thirdly,
many Muslim organisations maintained and widely disseminated among
their followers a religious interpretation of prostitution, one which was
associated with adultery. This created a public feeling that the regulation
is an effective tool for shaping morality and has no negative impact on
the social and economic lives of local people. Fourthly, the Alliance was
often deemed not to have the authority to criticise, or to contradict, the
regulation.⁵⁹
Their struggle was also hindered by the fact that most members of the
Alliance are university students in Yogyakarta coming from different
cities. In demonstrations or public hearings, they were asked to show
their identity cards (ktp) in an effort to show that they did not represent
the people of Bantul.The Bantul administration used this point to weaken
their movement.⁶⁰ Being aware of this difficulty, the Alliance changed
tactics. It broadened its scope of activism to issues beyond prostitution
and changed the name of the organisation to the Alliance of Those
Concerned about Bantul’s Policies (Aliansi Peduli Kebijakan Bantul,
apkb).⁶¹
 Interview with kh. Nur Jamil, August 2011.
 Nugroho Angkasa, ‘Pelarangan Tentang Pelacuran di Bantul Yogyakarta’, Kabar-
Indonesia, 6 August 2008.
 Interview with Tustiyani, the head of dprd Bantul, July 2011.
 Interview with Subkhi Ridho, the coordinator of Lembaga Studi Islam dan Politik
(lsip, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Politics), member of the atplp, July
2011.
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6 Conclusion
The Bantul byelaw on prostitution is one of many regulations on matters
of publicmorality.The regulation touches upon a number of key concepts,
such as the violation of religious teachings, human dignity, Pancasila and
health. The rise of the pks and pd and the decline of the pdi-p has been
one of the socio-political factors which provides for a situation where the
political parties find themselves stressing Islam and Muslim interests.
As a result of the absence of a single definition of prostitution, debate
over the meaning of prostitution in the regulation occurred. While the
secular parties relate prostitution to public participation and health issues,
the Islamic ones connect prostitution with Qurʾanic-based morality. The
borders and limitations of prostitution are unclear. Unlike the preceding
regulations, such as the 1954 Yogyakarta province regulation, and the
kuhp, which only deal with the issue of pimps and brothel owners, the
Bantul regulation has a broader scope, covering everyone committing
indecent acts, including for example those acting seductively.
Besides the cases of wrongful arrest, the Bantul court reports record
that no pimps have ever been arrested under the regulation. Instead,
intense raids by the police resulted in women suffering significant
economic hardship. Women activists and organisations harshly criticised
the regulation as it has institutionalised the criminalisation of women.
Legal attempts to change or revoke the byelaw, through judicial review
petitions, have been made, but so far have been unsuccessful.
Appendix
Table 2 Result of the national and Bantul elections in 2004 and
2009
Party National (percent) Bantul (seat)
 (per cent)  (per cent)  
pdi-p , ,  
Partai Golkar , ,  
pd , ,  
pan , ,  
pks , ,  
ppp , ,  
pkb , ,  
women in local politics 215
Table 3 Prostitution actions in the Bantul court (2007–2011)
Month ∑
Year            
      
       
     
    
        
∑ 

part 3
SHARIA AND COUNTERCULTURE IN ACEH
Kees van Dijk
Aceh has always been both a special and (for the central government)
a troublesome province. The region is well-known for the religious
disposition of its inhabitants and is invariably mentioned as one of
Indonesia’s ‘most Islamic’ regions. Aceh also has a history of fierce
resistance against any infringements on its freedom to arrange its own
affairs. In the closing decades of the 19th century it took the Dutch much
effort to subjugate Aceh, something which according to the Acehnese was
never fully accomplished. Between 1945 and 1950 no Dutch troops were
sent to Aceh. The Dutch refrained from any effort to re-establish their
authority there, afraid, if the Acehnese are to be believed, of the resistance
theymight encounter. During this periodAcehwholeheartedly supported
Indonesia’s struggle for independence, but in 1953 it clashed with Jakarta.
Acehnese leaders, resisting control by the central government over the
judiciary, the local administration and local units of the Indonesian
army, took up arms and joined the rebellions that were taking place in
other parts of Indonesia, striving for an Islamic State of Indonesia. An
additional cause for concern that the province’s existence was in danger
was that Acehnese religious leaders had their doubts about the orthodoxy
of Islam being promoted by the central government; identified by these
leaders as being inspired by Islam as practised on Java. In 1957 a ceasefire
was agreed upon and in May 1959 Aceh was granted special status. It
became the Special Region of Aceh (Daerah Istimewa Aceh) (the only
other province with the same status was and is Yogyakarta) and it was
given autonomy in the fields of religion, customs and education.
In fact, May 1959 was not the right moment in Indonesian history to
be awarded a degree of self-rule. Two months later President Sukarno
proclaimed a return to the Constitution of 1945. The proclamation
ushered in Guided Democracy, a period that would prove to be at least as
oppressive as that of the New Order. The new name given to the province
survived, but that was all that was accomplished. Centralisation, not
decentralisation characterised the years between 1959 and 1998. The
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dissatisfaction this caused once again resulted in the Acehnese taking
up arms. In 1976 the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement,
gam) was founded. Government suppression of the gam was brutal, with
many ordinary citizens falling victim to the army’s operations as well.
The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 was a watershed moment.
To redress the mistakes of the past, decentralisation became a political
priority. This new policy was coupled with efforts to end rebellions in
a number of provinces that had plagued the country for years. Under
B.J. Habibie, the first president after Suharto, East Timor (Timor Leste)
was granted independence, while Aceh’s prerogatives of May 1959 were
reconfirmed. Under his successors, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati
Soekarnoputri, expecting or hoping that religious concessions might
end the gam rebellion, Jakarta gave Aceh the authority to develop its
own Islamic legal system, culminating in Law No. 18 of 2001 on special
autonomy for Aceh. The law also gave Aceh a new name, Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam, Aceh Country Abode of Peace, combining Acehnese and
Arabic terminology. The miscalculation in Jakarta was that for the gam
it was independence that mattered in the end, not religious reform. As
Reza Idria writes in his contribution, in the negotiations leading up to
the Memorandum of Understanding between gam and the Indonesian
government of 15 August 2005, Sharia formed no part of the discussions.
It took until after the tsunami of December 2004 for an agreement
to be reached. By then, the central government had put into place a
framework for the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh which, as
would later become clear, gam leaders could only partly endorse. The
tension between Islamisation promoted from outside and local opinions
is illustrated by the inclusion of the punishment of stoning to death for
those who commit adultery in a draft law in 2009. This was the work
of the national Islamic party pks (which evoked the threat, often used
in Islamist circles, of eternal damnation in order to get fellow Muslim
politicians to support its view), but as Moch Nur Ichwan notes in his
contribution, the new bill did not take effect because the governor of
Aceh, a former gam leader, refused to sign it.
In this section it has been chosen not to highlight Aceh’s fame as
a province where the people are committed to the enforcement of
Sunni Islam, but to draw attention to behaviour in defiance of this
and to the existence of groups and opinions which challenge orthodox
interpretations. As Reza Idria points out, most studies on Sharia in Aceh
have emphasised its enforcement, and rarely deal with the reactions of
the Acehnese population to its implementation. A similar remark can
be made about the reports published by human rights organisations
and other ngos, and by the coverage in Indonesian and foreign mass
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media. Hence, he and Nur Ichwan, who emphasises the same point, pay
particular attention to criticism and counter-streams in Acehnese society.
In part, such dissent takes the form of a critical discussion of the concrete
shape that Sharia legislation has taken; stressing how little attention is
paid to the real problems that have to be tackled, such as the combat of
corruption and poverty and how detrimental the new legislation is to
the position of women and members of minority groups. As becomes
clear from Nur Ichwan’s discussion of the position of heterodox Sufi in
present-day Aceh, another point of concern is the strict interpretation of
Sunni tenets that characterise the religious laws promulgated thus far in
Aceh, disregarding the beliefs and practices of the Shiʾa, Sufi, Ahmadiyah
and other religious minority communities and the concomitant lack of
religious tolerance such an approach reflects. To a degree, resistance finds
its expression in defiance of religious directives imposed from above by
the population at large and by punkers, homosexuals and other people
with a different way of life and who are trying to preserve their own
subculture. As Reza Idria also points out, yet another point is the value
attached to one’s own way of life. Some Acehnese Islamic leaders almost
took it as an insult that it was Jakarta, and not they themselves, that
determined what the introduction of Islamic law would mean in a region
well-known for its devotion to Islam and its rich Islamic tradition.
A question to be asked when discussing Islamic legislation – in Aceh
and elsewhere – is whether ‘religion’ can be isolated in studying its
implementation. Religiously inspired byelaws in other parts of Indonesia
are defended not by an appeal to Islam, but by evoking Indonesian
and local values and norms of decency. One cannot simply dismiss
such reasoning as justifications conjured up by politicians in Jakarta
and others in order to circumvent the legal ban on the drafting of
religious regulations by local administrations. The result would be an
oversimplified picture of what makes people play an active role in the
introduction and enforcement of Islamic law and in resisting it. In Islamic
Southeast Asia religion and customs (agama dan adat istiadat) are often
mentioned in one and the same breath; and as the contributions to this
section indicate, local values form an important point of reference. Reza
Idria calls attention to the fact that in Aceh behaviour is often prohibited
because it is incompatible with Islamic and Acehnese culture.
His contribution is a good illustration of David Kloos’ observation that
fieldwork is an indispensable tool when dealing with the construction
and functions of stereotypes about the Acehnese, presented by outsiders
and in local society itself; and also in relation to the misconceptions
which are the result of fixed ideas about a society. He shows that the
representation of the Acehnese as being pious and militant people should
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not make people conclude that the Acehnese are necessarily receptive
to fundamentalist or Islamist propaganda from outside; for that the
opinions about what constitutes proper Islam are too wide apart. This
was, as David Kloos points out, a mistake made by former Jemaah
Islamiyah leaders when they set up a training camp in Aceh, discovered
by the Indonesian authorities in 2010. Earlier, in 2002, al-Qaeda leaders,
investigating the possibility of setting up a base in Aceh probably made
the same wrong assessment. The discovery of the training camp and the
military operations against it form the point of departure of David Kloos’
analysis. Taking place near the village where he was doing fieldwork, the
events allowed him to gain a first-hand insight into people’s reaction and
beliefs; and also in a society made weary by past violence.
7 Neo-Sufism, Shariatism, and Ulama Politics
Abuya Shaykh Amran Waly and the
Tauhid-Tasawuf Movement in Aceh1
Moch Nur Ichwan
1 Introduction
The current official implementation of Sharia in Aceh and the subsequent
emergence of shariatism,² represented by Islamist groups, have positioned
Sharia as the ‘master signifier’ which defines almost all spheres of life –
educational, social, political, economic and cultural. In this context,
official Sharia ulama as well as societal Sharia ulama emerged as the
authority to define what kind of Islam is to be adopted by the government
and practised by people in the region. This development has undeniably
led to the marginalisation of non-Sharia oriented Muslim groups,
such as Sufi and other groups considered as being deviant. This has
also led to the resurfacing of a confrontation between Sufi ulama and
Sharia ulama in Aceh. The best example of this conflict is that between
an official ulama institution Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (mpu,
Consultative Council of Ulama)³ and the societal ulama organisations
Himpunan Ulama Dayah Aceh (huda, Association of Acehnese Dayah
Ulama) and Majelis Ulama Nanggroe Aceh (muna, Ulama Council of
 Part of this contribution was presented at the conference Sufism for a New
Age, University of Western Sydney, 9–30 September 2011. I would like to thank
Prof. Julia Day Howell and the participants in the conference for their fruitful
discussion. I would also like to thank the Islam Research Programme (irp) of
Leiden University for making the research for writing this chapter possible.
However, I alone am responsible for its content. Fieldwork was carried out in
February 2009, March 2010, July 2011 and January 2012.
 Shariatism here is a religio-political ideology which aims to promote compre-
hensive Sharia implementation in all aspects of life.
 While the mui is a state-supported societal institution, the mpu is fully part of
the state. Qanun No. 9/2003 gives the mpu powerful authority. Executive and
legislative bodies are obliged to consult it not only in matters pertaining to Sharia
but also in ‘secular’ policies – although such a power has not been exercised
properly.
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Nanggroe Aceh) on the one hand and a neo-Sufi group, called Majelis
Pengkajian Tauhid Tasawuf (mptt, Council for the Study of Tauhid
Tasawuf), led by Abuya Shaykh Amran Waly, on the other hand.⁴
Amran Waly has been accused of spreading wahdat al-wujud (Unity
of Being/monism), a Sufi teaching of man’s unity with God which is
considered by Sharia ulama as deviant and not being in line with ‘correct’
Sunni orthodoxy.
This chapter will analyse the neo-Sufi challenge by Abuya Shaykh
AmranWaly and the Majelis Pengkajian Tauhid Tasawuf, which I call
the Tauhid Tasawuf movement, to official shariatisation by the state and
shariatism in general. Amran Waly and the mptt try to synthesise the
wujudiyya Sufi doctrine with orthodoxy, a concern which has led to
them being charged with heterodoxy. However, the fact that the mptt
survives to this day and is even spread widely not only in Aceh but also
elsewhere in Indonesia and Southeast Asia deserves further analysis.
Amran Waly’s views on Sharia, ‘tauhid tasawuf ’ and wahdat al-wujud,
and the way Sharia ulama have reacted will get special attention here.
I will argue that the long struggle between Sharia and Sufi ulama should
be understood in the context of the local politics of Aceh and that the
dissemination of Sufi views and ways of life reflects their resistance
against the overwhelming official Sharia implementation and shariatism
in Aceh today.
2 Shariatism and Sufism: Never-Ending Struggle?
The conflict between Sharia and Sufi ulama is not new in Aceh. It dates
back to before the 13th century, to the early dissemination of Islam in the
region. Anthony H. Johns argued that it is through Sufism that Islam
was first introduced to Aceh and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.⁵ In fact,
Sufism was ‘state Islam’ in the Acehnese Sultanate for quite a long time
 I adopt the notion of neo-Sufism used by Howell which means ‘a this-worldly
ethical and devotional practice free of the Sufi orders’: Julia Day Howell, ‘Sufism
and the Indonesian Islamic Revival’, Journal of Asian Studies, 60:3 (2001), 701–729.
Amran Waly’s mptt is included in the category of neo-Sufi movements because
it emphasises the spirituality of this-worldly ethical and devotional practice
and does not follow the disciplines of Sufi orders, especially in terms of the
relationship between the spiritual leader and his disciples.
 Anthony H. Johns, ‘Islamization in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsid-
erations with Special Reference to the Role of Sufism’, Southeast Asian Studies,
Vol. 31, No. 1, June 1993, 43–61.
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during which period Sharia ulama were marginalised. During the reigns
of Sultan ʿAlauddin Riʿayat Shah (1589–1604) and Sultan Iskandar Muda
(1607–1636), which is considered to be the golden age of Aceh, the Sufi
ulama Shaykh Hamzah al-Fansuri (d. 1590) and Shaykh Syamsuddin
al-Sumatrani (d. 1630) successively assumed the position of shaykh
al-Islam of the sultanate.⁶ These ulamas were Sufi masters who embraced
the wujudiyya Sufi teaching, which believed in a possible unity with God
through the spiritual path. They enjoyed the protection and patronage of
their respective sultans in carrying out their intellectual activities and
disseminating their teaching, despite strong opposition from the Sharia
ulama.⁷ When al-Sumatrani died in 1630, he was replaced by his Sufi
disciple, Shaykh Jamaluddin, but the latter was not appointed shaykh
al-Islam.
Sultan Iskandar Thani, who reigned from 1636 to 1641, appointed
Shaykh Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658), a high profile orthodox Sufi ulama
of the Rifaʿiyya, ʿAydarusiyya and Qadiriyya orders from Ranir (Rander)
in India, as shaykh al-Islam in 1637.⁸ Invested with this authority, al-Raniri
condemned the wujudiyya teaching of al-Fansuri and al-Sumatrani and
considered it deviant and misguided. He even ordered the execution of
some wujudiyya followers and all al-Fansuri’s and al-Sumatrani’s books
to be burned.⁹ He retained his position of shaykh al-Islam when Iskandar
Thani died and was replaced by his daughter, Sultanah Safiyatuddin
(1641–1675). When he lost the support of the Sultanah, he left Aceh
in 1644, and was replaced by Shaykh Saif al-Rijal, a wujudiyya Sufi
master. Saif al-Rijal continued to spread al-Fansuri’s and al-Sumatrani’s
 Amirul Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Aceh
(Leiden, etc: Brill, 2004), 148–149.
 Osman binBakar, ‘Sufism in theMalay-IndonesianWorld’, in SeyyedHosseinNasr
(ed.), Islamic Spirituality: Manifestations (New York: The Crossroad Publishing
Company, 1991), 285.
 Azyumardi Azra, Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern ‘Ulama’ in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, asaa Southeast Asian Publication Series
(Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press 2004), 56. On Al-Raniri see Muhammad
Naquib al-Attas, Raniri and the Wujudiyyah of 17th century Aceh (Singapore:
Monographs of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, no. 3, 1966);
G.W.J. Drewes, ‘Nur al-Din al-Raniri’s charge of heresy against Hamzah and
Shamsuddin from an international point of view’, in C.D. Grijns and S.O. Robson
(eds.), Cultural contact and textual interpretation: Papers from the fourth European
colloquium onMalay and Indonesian studies, held in Leiden in 1983.Verhandelingen
van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. 115 (Dordrecht
and Cinnaminson: Foris Publications, 1986), 54–59.
 Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra, 157.
224 islam, politics and change
teachings. Yet not much information is available about him and his
thoughts.¹⁰
Replacing Saif al-Rijal in 1661, Syaikh Abdurraʾuf al-Sinkili (d. 1693),
who was a low profile orthodox Sufi of the Shattariyyah order, took a
moderate position in the conflict between wujudiyya and shariatism. He
was well accepted by the four successive sultanahs of Aceh (Safiyatuddin
Tajul Alam [1641–1675], Naqiyatuddin [1675–1678], Zakiyatudin ʿInayat
Shah [1678–1688], and Zainatuddin Kamalat Shah [1688–1699]) until his
death in 1693.¹¹ As orthodox Sufi master, al-Sinkili, tried to reconcile
Sharia and tasawuf (Sufism). He never condemned wujudiyyah followers
and discouraged the labelling of other Muslim fellows as kafirun
(disbelievers).¹² The period of the sultanahs reflect the adoption of
heterodox and then orthodox Sufism as ‘state Islam’.
Today Aceh again is the scene of a confrontation between Sharia
ulama, orthodox Sufi ulama and heterodox Sufi ulama, with the first
group dominating the other two. While Sharia ulama can align with
orthodox Sufi ulama, they cannot do so with heterodox ones. Sharia
ulama and orthodox Sufi ulama even at times join hands in challenging
the heterodox Sufi ulama. The dominant role Sharia ulama currently
play in Aceh could not have been attained without the help of the state
which officially implements Sharia from above.¹³ The role of Sharia
 Saif al-Rijal was originally from Minangkabau. He studied in Surat in India, and
arrived in Aceh on 8 August 1643. He was the student of Shaikh Jamaluddin, the
disciple of al-Sumatrani. Takeshi Ito, ‘Why Did Nuruddin ar-Raniri Leave Aceh
in 1054a.h.?’, bki 134 (1978), 490–491; Azra, Networks of Malay-Indonesian and
Middle Eastern ‘Ulama’, 60–62; Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra, 157; Sher Banu
A.L. Khan, ‘What Happened to Syaiful Rijal?’, in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en
Volkenkunde, April 2011.
 For further study on these sultanahs see Sher Banu A.L. Khan, Rule Behind the
Silk Curtain: Sultanahs of Aceh 1641–1699, unpublished PhD dissertation, Queen
Mary University of London, 2009; idem, ‘The Sultanahs of Aceh 1641–1699’, in
Graf, Schroter andWieringa (eds.), Aceh: History, Politics and Culture (iseas:
Singapore, 2010); Mehment Ozay, ‘Women as Rulers Phenomenon in Southeast
Asian Islamic Society: The Queens of Aceh’, paper presented at World Congress
for Islamic History and Civilization: Intellectuals Stimulate Transformation,
Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya, 10–11 October 2011.
 Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra, 157.
 For more on Sharia in Aceh see Moch Nur Ichwan, ‘The Politics of Shariʿatization:
Central Governmental and Regional Discourses of Shariʿa Implementation in
Aceh’, in R. Michael Feener and Mark Cammack (eds.), Islamic Law in Contempo-
rary Indonesia: ideas and institutions (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Islamic Legal
Studies Program, Harvard Law School and Harvard University Press, 2007), 193–
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ulama in drafting some Sharia qanuns (byelaws) is apparent, since they
hold positions in the Dinas Syariat Islam (Sharia Office) and the mpu;¹⁴
as is their role in drafting and endorsing the draft qanun on Jinayat
(Islamic Criminal Legal Code) and the Qanun on Islamic Criminal
Legal Procedure. Although these qanuns could not be implemented
because the governor refused to ratify them despite their approval by
the Parliament of Aceh, the Sharia ulama continue to struggle for their
implementation. Together with Sharia-oriented Islamist organisations
and movements, they demand the reopening of the discussion in Aceh’s
legislative assembly.¹⁵ Sharia ulama are also influential in other Sharia
state institutions, such as Mahkamah Shariyah (Sharia courts), Wilayatul
Hisbah (Sharia police – now integrated with the civil service police [Polisi
215; Tim Lindsey, M.B. Hooker, R. Clarke and J. Kingsley, ‘Shariʿa Revival in Aceh’,
in Feener and Cammack (eds.), Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia, 216–254;
Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern
Indonesia (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2008); Al Yasaʾ Abubakar, Syariat
Islam di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam: Paradigma, Kebijakan dan Kegiatan
(Banda Aceh: Dinas Syariat Islam nad, 2008); Reza Idria, ‘Mesin Syariat’, Journal
Gelombang Baru, vol. 4 (2009), 7–15; Michael Feener, Shariʿa as Social Engineering
(London: Oxford University Press, 2013).
 The Sharia qanuns are Qanun No. 10/2002 on Islamic Courts; Qanun No. 11/2002
on the Implementation of Islamic Sharia in the Field of Islamic Belief (ʿaqidah),
Worship (ʿibadah) and Symbols (shiʿar); Qanun No. 12/2003 on Intoxicants and
the like (khamr); No. 13/2003 on Gambling (maysir); Qanun No. 14/2003 on
the Illicit Relations between Men andWomen who are not Married (khalwat).
These qanuns could not be properly implemented in the Sharia courts until the
Governor’s RegulationNo. 10/2005 onTechnicalGuidance for the Implementation
of Punishment (ʿuqubat) was issued on 12 June 2005. Since then Aceh has
witnessed Sharia punishment, especially for gamblers, people consuming
alcoholic beverages, and for khalwat and adultery by caning in public. The
implementation of Sharia in the region was finally strengthened by the Law on
the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) in 2006, a law issued after the Helsinki Peace
Agreement of 2005 between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh
Movement.
 The issue of the qanun on Jinayat was raised again in the run up to the 2014
general elections and it has been agreed to discuss it again in the Parliament. If
this qanun were to be ratified by the governor, Sharia implementation would
be much more ‘comprehensive’ and would include stoning to death (rajm) for
married adulterers and caning for homosexuality – practices conducted in other
Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The draft qanun included
such punishments as 100 lashes of the cane for unmarried adulterers and stoning
to death for the married ones; 100 lashes and a maximum fine of 1,000 grammes
of fine gold, or imprisonment of up to 100 months for homosexuals.
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Pamong Praja]), and Baitul Mal Aceh (Islamic Treasury House).¹⁶ In
these institutions orthodox Sufi ulama share some influence, but the
heterodox ones do not.
As the state ulama institution which has the right to issue fatwas, the
mpu plays an important role in defining Islam for the region, and can
decide what kind of Islam is to be adopted by the state. By issuing fatwas,
the mpu disseminates its Sharia-oriented views and exercises its political
interests. It has the right to claim which groups are in line with the ‘right
Islam’ and which are not, and which groups should be supported and
which groups should be marginalised. Whereas most of its members are
Sharia ulama, there are also a number of orthodox Sufi ulama, but no
heterodox ones.¹⁷
There are also societal ulama organisations which bring together
Sharia ulama and orthodox Sufi ulama. Among them are the huda
and muna.¹⁸ While most of their members are Sharia ulama, a number
of them are Sufi ulama who are mostly associated with orthodox Sufi
groups (tariqahmuʿtabarah). huda’s chairperson, Abuya Ibrahim Bardan
(well-known as Abu Panton [1945–2013]), was a Sharia ulama who
was at the same time also a member of the Naqshabandiyah order.¹⁹
muna’s spiritual adviser, Abuya Prof. Muhibbuddin Waly (also known
as Abuya Professor), was the grand leader (murshid ʿamm) of the
 On state policies on Sharia in Aceh see Al Yasaʾ Abubakar, Syariat Islam di Provinsi
Naggroe Aceh Darussalam: Paradigma, Kebijakan dan Kegiatan (Banda Aceh:
Dinas Syariat Islam (5th ed.), 2008).
 For more information on the mpu see Moch Nur Ichwan, ‘Official Ulema and the
Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariʿatization
and Contested Authority in Post-New Order Aceh’, Journal of Islamic Studies 22:2
(2011), 183–214.
 huda is a dayah-based ulama association established in 1999 to support a
referendum in the province on the status of Aceh (Michelle Ann Miller, Rebellion
and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta’s Security andAutonomy Politics in Aceh (London:
Routledge, 2009), 54, 77). muna is an ulama association created by ex-gam
members and the Aceh Party before the general elections of 2009. There is also
an association for dayahs and their ulama, Inshafuddin, associated with the perti
(Persatuan Tarbiyah Islam), a traditionalist Muslim organisation. Many of its
members are also members of the huda, muna, and mpu. However, as it presents
itself more as a dayah association, rather than association of dayah ulama, I do
not include it in the category of ulama organisations. Moreover, Inshafuddin
stays aloof from politics and Sufi debates, although some of its members get
involved personally.
 Communication with Tgk. Faisal Ali, secretary general of huda, 20 November
2013.
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Naqshabandiyah order inAceh until his death in 2012. Led by an orthodox
Sufi, the members of muna are mostly Sharia-oriented and orthodox
Sufi Muslims.
Although there have been differences of opinion between huda and
muna, and between them and the mpu, these three ulama organisations
unite in facing the mptt and raising the issues of deviant sects (aliran
sesat). The ulama of the muna, huda and mpu of East Aceh, for instance,
joined forces against what they called groups or persons not being part of
Sunnism (Ahlu-sunnah wal-jamaʿah, People of the Sunnah of the Prophet
and the Community) or being ‘deviant and misguided’. They organised a
gathering on 26 May 2009 to launch a fatwa that the Naqshabandiyah
opinions taught by Prof Dr Kadirun Yahya were deviant and misguided.
The provincial mpu issued a similar fatwa.²⁰ Kadirun Yahya’s followers
were asked to repent and return to the correct course in accordance
with true Sunnism.²¹ One year later, on 15 May 2010, these three ulama
organisations of East Aceh issued another fatwa against wahdat al-wujud,
which was aimed at Abuya Amran Waly’s religious teachings, as we will
see below.
What is related above reflects the image of Aceh as a province of
Sharia. No terms or concepts associated with Sufism are found in any
of the qanuns. The Aceh administration no longer considers tasawuf
an important part of governance.²² Sufism is allowed as far as it is in
line with the Sharia worldview, that is, orthodox Sufism which tries to
reconcile Sufism and Sharia. Among the orthodox Sufi orders active in
Aceh are the Naqshabandiyah, Qadiriyah wa Naqshabandiyah (tqn),
Naqshabandi Haqqani, Shattariyah and Haddadiyah.
The Naqshabandiyah, a Sufi order established by Bahaʾud-Din Naqsh-
band Bukhari (1318–1389) in Central Asia, has been active in Aceh at
least since the 17th century. In the 20th century it grew in popularity
 Majelis Ulama Permusyawaratan.Kumpulan KeputusanMajelis Permusyawaratan
Ulama Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Banda Aceh: Sekretariat Majelis
Permusyawaratan Ulama, 2008), 123–125.
 They accused Kadirun Yahya’s Naqsyabandiyah of being deviant because they
claim that it teaches, among other things, that Qurʾanic verses can make dead
people alive; that the spirits of dead people are flying between heaven and earth;
that someone who performs suluk (spiritual exercise) at a certain place is not
obliged to perform the Friday prayer; and that someone who has no money to
perform the pilgrimage to Mecca should perform suluk at a particular place
(Sufimuda, ‘Ulama yang Menyesatkan Ulama’, http://sufimuda.net/2009/05/27/
ulama-yang-menyesatkan-ulama/).
 Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, Acehnologi (Banda Aceh: Bandar Publishing,
2012), 84.
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since in the 1940s Shaykh Muda Waly al-Khalidy disseminated its tenets.
After his death in 1961, his elder son, Abuya Shaykh Tgk. Muhibbuddin
Waly, was appointed the murshid ʿamm of the Naqshabandiyah in Aceh.
When Muhibbuddin Waly died in 2012, he was replaced by his younger
brother, Abuya Tgk. Jamaluddin Waly.²³ Tgk. Ibrahim Bardan (Abu
Panton), chairperson of huda, was also a member of this Sufi order, but
not a murshid.²⁴ The Naqshabandiya is an orthodox Sufi order which
tries to bring mystical teachings and practices into conformity with the
precepts of Islamic law. Weismann even says that although many ulama
emphasised the basic compatibility of Sufism and orthodoxy, ‘none,
however, combined and implemented the two tenets in so consistent a
way as did the masters of the Naqshbandiyya.’²⁵
The Qadiriyah wa Naqsabandiyah (tqn), of which the current head-
quarters are located in Tungkop, Aceh Besar, is led by Tgk. Sulfanwandi
Hasan. It organises pengajian (religious instruction gatherings) and dhikr
meetings every Thursday evening in the mosque of the dayah Yayasan
Raudhatul Qurʾan Darussalam, which he leads. Most who attend have
an urban background and come from Aceh’s capital, Banda Aceh. The
meetings usually emphasise soul purification by way of dhikr, rather than
by Sharia byelaws. According to Tgk. Sulfan, Muslims can enjoy religion
by practising dhikr, and not by implementing laws in the form of qanuns.
Dhikr is spiritual food for humans that should be continually renewed
so that human spirituality survives. Therefore, it is Islamic spirituality
and not Islamic laws that should be revived.²⁶
The Naqshabandi Haqqani brotherhood of Aceh is led by Teungku
Muhammad Zamhuri al-Hafizh (as khalifa), one of the imams of the
Baiturrahman grand mosque in Banda Aceh. Teungku Zamhuri leads
dhikr meetings every Wednesday night at the mosque of Gampong
 The other murshids are Teungku Haji Adnan Mahmud Bakongan, Teungku
Haji Abdul Hamid Meulaboh, Teungku Haji Hasan Abati Lamno, Abu Matang
Peureulak, Abu Karimuddin Baktya, Teungku Haji Nasir Waly, Waled Hasanul
Basri PimpinanDayahmudiMesra Samalanga, AbuMuhhamadTayeb Batee Lhee
Lhoksukon dan Tgk. Zuhdi, the son of Abu Karimuddin: ‘Dayah Darussalam:
Pusat Kajian Tauhid dan Tasawuf Tertua di Pantai Barat Selatan Aceh’, http://
www.dokumenpemudatqn.com/2013/09/dayah-darussalampusat-kajian-tauhid
-dan.html.
 Communication with Tgk. Faisal Ali, secretary general of huda, 20 November
2013.
 Itzchak Weismann,The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide
Sufi Tradition (London etc.: Routledge, 2007), vii.
 Communication with Sehat Ihsan Shadiqin, who sometimes attended the
pengajian of tqn, 5 January 2011.
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Lambhuk in Banda Aceh, conducted after the evening prayer and usually
attended by about 20 people, coming from Lambhuk and the surrounding
villages. In 2004 after the tsunami, Teungku Zamhuri and his disciples
coordinated donations from the members of the Naqshabandi Haqqani
from around the world for the survivors of the disaster. What is special
about the order is that it uses music, called in Aceh rapai, during the
dhikr. This is unusual in Aceh, because most Sharia-oriented ulama
consider music forbidden, certainly during dhikr meetings. However,
Teungku Zamhuri views rapai as a medium for making the heart peaceful
and for concentrating on the dhikr. He believes that the Sufis in the past
used music during dhikr meetings to increase concentration. Concerning
Sharia, Teungku Zamhuri said that implementation of Sharia as it is today
will not bring people closer to God. For him, God should be approached
by dhikr and good deeds to others.²⁷
The Shattariyah order has been active in Aceh since the days of Shaykh
ʿAbdurrauf al-Sinkili. The current centre is the Masjid Jamik (Grand
Mosque) of the village of Peulekong in the Seunagan Timur sub-district
in Nagan Raya. The order is led by the murshid Abu Habib Kudrat,
descendent of Habib Abu Muda Seunagan, an important Shattariyyah
leader in Aceh. The Shattariyah Sufi in Aceh persist in using their own
method of deciding the beginning of Ramadan and Shawwal, and it is
not uncommon for its followers to begin fasting and to celebrate ʿId
al-Fitri on a day different from that decided by Sharia ulama and the
government.²⁸
Unlike other Sufi orders, the Haddadiyya, known also as Alawiyya,
does not have many followers in Aceh where it was introduced by
Syaikh Abu Hasan Krueng Kalee (1886–1973), who joined it when he
lived in Mecca.²⁹ Syaikh Abdullah Ujong Rimba, his disciple, joined
the order under his guidance. The reason the Haddadiyya order is
not well developed is that neither of these charismatic ulama made
a conscious effort to propagate it. The grandson of Syaikh Krueng
Kalee, Tgk. Qusaiyen, informed me that he had been told that Syaikh
Krueng Kalee considered tariqa (spiritual path) to be compatible only
for those who have problems with (or are weak in) religious Islamic
 Sehat Ihsan Shadiqin, ‘Tasawuf dalamWilayah Syariat: Sufisme dalamMasyarakat
Aceh Kontemporer’, Jurnal Ar-Raniry, No. 86, July–December 2009, 76–94.
 ‘Pengikut Tarekat Syattariah di Aceh Shalat Id hari ini’, http://regional.kompas
.com/read/2013/10/14/1505506/Pengikut.Tarekat.Syattariah.di.Aceh.Ikuti.Shalat
.Id.Hari.Ini.
 Sehat Ihsan Shadiqin, Tasawuf Aceh (Banda Aceh: Bandar Publishing, 2008),
143–146.
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knowledge. He also said that it had been tried to revive the Haddadiya,
but that this had not been successful.³⁰
All the abovementioned tariqas in Aceh are part of orthodox Sufi
orders. There are also some heterodox wujudiyya Sufi and neo-Sufi
groups. In the past wujudiyya Sufism existed as spread by Hamzah al-
Fansuri, Syamsuddin Sumatrani and Saiful Rijal. Today, Aceh wujudiyya
Sufism has emerged in a new form.TheMajelis Tasawuf Hamzah Fansuri,
for instance, which is led by Abu Alimin, the head of dayah Hamzah
Fansuri of Ujong Pancu, disseminates the teachings of Hamzah al-
Fansuri. Unlike other dayah, his students come to the dayah in the
evening, sleep there after studying and go home in the morning. What
is taught is not Sharia, but rather haqiqa (Essence of God) andmaʿrifa
(spiritual knowledge of God). Some ulama accuse Abu Alimin of spread-
ing Hamzah al-Fansuri’s teaching of wahdat al-wujud, which mainstream
Acehnese ulama look upon as deviant. Abu Alimin is interested in the
esoteric, spiritual dimension of Islam, rather than in the qanunisation of
Sharia.³¹
There are some other groups, locally commonly called salek buta
(blind Sufi practitioners), which perform certain Sufi practices, but do
not have tariqa chains or a murshid. Most of them are based on doctrines
of wujudiyya. Fatwas were issued against them by the mui of Aceh during
the New Order period and by the mpu after 1998. Another organisation
condemning them was the Muhasabah Ulama Forum of North Aceh.
In August 2009 it issued a fatwa against the teachings of Kasem Bin
Sulaiman,³² followed in November 2009 by a fatwa against Amran Waly.
A third fatwa was issued in 2010 against Teungku Muhammad of Tanah
Pasir.³³ All these groups are considered to go against the correct doctrine
of the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaʿa.
In the last decade new popular neo-sufi movements have emerged.
As elsewhere in Indonesia this happened especially in the cities. In
Indonesia neo-Sufism has been an urban phenomenon since the 1990s.³⁴
 Communication with Tgk. Qusaiyen, 29 January 2014.
 Shadiqin, ‘Tasawuf dalamWilayah Syariat’, 80–85.
 ‘Fatwa mpu Aceh Utara Tentang Aliran Salek Buta’, http://www.santridayah.com/
2012/12/fatwa-mpu-aceh-utara-tentang-aliran-salek-buta.
 ‘Dinyatakan Sesat Aliran Sekte Salek Buta Masih Resahkan Aceh’, http://www.voa
-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2010/01/06/2439/dinyatakan-sesat-aliran-sekte
-salek-buta-masih-resahkan-aceh/#sthash.d4utj2fs.dpbs.
 Julia Day Howell, ‘Indonesia’s Urban Sufis: Challenging Stereotypes of Islamic
Revival’, isim Newsletter 6 (2000), 17; Julia Day Howell, Subandi and Peter L. Nel-
son, ‘Indonesian Sufism, Signs of Resurgence’, in New Trends and Developments
in the World of Islam, Peter B. Clarke (ed.) (London: Luzac Oriental, 1998).
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In Aceh it became so after the end of the gam conflict. Most of the leaders
of such neo-Sufi groups are also affiliated with traditional Sufi orders.
While the traditional Sufi orders remain small, probably because of their
tight spiritual discipline, neo-Sufi groups gain a wide following. Amran
Waly’s Majelis Pengkajian Tauhid-Tasawuf (mptt) is one of the best
examples of such neo-Sufi groups in Aceh.³⁵ Accused of spreading deviant
teachings by the Muhasabah Ulama Forum of North Aceh, Amran Waly
is actually a neo-Sufi who tries to synthesise wujudiyya Sufi doctrine
with orthodoxy. His concern with wujudiyya, although interpreting it
in a new way in order to bring it into conformity with orthodoxy, has
made him and his tauhid-tasawuf movement the target of accusations
of spreading deviant beliefs. In spite of this the mptt is growing not only
in Aceh but also elsewhere in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. There are
ulama who consider his teachings deviant, but due to his commitment
to uphold Sharia other ulama do not. The latter are mostly those who
have relations, directly or indirectly, with Amran Waly’s father, Shaykh
Muda Waly.
3 Syeikh Amran Waly and Majelis Pengkajian Tauhid Tasawuf
(mptt)
Abuya Shaykh Haji Amran Waly al-Khalidy is one of the most important
Sufi leaders in Aceh today.³⁶ He was born on 21 August 1947 into the
family of an important modern-day Acehnese Sufi leader, Abuya Shaykh
Muhammad Waly al-Khalidy, better known as Shaykh Muda Waly
(1917–1961),³⁷ leader of the Dayah Darussalam of Labuhan Haji in South
 Majelis Zikir al-Waliyah, led by Abuya Shaykh Jamaluddin Waly, Amran Waly’s
stepbrother, is another example of a neo-Sufi group. Emphasising dhikr, it is
much smaller than the mptt: Shadiqin, Tasawuf Aceh, 149–151. Shadiqin wrote
that its leader is Abuya Professor Muhibbuddin Waly, the eldest son of Shaykh
Muda Waly, but Abuya Jamaluddin Waly told me that he led the group. Interview
with Abuya Jamaluddin Waly, February 2009.
 For a brief account of AmranWaly and mptt see sub-chapter 6 by Moch Nur
Ichwan, ‘Alternatives to Shariatism: Progressive Muslim Intellectuals, Feminists,
Queers and Sufis in Contemporary Aceh’, in Regime Change, Democracy and
Islam: the Case of Indonesia, Final Report Islam Research Programme Jakarta
(Leiden: Leiden University, March 2013).
 He learned religious Islamic knowledge from Abu Hasan Krueng Kalee and
Teungku Hasballah Indrapuri and continued his studies in West Sumatera
and Mecca. After returning from Mecca he established Dayah Darussalam,
Labuhan Haji. On Shaykh Muda Waly see Muhibbuddin Waly al-Khalidy, Ayah
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Aceh.³⁸ Hasjmy counted Shaykh Muda Waly as an important leader of
the ‘Kaum Tua’, traditional Muslims in Indonesia resisting the reform
movement at the beginning of the 20th century.³⁹ He was a khalifa of
the Naqshabandiyya Sufi order.⁴⁰ Almost all Naqshabandiyya murshids
in Aceh have ties to him and many of the founders of the big dayahs in
Aceh which were established after 1945 were his students.⁴¹ Amran Waly
learned religious Islamic knowledge from his parents, and then from
Abuya Syech Zakaria Labai Sati (West Sumatera) and Imam Syamsuddin
(Sangkalan Abdiya), two of Muda Waly’s disciples, in subjects such as
fiqh, usul fiqh (methodology of Islamic law), ʿaqida (theology), tasawuf,
mantiq (logic), and Arabic linguistics.
AmranWaly became a member of the Naqshabandiya order under
the guidance of Shaykh Aidarus Kampar, the son of Shaykh Abdul
Ghani Al-Kampari, who also granted him the authority to spread
Naqshabandiyya and to teach Majmuʿ Rasail, a treatise on the order
written by Shaykh Sulaiman Zuhdi at the end of the 19th century. He
also learned religious knowledge from Abu H. Daud Zamzami of the
pesantren Riadhus Shalihin in Banda Aceh and studied at universities
in Aceh and West Sumatera, as well as at the College Islam in Lampuri
in Kotabaru in Kelantan, Malaysia, but he did not finish his graduate
studies.⁴²
Kami Maulana Syeikh Haji Muhammad Waly al-Khalidy (Teungku Syeikh Haji
Muda Waly) (Kuala Lumpur: Kulliyah of Laws International Islamic University,
1993).
 His mother, Raudhatinnur (Ummi Pawoh), was the second wife of Muda Waly.
ShaykhMudaWaly had three wives and 14 children (ten sons and four daughters).
His first wife was the mother of Muhibbuddin Waly and Jamaluddin Waly, his
second of AmranWaly. Among Muda Waly’s other children are AhmadWaly,
Harun Ar-Rasyid Waly, Mawardi Waly, Muhammad Nasir Waly and Ruslan
Waly, all respected ulama in Aceh: A. Hasjmy, ‘Teungku Syekh Haji Muhammad
Waly al-Khalidy’, in Ulama Aceh: Mujahid Pejuang Kemerdekaan dan Pembangun
Tamadun Bangsa (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1997), 205–206.
 Hasjmy, ‘Teungku Syekh Haji MuhammadWaly al-Khalidy’, 201–208.
 Nurhayati Razali, ‘Peranan Syaikhul Islam Syeikh Muhammad Waly Al-Khalidy
dalam Pengembangan Pendidikan Tarikat Naqsyabandiyah di Aceh’, Peuradeun
i:1 (September 2013), 41–52.
 On Naqshabandiyya in Indonesia, including Aceh, see Van Bruinessen, Tarekat
Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia: Survei Historis, Geografis, dan Sosiologis (Bandung:
Mizan, 1992).
 Hasjmy, ‘Teungku Syekh Haji MuhammadWali al-Khalidy’, 205; mptt, ‘Riwayat
Pesantren Darul Ihsan’, http://mptt.or.id/home/pesantren/item/73-pesantren
-darul-ihsan.html.
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One of his brothers and also one of his main antagonists was
Muhibbuddin Waly, an orthodox Sufi, Naqshabandiyah leader and
spiritual adviser of the muna. As Shaykh Muda Waly did not grant
the title of murshid to his own sons, Muhibbuddin Waly received his
fromShaikhAbdulGhaniAl-Kampari, AmranWaly fromShaikhAidarus
Kampar, the son of Syech Abdul Ghani Al-Kampari. It seems that this
was the root of their strained relations.
Abuya Shaykh Amran Waly led the dayah Darussalam of his father
from 1972 to 1982, and established his own dayah, Darul Ihsan, also in
Labuhan Haji, in 1982. Yet, together with his brothers Muhibbuddin
and Jamaluddin, he continued to run the dayah Darussalam. Once he
was also a politician. He was a legislator of South Aceh from 1982 to
1987.
The Majelis Pengkajian Tauhid Tasawuf Abuya Syech AmranWaly
al-Khalidy, or mptt Abuya Syech Amran Waly al-Khalidy, or simply
mptt was not founded by Shaykh Amran Waly himself, but by a number
of his students, who deemed it important that AmranWaly’s teachings
on tauhid-tasawuf were disseminated.⁴³ The mptt was established in
2005 with AmranWaly’s dayah as its headquarters, but the pengajian
meeting where the initiative was taken was held in February 2001.
Its aims are: first, to promote religious practices based on Prophetic
traditions or Sharia according to the fiqh of the Shafiʿite school of
law; second, to encourage virtue (akhlaq) and to come closer to God
the Almighty in order to gain insight (maʿrifa) into His Oneness
(tauhid); and, third, to believe (aqidah), to witness (mushahadah)
and to unveil (kashaf ) the reality of Allah, who is one in His essence
(dhat), attributes (sifat) and acts (Wahdat al-Wujud Muwahhidah).⁴⁴
Such teachings, according to the mptt, will enhance humans’ love
for Allah and His creatures, and lead to Islam and true belief (iman
haqiqi).
In 2012, the mptt had branches in more than 13 districts in Aceh, and
in some other regions in Indonesia, among them in Java, Sumatra and
Sulawesi, as well.⁴⁵ In Terengganu in Malaysia Amran Waly’s followers
founded the Ikatan Pendidikan Tauhid Tasauf (iptaf – Association of
 The name Abuya Syech Amran Waly al-Khalidy is attached to the mptt because
tauhid-tasawuf was also taught previously by his brother Prof Muhibbuddin
Waly.
 mptt, ‘Riwayat Pesantren Darul Ihsan’, http://mptt.or.id/home/pesantren/item/
73-pesantren-darul-ihsan.html.
 Interview with Tgk. Meflin al-Hasani, Amran Waly’s disciple, March 2010 and
July 2012.
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Tauhid Tasawuf Education), led by Ustaz Mustaffa Kamal bin Hamzah.⁴⁶
In its development, it is supported by Syekh Ibrahim Mohammad
(Malaysia), Dr Rahimuddin Nawawi Al-Bantani (an ulama from Banten
living in Malaysia) and Dr Diauddin Kuswandi (Surabaya). Until 2014,
there were three Southeast Asia Ulama Conferences of Tauhid Tasawuf:
in Meulaboh, West Aceh (2010), Selangor, Malaysia (2012), and Blang
Pidie, Southwest Aceh (2014).
4 Some Aspects of Amran Waly’s Teachings
There are three important teachings of Amran Waly which deserve our
attention here.They concern Sharia, tauhid tasawuf and al-Insan al-Kamil
(Perfect Man).
4.1 Sharia and Shariatism
Islamic Sharia in the Aceh qanuns is defined as ‘Islamic guidance in all
aspects of life’. These few words signify that the implementation of Sharia
should not be ‘partial’, but comprehensive (kaffah), covering the private
and the public spheres. However, hitherto implementation is far from
comprehensive; it covers only Islamic clothing, intoxicants and the like,
gambling, and illicit relations between men and women who are not
married to one another. The reason is that before the state can enforce
Sharia norms, qanuns have to be drafted and these qanuns have to be
agreed upon and ratified by the legislative assembly and the governor
before they become effective.
Moreover, the Sharia euphoria has neglected the inner dimension
of Islam and marginalises Sufi groups. Amran Waly does not oppose
Sharia as a divine norm, but he rejects the ‘qanunisation’ of Sharia and
the neglect of the esoteric dimension of Islam. He suggests that Muslims
should implement Sharia in their daily life, with or without qanuns, and
that Sharia is not the end objective. It is the first step towards the ultimate
goal, that is God. His notion of Sharia is close to that of fiqh. Sharia
is related to religious devotion, like prayer, fasting, paying the zakat,
and the pilgrimage to Mecca; and the relations between human beings
(muʿamalah), like trade and financial management. He suggests that after
conforming to Sharia one should try to progress to the more advanced
 Interview with Ustaz Mustaffa Kamal bin Hamzah, head of the iptaf Terengganu,
in Meulaboh, 9 March 2010.
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stages of haqiqa and maʿrifa; two fundamental aspects of tasawuf.⁴⁷
Tasawuf purifies the heart of all relations other than that with Allah.
With a purified heart, affection follows, and good relations with God
and with all fellow creatures on earth are secured. ‘Performing Shariʿa
without haqiqah will lead to fasiq [sinful behavior]. Fasiq will lead to
hypocrisy. Hypocrisy causes fitnah [chaos] and many problems which
cause destruction in this world.’⁴⁸
Moreover, Sharia is aimed at eliminating shirk jali (apparent polythe-
ism), and haqiqa at eliminating shirk khafi (hidden polytheism).⁴⁹ The
latter is much harder to accomplish than combating apparent polytheism
by applying Sharia. Sharia is the basic foundation which can not do
without the higher religious experience of divine reality. This means that
a private religious experience is better than a public display of religiosity
which lacks the deeper dimension of Islam.
Meeting members of the mptt made it clear to me that what is called
ʿamal (good deed) is a spiritual exercise, rather than a social activity.
It is usually understood in spiritual practice terms. They are critical of
what they refer to as the ‘qanunisation of Sharia.’⁵⁰ Sharia is divine but
qanunisation of it could trivialise it and even obstruct the path to the
spiritual realm and to deeper knowledge of God. Such critical views of
a Sharia-oriented understanding of Islam are typical of Sufism. Yet a
close reading of their views shows that what they perceive as Sharia is
merely fiqh, and does not serve as ‘Islamic guidance in all aspects of life’
as reflected in the qanuns or ‘way of life’ as understood by most Islamists.
4.2 Tauhid-Tasawuf
Sufism, according to Amran Waly, is based essentially on the ‘science’ of
tauhid-tasawuf. About the relationship between tasawuf and Sharia he is
clear: ‘[t]asawuf is the spirit (ruh) of Sharia, without which law cannot
be implemented in a more consistent way, strong belief and high moral
standards can not be achieved, and the Prophetic traditions cannot be
followed’.⁵¹ He believes that Sufism can enhance moral behaviour and
 On the notions of maʿrifa in Sufism see Reza Shah-Kazemi, ‘The Notion and
Significance of Maʿrifa in Sufism’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 13:2 (2002), 155–181.
 Amran Waly, Ajaran Tauhid-Tasawuf, 8.
 Abuya Shaykh Amran Waly, ‘Soal-jawab seputar Tauhid-tasawuf Abuya Syech
Amran Waly’, mptt brochure (10 October 2009).
 Interviews with Meflin, July 2011, and Abdul Qadir, January 2012.
 Abuya ShaykhAmranWaly, ‘Mukaddimah’, in Ismail al-Harawi,Manazil al-Sairin,
trans. Abuya Shaykh Amran Waly (Labuhan Haji: mptt, 2012), v.
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should be taught to all Muslims; ulama, bureaucrats and lay people alike.
He disagrees with most Sharia ulama who are of the opinion that Sufism
should only be taught to a limited number of people, people with mature
religiosity, and not to lay people.⁵²
Tauhid-tasawuf is an important concept in Amran Waly’s thought. It
underlies the whole teaching he developed in the mptt. In a brochure,
Uraian/Pembahasan dalam Pengkajian Tauhid Tasawuf untuk dapat
Disampaikan dan Dipahami bagi Umat Islam (Explanation about Tauhid-
Tasawuf to be Delivered or Understood by the Islamic Community), the
study of tauhid-tasawuf is defined as: ‘The study of the knowledge of
tauhid by individuals who have purified their heart from being closer to
others than Allah. He or she views Allah as pure from new things, and is
able to disregard outer causes based on Allah’s eternal knowledge and
Allah’s eternal laws.’⁵³
The concept of tauhid-tasawuf is a critique of the understanding of
tauhid which emphasises the belief (iʿtiqad) in the existence of Allah and
His divine attributes, without which ʿibada (devotion) is not accepted.
This is not wrong, but it is not enough. To eliminate hidden polytheism
and reach the real tauhid it should be complemented with the Sufistic
teachings of haqiqa and maʿrifa.⁵⁴
Haqiqa and maʿrifa are related to the concept of tauhid (monotheism)
and shirk (polytheism). Knowing the Essence of God (haqiqa) is aimed
at eliminating hidden polytheism (shirk khafi). Hidden polytheism also
leads to all kinds of negative human behaviour, foremost among these
ananiyya (egoism), ʿujub (vanity) and riyaʾ (to deliberately present oneself
to be virtuous or good natured in order to get respect, admiration or a
good reputation). Ananiyya, ‘ujub and riya’ can only be attributed to God.
Men or women who behave in such a way are regarded as claiming to be
God, and that is shirk. All such behaviour may lead to hypocrisy and
hubb al-dunya (love of the world). Meanwhile, apparent polytheism (shirk
jali) can be eliminated by practising Sharia.⁵⁵ Knowing the substance
of Sharia, haqiqa and maʿrifa means knowing the true tauhid (maʿrifat
tauhid yang hakiki). Such knowledge would encourage ‘a weak man or
 Meflin, ‘AmranWali: Kesufian Perbaiki Akhlak Kita’, Gema Baiturrahman Online,
5 June 2010, http://www.gemabaiturrahman.com/2010/06/amran-wali-kesufian
-perbaiki-akhlak.html.
 Abuya Syech Amran Waly, ‘Uraian/Pembahasan dalam Pengkajian Tauhid
Tasawuf untuk dapat Disampaikan dan Dipahami bagi Umat Islam’, mptt
brochure (no date), 1.
 Amran Waly, ‘Soal-jawab seputar Tauhid-tasawuf Abuya Syech Amran Waly’, 1.
 Ibid.
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woman to become a true Muslim so that he or she can be on friendly
terms or associate with both the Creator (khaliq) and creatures (makhluq),
and have a noble character (akhlaq) and affection. The result will be the
unity of the commmunity (umma) who follow the Prophet and are true
Muslims.’⁵⁶
According toAmranWaly, it is such knowledge that has been neglected
by most ulama in Aceh, Indonesia and Southeast Asia. That is why he
makes such a great effort to develop and spread Tauhid-Tasawuf teachings
through the mptt in Southeast Asia.
4.3 Wahdat al-Wujud and al-Insan al-Kamil: Reinterpreting Ibn ʿArabi
through Al-Jili
In November 2009, Amran Waly published Sekelumit Penjelasan tentang
Ajaran Tauhid-Tasawuf Abuya Syekh H. Amran Waly & Penjelasan
beberapa ucapan ʿAbdul Karim al-Jili dalam Kitabnya al-Insanul-Kamil fi
Maʿrifatil-Awakhir wal-Awaʾil (Brief Clarification of the Teachings of
Tauhid-Tasawuf of Abuya Syekh H. AmranWaly and an Explanation of a
number of Remarks by ʿAbd Karim al-Jili’s in his Book al-Insanul-Kamil
fi Maʿrifatil-Awakhir wal-Awaʾil). The book was controversial because
it discusses the opinions of ʿAbd Karim al-Jili (d. 1428),⁵⁷ whommany
Sharia ulama accuse of expressing the ‘deviant’ teaching of al-Insan
al-Kamil which in fact contains the teaching of Ibn ʿArabi of wahdat
al-wujud. ʿAbd Karim bin Ibrahim al-Jili, a Sufimaster fromYemen, was a
descendant of the famous Sufi ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166) and entered
the Qadiriyya order. He was a disciple of Shaykh Sharaf al-Din Ismail
 Ibid.
 ʿAbd Karim bin Ibrahim al-Jili wrote about 30 books and treatises, of which
al-Insān al-Kāmil fī Maʿrifat al-Awākhir wa al-Awāʾil is the best known. It is
based on Ibn ʿArabi’s concept of Insan Kamil in which he discussed three
stages for the perfect man. The first, badaʾah (beginning), when a human
is given his divine attributes; second, tawassut (intermediate stage), when
the perfect human being, who is both human and divine, can understand
both human and divine realities and receive all knowledge (both seen and
unseen); third, khitam (end), when the perfect human being is given power
that can be used in the natural world and gives him or her power over any
other being; Reynold A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism (Richmond,
Surrey: Curzon Press, 1994), 81; H. Ritter, ‘Abd al-Karīm, Kutb al-Dīn b. Ibrāhīm
al-Jīlī’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., P. Bearman, T. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth,
E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2014). Reference. 08
July 2014, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam
-2/abd-al-karim-kutb-al-din-b-ibrahim-al-djili-SIM_0099.
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al-Jabarti (d. 1403–1404), from Zabid, Yemen, whose name is included in
the chain of transmission (sanad) of the Qadiriyya in Indonesia.⁵⁸ About
the influence of al-Jili’s al-Insan al-Kamil, Nicholson wrote that ‘the
Insānuʾl-Kāmil exerted a powerful influence upon Indonesian Sufism’.⁵⁹
Al-Attas, Osman bin Bakar, and Van Bruinessen agree with this.⁶⁰ Osman
bin Bakar points out that although Al-Fansuri found his Sufi inspiration
in Ibn ʿArabi’s Wahdat al-Wujud, his writings also reflect familiarity
with the works of Al-Jili, with particular reference to his teaching on the
al-Insan al-Kamil.⁶¹ Thus, Amran Waly’s adoption of al-Insan al-Kamil
indicates a continuing influence of al-Jili, and through him of Ibn ʿArabi’s
wahdat al-wujud, in Aceh to this day.
In the Sekelumit Penjelasan tentang Ajaran Tauhid-Tasawuf, Amran
Waly does not explain all aspects of al-Jili’s teachings. Instead, he
concentrates on four statements which deal with Sharia, tariqa, haqiqa
and maʿrifa:⁶²
. Allah rabbunMuhammad ʿabdun fi al-sharia (Allah isMaster,Muham-
mad is servant in the Sharia).
. Allah dhatun Muhammad sifatun fi al-tariqa (Allah is Essence,
Muhammad is attribute in the tariqa).
. Allahu ruhun Muhammad jasadun fi al-haqiqa (Allah is Spirit,
Muhammad is body in the haqiqa).
. Allah Muhammad fi al-maʿrifa (Allah is Muhammad in the maʿrifa).
Amran Waly carefully comments on these statements, trying to get rid of
Wahdat al-wujud connotations.
On the first statement he says, ‘We are advised to be obedient to
Allah by paying attention to the boundaries of law, because Sharia is
law containing commands and prohibitions which are an obligation and
must be followed.’
On the second statement he says, ‘Muhammad is presented here as
attribute, because an attribute (sifat) always needs an essence (dhat), to
which an attribute belongs’. He rejects the interpretation that Muhammad
 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jilani and the Qadiriyya in
Indonesia’, Journal of the History of Sufism, 1–2 (2000), 361–395.
 Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism, vii.
 Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia: Survei Historis,
Geografis, dan Sosiologis (Bandung: Mizan, 1992).
 Osman bin Bakar, ‘Sufism in the Malay-Indonesian World’, 283–285.
 The author follows here the classical phases of gaining mystical knowledge
by following the Sharia, followed by the path (tariqa), leading to the Essence
(haqiqa), ending in deeper knowledge or gnosis (maʿrifa).
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is the attribute of God, or that Muhammad is the manifestation of the
existence of God, or that God becomes Muhammad.
On the third statement he said that it is ‘a symbol of a person who has
been overwhelmed by the Light of God’s existence, whose dhat is without
kaifiyat (properties), infinite and incomparable, so that actions, attitudes
and dhat of Allah manifest (tajalli) factually in himself, after his existence
has disappeared in his view. This is themaqam of fanaʾ ([mystical] stage
of annihilation). The use of fanaʾ is to eliminate ananiyyah (egoism).’
The fourth statement he translates as ‘Allah is themutawalli (guide) of
Muhammad’. He argues that the word mutawalli is actually omitted in
the Arabic original sentence. For in Arabic grammar, it is possible for
the first substantive in a genetive construction (al-mudaf ) to be omitted
in favour of the second noun in the genitive construction (al-mudaf
ilayhi). This is called hadhf al-mudaf ʿala l-mudaf ʿilayh. He compares
this statement linguistically with Surat Yusuf (12:82), wa-sʾal al-qaryata
(ask the village), which should be read as wa-sʾal ahl al-qaryah (ask [the
people of] the village). The word ahl (people) is in this example the
omittedmudaf. He says, ‘Allah guides Muhammad or people in this life
by giving them guidance, well-being (taufiq) and help (maʿunah)’.⁶³ He
also says that ‘in this stage, a Sufi has reached baqaʾ (eternity) after fanaʾ
(annihiliation). He will be always with Allah, and not with his own bad
desires (hawa nafsu).’ The person who has reached this state is called
khawash al-khawash (the special among the specials), and therefore he
or she becomes an insan kamil (perfect human being).⁶⁴
According to Amran Waly, these statements signify the ‘spiritual
migration of a human being to his or her God. Anyone who follows these
statements properly will reach the status of a perfect human being.’⁶⁵
In these statements Muhammad is a symbol of a perfect human being;
the term Muhammad refers to a perfect human being in general, and
not necessarily to the Prophet Muhammad. AmranWaly also said that
‘those who do not understand correctly Abd al-Karim al-Jili’s teachings
or statements will not get the Light of Knowledge (nur maʿrifa). They
should no longer claim to be a leader of tariqah, or the spiritual path,
like some persons do who claim to be tariqa leaders or false murshids.’⁶⁶
Amran Waly also quotes a controversial interpretation by al-Jili of the
Qurʾanic verse Qul huwa Allahu ahad. This verse is usually translated as
‘Say, Muhammad, He is Allah the only one.’ Al-Jili suggests that the word
 Amran Waly, Sekelumit Penjelasan, 6.
 Ibid., 7.
 Ibid., 3.
 Ibid., 3.
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huwa (he) does not refer to Allah, but to the ‘reality of man’ (haqiqa
insan). But AmranWaly said that it does not mean that ‘the reality of
man is Allah’. The real reality of man is illumination ( faid) or shadow of
God, which does not exist independently.⁶⁷
The above views must be seen from the perspective of the already
mentioned aim of the mptt: ‘to believe, to witness and to unveil the reality
of Allah, who is one in His Essence, attributes and acts’.⁶⁸ By inserting
the concepts witnessing (mushahada) and unveiling (kashaf ) in his
teaching, Amran Waly tries to synthesise wahdat al-wujud with wahdat
al-shuhud (unity of witnessing).⁶⁹ By such effort, Amran Waly claims
that his understanding of al-Jili’s wujudiyya is in line with orthodoxy and
cannot be considered deviant. Perhaps the wordmuwahhidah, meaning
one who believes in the oneness of God (tauhid), inspired him to choose
the name ‘tauhid-tasawuf ’. It is this reinterpretation of al-Jili’s wujudiyya
which was misunderstood by and is widely debated among Sharia ulama
and orthodox Sufi ulama in Aceh, which would cause Amran Waly and
the mptt much trouble.
4.4 Synthesising al-Jili with Ibn Ataillah and al-Harawi
Apart from teaching al-Jili’s Al-Insan al-Kamil, Amran Waly also teaches
Hikam (Maxims) andManazil al-Saʾirin ila Rabb al-ʿAlamin (Stations
of the Seekers towards the God of the Universe), the works of the great
orthodox Sufis Ibn Ataillah al-Sakandari (al-Iskandari) (d. 1309) and
Abu Ismail Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Ansari al-Harawi (d. 1089)
respectively. He teachesAl-Insan al-Kamil to a limited number of disciples
belonging to his inner circle, and Hikam to a broader audience who have
basic knowledge of Sufism, andManazil al-Saʾirin to a still wider group
of laymen. Amran Waly translatedManazil al-Saʾirin into Indonesian.
The use ofHikam andManazil al-Saʾirin by AmranWaly has been
welcomed by the ulama and society at large. There have been no negative
reactions. mptt meetings have been attended by hundreds of people, and
sometimes by more than a thousand. The reason must be that both Ibn
Ataillah and Ibn Ismail al-Harawi are orthodox Sufi ulama. Why Amran
Waly bases this teaching upon these three Sufis is not clear. Perhaps there
is a pragmatic consideration, that is to address the controversial teachings
 Amran Waly, Sekelumit Penjelasan, 7.
 mptt, ‘Riwayat Pesantren Darul Ihsan’, http://mptt.or.id/home/pesantren/item/
73-pesantren-darul-ihsan.html.
 Contrary to wahdat al-wujud which is the unity of all being in an ontological
sense (monism), wahdat al-shudud is the mystical experience of this unity.
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of al-Jili he adopted, but, more than that, there are substantial similarities
of Sufi teaching, which at the end can be interpreted in the perspective
of wujudiyya muwahhida. Hikam is a widely read and well-accepted
Sufi book in Aceh and Indonesia. Ibn Ataillah also never condemned
Ibn ʿArabi’s teaching of wahdat al-wujud and defended Ibn ʿArabi in his
debate with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).⁷⁰ Al-Harawi’s teachings are regarded
as a reformed Sufism. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), Ibn Taymiyya’s
disciple, wrote a book,Madarij al-Salikin, which is based on al-Harawi’s
Manazil al-Saʾirin. It seems that AmranWaly wants to show Sharia ulama
and orthodox Sufi ulama and society that his opinions are not deviant.
5 Fatwa against Amran Waly and His Movement
A serious confrontation between Amran Waly and the Sharia ulama
occurred after Amran Waly had published his Brief Clarification in
November 2009. A few months later on 15 May 2010 a meeting was
held in Pantonlabu in North Aceh to commemorate the anniversary of
the Dayah Malikussaleh of Teungku Ibrahim Bardan, at that moment
chairperson of the huda. He and the mpu of North Aceh used the
occasion to discuss Amran Waly’s book. Muhibbuddin Waly delivered a
speech on ‘The Controversy over the Doctrine of Wujudiyyah in Aceh’s
History’.⁷¹ In its written version Amran Waly is not mentioned, but it
seems that he was in the actual speech. When I asked Muhibbuddin
Waly a few months later, he told me that he considers what his brother is
teaching as deviant.⁷²
What is certain is that the book was indeed discussed at the same
school during a meeting on 15 May 2010, attended by a number of
popular ulama. As reported in Santri Dayah, Abu Tumin said, ‘Wahdat
al-wujud, which is wrong, is that what was taught by Hamzah Fansuri
and Syamsuddin Sumatrani. Abuya Muda Waly never taught wahdat
al-wujud, he taught wahdat al-shuhud. Wahdat al-wujud is divided into
two: that which leads to ittihad and that which leads to hulul. Ittihad is
the fusion of two realities into one form, while hulul is the manifestation
of Allah in man.’⁷³ Ibrahim Bardan said that Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. 874)
said that one should not believe that a person is reaching haqiqa if he
 Stephen Schwartz,The Other Islam: Sufism and the Road to Global Harmony
(New York etc.: Doubleday, 2008), 127–128.
 The paper was published in the magazine Santri Dayah, vii (05, 2010), 2–8.
 Interview with Abuya Muhibbuddin Waly, July 2011.
 Santri Dayah, 7: 5 (2010), 9.
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does not perform Sharia properly, ‘even if he would fly to the sky’. He
also quoted Ibn Hajar (d. 1567) that Ibn ʿArabi is a Sufi who believes
not in wahdat al-wujud, but wahdat al-shuhud. About Amran Waly, he
said, ‘No one said that Abu Amran [Amran Waly] is deviant, but what is
taught by Abu Amran could not be grasped by common people.’ Abu
Mustafa Puteh said, ‘There is no need to look at history. That is their
own business. What is important for today is that wahdat al-wujud is
not allowed.’⁷⁴ Two conclusions and six recommendations were issued
which were referred to by the media as ‘the Fatwa of the mpu of North
Aceh’. One of the conclusions was that wahdat al-wujud containing
ittihad and hulul was deviant and misleading (sesat dan menyesatkan).
Of the recommendations points 1, 2 and 4 are the most relevant for our
discussion. They urged the Aceh government in the implementation
of Sharia to stick to the opinions of the Shafiʿite school of law; to keep
an eye on and prosecute people who publish in whatever form ideas
which could contaminate the beliefs and moral standards of the Islamic
community; and to act in the same way against any group which spreads
deviant teachings in society.⁷⁵
Although AmranWaly is not mentioned by name in the fatwa, during
the meeting his name was dropped and, therefore, the fatwa implicitly
refers to him.The meeting also concluded that the content of Amran
Waly’s book is dangerous for people’s belief and that it could lead to
wahdat al-wujud. Ibrahim Bardan called on people to hand in their
copies to the mpu to have them burned.⁷⁶
6 The mptt’s Ulama Meeting of 2010: Sharia Ulama’s
Intervention
What the effect was of the fatwa became clear when the mptt wanted
to organise a gathering of its ulama in 2010. Sharia ulama, through the
mpu and the involvement of the governor and police, intervened and
prevented it from taking place. Later they turned an mptt conference
into a Sharia-oriented meeting.
In 2009, some months before the fatwa, the mptt had asked the
mpu for a recommendation to hold a Southeast Asian congress on
Tauhid-Tasawuf in Banda Aceh. This is normal procedure. All public
 Santri Dayah, 7: 5 (2010), 9.
 Santri Dayah, 7: 5 (2010), 8. The usual translation of hulul is incarnation.
 ‘mpu Larang Peredaran Buku Syeh AmranWali’, Serambi Indonesia, 26 November
2009.
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events in Aceh require such a recommendation besides permission by
the police. The mpu declined because, as it stated in a letter dated 23
July 2009, it was not sure what Abuya Amran Waly exactly taught in the
mptt. In response the mptt invited the mpu to attend one of its regular
religious meetings in which he discussed Ibn Ataillah’s book al-Hikam,
to find out whether his teaching is deviant, but the mpu leaders ignored
the invitation. Probably they were well aware of Amran Waly’s religious
ideas and could not agree with them.
A few monts later the mptt did hold its first Ulama Conference
attended by its followers from various parts of Aceh and Malaysia. It
took place in Meulaboh on 9–10 March 2010. The mpu had issued its
recommendation but had made the condition that it should be a Sharia
conference, and not a Sufi one. It had also enforced a Sharia-oriented
programme. All speakers were Sharia ulama, and Amran Waly and
mptt guests from abroad were not allowed to deliver speeches. The
official conference, with its morning and afternoon sessions, seemed a
success. However, the mptt members organised their own unofficial Sufi
programme, held after the early morning and sunset and evening prayers,
as a hidden resistance to the intervention of the state’s Sharia-oriented
ulama. I was present and regularly heard participants oppose the official
Shariatisation. There was a feeling of being oppressed by the Sharia
ulama and the government with its ‘simplistic’ policies, as they saw it, of
Islamisation taking the formof formal Shariatisation.The implementation
of Sharia in Aceh was dismissed as trivial and artificial, because the
qanuns and official Sharia discourse neglected the richness of the esoteric
dimensions of Islam.⁷⁷
This was not the last Ulama Conference of the mptt. Two others
were held, one in Selangor in Malaysia in 2012, and another one in
Abdya in West Aceh in 2014. Unlike the one in 2010, these were real
Sufi conferences, in which Sufi teachings, including wujudiyya, were
discussed openly without fear.
7 Political Alliance: Struggle for Existence
After the issue of the fatwa which declared his views deviant, Amran
Waly actively looked for political patronage and extended his networks.
His alignment with the regent of West Aceh enabled him to hold
the Ulama Congress in Abdya. Regent Ramli supported the meeting
politically and financially. This alliance is reflected in the slogan of
 Interview with Tgk. Zainuddin, Amran Waly’s disciple, Meulaboh, March 2010.
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Meulaboh as ‘the city of Tauhid-Tasawuf ’. Undeniably, the regent of West
Aceh looked for religious legitimacy from Amran Waly and mptt to
support his Islamisation policy. He issued Regent Regulation (Peraturan
Bupati) No. 5/2010 which forbids women to wear tight trousers. He was
criticised by feminist and human rights activists as well as progressive
Muslim intellectuals. Some ulama, among them Alyasaʾ Abubakar, even
considered the regulation unnecessary, pointing out that trousers are the
traditional attire of Acehnese women.⁷⁸
AmranWaly also cemented ties with former Abdya regent, Akmal
Ibrahim (who wanted to run for regent for a second time), the present
Abdya regent, Jufri Hasanuddin, the South Aceh regent, Husein Yusuf,
regent of Galus, Ibnu Hasim, and vice regent of Pidie, Nazir Adam, to
mention a few. AmranWaly was usually invited to deliver speeches before
the regency officials. He and the mptt stressed that this belonged to
the realm of daʿwah and thus was part of the duties religion demanded
from them, and not a political activity.⁷⁹ Yet it is such political alliances
which were instrumental in strengthening Amran Waly’s influence in
society and among the political elite and which have protected him and
his Tauhid-Tasawuf movement against the possible consequences of the
fatwa and other negative charges.
During the governorship of Irwandi Yusuf (2007–2011), Amran
Waly failed to get support from the provincial government. This was
understandable, because Irwandi Yusuf as ex-gam combatant was closer
to Muhibbuddin Waly and the muna (an ex-gam member created the
ulama council), than to Amran Waly and the mptt. For the same reason
Irwandi Yusuf ’s successor, Zaini Abdullah, also does not support him.
However,MalikMahmud,Wali Naggroe (traditional leader) of Aceh since
December 2013, does. He opened the Southeast Asian Ulama Conference
in Abdya in 2014. The conference was funded by the administration of
Abdya, which spent about 1.2 billion rupiah. The fact that the mptt is
not part of the local government but was able to get such a large sum
of financial support could not be seen as other than political success.
Partly because of such political backing, the Tauhid-Tasawuf movement
has survived until today, has even spread in Aceh and has gained new
followers elsewhere.⁸⁰
 Interview with Prof. Alyasaʾ Abubakar, Banda Aceh, May 2011.
 Interview with Abdul Qadir, Amran Waly’s disciple, January 2012.
 Before the 2014 election, Amran Waly proposed the need to create, or even
convert the mptt into a local political party. Yet, most members disagreed with
the idea on the grounds that it is better for the mptt to remain what it is, a
neo-Sufi movement. Also, not all members have similar political views. However,
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Amran Waly (3rd from right) with Shaykh Muhammad Fadil Al-Jaelani (4th
from right) and the Wali Nanggroe of Aceh (2nd from right) during “Muzakarah
Tauhid Tasawuf” 2014. Picture courtesy of Harian Aceh.
8 Conclusion
The mainstreaming of Sharia through the official implementation of
Sharia in Aceh formore than a decade hasmarginalised Sufism, especially
heterodox Sufism. Sharia ulama have been given ample opportunity to
define Islam in the region from above.Through the state ulama institution
mpu they have issued Sharia-oriented fatwas, some of which are against
Sufism considered to be heterodox. Sharia ulama have sometimes cooper-
ated with orthodox Sufi ulama to marginalise heterodox or allegedly het-
erodox Sufi ulama and groups. What brings them together is Sharia. The
consequence is that because of accusations of deviancy by Sharia ulama
and orthodox Sufi ulama, most heterodox Sufi groups have a limited
following. The issue of deviancy is a sensitive one in Aceh. Many of those
labelled as such have been attacked by society. However, AmranWaly
and the mptt are an exception. Their ideas attracted new followers. This
a new wing organisation was established, called Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah
Perjuangan (Perti-P). It is intended to be an alternative to the existing Persatuan
Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), a national socio-religious organisation introduced in
Aceh by Shaykh Hasan Kueng Kale. Shaykh Muda Waly was adviser to the Perti.
Amran Waly was of the opinion that the Perti needed reform. Because it was
impossible to accomplish this, he established Perti-P. Personal communication
with T. Misbah Lembong, adviser to the Perti-P, January 2014.
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reflects the popular need for not only a legalistic understanding of Islam,
but also for a religious spiritual experience.
There are at least four reasons why the mptt survived the charges and
even grew. Firstly, as the son of Shaykh Muda Waly Amran Waly has
‘blue blood’. People respect him because they respect his father. Secondly,
he has been supported by a number of orthodox Sufi ulama, most of
whom have relations directly or indirectly with Shaykh Muda Waly and
his Darussalam dayah, who do not consider his teachings to be deviant –
although some say that they should not be taught to lay people. Thirdly,
AmranWaly synthesises al-Jili’s teachings with those of orthodox Sufism,
that is, with the teachings of the great orthodox Sufis Ibn Ataillah and
Abu Ismail Abdullah Al-Ansari al-Harawi, which gives his teachings an
orthodox touch. Fourthly, his alignment with members of the political
elite has provided political protection and patronage. The fact that the
third Southeast Asian mptt ulama conference was supported politically
and financially by the district administrations indicates that this political
alignment contributed to the survival of the movement. The negative
reaction of some Sharia ulama and traditional orthodox Sufi ulama must
be seen as the continuation of the long conflict between Sharia ulama
and Sufi ulama in general, and the alignment between Sharia ulama
and orthodox Sufi ulama against heterodox Sufi ulama in particular.
Nevertheless, the existence of orthodox and heterodox Sufisms, although
with the marginalisation of the latter and the synthesis of both, indicates
that Acehnese implementation of Sharia is not as comprehensive as
its slogan suggests. The long Acehnese history has shown that, despite
shariatism hegemony, there always is room for Sufism.
8 Cultural Resistance to Shariatism in Aceh
Reza Idria
1 Introduction
In this contribution I will analyse some forms of cultural resistance to
Sharia in Acehnese society, but it is impossible to talk about the roots of
the implementation of Sharia¹ in contemporary Aceh, a province situated
in the western part of the Indonesian archipelago, without referring
to the political situation in Indonesia after the fall of General Suharto.
Political turbulence brought to an end the New Order government –
the longest ruling regime in the modern history of Southeast Asia –
on 21 May 1998. The dramatic resignation of Suharto, followed by the
independence of Timor Leste, caused a serious challenge to the unity
of the Republic. Some provinces also demanded referenda (on either
remaining in the Republic or becoming fully independent), and these
included Aceh, Papua, Banten, Maluku and Riau.
In Aceh, soon after the collapse of the Suharto regime, a series of
demonstrations took place demanding a referendum to further their
desire for secession from the Republic.² A separatist group, the Free
 Sharia is an Arabic term, literally meaning ‘path to water’ and in the religious
sense (Islam) means ‘duty to God’. Cf. M.B. Hooker, Indonesian Syariah: Defining
a National School of Islamic Law (Singapore: iseas Publishing, 2008), ix. Sharia
normally refers to legal practices or living law as a sort of Islamic way of life on
the basis of two main sources in Islam, the Qurʾan and the Hadith. However, the
formulation of Sharia differs from one Muslim country to another. In the context
of Aceh, Sharia can be an ambiguous term, pertaining to (1) Sharia in the normal
sense, i.e. Islamic law; and (2) Sharia in the sense of the government’s policy and
regulations in relation to religious matters. The Sharia resistance that is the focus
of this chapter mainly contests the second term. In short, the resistance to Sharia
discussed here is not resistance to Islam and Sharia as such, but rather resistance
to the authority’s interpretation and tasks in formulating regional regulations,
which they label as Sharia and in accordance with Islamic teachings.
 It was on 8 November 1992 that two million Acehnese gathered in front of Masjid
Raya Baiturrahman, Banda Aceh, to demand a referendum for Aceh. Led by
several associations of Acehnese student activists and sira (Centre of Information
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Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, gam), gained popularity.³
Since the arrival of the Reformasi era throughout Indonesia in 1998,
gam had been increasing its rebellious activities in many parts of Aceh.
Needless to say, the gam soldiers hadmuch to benefit from in the unstable
political situation at the national level. A series of guerilla attacks on
the Indonesian army, as well as massive propaganda about the coming
era of independence in Aceh, promoted its cause. The loss of Timor
Leste after the referendum forced the government of Indonesia to find
another ‘soft’ solution. The central government thus avoided the options
of either accepting the Acehnese demand for the referendum or again
using military oppression to tackle the Aceh case.⁴ Neither option would
provide benefits to the central government at that time. In particular, the
first option could trigger similar demands from other regions. Jakarta
might also consider that nearly every Acehnese was strongly against the
government and supported gam at that moment. Therefore, religious
identity, which is historically and culturally central to the Acehnese,
became a valuable asset to be exploited by the Indonesian government,
just as the first Indonesian president, Sukarno, used it to suppress the
Acehnese rebellion in 1960s.⁵ Understanding the political situation, both
for the Aceh Referendum), this provocative action forced the central government
in Jakarta to take advanced steps to reduce potential chaos.
 The Free Aceh Movement (gam), also known as the Aceh Sumatera National
Liberation Front (asnlf), was declared by Hasan Muhammad di Tiro in 1976.
About the early formation of this rebellious movement see Hasan Muhammad
di Tiro,The Unfinished Diary of Tgk. Hasan Tiro, (asnlf, 1981); see also Tim
Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion 1989–1992 (Ithaca: Cornell Indonesian
Modern Project, 1995). For a comprehensive study about the conflict and the
roots of the peace process in Aceh after the tsunami of 2004 see Anthony Reid,
Verandah of Violence, the Background to the Aceh Problem (nus Publishing &
Seattle: Singapore University Press & University of Washington Press, 2006).
 In order to quash the gam rebellion, Suharto declared Aceh to be a Military
Operation Zone (dom). During this period (1989–1998), some regions of Aceh
such as Pidie, Aceh Utara (North Aceh) and Aceh Timur (East Aceh) became
mass killing fields. Thousands of people were killed, raped and tortured. See
Al-Chaidar, Aceh Bersimbah Darah: Mengungkap Penerapan Status Daerah
Operasi Militer (dom) di Aceh 1989–1998 (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 1998).
Later on, President Megawati was responsible for human rights violations in the
region after she declared martial law in the province of Aceh in 2003.
 As in 1953, Aceh started to confront the Indonesian government. Teungku Daud
Beureueh led the struggle and declared Aceh to be part of the Darul Islam or
Negara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic State) under the Imam sm
Kartosoewiryo. The conflict ended after Sukarno offered Aceh special status,
including local government rights to implement Islamic law. See Nazaruddin
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in the past and the present, will lead us to understand why someAcehnese
Muslims are now fighting against ‘Islamic law’.
To understand why the Sharia proposal became an integral part of
the response to the political situation in Aceh, particularly after the
fall of Suharto, one must look closely at the activities of the Free Aceh
Movement during the war. Although many researchers argue that gam
had already been transformed into a non-religious movement,⁶ it was
clear at the time of conflict that many local gam combatants tried to
convince the people of Aceh that their struggle was a struggle along the
path of God ( jihad fi sabilillah), one that sought to bring a victory for
Islam in Aceh.⁷ It was important for gam to reject being labelled as an
Islamic separatist group if they wanted to gain international support;
however, at the local level they needed Islam to gain adherents. It is
evident that the contradiction and ambiguity of gam propaganda were
taken into consideration by the central government when formulating a
counter-strategy to delegitimise the rebellion.
Thus, the central government proposed a special approach to the
province of Aceh. The government first issued Law (uu) No. 44/1999
on the special status of the province of Aceh, concerning religion, adat
(custom) and education. This was followed two years later by the issue
of Law uu No. 18/2001. The latter granted special autonomy to Aceh
and allowed Sharia to be implemented.⁸ These new regulations granted
Sjamsuddin,The Republican Revolt: a Study of the Acehnese Rebellion (Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1985). See also C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner
of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1981).
 About the notion of transformation of the rebellious movement see for example
Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia
(California: Stanford University Press, 2009); see also Kirsten E. Schulze,The Free
Aceh Movement (gam), Anatomy of a Separatist Organization (Washington dc:
East-West Center, 2004).The European-based gam leaders, mainly in Sweden and
Norway, objected to the use of the terms Islam and jihad and showed hesitance
about applying Sharia law in Aceh. Most of them used terms such as ‘historical
consciousness’ (kesadaran sejarah) or ‘historical duty’ (tugas sejarah), if asked
about the spirit behind the struggle for independence. However, according to
some interviews I conducted prior to the Helsinki Peace Agreement, many local
combatants stressed in public their convictions about jihad and a victory for
Islam as goals of independence.
 However, one could also argue that the form of jihad as understood by gam
differs from the Acehnese jihad that was waged against the Dutch during the
colonial era. About this notion see for example James T. Siegel, ‘The Curse of the
Photograph: Atjeh 1901’, Indonesia, no. 80 (October, 2005), 21–38.
 See Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syariat Islam dari
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broader powers to the provincial government to implement the so-called
‘comprehensive Islamic Law’ or Sharia (Syariʾat Islam) and the special
right to establish a Sharia court (Mahkamah Syariʾah) and the Official
Department of Sharia (Dinas Syariʾat Islam). It also changed the name
of the province from Aceh to Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. According
to some local elites, the new name sounds more Islamic, peaceful and
independent. Unfortunately, these new regulations and status contributed
nothing to stopping the conflict.
2 Sharia for a Decade: A View from Within
Since 2001, Sharia and the indefatigable conflict between Aceh and
Jakarta have been intertwined. However, according to many Acehnese,
God eventually sent his hand to stop the war.⁹ The earthquakes and
tsunami on 26 December 2004 changed the political situation in
the region. On 15 August 2005, in Helsinki, Finland, the Free Aceh
Movement and the Indonesian government signed a memorandum of
understanding (MoU), ending one of the bloodiest conflicts in Southeast
Asia. Damien Kingsbury wrote a chronological story of the peace
process in Helsinki, describing the negotiations round by round. It
shows clearly that there was no talk about Sharia.¹⁰ Nonetheless, the
implementation of Sharia, although it did not significantly contribute to
ending the conflict, had already been promulgated in theUndang-undang
Pemerintahan Aceh/uupa (the Law on Aceh Governance) after the
Helsinki proposal. The central government legalised the uupa on the
basis of Law uu No. 11/2006. Broadly speaking, after the Helsinki MoU
and the enforcement of the Law on Aceh Governance (uupa), Sharia
was handed over to the Acehnese provincial government. The central
government transferred a ‘tool’ to the local authorities.
Meanwhile, the tsunami recovery process and the peace in Aceh
attracted an international presence to the region. Interestingly, the first
Indonesia sampai Nigeria, (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), 26–29. According to
Law No. 18/2001, special autonomy for Aceh includes redistribution of revenues,
reformation of the government structures and Islamic law.
 See my work ‘MuslimTheological Perspectives on Natural Disasters: The Case of
Indonesian Earthquakes and Tsunami of 2004’, maThesis submitted to Leiden
University, 2010.
 Damien Kingsbury was gam’s political adviser during the peace talks in Helsinki,
Finland. See Damien Kingsbury, ‘The Aceh Peace Process’, in Arndt Graf et al.,
Aceh: History, Politics and Culture (Singapore: iseas Publishing, 2010), 135–156.
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public caning took place in 2006, but it did not draw international
attention to the consequences of the implementation of Sharia. Conflict
resolution and disaster management preoccupied the minds of people as
reconstruction and rehabilitation were underway. Reports about Aceh
in local and international media were dominated by news concerning
peace-keeping, reconstruction progress and aid transparency. Arguably,
Sharia was not an interesting issue for the mass media at that time.¹¹
Moreover, Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar had been elected to
become the new governor and vice-governor of Aceh. Both are known
for their ‘secular’ background, especially Irwandi Yusuf who was a former
gam spokesman. Both men are very much in line with international gam
leaders and their political views, whichmeant that neither had a particular
interest in promulgating Sharia.¹² Following the peace agreement, the
Free Aceh Movement was transformed into a local party, Partai Aceh
(pa, The Aceh Party). However, the situation changed soon after many
international ngos left Aceh. The Sharia police, popularly known as wh
(Wilayatul Hisbah), announced their presence with wholesale arrests of
those violating Sharia regulations (qanun).¹³ They carried out intensive
raids on the so-called ‘suspect locales’, secluded places such as beaches,
cafés and hotels. This was followed by the issue of various prohibitions of
public conduct that, according to the authorities, are incompatible with
Sharia, such as celebrating New Year’s Eve, public entertainment, and
more. Acehnese women are obliged to wear the jilbab (headscarf) and
are prohibited from wearing tight dresses.
The abuse of Sharia and its relation to the politics of Jakarta can
also be traced back to when the Aceh Party won the general election in
2009. Shortly before leaving the parliament building, the members of
the outgoing Aceh representative council (dprd Aceh) – members of
national political parties such as Golkar, pdi-p, pks and ppp (as opposed
to local parties including pa) – passed a draft of the Qanun Jinayah
or the Islamic Penal Law. This law includes stoning to death for those
 I have made initial studies of the archives of Serambi Indonesia, a daily Acehnese
newspaper from 2005 to 2007. It is difficult to find news concerning Sharia
affairs during the time of the disaster. News about the disaster rehabilitation and
reconstruction dominated.
 Moch Nur Ichwan, ‘Official Ulama and Politics of Re-Islamisation: TheMajelis
Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shariʾatisation and Contested Religious Authority in
Post-New Order’s Aceh’, Journal of Islamic Studies 22:2 (2011), 204.
 According to the Aceh Sharia qanun, public caning is the punishment for those
who commit the following acts: khalwat (sexual retreat), maisir (gambling),
khamar (alcohol consumption). After the issue of uu No. 11/2011, all the Acehnese
government’s regulations are considered qanun.
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who commit adultery and 100 lashes for homosexuality. However, this
regulation has been postponed because the governor, Irwandi Yusuf,
has refused to sign the qanun. However, according to the autonomy
regulations, at the provincial level Irwandi Yusuf has no right to intervene
in Sharia policy as it is applied by regents.
There have been human rights abuses by Sharia officers and regional
government officers within Aceh province. For example, two members
of the Sharia police raped and tortured a 20-year-old female student they
had in custody on 15 July 2010. Furthermore, there are regents who have
started to apply controversial regulations in their own regions. As an
example, Ramli ms, the regent of West Aceh, issued a qanun forbidding
women to wear jeans and ‘tight’ clothing.¹⁴ Thus, Muslim women in
West Aceh have been required to wear full-body clothing which does
not reveal their figures and only shows their face and palms. Another
‘strange’ regulation was issued by the regent of South Aceh, Husein Yusuf.
Oddly, he has prohibited male civil servants from having beards.¹⁵ Since
then, local and international media and human rights-based ngos have
started to report abuses in relation to the administration of Sharia in
Aceh.¹⁶
Sharia has now been implemented for a decade. Its dynamic appears
in the ongoing process of the regulations, some of which we have just
mentioned. I should thank many researchers who have already provided
critical studies concerning the background of the imposition of Sharia
in contemporary Aceh; works such as those by Amal and Panggabean
(2003);¹⁷ Kingsbury (2007);¹⁸ Feener and Cammack (2007);¹⁹ Salim
 The regulation was issued on 27 May 2010 and applied in West Aceh only. At the
provincial level, the qanun about Muslim dress was issued in 2002 where Article
No. 13 only stated that every Muslim should wear Islamic dress. The explanation
of Article No. 13 further states that Islamic dress should cover the aurat, not be
transparent and not be sensual. There is no subsection that jeans and trousers are
forbidden.
 Serambi Indonesia, 12 May 2010. Husin Yusuf never explained why he said so. He
only told the media that ‘we are not living in Iran, we are Indonesian Muslims’.
 See for example Human Rights Watch, ‘Policing Morality: Abuses in the
Application of Sharia in Aceh, Indonesia’, hrw report 2010, 4 December 2010.
 Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syariat Islam dari
Indonesia sampai Nigeria (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet), 2004.
 Damien Kingsbury, ‘The Free Aceh Movement: Islam and Democratization’,
Journal of Contemporary Asia 37:2 (2007), 166–189.
 R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack (eds.), Islamic Law in Contemporary
Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions (Cambridge,Massachusetts: Islamic Legal Studies
Program, Harvard Law School & Harvard University Press, 2007).
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(2008);²⁰ Aspinall (2009);²¹ Ramli (2010);²² Basri (2011);²³ and Ichwan
(2011).²⁴ Most of the aforementioned studies have, more or less, indicated
how Sharia became a ‘means’ of quelling separatist sentiment.
However, in spite of the works of these scholars there are still many
stories left, many accounts to be analysed and many findings to be
discussed concerning the ongoing processes of Sharia in Aceh. The
introductions of many of the aforementioned studies have focused on the
legal issue of Sharia in Aceh. Only a few examine how ordinary Acehnese
perceive Sharia, as Moch Nur Ichwan notes:
Despite growing Shariʿatization processes, however, some developments
indicate otherwise. There have been also growing resistances from
“progressive circles” such as someMuslim politicians (especially, but not
exclusively, ex-gam), public intellectuals, academics (especially, but not
exclusively, of the State Institute of Islamic Studies (iain) Ar-Raniry),
feminists, queer activists, Shiʿite intellectuals, literary writers, and
human rights activists.²⁵
According to Ichwan, this reality has so far been neglected by many
researchers. In his own study, Ichwan tries to conceptualise types of
Sharia resistance as an ‘alternative voice to shariatisation’ in Aceh. Modes
of Acehnese resistance to Sharia may vary by education, political views,
region, gender and personal disposition.
Ichwan pays attention to intellectual and religious-based group
activities when challenging Sharia, which leaves some aspects still
unexplored. Here I attempt to provide a more in-depth account of how
individuals of less powerful, vulnerable and cultural groups in Aceh
respond to the ongoing processes of Sharia, mainly in their daily and
 Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern
Indonesia (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2008).
 Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia
(California: Stanford University Press, 2009).
 Affan Ramli,Merajam Dalil Syariat (Banda Aceh: Bandar Publishing, 2010).
 Hasan Basri, ‘Applying Islamic Law (Syariʾat) in Aceh: A Perspective from
Within’, in Arndt Graf et al., Aceh: History, Politics and Culture (Singapore:
iseas Publishing, 2010), 265–286.
 Ichwan, ‘Official Ulama and Politics of Re-Islamisation’, 183–214.
 Moch Nur Ichwan, ‘Alternative Voices to Officialized and Totalized Shariatism
in Aceh’, a research in progress report (2010) presented at the irp meeting, the
Netherlands Embassy, Jakarta, 30 May 2011. I offer my sincere and special thanks
to Dr Nur Ichwan for fruitful discussions before exploring the topic of this
research.
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cultural activities. By closely examining the Acehnese people’s activities,
I will analyse some forms of cultural resistance to Sharia in Acehnese
society, particularly in Banda Aceh. For example, I believe that the Sharia
authority, the Aceh ulama council, and the local government of Aceh
often prohibit things that, according to them, are incompatible with
Acehnese culture and Islamic culture (‘tidak sesuai dengan kebudayaan
Aceh dan kebudayaan Islam’). Within the confines of this study, I would
like to examine how some Acehnese people respond to and challenge
such prohibitions.
According to social theorists, cultural resistance is the practice of
using meanings and symbols to combat a dominant power. The term
resistance covers a wide variety of forms of collective actions and may
take a defensive form, such as concealment and including the ambiguous
form of mimicry, which from above may be read as a mistake, but
viewed from below looks more like mockery. In this case, the strategy
adopted is ‘defensive’, ‘subversion rather than confrontation’.²⁶ Moreover,
F. Bailey coined modes of resistance such as ‘pilfering, feigned ignorance,
sabotage, arson, wangling, fiddling, and dodging’.²⁷ Although I will pay
no attention to groups of peasants or workers in Aceh in this paper, James
C. Scott’s concept of ‘weapons of the weak’ is helpful in understanding
how daily resistance has been expressed by less powerful people.²⁸ All
these concepts are fundamental for this study.
3 Resistance to Sharia: An Overview
It is important to note that nearly all Acehnese are afraid of being labelled
as ‘anti-Sharia’.²⁹ However, from the very beginning, some elements of
Acehnese society have shown their disapproval of the central government
proposal to apply Islamic law in Aceh. Prior to the tsunami of 2004,
opponents of Sharia could be categorised into two main groups, each
with different purposes. The first is a group that was dominated by the
traditional Dayah (Islamic Boarding Schools)-based Ulama, including
Waled Nu, one of the influential Acehnese Muslim scholars who called
the proposal on Sharia ‘cari ʿab’ (an Acehnese word literally meaning
 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory: Second Edition (Cambridge-Malden:
Polity Press, 2007), 91–92.
 F.G. Bailey,The Kingdom of Individuals (New York-Ithaca, 1993), 17.
 James C. Scott,Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
 Ichwan, ‘Alternative Voices to Officialized and Totalized Shariatism in Aceh’, 5.
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‘looking for a meal’) or ‘tipu Jakarta’, a deception by Jakarta, and only
intended to ignore the Acehnese.³⁰ In a seminar I attended, Waled Nu
or Tgk. Nuruzzahri, a leading figure of the Himpunan Ulama Dayah
Aceh/huda (Association of Acehnese Dayah Ulama) criticised Jakarta’s
policy in his speech in front of the Aceh civil society networks at the
Sultan Hotel, Banda Aceh, 17 June 2007. He spoke of ‘cariʾab’ and refused
to use the word ‘Sharia’ to denote the formalisation of Islamic law in Aceh.
Furthermore, the huda also criticised the government’s version of Sharia
for being only a partial understanding of Islamic law. In short, if Jakarta
had any interest in showing goodwill, it would allow for a comprehensive
Islamic law, one which is total and not partial, called Syariat Islam Kaffah.
However, according to the huda, the government did the opposite and
therefore it rejected the government’s version of Sharia.³¹
The second group comprised various elements but shared the same
view regarding the government’s proposal. They were politicians (mainly
gam leaders), human rights activists and university intellectuals who
saw the implementation of Sharia as a political tool of the government to
create conflict among the Acehnese. For example, according to Nur Djuli,
a senior leader of gam, Aceh had become a centre of Islamic teaching
throughout Indonesia. It is ironic then that the Indonesian government
was now trying to ‘re-Islamise’ Aceh. Djuli argued that this special
status was only a government tactic to win the hearts of the Acehnese.
Moreover, Djuli said that gam made no attempt to establish an Islamic
state. Ideologically, gam was motivated by historical consciousness and
gam’s struggle is based on the idea of independence, not religious issues.³²
For some Acehnese human rights activists, Sharia is a government
policy used to conceal the human rights violations of the past.³³ While
it is said that professors at iain Ar-Raniry and the University of
Syiah Kuala were involved in designing the Sharia regulations, others,
including intellectuals at a number of other Aceh universities, have
shown their opposition to the imposition of Sharia.³⁴ In 2003, iain
 See Rusjdi Ali Muhammad, Revitalisasi Syariat Islam di Aceh: Problem, Solusi
dan Implementasi (Banda Aceh: Ar-Raniry Press, 2003).
 See H. Anwar Fuadi A. Salam, Dapatkah Syariah Islam diberlakukan di Aceh?
(Banda Aceh: Gua Hira, 2001). However, recently many Dayah-based ulama have
changed their opinion, and many of them now have become Sharia supporters.
 See Kingsbury, ‘The Free Aceh Movement’, 166–189.
 Interview withWiratmadinata (International Centre for Transitional Justice-Aceh
Programme) and Hendra Fadli (Kontras Aceh), 23 March 2011.
 See Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Dari Maaf ke Panik Aceh: Sebuah Sketsa Sosiologi-
Politik, (Jakarta: Tifa Press, 2008), 358.
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Ar-Raniry organised a public seminar concerning the issue. Many
participants, mainly lecturers, reportedly criticised the Indonesian
government’s decision to end the war by giving Islamic status to Aceh
province. One even said that the introduction of Sharia is a ‘harassment
policy’.³⁵
Recently, the Sharia authorities have been concentrating their efforts
on the issue of women’s dress, organising public canings, forbidding
public entertainment, as well as issuing many prohibitions concerning
private matters. This has provoked counter-discourses from those who
believe that these regulations do not touch the substance of Islam and
Sharia itself. In fact, many books and media articles have been written by
contemporary Acehnese intellectuals such as Fuad Mardhatillah,³⁶ Affan
Ramli,³⁷ Husni Mubarak A. Latief,³⁸ Teuku Harits Muzanni,³⁹ Asrizal
Luthfi⁴⁰ and Teuku Muhammad Jafar Sulaiman.⁴¹ They have criticised
this version of Sharia as a ‘top-down policy’ formulated without popular
consent.
Furthermore, Irwandi Yusuf ’s objection to signing the Qanun Jinayah
is also inseparable from the reaction of Acehnese civil society organi-
sations that demonstrated their resistance to Sharia. After the draft of
the Qanun Jinayah was published in the newspapers, 100 activists from
the Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil Peduli Syariat/jmsps (the Civil Society’s
Network of People Concerned about Sharia) went to the Aceh Parliament
and asked its members and the governor of Aceh to stop proposing
 See Lily Zakiah Munir, ‘Simbolisasi, Politisasi dan Kontrol terhadap Perempuan
di Aceh’, in Burhanuddin (ed.), Syariat Islam: Pandangan Muslim Liberal (Jakarta:
Jaringan Islam Liberal-the Asia Foundation, 2003), 131.
 Fuad Mardhatillah, ‘Islam Protestan’, Journal Gelombang Baru, vol. 4 (2009),
63–102.
 Affan Ramli,Merajam Dalil Syariat (Banda Aceh: Bandar Publishing, 2010).
 Husni Mubarak A. Latief, Sengkarut Syariat Atas Bawah, Journal Gelombang
Baru, vol. 4 (2009), 111–122.
 Teuku Harist Muzani, ‘Syariat Tanpa Simbol’, www.acehinstitute.org/index.php
?option=com_content&view=article&id=385:syariat-tanpa-simbol&catid=74:
paradigma-islam (accessed 2 March 2011).
 Asrizal Luthfi, ‘Pribumisasi Syariat’, www.acehinstitute.org/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=445:pribumisasi-syariat&catid=74:paradigma
-islam (accessed on 2 March 2011).
 Teuku Muhammad Jafar Sulaiman, ‘Syariat Islam tidak Perlu Dibela’ (Negosiasi
Pluralisme Sebagai IslamMasa Depan Aceh), www.acehinstitute.org/id/index
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=810:syariat-islam-tidak-perlu
-dibela-negosiasi-pluralisme-sebagai-islam-masa-depan-aceh&catid=133:
paradigma&Itemid=280 (accessed 2 March 2011).
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Sharia qanuns containing human rights violations.⁴² jmsps comprises
several local ngos, such as the Human Rights ngo Coalition, Aceh
Legal Aid Foundation (lbh), women volunteers on humanitarian issues
(rpuk), Flower Aceh, kktga, Komunitas Tikar Pandan, Aceh Judicial
and Monitoring Institute, Violet Grey, Women’s Voice Radio, Gender
Working Group, seia, Fatayat nu, Sekolah Menulis Dokarim, Kontras
Aceh, Centre for Human Rights Studies-Unsyiah, Sri Ratu Safiatuddin
Foundation and others. The group successfully convinced Irwandi to
postpone the implementation of the Qanun Jinayah.
The decision by politicians, intellectuals and humanitarian activists to
protest and Irwandi Yusuf ’s decision to postpone the implementation of
the Islamic penal law show that forms of resistance to Sharia are various
and exist. But how do ordinary Acehnese, without the backing of any
political party, intellectual academy, material and the power of money,
resist Sharia?
4 Sharia and Cultural Resistance: Voices from Below
On 31 December 2011, the Aceh ulama council and the mayor of Banda
Aceh put an advertisement in the Serambi Indonesia newspaper. The
authorities prohibited the Acehnese people from celebrating New Year’s
Eve. They did the same in 2009 and 2010. The threat was that fireworks
and trumpets would be seized by the Sharia police.The beach near Banda
Aceh would be closed to the public during the night. But, by midnight,
thousands of people were driving cars andmotorcycles, blowing trumpets
and illuminating the sky of Banda Aceh with their fireworks. No one
knows exactly where people bought the trumpets and fireworks and
where they hid them before midnight. Everyone knew, however, that the
Sharia police could do nothing about the crowds that night.
This is not the first time that ‘feigned ignorance, sabotage, arson,
fiddling, and dodging’ were used against the Sharia authority. For
instance, there have been beauty contests held in Banda Aceh, such
as Miss Aceh Fair, Miss Coffee, Ratu Waria Aceh (Queer Queen of Aceh)
and Duta Wisata Aceh (Aceh Tourism Ambassador) without approval
from the Sharia office.
Some Islamic student groups and ulama condemned the contests
and asked the government not to give permission to those wanting to
organise these events. The group called Violet Grey⁴³ found its own way
 Serambi Indonesia, 22 November 2009.
 Violet Grey is an organisation that claims to strive for the rights of lesbian,
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to combat the rule. In 2009, Violet Grey hosted a controversial activity,
Pemilihan Ratu Waria, a queer festival. Violet Grey had hidden its true
agenda and asked for approval from the Aceh Ulama Council and the
Sharia police to organise a music concert and a seminar for charity.
After the event, Violet Grey announced to the public who had won the
festival. Ulama and some hardline Islamist groups and Muslim student
organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir, fpi, ldk and kammi demanded the
dissolution of Violet Grey.⁴⁴
The two accounts below provide a more in-depth story and analysis
in terms of how specific groups of Acehnese express their opposition to
the administration of Sharia.
5 Challenging Arabisation through Arab Films
One of the unusual phenomena in Banda Aceh is that there is no public
cinema at all in the city. This is different from the capital cities of other
Indonesian provinces where watching films at cinemas is a regular feature
of urban lifestyles. For example, neighbouring cities such as Medan and
Padang have at least three cinemas each, generally in plazas and malls.
Banda Aceh, despite the development of various business projects after
the tsunami, has no cinema.
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, there were four popular cinemas
in Banda Aceh. The oldest one was the GarudaTheatre located close to
the Blang Padang public playground. In fact, the GarudaTheatre was a
building for art performances and was one of the colonial legacies of
Banda Aceh. After independence, it became the first commercial public
cinema in town. In 2004, the building was hit by the tsunami. Now, it
has been rebuilt for other purposes, mainly for weddings, and there is
no regular schedule either for art performances or films. Further, there
were cinemas dedicated to the memory of the people of Banda Aceh,
gay, bisexual and transgender people (lgbt) in Aceh. Initially, this group was
introduced to the public in 2007 as an organisation focused on anti-hiv/aids
campaigns as well as disseminating information related to sexual and reproductive
health issues. It was supported by some international ngos such as Hivos, World
Vision and the National Commission on hiv-aids. Violet Grey has now shifted
its focus to human rights issues, especially advocating the rights of lesbians, gays
and transgenders in Aceh who face discrimination and intimidation from both
society and the authorities.
 See www.antaranews.com/berita/1266144439/ulama-kecam-kontes-waria-aceh
(accessed 2 March 2011).
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including the GajahTheatre, Jelita Theatre and pas 21. pas 21 was burnt
down during the conflict of 2001 and the Jelita theatre was closed in the
late 1990s after the political situation worsened. It has now become a
supermarket and has been renamed Hermes Mall.
The Gajah Theatre was the last remaining cinema in Aceh, even
surviving the conflict. However, it was closed to the public following
the disaster of 2004 and is now used as a military warehouse. Thus,
there are currently no cinemas in Banda Aceh. It is said that the Sharia
authorities regard the presence of a cinema in Aceh as incompatible with
the implementation of Sharia. Indeed, the authority considers cinemas
to be potential places for Sharia violations. In his article, Bioskop di
Banda Aceh: Sejarah Esek-Esek (‘Cinema in Banda Aceh: A History of
Improper Sexuality’) Sehat Ihsan Sadiqin wrote, ‘it is commonly thought
that people in Banda Aceh went to the cinema not only to watch films but
also to khalwat.’⁴⁵ According to Sadiqin, this is one of the reasons why
the local government then asked the owner of the cinema to separate
men and women in the building. He acknowledges the possibility of
the cinema becoming a place where Sharia violations could take place.
However, it is not clear whether Sadiqin agrees with the local government
policy on cinema, because he also wrote that entertainment, including
films, is a necessity and not in contradiction with Islam.⁴⁶
In fact, until now there has been no regulation that prohibits people
from opening or going to the cinema in the Sharia qanuns. But prior to
the tsunami, the Sharia police regularly came to raid those accused of
committing khalwat while watching films at the cinema. Consequently,
people stayed away from the cinemas and in the end they were forced
to close. Needless to say, people in Aceh are now watching films on
television or vcd players.
Fozan Santa, an Acehnese-born filmmaker, has a different opinion
concerning Sharia policy on cinema. Along with some of his colleagues
he runs a local organisation called Sekolah Menulis Dokarim (Dokarim
Writing School).⁴⁷ This organisation was founded in 2003 by some
Acehnese writers, and is known as an alternative literary school for
Acehnese students interested in literature. Initially, the programme
 Sehat Ihsan Sadiqin, ‘Bioskop di Banda Aceh: Sejarah Esek-Esek’, http://hiburan
.kompasiana.com/film/2010/05/21/bioskop-di-banda-aceh-sejarah-esek-esek/.
 Ibid.
 Dokarim was the nickname of the late 19th century bard poet Abdul Karim, the
author of the Tale of the Dutch War. What little we know about him comes from
Snouck Hurgronje’s De Atjèhers (Batavia and Leiden: Landsdrukkerij and Brill,
1893–1894).
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was primarily about creative writing and publishing.⁴⁸ Fozan joined
the organisation in February 2005, shortly after the tsunami. He was
very critical of Acehnese government policy and, according to him,
the intensity of the implementation of Sharia has destroyed one of the
important things in life – the right to entertainment.
Fozan argued that film is a strongly effective medium for learning
and that the cinema is an important public sphere where people share
information and culture. His background as a film director as well as a
screenplay writer resulted in the Dokarim programme changing from
being solely training for writers to also including an annual Banda Aceh
film festival.
The festival is unlike any other film festival. Since Banda Aceh has
no cinema, Fozan and his friends installed screens and vcd players at
the university campus, cafés and villages for the festival. Interestingly,
all the films shown during the festival are concerned with the situation
in the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, Fozan and the Dokarim
school members call the festival the ‘Festival Film Arab’ or the Arab Film
Festival. But why an Arab film festival?
Fozan, who graduated from iain Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, argues
that Sharia has led to the imposition of Arab culture in Aceh. As
an educated Muslim, he imagined that Islam and Sharia (in their
fundamental definition) would contribute positively to building back a
better Aceh after the bloody conflict and tsunami, but he argues that the
authorities have politicised Islam and Sharia to gain power. According to
him, few contemporary Acehnese distinguish between Islam and Arab
culture. Through his knowledge of Islam and Muslim cultures he wants
to illustrate that what is happening in Aceh is a process of Arabisation
rather than Islamisation. The slogan of the festival is ‘Sinoe Aceh Sideh
Arab, Sinoe Sideh Hana Rab’, which literally means ‘Here is Aceh, there is
the Arab World; Here (Aceh) andThere (Arabia) are not close (and not
so alike)’. It highlights that there are many differences between the two
cultures and that one cannot simply replace the other.
Below are some of the titles of films that have been shown at the
festival:
In 2009:
. Condemnations, Walid Mattar, Tunisia, 2009, 15 min
. The Unknown Lady, Fajr Yacoub, Syria-Palestine, 2010, 22 min
. La Trappola, Lemnaouer Ahmine, Algeria, 2010, 62 min
 Sekolah Menulis Dokarim is a member of the Cultural League Komunitas Tikar
Pandan: see www.tikarpandan.org (accessed 5 August 2011).
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. I am George, Mohsen Abdelghan, Egypt, 2010, 10 min
. Saba Flous, Anis Lassoude, Tunisia, 2010, 15 min
. Jasmin Bird, Sulafa Hijazi, Syria, 2009, 90 min⁴⁹
In 2010:
. Caramel, Nadine Labaki, Lebanon, 2007, 90 min
. The Stoning of Soraya M, Cyrus Nowraste, Iran, 2009, 110 min
. Baran, Majid Majidi, Iran, 2003, 98 min
. Le Grand Voyage, Ismael Ferroukhi, Morocco-France, 2007, 108 min
. Shouf Shouf Habibi, Albert Ter Heerdt, Morocco-the Netherlands,
2008, 85 min
. Turtle Can Fly, Bahman Gohbadi, Iraq, 2007, 95 min⁵⁰
TheArab FilmFestival, organised by theDokarim School, is an interesting
phenomenon within the ongoing process of Sharia implementation.
On the one hand, it seems that this programme supports the notion of
Sharia in Aceh. Many people attend the festival and participate in a series
of discussions after the screenings. Fozan realises that most ordinary
Acehnese regard ‘Arab’ and ‘Islam’ as being synonymous. Everything that
comes from the Arab world is considered Islamic and treated as holy.
Dokarim Arab Film Festival wants to show the contrary through films.
He believes that films may influence people in a peaceful way to be aware
of the distortion of the real meaning of Sharia. This is the way to support
‘Sharia’ by resisting Sharia, as he concluded.
6 Punk: Resistance to Sharia from the Street
A piece of writing appeared on the social network website, Facebook,
entitled ‘Aku Azhari, Aku Seorang Punker: Apa Ada Masalah Besar?’
(‘I am Azhari and I am punker: Is there a big problem with that?’). It
was posted by Azhari Aiyub on 13 February 2011.⁵¹ Within a matter of
hours, some 70 comments were posted in response. The article talks
 The Dokarim report, 2009.
 The Dokarim report, 2010.
 www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150142263646015 (accessed 15 July 2011).
This article has also been published by Distraction Zine, vol. 4, June 2011. Internet
access can easily be found in many places including coffee shops in Banda Aceh
and is one of the valuable contributions made by the international development
presence involved in rebuilding Aceh after the disaster. Most Acehnese now have
a Facebook account.
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about a punker who was angry because his dignity as a human being was
being violated. The entry also talks about the chronological history of the
punk community. Azhari further discusses punk ideology and nihilist
philosophy, punk anarchical ideas and statements about how such a
marginalised group survives in Aceh at a time of growing hypocrisy. In
fact, Azhari is Acehnese-born and a well-known figure within modern
Indonesian literature. He does not wear punk clothes nor lives on the
streets like many other punkers. His writing nonetheless showcases
his sympathy with punk communities against the background of many
Sharia police-backed arrests of members of the punk community in
Banda Aceh.
Azhari first reacted when he read the news coverage of the arrest of
several punkers by the Sharia police in 2011.⁵² These punkers were taken
to the State Police Academy in Saree, Aceh Besar, where they were shaved.
A number of pictures showing this were published by several mass media.
Azhari was furious and wrote the article in response. He told me that
he had previously sent the article to several local media for publication
but they all rejected his article, despite the fact that none of Azhari’s
writings had ever been rejected before. Azhari accused the local media
of supporting the interests of politicians whose religious hedonistic and
hypocritical lifestyles were being disrupted by the presence of the punkers
‘who do not see what is considered important by several politicians and
rich people in Aceh as important’.⁵³
How punkers came to be and how long they have been in Aceh is not
exactly known. As a rebel movement, punk started out in London and
spread throughout the world. In Indonesia, punk communities generally
grow in big cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and Yogyakarta.
These communities are characterised by their clothes, hairstyles and
gatherings. Leather jackets, nails, colourful Mohawk hairdos and special
shoes have made them different from the majority of people. Punk has
been identified as part of a counterculture, groups that resist surrounding
social conventions.⁵⁴
It is said that punk communities existed in Aceh prior to 2000. They
started by establishing a number of rock bands and conducted several
music festivals as a way to resist the never-ending political disputes in
Aceh. People in Banda Aceh were struck by the presence of unusually
dressed youths. They look different from others since they usually play
 Serambi Indonesia, 12 February 2011.
 Interview with Azhari Aiyub, 16 March 2011.
 See for example Roger Sabin (ed.), Punk Rock, So What? The Cultural Legacy of
Punk (Routledge: London & New York, 1999).
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music andwalk around on the streets of Banda Aceh.They call themselves
‘Punkers’. A few people complained in the media about the presence
of punk in Banda Aceh, because they look ‘weird and un-Islamic’ and,
culturally, punk is not part of Acehnese culture. Some parents also said
that they were afraid their children would join the group.⁵⁵ Since January
2011, members of the punk community in Banda Aceh have become the
main target of regular sweepings by the Sharia police. They are usually
arrested and imprisoned for several days before being returned to their
parents.
Dedi Besi, who is considered senior within Aceh’s punk community,
said that he became a punker in 1998. Dedi learned about punk when he
was studying in Yogyakarta. He believes that being a punker is in line
with his job as an archaeologist. Then, he was called Dedi Besi (Iron
Dedi) by his fellow punkers because he likes to look at and collect junk
metal and iron, especially rusty nails he finds on the streets. Dedi used
these rusted nails as accessories for his clothing. He looks polite and is far
from looking like an urchin. He always carries a small guitar wherever
he goes. He does not live on the streets, because his parents are relatively
wealthy. I was even more amazed by the fact that Dedi is now teaching
archaeology at the Faculty of Culture at the State Institute of Islamic
Studies (iain) Ar-Raniry.
Dedi asserted that many Acehnese punkers know about things that
are forbidden by Islam.They do not live freely, nor do they indulge in free
sex even though they are accused of doing so; they do not rob people,
and they do not provoke riots. They only gather, walk on the streets and
play musical instruments. Perhaps, their appearance is unlike that of the
rest of the community, but this does not mean that they are criminals.
He does not deny that there are punkers who drink and fight, but this
does not give the authorities the right to suppress and reject punkers’
existence in Aceh by deploying the Sharia police as the guardians of
Sharia law. He believes that the Sharia police should take a more humane
approach to the punkers.⁵⁶
Dedi argues that many people who have a more conservative appear-
ance commit violent acts, steal, are corrupt, drink, and adopt undesirable
practices. Dedi Besi sees the tension between the punkers and the Sharia
police as a result of the Sharia police’s failure to understand what punk is.
In fact, there are many kinds of punks and most are not involved in neg-
ative activities. Nonetheless, punkers have suffered blanket indictments.
 Readers’ forum of Serambi Indonesia, 3 January 2011.
 Interview with Dedi Besi, 29 June 2011.
264 islam, politics and change
After the arrests, the Sharia police banned some of the punk commu-
nities, publishing a list in the mass media. These include:
. Rantai Hitam (Black Chain)
. Museum Street Punk
. Rock in Love
. Damai Boleh Ribut Boleh or DaboRibo (Peace Okay Chaos Okay)
. Netral (Impartial)
. Anak Brutal (Bad Boys)
. Ello
. Tanggoel Rebel (Rebel Dyke)
. Jusuid Guero
. Black Green
. Brume + Horizontal
. Lamb of Gun⁵⁷
Meanwhile, Syahril, a Sharia police officer, said that the arrests were
lawful because punk is a Western subculture which is unfamiliar to
Acehnese people. Therefore, the punkers’ existence is deemed to have
disturbed order within the city of Banda Aceh. According to Syahril,
punkers have been involved in activities that have worried local people.
Syahril did not provide further details about such activities, but he did
emphasise that punkers should not exist in Aceh. Punkers have to respect
Aceh as a region that is implementing Sharia law. If the punkers do not
want to respect the Sharia law, then they should leave Aceh.⁵⁸
Despite the punkers’ explanation, a number of Islamic organisations
support the Sharia police’s extrememeasures.These Islamic organisations
issued a press release stating their support for the arrests. Teuku Zulkhairi,
a member of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah/ddi (Islamic Dakwa Council)
and the President of iain postgraduate students, is one of the outspoken
supporters of the Sharia police. He wrote an article entitled ‘Menyorot
Komunitas Punk Aceh’ (‘Bringing to Light Aceh Punk Communities’).⁵⁹
Zulkhairi further attacked those who defended punkers and called them
‘a group whose way of thinking should be questioned’ and a group
that ‘always hides behind human rights issues when defending things
advocated by non-Muslims’. He further asked, ‘How would a Muslim
justify a punker’s way of life?’
This is where the debate stands. Lowbat Boeloek, a leader of a punk
community, stated that their activities have not violated Sharia law. The
 Serambi Indonesia, 11 February 2011.
 Interview with Syahril, April 2011.
 Harian Aceh, 24 January 2011.
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punk community to which Lowbat belongs is called Tanggoel Rebel.
They have often taken to the streets to announce that they have the
right to live in Aceh and they have protested against the arrest of several
of their members. Boeloek himself is an educated young man. He is
finishing his studies at the Economics Faculty of Syiah Kuala University.
Boeloek condemns the government of Banda Aceh which, through its
Department of Sharia Law, has generalised and categorised the existence
of the punkers’ ways of life as ‘penyakit masyarakat’ (social diseases).⁶⁰
Lowbat Boeloek claimed that they still carry out the five-times-a-day
prayers and they have helped to clear Banda Aceh’s streets of rubbish. It is
not the business of the Sharia police to worry about their hair and clothing
styles. Everything depends on personal tastes and aesthetic perspectives
and these clearly differ between people. Punk communities can easily
point out a number of cases of corruption implicating those who claim
to be religious (and claim to be Muslims) who, on different occasions,
would deliver sermons on morals and on how to maintain Sharia law.
Meanwhile, their deeds are far removed from Islamic teachings. Punkers
exist to fight against their hypocrisy, Lowbat continued.
The emergence of a Muslim punk community in Yogyakarta has been
an interesting phenomenon and provides a useful comparison for the
situation in Banda Aceh.⁶¹ Members of this group dress like punkers but
they emphasise their roles as Muslims. Besides singing on the streets,
these particular punkers also carry out regular religious study groups
called punkajian, a creative way of writing ‘Pengkajian’, which means
study. Dedi and Lowbat claimed that many of them also did what the
Yogyakarta Muslim punkers did. Nonetheless, the government of Aceh
and the Sharia police only look at the way these punkers dress and judge
it to be different from the local standard of ethics and local religious
understanding. Lowbat asserted that tastes will never be the same ‘until
Judgement Day’.
The fact that the punkers’ existence is not welcomed is not a problem
confined to Banda Aceh. Big cities in Indonesia such as Bandung, Jakarta,
and Yogyakarta also have punk communities and they often have to
deal with the police as well. I can accept the critical notion that it is
still too early to identify punk as a form of cultural resistance to Sharia
law in Aceh as it must be further problematised and debated. However,
Banda Aceh differs from the larger cities in Indonesia both in terms of
its size and for its introduction of Sharia-based regulations and in this
context gives punkers a different role. Lowbat Boeloek further stated that
 Interview with Lowbat Boeloek.
 http://punkmuslim.multiply.com/.
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Acehnese punkers existed prior to 2000 but that they had drowned in
the tsunami or had been killed in the conflict. On 9 September 1999,
some punkers gathered again and re-established their movement to form
a countermovement against the hypocrisy of the Achenese elite. They felt
that the traditional Acehnese attached too much value to clothes and
religion, as opposed to the many ‘real’ problems in society.
It is the way punkers dress and the songs they sing that the authorities
and the Sharia police dislike. Often, the police dispersed them as they
were gathering at particular locations within Banda Aceh. Such dispersals
have worsened the relationship between the punk communities and
the Sharia police. Indeed, the situation became worse at the beginning
of 2011, when the police and the punkers clashed and a Sharia police
officer was stabbed. Since that incident, punkers have been targeted by
the Sharia police. However, the punkers have fought back and have taken
to the streets, shouting that they do not want to be eradicated by the
Sharia police.
It is interesting to see how the democratic process runs in Aceh
with regard to this case. After the tsunami, the international presence
influenced the rapid adoption of human rights norms among Acehnese
civil society organisations. The role of lawyers from Banda Aceh’s Legal
Aid Institution (lbh), an institution aiming to provide free legal aid to
people, was clear when some young lawyers tried to release the arrested
punkers. Nevertheless, the lbh was unable to start a legal case against
the Sharia police because the punkers who had been tortured did not
want to report the Sharia police to the national police. ‘It doesn’t make
any sense, they are the same’, Boeloek said.
The problem with the punkers is yet to be resolved even though a
number of parties have tried to invite the Sharia police and representatives
of the punk communities to participate in a comprehensive dialogue.
Discussions and seminars have been held in order to respond to the
violence experienced by this minority group. However, physical clashes
between the Sharia police and punkers continue to occur. Two days prior
to Ramadan, on 29 July 2011, Sharia police once again conducted raids
against punkers in Banda Aceh.⁶² During the raid, one punker, named
Rully or Oyie, was arrested and beaten by the authorities. This was done
in front of the deputy mayor of Banda Aceh.⁶³
The government programme named ‘Visit Banda Aceh Year 2011’
should be taken into consideration when trying to find out why the Sharia
 http://harian-aceh.com/2011/07/28/satpol-pp-dan-wh-keroyok-anak-punk (ac-
cessed 31 July 2011).
 Interview with Junaidi Hanafiah, a journalist of Harian Aceh, 2 August 2011.
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police and the government of Banda Aceh have been aggressive and
hostile to punkers. It is likely that the authorities fear that the punkers –
with their activities which are considered inappropriate or not part of
Acehnese culture – may spoil the image and motto of Banda Aceh as the
‘Bandar Wisata Islami’ (‘Islamic Tourism City’ or ‘A Spiritual Gateway to
Islamic Tourism’) and drive away tourism.
The year 2011 saw a further number of contradictions in the position of
the Aceh government with regard to adherence to Sharia implementation.
While the entertainment industry was minimised with Sharia law
banning the gathering of men and women, the government did organise
a number of festivals. The Peunayong⁶⁴ Festival, Duta Wisata Aceh
(Aceh Tourism Ambassadors) and the River Festival, among others, are
examples of public events held by Banda Aceh’s Ministry of Tourism
to support the ‘Visit Banda Aceh Year 2011’ programmes. Here, the
government failed to deploy enough Sharia police officers to oversee the
separate attendance of men and women at these events, thereby failing
strictly to adhere to the regulation that no mixing of men and women
can take place at public events.
7 Concluding Remarks
Aceh experienced various challenges in the implementation of Sharia. A
decade after its formalisation, there is still no consensus on which type
of ‘appropriate’ Sharia should be adopted by this region. Some religious
groups and Acehnese public figures have criticised the Sharia-based
legislation, arguing that Sharia is now merely used by the government as
a tool to strengthen its political position. However, many previous studies
concerning the implementation of Sharia in Aceh have often overlooked
ordinary people’s reaction to the law. To fill the gap, some cases and
youth expressions summarised in this article show some examples of
how the implementation of Sharia has drawn criticism from the ordinary
Acehnese. Their criticism has been expressed in the form of resistance
and disobedience. However, central to this work is that their actions are
not meant to reject Islam and Sharia, but to combat the politicisation of
Islamic law by the authorities.
 Peunayong is a Chinatown situated in the centre of Banda Aceh.

9 Images of Violence and Piety in Aceh
David Kloos1
1 Introduction
On 23 February 2010 people in Aceh were surprised by the news that
a training camp for aspiring jihadis, or ‘terrorists’ as they were simply
called in local media, had been discovered near Jantho in the district of
Aceh Besar, the rural area surrounding the provincial capital of Banda
Aceh. An initial effort by the police to make arrests turned out to be
disastrous and a large number escaped into the nearby mountains. In
the subsequent attempt to round up the group, several members of the
security forces were killed.² Three innocent civilians were also killed,
two of them because they had been mistaken for terrorists and the
third because he was hit by a stray bullet.³ Wary of further escalation,
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stated that these terrorists were not
connected to gam (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement),
the Acehnese separatist organisation that was formally disbanded after
the signing of a peace treaty with the Indonesian government in August
2005.⁴ Ultimately, it took more than a month to kill or arrest all of
the alleged terrorists and affiliated members of the cell. Among them
 Acknowledgments: The research conducted for this chapter was supported
by the Faculty of Arts, vu University, Amsterdam, and the Islam Research
Programme (irp). I am grateful toHeather Sutherland andHenk Schulte Nordholt
for supervising my PhD research, and to Marise van Amersfoort, Martin van
Bruinessen, Léon Buskens, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G. Kaptein for supervising
the irp Indonesia team. I am grateful to Annemarie Samuels and the editors of
this volume for their critical comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
 ‘Baku tembak berkecamuk di Seulimeum’, Serambi Indonesia, 5 March 2010;
‘Pengepungan berlanjut’, Serambi Indonesia, 6 March 2010; ‘4 Jenazah dievakuasi
dari Medan Tempur’, Serambi Indonesia, 7 March 2010.
 ‘Pengepungan Jantho, satu warga tewas’, Acehkita.com, 23 February 2010; ‘Kami
hanya cari ikan’, Acehkita.com, 24 Feburary 2010; ‘2 warga tertembak, Polda harus
bertanggungjawab’, Acehkita.com, 24 February 2010; ‘Lagi, seorang warga tewas
tertembak’, Acehkita.com, 4 March 2010 (accessed 14 March 2010).
 ‘Teroris di Aceh tak terkait gam’, Serambi Indonesia, 6 March 2010.
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was Dulmatin, the most wanted terrorist in Southeast Asia, and the
leader of the group. He was shot dead on 9 March, in an internet café in
Tangerang, Banten.⁵
In the following months more information became gradually avail-
able.⁶ The group, it turned out, had split off from the Jemaah Islamiyah
(ji), an infamous jihadi organisation commonly linked to Al Qaeda and
led by the radical cleric Abu Bakar Baʾasyir. Apparently, Dulmatin, one
of the masterminds behind the deadly terrorist attack on Bali in 2002,
had become alienated from the movement. Since 2006 he and a number
of like-minded persons had concluded that the jihadi struggle had gone
astray, and that it was necessary to develop ‘a new programme that could
unite the jihadi community’.⁷ The training camp in Aceh revealed the
existence of a new coalition which, besides Dulmatin, included well-
known radical Islamists from Java and elsewhere, as well as a handful of
local Acehnese who were sympathetic to the jihadi cause. The group was
heavily armed and had considerable knowledge of the terrain around
Jantho. When the police secured the site of the training camp they
encountered weapons, books about ‘global jihad’, and dvds related to the
Bali bombings. During the investigation the police ‘speculated that the
militants were preparing to fight in Palestine and did not have a domestic
Indonesian agenda’.⁸
The choice of Aceh to start a training camp was not particularly smart.
It appears that Dulmatin and his group were looking for a ‘secure base’
for their operations. They chose Aceh as a location, first, because the
successful guerrilla actions of gam had made Aceh look like suitable
terrain for underground activities and, second, because Aceh seemed like
fruitful ground for recruitment as a result of the local implementation
of Sharia law.⁹ Both assumptions were wrong. War-torn Aceh was not
a great place to walk around with guns. Attempts to involve known
radical religious teachers failed hopelessly, at least partly because of the
uncompromising way in which the leaders of the cell rejected Acehnese
 International Crisis Group, ‘Indonesia: Jihadi surprise in Aceh’, Asia Report
No. 189, 20 April 2010, 12.
 An authoritative analysis can be found in ibid.
 Ibid., 1.
 us Embassy, ‘Aceh police action nets four militants, estimated 50 at large in
jungle’, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10JAKARTA254_a.html (accessed
3 November 2013). Indeed, this was most likely one of the coalition’s goals,
although the plan to send trained Indonesian jihadis to Gaza had apparently
already been cancelled in early 2009. See International Crisis Group, ‘Indonesia:
Jihadi surprise in Aceh’, 9.
 Ibid., 7–8.
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Hills around Jantho where the confrontation with alleged terrorists took place
cultural practices as ‘un-Islamic’. This does not mean that no Acehnese
were involved in the group. A list of suspected members, compiled a few
months later by the International Crisis Group, counted 18 people from
Aceh out of a total of 78.¹⁰
Aceh is often seen as a place where radical Islamist movements are
less influential than in other parts of Indonesia. This is true, in the
sense that the separatist conflict made it difficult for such groups to
establish themselves. At the same time, this view risks reproducing
some simplistic stereotypes, namely that the Acehnese are inherently
conservative, pre-occupied with their own territorial concerns, and
hostile or ‘immune’ to outside influences. Stereotypes like these coloured
the ways in which both domestic and international media analysed
the ‘terrorist’ issue. Some media outlets wrote about the possible links
between the discovery of the jihadi camp, expressions of fundamentalism
in Aceh and Sharia law.¹¹ Other, less suggestive reports came to a
diametrically opposite conclusion, emphasising that this group came
from outside Aceh, and quoting Acehnese political and religious leaders
 Ibid., ‘Appendix b’, 19–22.
 See, e.g., this highly suggestive report on the website of Radio Australia, http://
www.radioaustralia.net.au/asia/2010-05-04/jihadi-terrorist-cell-uncovered-in-
aceh/189854 (accessed 3 November 2013).
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who stated that the group would never find support among the Acehnese,
whose Islamic teachings were peaceful.¹² Both views, in my opinion,
are problematic.
When the training camp was discovered in February 2010, I was living
in Aceh in order to conduct fieldwork for my doctoral dissertation.¹³
Coincidently, one of the clashes between the alleged ‘terrorists’ and the
security forces took place in a forest relatively close to my field site, a
rural village in Aceh Besar, which I will refer to by the pseudonym of
‘Jurong’. This situation provided me with an unexpected opportunity
to record the villagers’ first reactions to these events at a time when it
was still very unclear what kind of people the authorities were dealing
with, what their motivations were, and how the violence would end.
Interestingly, these reactions varied widely. Many people were afraid
that the conflict might flare up again. Others expressed their anger at
what must certainly be ‘outsiders’ whose presence was disrupting Aceh’s
fragile peace. Again others sympathised with the apparent motivations of
the ‘terrorists’, even if they did not agree with the use of violence or with
the choice of Aceh as a base. At the same time, there was considerable
uncertainty and ambivalence about what to believe, or how to make
sense of the situation. Safwan, a 43-year-old civil servant, after expressing
his surprise and speculating whether the situation might get out of hand
and become ‘political’, explained to me that most of all he felt ‘confused’
(bingung).
In this chapter I argue that in order to understand these divergent
emotions and explanations, it is important to investigate, first, the ways
in which different ‘images of violence and piety’ have developed over
a long period of time and in the context of Acehnese history and society,
and second, what impact these images have on society today.¹⁴ As
such, this case provides an opportunity to address a specific problem
that has been weighing on my mind for some time. The Acehnese are
known, stereotypically, as a particularly pious and militant people.
 See, e.g., the Jakarta Post, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/09/aceh
-denies-any-links-with-terrorism.html (accessed 3 November 2013).
 David Kloos, Becoming better Muslims: Religious authority and ethical improve-
ment in Aceh, Indonesia, PhD dissertation, vu University Amsterdam, 2013.
 This chapter does not contain an argument about ‘religious violence’. William
Cavanaugh convincingly demonstrated the nonsensical nature of this label,
arguing that it commonly functions to deflect attention from, or brush under
the carpet, the ‘secular’ roots of violence, without supplying valid reasons for
doing so, see William Cavanaugh,The myth of religious violence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
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This image is old, and it is persistent. It has been reproduced again
and again in written sources, such as official documents, books and
newspapers, but also in visual sources, such as photographs and films,
and in ‘traditional’ art performances such as dance. It is important to
approach these images critically.They are distortions of the ways in which
people in Aceh experience their religion.They conceal the contradictions
and ambiguities that inform lived reality. They are ideological, and
often say more about political agendas than people’s everyday lives.
At the same time, however, anyone who has spent time in Aceh will
acknowledge that these stereotypes, although highly problematic in an
analytical sense, have a particular purchase in social reality. In other
words, the images of violence and piety are not just constructions created
‘on the outside’. They are present in Aceh and they must be taken into
account if we want to understand how people address the question
of ‘what it means’ to be Acehnese. Of course, images of violence and
piety do not determine people’s thoughts and actions. Yet the question
is important because it holds implications both for the way in which
we address trends in local politics (including, but not limited to, the
implementation of Islamic law), and the complex processes of social and
cultural change. This chapter traces images of violence and piety in Aceh,
asking, first, how they manifested themselves in the specific context of
Jurong in early 2010 and, second, how they are rooted in and are drawn
from the multi-interpretable, discursive strands that make up Acehnese
history.
The structure is as follows. The first chapter offers the historical
context. The second part moves to the events of 2010, focusing on the
ways in which the scarcity of official information, rumours and the village
talk revealed particular images of violence and piety. In the third part I go
back into history to trace some of these images, focusing on the myriad
meanings they have been given in different periods and by different
segments of Acehnese society. I will focus on the idea of ‘holy struggle’,
which is sometimes referred to through the Islamic concept of jihad, and
sometimes by (less sensitive) Indonesian language alternatives such as
perjuangan suci. In the conclusion I return to the problem of stereotypes
in Acehnese society.
2 Violence and Religion as Defining Aspects of Acehnese
History
Islam has played a central role in the formation of Acehnese identity
ever since at some point around the turn of the 20th century it became
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a meaningful category for ethnic self-representation.¹⁵ Today, ‘being
Acehnese’ is commonly understood as a combination of speaking (any
dialect of) theAcehnese language, respecting a local variation ofAcehnese
customs (adat), adhering to Islam, and identifying, one way or another,
with the Acehnese past.¹⁶ In the second half of the 20th century Acehnese
ethnic identity became increasingly politicised in a development closely
connected to the region’s violent history.
The Dutch colonial army invaded Aceh in 1873, in a move legitimised
as an attempt to eradicate piracy in the Straits of Malacca, but today com-
monly placed by historians in the context of imperial conquest.¹⁷ What
the Dutch expected to be a brief campaign turned into a grinding war.
Although the Acehnese Sultan capitulated in 1903, there continued to be
localised but intense eruptions of violence until the Japanese occupation
ended Dutch rule in 1942.¹⁸ In 1891, the Dutch orientalist Christiaan
Snouck Hurgronje discovered that the leaders of ‘Acehnese’ resistance
perceived the struggle as a ‘holy war’. Behind the line of concentration a
bitter conflict over arms, resources and authority had broken out between
representatives of the traditional aristocracy (the uleebalang) and a group
of religious scholars (the ulama). In the 1890s it was the ulama, rather
than the uleebalang who had come to lead the war, framed it as a jihad
and, as a result, gained unprecedented authority among the population.
In response, Snouck Hurgronje advised the Dutch generals openly to
 As Edward Aspinall has written, ‘there is little evidence from before the twentieth
century of a widely shared, conscious Acehnese identity, and there is even
less to suggest that such an identity was a basis for mobilization, even during
war’: Edward Aspinall, Islam and nation: Separatist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 20. In the vernacular literature
predating the 20th century the word ‘Aceh’ refers not to a defined physical space,
but to Banda Aceh, the harbour on the tip of Sumatra and the site of the Sultan’s
palace (kraton). The important identity marker for ordinary people then was the
Islamic religion and their status as residents of a particular village or fiefdom. It
was the Dutch colonial government which came to speak of Aceh as a ‘province’
with particular cultural and religious characteristics. See Kloos, Becoming better
Muslims.
 According to official statistics, 98 per cent of circa 4 million inhabitants of Aceh
province consider themselves Muslim, while the large majority is ethnically
Acehnese.
 See, e.g. Nicholas Tarling, Imperialism in Southeast Asia (London and New York:
Routledge, 2001), 135–144.
 For a discussion see Paul van ’t Veer, De Atjeh-oorlog (Amsterdam: De Arbeider-
spers, 1969).
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support the uleebalang, while at the same time ruthlessly persecuting
the militant ulama and their followers.¹⁹
The Japanese occupation featured a reconfiguration of the political role
of the ulama and the uleebalang. While the Dutch had experimented for
some time with the co-optation of quiescent ulama, during the Japanese
period this became common policy. After the defeat of the Japanese in
the PacificWar, the tension between the two groups resulted in a civil war
known, rather euphemistically, as the ‘Social Revolution’ (1945–1946).
In this brief but intense confrontation the uleebalang were stripped
of power, many of them being killed, incarcerated or put to flight.²⁰
The strengthened role of the ulama – and their role in the resistance
against the Dutch – was recognised in 1945 by the Indonesian Republican
government, which appointed Daud Beureueh, a charismatic and highly
influential reform-minded ulama, as the governor of Aceh province.²¹
Daud Beureueh aspired to create an Islamic polity in Aceh.²² However,
his attempts to raise the status of Islamic law failed, partly as a result of
internal feuds between Aceh’s political and religious leaders, and partly
because of a lack of support from the government in Jakarta. In 1951
Aceh was incorporated into the province of North Sumatra.
Political developments in the second half of the 20th century were
dominated by two subsequent rebellions. In 1953 a radicalised faction of
ulama led by former governor Daud Beureueh started an armed rebellion
against the central government in Jakarta under the banner of Darul
Islam (‘Abode of Islam’). The revolt, which was aimed at transforming
Indonesia into an Islamic state, ended in 1962 after the government had
 Snouck Hurgronje’s advice was laid down in the infamous ‘Atjeh-rapport’ (Aceh
report). See Emile Gobée and Cornelis Adriaanse, Ambtelijke adviezen van
C. Snouck Hurgonje 1889–1936. 3 volumes (’s Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1957–1965.),
Vol. i, 47–125.
 For a detailed discussion of this period see Anthony J.S. Reid,The Blood of the
People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979).
 Daud Beureueh was the leader of the Persatuan Ulama-Ulama Seluruh Aceh
(All-Acehnese Association of Ulama, pusa). This organisation was founded
in 1939 and played an important role in a rebellion against the Dutch colonial
government in 1942 and the subsequent Japanese occupation. pusa-affiliated
ulama, including Daud Beureueh, were rewarded by the Japanese with official
government functions, particularly in the domain of Islamic law, that used to be
the jurisdiction of the uleebalang.
 See, in particular, Eric E. Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh: a Study of Center-
periphery Relations in Indonesia. PhD dissertation, Cornell University (1983),
162–163.
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restored Aceh’s provincial status and promised the Acehnese autonomy
in the fields of religion, customs and education.²³ In the 1970s however,
ongoing centralisation and dissatisfaction with the central government’s
policy of concentrating the yields from natural resources in Jakarta led
to a new rebellion. In 1976 Hasan di Tiro, an Acehnese businessman
and diplomat hailing from a famous family of ulama, founded Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, gam). The civil war between
gam and the Indonesian military escalated in the late 1980s, developing
into a protracted conflict producing some of the worst atrocities in the
history of the Indonesian Republic. gam was based, at least partly, on
the networks of Darul Islam. In contrast to its predecessor however,
the movement developed a largely secular, ethno-nationalist ideology
directed at separating Aceh from the Indonesian nation.²⁴
In 1999, a year after the Asian financial crisis heralded the fall of the
New Order regime, Aceh was allowed by the government in Jakarta
to implement a regional formulation of Sharia law as part of a new
autonomy package amid hopes of ending the ongoing conflict. The
initiative was rejected by gam, which considered Jakarta’s decision as a
move to delegitimise the separatist movement.²⁵ The December 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami hit Aceh with full force, destroying the provincial
capital Banda Aceh and decimating the population living on or near the
coast.²⁶ In the context of post-disaster reconstruction, a peace agreement
 Connecting the struggle to the wider Darul Islam movement, the rebels pledged
loyalty to the ‘Islamic state of Indonesia’ (nii) declared more than ten years earlier
by Kartosuwiryo inWest Java. For discussions of this period see Cornelis vanDijk,
Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (Leiden: kitlv
Press, 1981); Chiara Formichi, Islam and the making of the nation: Kartosuwiryo
and political Islam in twentieth-century Indonesia (Leiden: kitlv Press, 2012);
Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin,The republican revolt: A study of the Acehnese rebellion
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).
 See Aspinall, Islam and nation.
 See LawNo. 44/1999 on the Special Status of the Province of Aceh; for a discussion
of the stances of gam and the Indonesian government see Aspinall, Islam and
Nation, 209–217; Michelle A. Miller, Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta’s
Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh (London: Routledge, 2009). For an
analysis of the implementation, institutionalisation and current enforcement of
Sharia law in Aceh see R. Michael Feener, Shariʿa and social engineering: The
implementation of Islamic law in contemporary Aceh (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013); R. Michael Feener, David Kloos and Annemarie Samuels (eds.),
Islam and the limits of the state: Reconfigurations of ritual, doctrine and community
in contemporary Aceh (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
 Estimates of the death toll vary between 130,000 and 200,000. A total of 167,000
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was signed by gam and the Indonesian government in August 2005.
Since then, the rebel movement has been disarmed and turned into a
political party, Partai Aceh (pa), which is currently in power both at the
provincial level and in most districts. At the time of writing, pa, with
the exception of some district heads and political entrepreneurs with
populist inclinations, had not pushed for further expansion of the Sharia
legal framework.
Ambiguity towards political Islam reflects gam’s earlier ideological
positioning during the conflict. At the same time, it should be noted that
the conflict made it difficult for (trans)national, revivalist, or radically
Islamist groups to establish themselves here. For example, the revivalist
Islamic Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, pks), which
has been quite successful at the national level, in the 2009 local elections
won only 3.8 per cent of the votes, while Partai Aceh gained 46.9
per cent.²⁷ The conservative Islamic student movement Kesatuan Aksi
Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (kammi), which established an Acehnese
branch in 1998, is vocal and visible, but plays a minor role in terms
of membership. Radical Islamist movements, such as Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia (hti) and the Front Pembela Islam (Front of the Defenders of
Islam; fpi), have also had difficulty establishing themselves in Aceh.²⁸ My
interlocutors explained this relative weakness in different ways. Some of
is the official number used in most government publications. For an in-depth
analysis of the effects of the tsunami on Acehnese society and the post-tsunami
remaking of everyday life see Annemarie Samuels,After the tsunami:The remaking
of everyday life in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, PhD dissertation (Leiden University,
2012).
 Mawardi Ismail et al., ‘Local political parties in Indonesia: the Aceh test case’,
Policy Brief, Australia Indonesia Governance Research Partnership (Crawford
School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Canberra,
2009). The pks, founded in 2002 as the successor of the ‘Justice Party’ (pk, 1998),
has been inspired by the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and
won 7.9 per cent of the votes in the 1999 parliamentary elections. At the time
of writing, the party was part of the government coalition of President Susilo
Bambang Yudhuyono.
 See Aspinall, Islam and nation, 193–199; Marzi Afriko, ‘Syariat Islam dan
radikalisme massa: melacak jejak awal kehadiran fpi di Aceh’, in Arskal Salim and
Adlin Sila (eds.), Serambi Mekkah yang berubah: views from within (Tangerang:
Pustaka Alvabet bekerja sama dengan Aceh Research Training Institute, 2010),
19–56. Hizbut Tahrir, a transnational organisation which strives for the restoration
of the Caliphate, claims to have been in Aceh for many years. However, friends at
the campus told me that they have seen people wave the Hizbut Tahrir flag only
since the 2004 tsunami.
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them suggested that Aceh is ‘already very Islamic’ and that the Acehnese
did not need groups ‘from outside’ to tell them how to practise their faith.
Others stated that radical Islamist groups might be seen as disturbing
the fragile state of peace.
Suffice it to say, then, that the inability of Islamist groups to win much
support resonates with a more general observation that many ordinary
Acehnese tend to be hesitant, indifferent and, in some cases, hostile to
‘political Islam’ or religious activism more broadly. Such stances and
sentiments are seldom highlighted – or even recognised – in the scholarly
literature. This is because most studies about Aceh (and Islamic societies
more generally) focus squarely on the domain of the state, ‘civil society’,
and the practices and policies of formal institutions.²⁹ In the next section
I move to the ethnographic context of Jurong at a time in which, as one
of my interlocutors cynically noted, soldiers and terrorists had come to
their backyards to ‘play around with weapons’.
3 Global Jihad, or ‘Money and Guns’?
On 23 February 2010, just before noon, the well-informed news website
Acehkita.com reported shooting between police and an ‘armed group’ the
night before, in a forest near Jantho, the main town and administrative
centre of the rural district of Aceh Besar. The group was said to consist
of about 50 heavily armed people. Three of them were arrested. The
others escaped. In the early evening the website stated that a special
operations police brigade (Brigade Mobil, or Brimob) was ‘combing’
the mountainous area near Jantho, which was by now referred to as
the ‘suspected location of a group affiliated to Jamaah Islamiyah’. More
than 300 police troops were deployed. A few hours later it was reported
that, in the midst of the raid, a ‘civilian’ was shot dead by accident while
another (his son) was severely wounded. The two, fellow villagers told
reporters, had gone out fishing.³⁰
The remaining ‘terrorists’, as they were now invariably called, managed
to escape to the forested hills at the foot of Seulawah Mountain, the
watershed which separates the Aceh River valley from the north coast
lowlands. Despite the rumours of Jemaah Islamiyah, for some time the
authorities appeared to be unsure about the identity of the group. On 25
 For an elaboration of this argument see Kloos, Becoming better Muslims.
 ‘Polisi baku tembak di Jantho’, Acehkita.com, 23 February 2010; ‘Menysir Jemaah
Islamiah’, Acehkita.com, 23 February 2010; ‘Pengepungan Jantho, Satu warga
tewas’, Acehkita.com, 23 February 2010 (accessed 14 March 2010).
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February, on the threshold of an eruption of violence, the chief of the Aceh
police force declared, ‘We are still investigating who they are, where they
come from, and why they have come here’.³¹ The worst confrontation, on
4 March in a forest near the village of Lamkabeu, resulted in the deaths
of three police, 11 wounded, and another civilian casualty (a farmer
from Lamkabeu).³² In subsequent weeks local media covered the chase
obsessively. However, it still took several months before a detailed picture
was formed of the composition of the group, its ideological pedigree,
and the central role of the infamous Dulmatin.
During the clash at Lamkabeue, people in the surrounding area were
requested not to leave their villages after dark. This also applied to the
villagers of Jurong. A small, rural community with about 500 inhabitants,
Jurong is located in the elongated strip of irrigated land between the
Jantho mountains and Seulawah. The discovery of the ‘terrorist camp’
caused a disruption of daily routines. Police patrolled the area regularly.³³
Roads and rice fields were closed off, calling to mind the time of the
conflict.³⁴ Unsurprisingly, one of the primary reactions among villagers
was one of fear. Saiful, a 66-year-old man who used to be a trader in the
nearby market, said:
People are scared. Scared that the conflict will flare up again. Is it really
a terrorist network ( jaringan teroris), like they say in the newspaper?
…We have not seen this before in Aceh. Or are they linked to gam, as
some other people say? If this is true, then we’re finished (habis semua).
Another reaction, which also placed the situation in the framework of
the conflict, was anger. Suraiya, a 28-year-old mother of one, expressed a
common feeling when I talked to her on 4 March, the day after the clash
at Lamkabeu:
 ‘Segera identifikasi tersangka teroris’, Serambi Indonesia, 25 February 2010.
 International Crisis Group, ‘Indonesia: Jihadi surprise in Aceh’, 12.
 During my fieldwork I travelled back and forth between Jurong and my other
field site, a neighbourhood in Banda Aceh, where I rented a house. In Jurong I
lived with a host family. During the shooting in Lamkabeu, neither the villagers
nor the local authorities thought my presence to be particularly problematic.
However I was requested to report daily to the nearby police office, which I did
for a few days until the shootings stopped.
 During the conflict Jurong was a relatively safe place. Due to its location – close
to the main road, the local police station and a well-known religious boarding
school – the village was spared much of the violence inflicted on more isolated
parts of Aceh Besar, including the mountainous areas around Lamteuba and
Lamkabeu, both of which were known as gam hotspots.
280 islam, politics and change
Like always, ordinary people are caught in between (masyarakat di
antaranya). Innocent villagers are being killed again. This is what the
police usually do: first they shoot; then they investigate (nggak ada
pembicaraan langsung ditembak).
The fact that it was harvest-time made the situation extra dangerous,
Suraiya explained. ‘People go to the rice fields. They may not know about
the curfew ( jam malam). No one knows exactly what is going on.’ My
host mother, Adhinda, worried about her (adult) son, who regularly
drove to the market of Lamteuba to deliver goods or people with his
pickup truck. ‘Here in the village it is safe’, she said, ‘it would be better if
he didn’t go there’.
One might expect this violence, and especially the shooting of an
ordinary villager, to be the talk of the day. However, when I asked Djuned,
whoworked as a tailor at themarket, what news was going around, he told
me that few people were talking about it in public. Asked why, he said,
‘You never know who is listening. We do not know more than what we
read in the newspaper. But there might be malevolent people around (ada
yang jahat, ada yang tidak).’ Further explanation was unnecessary. People
worried about the presence of intelligence agents – and the possibility of
raising suspicion – and thus kept quiet. This association became more
tangible for me in a discussion with Rina, a middle-aged woman who,
together with her husband, ran the village coffee shop. The day before I
talked to her, she explained, a couple of strangers had stopped at the coffee
shop.They had asked her whether she had seen anything suspicious, after
which she told them that she ‘did not know anything’ (a: hana teupeu).
This phrase alone – when used in this situation – symbolised the fear
and distrust of security forces during the years of conflict.
In private conversations, emotional reactions were accompanied
by more analytical ones. When I visited Safwan (quoted already in the
introduction), he and his family were watching the national news channel
Metro tv, which featured brief coverage from Aceh, including footage of
ambulances with wounded police arriving at the main hospital in Banda
Aceh. They were hoping for more information, and at the same time
curious to see how these events taking place nearby were presented to a
national public. The news crawler at the bottom of the screen contained
messages such as ‘4 terrorists, 1 Brimobmember dead’ and ‘sby: terrorists
are not gam’. It also featured a brief statement by the governor of Aceh,
Irwandi Yusuf, who declared that, despite the ‘hunt for the terrorists’
(operasi pemburuan teroris), Aceh was ‘a hundred percent safe’. In the
meantime, Safwan was giving his opinion:
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Safwan: You see, they [the ‘terrorists’] are all from outside. They
come from Java. Terrorism is a problem there, not here.
David: But haven’t they said on the news that some in this group are
Acehnese?
s: Yes, but they are not the ones recruiting (yang mengerahkan [i.e.
the leaders of the cell]).
d: Do you think Aceh is a fruitful place for an organisation like ji to
recruit?
s: Absolutely. There are many poor people around here, I mean
young people without much education. These people are easily
lured (mudah dipancing) when they are given money and
weapons (dikasih uang … senjata).
d: So what about the religious aspect (bagaimana faktor agama), you
know, the goals of ji?
s: [Thinks for a while] Yes, perhaps religion is important too. Aceh is
Islamic. … But this is not the main thing. People who have gone
to school, who have a job, they are not interested (nggak tertarik).
Talking to various people over the next few days, I found this sentiment
to be fairly common. Not everyone thought about it in exactly the same
way, though. Take, for example, Hafid, a 25-year-old young man who
sold vegetables at the market. Before the tsunami, Hafid had spent a few
years studying in a pesantren on the west coast. At first he downplayed
the situation, arguing that the group was small and could never disrupt
peace. Just like Safwan, he mentioned the temptation of money and
adventure: but then he brought up something that was completely absent
from Safwan’s speculations. One might agree with their methods or
not, he said, but the ‘terrorists’ were still ‘defenders of Islam’ (pembela
Islam). Although he did not have much formal education, Hafid was very
interested in international politics. Equally important, he was well aware
of the dominant sentiments among students of the pesantren.
Just go there, to the pesantren, and check what the students are talking
about. What they are reading. They worry about the situation in
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan. Look at what the Americans are doing.
Some people are afraid that they [i.e. ‘the Americans’] will come here,
and do the same as in Iraq. Are you still surprised, then, that this is
happening?
Hafid’s argument was not that the pesantren formed a dangerous pool
of potential jihadis. Rather, he wanted to convey that – contrary to
the often heard idea that the Acehnese are not susceptible to ideas
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coming from ‘outside’ – quite a lot of sympathy existed, especially among
younger people, for the idea of ‘global jihad’ and the struggle against
‘Western imperialism’. These thoughts and images circulated freely in
Aceh and, even though most ulama in Aceh forcefully reject the kind of
violent radicalism associated with ji and kindred groups, the (relatively
introverted) world of the pesantren is not exempt from this.
These reactions seem to fit rather well with the conflicting narratives I
described in the introduction, of Acehnese nationalism and transnational
Muslim solidarity. Other views complicated this dichotomy however.
Djuned (quoted above) initially advanced an argument that was similar
to that of Safwan:
There is no reason for terrorism here. Everyone in Aceh is Muslim. We
are all Shafiʾi. We respect people from other religions. Non-Muslim
people, like the Chinese, also live in Aceh, as long as they respect the
Acehnese (hormati orang Aceh [i.e. Muslims]). In Jakarta you can find
other madhhab [schools of law, i.e. other than Shafiʾi]. But in Aceh it is
not allowed to harass other people (tak boleh mengganggu orang).³⁵
Like Hafid, Djuned dismissed the jihadis as a ‘small group’, and predicted
that the unrest would soon be over. Having said that, however, he
continued with an interesting afterthought, drawing attention to regional
differences within Aceh:
Don’t forget that this is Aceh Besar. During the conflict, Aceh Besar was
calm. In Pidie and North Aceh, it is different. It is always disorder there
(selalu kacau). … People from Pidie are hot-headed (darah panas).
They are traders, looking for money (pedagang, mencari uang).
People fromWest Aceh could also be dangerous, he continued, albeit for
a different reason: ‘[i]n West Aceh, many people know black magic (ilmu
hitam), but in Aceh Besar, people are just normal (orang biasa saja)’. The
terrorists, in other words, had definitely come to the wrong place.
The ideas that North Aceh is a place of ‘disorder’ (kacau) and that
West Aceh is a remote, mysterious place abounding in witchcraft and
associated dangers (ilmu gaib) are important registers in Aceh. They
have roots going back to the pre-modern period, and were strengthened
 In Southeast Asia, the Shafiʾi madhhab is the generally accepted school of law
among Sunni Muslims. In his statement, Djuned referred to the fact that often
the Shafiʾi madhhab is regarded as less conservative and therefore more inclusive,
when compared to other schools of law, including the Hanafi and Hanbali.
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during the colonial period and subsequent conflicts.³⁶ These ‘internal’
stereotypes were addressed in different ways. Although the confrontation
at Lamkabeu took place fairly deep in the forest, it was clear that the
situation had escalated. Shots were heard within a wide radius, while
dead and wounded police officers, rather than ‘terrorists’, were being
evacuated from the forest and carried off to Banda Aceh over the main
road for all to see.³⁷ When I talked to Udin (20), sitting in the village
coffee shop, he said:
These areMujahedeen.They have come here to practice, you know, to go
to Pakistan, or Iraq. They are not a disturbance. So why should they be
arrested? [Lowers his voice] You know, all of these ambulances we hear,
they are carrying Brimob, not Mujahedeen. Have you wondered why?
Why it is just dead and wounded Brimob who are carried out of the
forest, even though they went in six against one?These fighters are alim
[knowledgeable]. They have special knowledge (ilmu). Some of them
have the knowledge to become invisible (ilmu gaib), or invulnerable
(ilmu kebal).
Thus in a single statement, Udin connected the confrontation to the
global jihad and to local traditions of mysticism and pious resistance.³⁸
A certain respect for the jihadis’ struggle was noticeable, especially
among young men. Often it was not (or not only) driven by religious or
ideological persuasion, but rather by amore generalmasculine fascination
with guerilla warfare and renegade behaviour. Referring to the size of the
security operation and the many rumours going around, Udin stated
that the terrorists, being heavily outnumbered by the police, had to be
sparing (hemat) with their bullets and use them in a smart way. One
of his friends, Ramli, later told me that the terrorists were much better
trained than many people thought. ‘They are professionals (profèssional)’,
he claimed, ‘elite (elit)’.
The emotions and explanations referred to in this section, for a
large part, were based on rumours. However it is not my intention
to engage in a factual reconstruction of events. Instead, I would like to
suggest that my conversations with the residents of Jurong may serve
 For an elaboration of this argument see Kloos, Becoming better Muslims.
 ‘10 Polisi Tertembak di Lamkabeue’, Acehkita.org, 5 March 2010.
 When I asked Mustafa, an older man who was also sitting in the coffee shop
and listening to my conversation with Udin, whether he knew people in the
village who commanded such powers, he said, ‘No, but in the past, yes, during
the period of the Darul Islam (masa di/tii)’.
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as a kind of prism, revealing some of the options my interlocutors had
at their disposal as they were trying to make sense of the situation.
These options were based on local differences, connected to gender,
social background and age. They elaborated or combined diverse
images – of Acehnese self-awareness and the struggle for independence,
of clandestine operations and internalised suspicion, of global jihad,
mystical powers and regional identity – and alluded to various ways in
which these images were woven into local memory and experience and
through which they became meaningful or tangible. Many people were
fearful of the conflict resurfacing, but probing deeper into individual
stances and concerns, these responses and speculations complicated the
seemingly straightforward representation of the situation as advanced by
most of the media reports and investigations quoted in the introduction.
They draw attention to the ambiguity of local interpretation, as well as its
changing nature.
In the next section I explore further the origins and evolution of these
discursive formations. Taken together, they constitute a rich and diverse
repertoire of ideas, images and collective memories. Focusing on the
popular discourse of ‘holy struggle’, I will try to show how these images
of violence and piety have travelled through time and space, affecting
different people in different ways.
4 From Indra Patra to ‘Crazy Aceh’: A Brief Genealogy of
Struggle
Indra Patra is a coastal fortification located some 20 kilometres north
east of Banda Aceh. The structure is one of the few tangible reminders of
the 16th century naval battles fought by the Sultanate of Aceh against
Portuguese competitors in the region. In the course of the 16th and
early 17th centuries, Acehnese and Portuguese war fleets clashed several
times. While political and economic motives informed these events,
both sides framed the conflict, at least partly, in religious language.³⁹
 See Amirul Hadi, Islam and state in Sumatra: A study of seventeenth-century Aceh
(Leiden: Brill, 2004); Peter Borschberg,TheSingapore andMelaka Straits: Violence,
security and diplomacy in the 17th century (Leiden: kitlv Press, 2010); Sanjay
Subrahmanyam, ‘Pulverized in Aceh: On Luís Monteiro and his “martyrdom”’,
Archipel 78 (2009), 19–60. The rise of Acehnese power and the arrival of the
Portuguese in the Straits of Melaka were connected developments. When the
Portuguese conquered Melaka, Muslim traders in the region rerouted their ships
to the north coast of Sumatra. This redirection of trade strengthened these ports,
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In 1566, the Sultan of Aceh, Alaʾud-din al-Kahar, sent an envoy to the
Ottoman Caliph, Suleiman the Magnificent, requesting him to ‘come to
the aid of Muslim pilgrims and merchants being attacked by the “infidel”
(kafir) Portuguese’.⁴⁰ A year later, Turkish arms were sent to Aceh by
Suleiman’s successor, Selim ii, and, in turn, became legendary objects in
the Acehnese literature of the 17th century.
When the Dutch invaded Aceh in 1873, as part of an attempt to enlarge
their colonial empire and gain full control over the Straits of Melaka,
the image of kafir aggression was revived. The leaders of Acehnese
resistance – local aristocrats, such as Panglima Polem, Teuku Umar,
Cut Nyak Dhien, and Cut Nyak Meutia, as well as local ulama, such as
Teungku di Tiro and Teungku Kutakarang – presented the struggle as
a Holy War. When Sultan Muhamad Daud Syah surrendered in 1903,
the war continued, and it was not before the late 1910s that the main
centres of resistance were crushed. An important symbol of the war
against the Dutch was an Acehnese language poem called Hikayat Prang
Kompeuni (‘Story of the War against the Dutch’) or Hikayat Prang Sabil
(‘Story of the Holy War’). Although many different versions of this poem
circulated, a central message in all of them was that individual Muslims
had a duty to take part in the struggle. Those who died, it stated, would
die as martyrs and go to Heaven.⁴¹
For Acehnese resistance fighters, theHikayat Prang Sabilmust have
been a source of inspiration and protection, with a function similar to that
of the amulets they wore around their necks or the flags with Qurʾanic
verses and other sacred artifacts they carried with them through the
forest. For the majority of Acehnese however, the text might have meant
something different. In the Hikayat Prang Sabil, the struggle against the
Dutch referred not just to the use of violence, but also at the same time
to a struggle of the soul, part of a personal, spiritual development, and as
a way of strengthening oneself against the ‘tricks of the devil’. The poem,
including Aceh, and offered incentives for a stronger attachment to Islam: see
Michael F. Laffan,Themakings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the narration
of a Sufi past (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 10; Om Prakash, ‘The
trading world of India and Southeast Asia in the early modern period’, Archipel
56 (1998), 31–42:34.
 Anthony Reid, ‘Aceh and the Turkish connection’, in Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter
and Edwin Wieringa (eds.), Aceh: History, politics and culture (Singapore: iseas
Press, 2010), 26–38:29–30.
 Different versions can be found in T. Ibrahim Alfian, Sastra Perang: Sebuah
pembicaraan mengenai Hikayat Perang Sabil (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1992) and
Henri T. Damsté, ‘Hikajat Prang Sabi’,Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- enVolkenkunde
van Nederlandsch-Indië 84, 1 (1928), 545–607.
286 islam, politics and change
in other words, was an instrument of moral self-fashioning, part of a
crucial (and in a sense very ‘modern’) literary development which may
be traced at least to the mid-18th century.⁴² This multilayered aspect
was lost to the ears of Dutch generals. For them, the poem was simply
a dangerous piece of propaganda. Soldiers of the colonial army were
ordered to search villages and houses for copies of the text. Most of these
were destroyed, while some were collected for study.⁴³
In the final decades of Dutch colonial rule Acehnese images of holy
war and Dutch ideas about Acehnese fanaticism evolved further. In July
1933, a Dutch military officer called Captain Schmid was murdered in
the town of Lho’ Sukon, North Aceh. The perpetrator was an ordinary
Acehnese villager, who was also killed in the attack. The murder was
widely covered in theDutch press and became the archetypical example of
a phenomenon known, across the Netherlands Indies, as ‘Aceh murders’
(d: Atjeh-moorden). The Dutch used this term to denote a particular
kind of suicide attack directed at the lives of Europeans. These attacks
were committed by Acehnese individuals (both men and women) who
lived on the margins of society. Poor, outcasts or suffering from an
incurable disease, they had lost any hope for their future and decided to
become martyrs in the name of their faith. Dutch administrators saw the
Atjeh-moorden as something related to, but also distinct from, the ‘holy
war’. In their eyes, the war in Aceh had come to an end in the late 1910s,
which meant that individual attacks on Europeans would no longer be
categorised as ‘acts of war’. Frustrated that the attacks continued to occur,
even though political and economic stability was clearly improving, they
accentuated the more primordial traits of the Acehnese ‘race’, including
religious fanaticism, conservatism, rebelliousness and, ultimately, an
inclination to craziness. In 1923, the largest mental asylum of the Dutch
East Indies was built in Aceh, with the specific purpose of dealing with
the problem of the Atjeh-moorden.⁴⁴
The image of holy war acquired new meanings in the independence
era. In 1945, a group of Acehnese religious leaders issued a declaration
which treated the Indonesian Revolution as jihad.⁴⁵ In the 1950s however,
the Darul Islam under the leadership of Daud Beureueh used the same
slogan to rebel against the Republican government. The idea of jihad was
 For an elaboration of this argument see Kloos, Becoming better Muslims.
 Damsté, ‘Hikajat Prang Sabi’.
 See David Kloos, ‘A crazy state: Violence, psychiatry and colonialism in Aceh,
Indonesia, ca. 1910–1942’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 170, 1
(2014), 25–65.
 Reid,The blood of the people, 190.
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‘reawakened … when Acehnese ulama called for a violent struggle with
the slogan “martyrdom or victory” and denigrated their opponents as
kafir and apostates’.⁴⁶ At the same time, the Indonesian military issued
a handbook in which they warned soldiers serving in the province
of the ‘bad influence’ of the Hikayat Prang Sabil. As noted, the Darul
Islam formed the germ of the next conflict between the Indonesian
military and the Acehnese separatist movement gam. The ideology of
gam was ethno-nationalist rather than Islamist. It fought for Acehnese
independence, not for an Islamic state. Yet the founder and leader, Hasan
di Tiro – a grandson of Teungku Cik di Tiro, one of the great leaders
of the Aceh war – was quick to conjure up the image of the holy war.
Thus, Aspinall writes about an Acehnese ‘cult of martyrdom’ marking the
early period of gam.⁴⁷ The insurgence was reminiscent of the holy war
in other ways too. Some gam commanders became legendary figures,
among both their own followers and their adversaries, not just because
of their leading role in the resistance, but also because of the magical
powers – including the power to become invisible or invulnerable – they
were believed to possess.
gam was not the only party to lay a claim to the heritage of the
holy war. In Aceh, the emergence of General Suharto’s New Order
regime – and the violent crackdown on (alleged) communists – was
accompanied by an attempt to tie the ‘rebellious’ class of ulama more
closely to the state.⁴⁸ In December 1965, the army created the Council of
Ulama of the Special Province of Aceh (Majelis Ulama Propinsi Daerah
Istimewa Aceh; the predecessor of the national Majelis Ulama Indonesia
[mui], or Indonesian Council of Ulama). In its first fatwa, the Council
‘banned’ communist sympathies, conflating communism with atheism
and neo-colonial ideology.⁴⁹ This decision was further solidified in terms
of a vow (ikrar) to continue the ‘holy struggle’ (perjuangan yang suci)
 Aspinall, Islam and nation, 96–97.
 Ibid., 97–99.
 These two developments were connected.Throughout Indonesia, themass killings
of suspected members of the Indonesian Communist Party (pki) were carried
out in part by affiliates of Islamic organisations. In Aceh, thousands were killed
in actions spearheaded by Islamic youth groups sympathetic to the Darul Islam,
who were ‘openly encouraged by the army commander in Aceh’: Morris, ‘Islam
and politics in Aceh’, 246.
 ‘Musyawarah Alim Ulama se Daerah Istimewa Aceh yang berlangsung dari
tanggal 17 s/d 18 Desember 1965’, 18 December 1965. Kumpulan fatwa-fatwa
Majelis Ulama Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh tahun 1965 s/d 31 Maret 1970 (Banda
Aceh: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh, 1979).
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that was the Indonesian Revolution.⁵⁰ In the 1970s and 1980s the Ulama
Council – as well as other institutions of state Islam, such as the State
Islamic Institute (iain) Ar-Raniry in Banda Aceh – was instrumental
in the process of aligning Acehnese ulama with the central ideological
principles of the New Order by moulding Islamic norms and practices
(and their scriptural justification) into the straightjacket of security,
economic growth and ‘development’.⁵¹ In 1985 former chairman of the
council and former governor of Aceh, Ali Hasjmy, in a reflection on
his career, claimed that ‘the people of Aceh agreed and believed that
Darussalam [i.e. ‘Aceh’] and the Majelis Ulama could not be separated in
themidst of the struggle’.This, he stated, is why the armyhad reinvigorated
the ulama in the ‘broad meaning of Darussalam, which is to produce
people of [the state ideology] pancasila, of God’s infinite greatness, of
superior spirit, of extensive learning, and a noble mind’.⁵²
The idea of holy struggle thus acquired different meanings in the
hands of different people. While Hasan di Tiro was putting effort into
harmonising the concept with Acehnese nationalism, Ali Hasjmy solidly
embedded it in secular state ideology. Beyond the polarised sphere of
political ideology, moreover, hybrid forms emerged. Let me conclude
this section with three examples which show that the images of violence
and piety discussed here are dynamic constructs, open to interpretation
and continuous adaptation depending on the context.
Tjoet Nja’ Dhien (1988) is one of the most successful Indonesian
motion pictures of the 20th century, and deals with an illustrious episode
in the Aceh War.⁵³ The film shows how Cut Nyak Dhien called her fellow
Acehnese to arms, in order to protect their land (a: nanggroe) and their
faith (keyakinan) against the ‘unbelievers’ (kaphe-kaphe), to educate their
children by reading the Hikayat Perang Sabil, and to follow them in
martyrdom (menjadi syahid) by joining the jihad. While romanticising
the holy struggle of the Acehnese, the film portrayed the war as part
of the Indonesian national struggle. As the actress Christine Hakim,
famous for her role as Cut Nyak Dhien (Tjoet Nja’ Dhien), put it:
Before I played Tjoet Nja’ Dhien I was always confused as to where my
blood came from, because I could not directly answer the question,
 M. Ali Hasjmy, Semangat merdeka: 70 tahun menempuh jalan pergolakan &
perjuangan kemerdekaan (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1985), 706.
 For an elaborated discussion of this process see Feener, Shariʾa and social
engineering.
 Hasjmy, Semangat merdeka, 711.
 Tjoet Nja’ Dhien (Indonesia, Eros Djarot, 1989).
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‘Where do you come from?’ I havemixed blood. I grewup inYogyakarta,
Central Java, but my parents, grandparents and great grandparents are
from Padang, Aceh, Banten, Pekalongan, Madiun, and the Middle East.
I wanted to know more. When you know your roots you know exactly
who you are and where you belong. …We Indonesians must respect
Tjoet Nja Dhien and other heroes too, who fought to make us free.⁵⁴
Another example is the afterlife of the Hikayat Perang Sabil. In 1999,
the poem was rediscovered by a young class of urbanites, who were
involved not in the armed struggle of gam, but in grand-scale, peaceful
demonstrations calling for a referendum on the administrative status of
Aceh.⁵⁵ The poem was recited during rallies, ‘with singers often moving
protestors to tears with the beauty of its rhythms and the power of its
lyrics’.⁵⁶ According to Aspinall, the sudden popularity of the poem may
be explained, at least in part, on the basis of the ‘clandestine contact’
between urban activists and gam. At the same time, it is important to
note that the epic acquired new meanings in the context of the call for a
referendum. Although many of them had never heard the poem before,
they were struck by its mobilising qualities, its ability to ‘stimulate a spirit
of Acehneseness and a spirit of resistance’. This, writes Aspinall, was a
‘cultural nationalism still in formation’.
Finally, let me mention the work of Taufik Al-Mubarak, a young
journalist, writer and former referendum activist, and his decision to
use the phrase Aceh Pungo (‘crazy Aceh’) as the title of a collection of
his newspaper columns.⁵⁷ This title was meant as a provocation, he
explained, displaying the fundamental ambivalence this term acquired
after the Dutch began to think of the Acehnese as being ‘inclined’ to
lunacy. Pungo (‘crazy’), as I noticed myself during my fieldwork, is both
a sensitive and an ambiguous term. In Aceh, to call someone pungo
may be the quickest way to get into a fight. At the same time, the term
has come to refer to a range of heroic, unique, magical or indeed any
other kind of extraordinary behaviour. In his foreword to the volume,
the editor wrote that Cut Nyak Dhien was also pungo, as was the author,
Taufik Al Mubarak. In the piece entitled ‘Pungo’, Taufik discusses, in a
confrontational style, the ironies of his time:
 CynthiaWebb, ‘Christine Hakim: Going where life leads her’, www.thejakartapost
.com, 8 December 2010 (accessed 4 November 2013).
 Edward Aspinall, ‘Whither Aceh’, Inside Indonesia 62, April–June 2000.
 Aspinall, Islam and nation, 139.
 Taufik Al-Mubarak, Aceh Pungo (Banda Aceh: Bandar Publishing, 2009).
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When, like now, it is the season of tenders, I seemanyAcehnese – though
not just Acehnese – who are suddenly crazy (tergila-gila) because they
want to buy a deluxe car of the Harrier brand. This desire is stronger
than the year before, when they just wanted to own a Honda crv or
New crv. Such people are commonly referred to by villagers as ‘Pungo
Moto’ [crazy for cars].
This type of desire reminds me of the early days of reformasi in
Aceh. During that period the Acehnese just asked for the human rights
violators to be brought to trial, but this was ignored by the central
government. Then the Acehnese raised their demands, requesting the
Federal government that Aceh would be given a share of 70 per cent of
the financial balance, leaving 30 per cent for the centre [i.e. ‘Jakarta’].
This request was also ignored, so Aceh asked for a Referendum.This
demand was not met either. Because they were angry, the Acehnese
simultaneously demanded Independence.
This shows us that the Acehnese are very Pungo in their demands,
and that they always try to raise the offer. For the Acehnese, this is a
matter of pride. But evidently, Indonesia can be more pungo still. The
Acehnese asked for independence, and they got a military emergency
instead. Biet-biet pungo [crazy indeed].⁵⁸
The challenge that Aceh is facing, Taufik seems to imply, goes beyond
the struggle against ‘outsiders’. It involves a critical perspective on
contemporary society, formulatedwholly fromwithinAceh, emphasising,
one might say, not only the struggle against others, but also the struggle
against oneself.
5 Conclusion
At first sight there seems to be little common ground between the
Acehnese history of resistance against state power and the sudden
appearance in February 2010 of the forces of global jihad.Themembers of
the jihadi cell led by the ‘famous’ terrorist Dulmatin were not particularly
interested in the Acehnese cause. Although they had hoped for more
sympathy among the notoriously pious Acehnese, as becomes clear from
their failed attempts to gain support from Acehnese religious leaders,
 Taufik Al-Mubarak, ‘Pungo’, in Aceh Pungo, 173–174, 174. Originally printed in
Harian Aceh, 17 June 2008. n.b.: ‘Season of tenders’ refers to the yearly period
during which government projects are put out to tender, after the approval of the
state budget.
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geography (suitable terrain for clandestine operations) seems to have
been amore important factor in their choice of location. At the same time,
people in Aceh generally seemed to regard their presence as an outright
threat to a hard-won peace. That said, this strange and unexpected
episode in my fieldwork also revealed a lot about the ways in which
‘Aceh’ has been constructed, both inside and outside the province, as
a meaningful entity. Like all geographic denominations, ‘Aceh’ means
more than a physical space defined by borders. It exists in the minds of
people as a set of particular features and images, connected to the shared
and contested memories of the past and views of, and aspirations for, the
future. My research in Aceh, which deals, among other topics, with the
religious practices and experiences of ordinary Acehnese, has involved
a careful deconstruction of the detrimental stereotypes dominating
many (scholarly as well as non-scholarly) views of Acehnese history and
society. The problem remains, however, that images of violence and piety
carry meaning for the people I write about. The stereotype of Acehnese
fanaticism is a distortion, but it is also, to some extent at least, quite
tangible and ‘real’.
This situation, obviously, produces particular challenges for a re-
searcher. On the one hand, these concern the complex ways in which
stereotypes created outside Aceh travel ‘back’, so to speak, from the
transnational spaces in which they are produced into the lives of ordinary
Acehnese. On the other hand, the discussion above shows that images
of violence and piety have been produced continuously within Aceh,
by different groups and individuals, and under differing circumstances.
One thing I have tried to make clear, then, is the usefulness of combining
historical research with the practice of doing fieldwork, approaching this
as a truly dialectical enterprise. Fieldwork as amethod is indispensible for
questioning the images constructed in archives, libraries and collective
memory, while archival and library research helps us to understand the
discourses and social practices we encounter in the field. By going back
and forth, we may appreciate the force of (stereotypical) images, as well
as the limits to their effects.
Another, more specific argument concerns the ways in which the
images of violence and piety – that is, the various expressions of ‘holy
struggle’ delineated above – are ‘used’, and how this is commonly
interpreted. By now it has become commonplace to frame the history
of Aceh in terms of an ongoing struggle against ‘outside’ forces, be
this Dutch colonialism, the Indonesian central state or the fears of
‘Westernisation’ or ‘Christianisation’ emerging in the slipstream of
post-tsunami reconstruction and post-2005 peace building processes.
This has led, to some extent, to misrecognition of the function of local
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stereotypes. Ethnic stereotypes provide the kind of ‘common ground’ on
the basis of which differences between groups are mutually recognised
and talked about.⁵⁹ Thus, Javanese may talk about ‘fanatical’ Acehnese
in order to emphasise their own moderate or ‘civilized’ outlook, while
Acehnesemay talk about ‘Javanese religion’ in order to reinforce their own
religious practices as being ‘properly Islamic’. Although both statements
are based on a claim of moral superiority, what is agreed upon is that the
Acehnese are particularly ‘pious’. However – and this is the point I want
to emphasise – stereotypes also return, and are sometimes even explicitly
directed (albeit perhaps in a different form) to those who produced
them in the first place. Let me make this clearer by returning briefly
to some of the images of violence and piety discussed in the preceding
sections.
Representations of Aceh, whether in academic writing, media sources,
the bulletins, leaflets, and research publications of (local and interna-
tional) civil society organisations, or – indeed – in statements made
by the Acehnese themselves, often treat Acehnese resistance to outside
influences as a basic premise, that is, as a point of departure rather than
a historical construction itself. The image of ‘holy war’, rooted in old
images of aggressive ‘unbelievers’ (starting with the Portuguese), was
reproduced and connected to an evolving discourse of Acehnese ethnic
self-awareness through resistance to Dutch colonialism and the abuses
of the Indonesian central state. The Aceh ‘conflict’ and the experience of
decades of violence and grief framed many reactions to the unexpected
outburst of violence in early 2010. My interlocutors in Jurong were con-
fronted with media reports about the death of innocent civilians, with
the closing of roads and rice fields, and with a stream of credible and
incredible rumours. Some of my interlocutors worried about the ‘return’
of the conflict. Others tried to close the discussion in advance by stating
that, obviously, this was not ‘their’ struggle. To some extent, these reac-
tions may be seen as a standard response, based on a one-sided account
of Acehnese history. Of course, the framework of the Aceh conflict refers
to a history and a violence that are both real and deeply disturbing. It is
also however, a way of simplifying, defusing, neutralising or rendering
irrelevant alternative discourses, as well as a range of ‘internal’ conflicts
and tensions. Both ‘Acehnese’ and ‘outsiders’ have stakes, in particular
situations and time frames, in downplaying such internal contestations,
thereby strengthening the stereotypes associated with Acehnese ethnic
identity.
 See e.g. Thomas H. Eriksen, Common denominators: Ethnicity, nation-building
and compromise in Mauritius (Oxford: Berg, 1998), 48–56.
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Not all reactions in Jurong were framed in conflict-derived terms.
The historical and ethnographic discussion presented above conveys
other images that were used to interpret, explain or categorise both the
cause and effect of violent confrontation. While these images may figure
less at the forefront of the dominant narrative of Acehnese history, they
are not, for that reason, necessarily less resonant, powerful or ‘available’.
Some of my interlocutors in Jurong, in their attempt to understand or
speculate about what was going on, drew on a long, multifaceted tradition
of Islamic mysticism, expressed in the dynamic use and meaning of a
text like the Hikayat Perang Sabil, or the belief in supernatural powers.
This complicates the framework of the Aceh conflict in at least one
respect, as the latter tends to oppose an ongoing Acehnese tradition of
pious resistance against the (equally static) interests of (‘syncretist’ or
‘pseudo-Muslim’) Javanese oppressors. In Jurong, the sources of magical
power and mysticism were often sought, geographically, in the west coast
districts and (sometimes) the central highlands, distinguishing these
areas from the ‘heartland’ of the Darul Islam and the gam (the north
coast and Pidie), as well as Aceh Besar itself. Such distinctions in turn,
were connected to the shifting dichotomies between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’
settings, between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ lifestyles, and to personal
differences in social background and class. Similar mechanisms inform
the ways in which official images of Aceh have been constructed. One
of the reasons why Ali Hasjmy was able to convert the Aceh-centric
image of holy war into a more neutral image of ‘holy struggle’ was his
social position as a reform-minded ulama, former Darul Islam leader
and administrator, his role in formulating and representing an urban
strand of Islamic modernism, and his personal experience with political
life in Jakarta. Few others were able to mediate so successfully between
the discourse of Acehnese exceptionalism and the New Order language
of statist developmentalism.
A final suggestion concerns the relationship between stereotyping
and the problematic idea of ‘pious resistance’ itself. First, it is important
not to overstate the ‘religious’ factor, even in instances where this might
seem apparent. Some of Jurong’s young men expressed their respect
for the jihadis’ struggle, not so much out of cause, but out of a more
general sense of sympathy for their relatively weak position (and thus
their bravery and the need to be ‘smart’), combined with an interest
in the adventurous side of armed combat; but if the image of pious
resistance loses its hold here, in other contexts Acehnese stereotypes take
centre stage, albeit perhaps in unexpected ways. As Taufik Al Mubarak
and his reference to the phrase ‘Crazy Aceh’ show, stereotypes are not
always used to sharpen mutual differences. They also have the ability to
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serve as the basis or conceptual footing for internal cultural critique.
Images of violence and piety are powerful signifiers when it comes to
stating the substance of Acehnese ethnic identity, yet they are also highly
contested within Acehnese society, and in order to understand their
effects it is crucial to ask how they are employed, by whom, and why.
In some situations they may indeed be used to magnify the difference
from ‘others’. In other situations they may lead to reflection, and raise or
strengthen ideas for cultural change.
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Glossary
Abangan Syncretistic or nominal (Javanese) Muslims.
Adat(-istiadat) Local traditions/customs/customary law.
Ahlu-sunnah wal-jamaʿah ‘People of the sunnah of the Prophet and the Com-
munity’; those who in their view adhere to Islam in
the right way.
Ahmadiyah Global religious community originating from Paki-
stan, which considers itselfMuslim; regarded as hereti-
cal by most mainstream Muslims.
Aisyiyah Women’s organisation of the Muhammadiyah.
Akhlak Morals/ethics.
Akta cerai Divorce certificate.
Alhamdulillah Praise be to God.
Aliran Pillar or stream, often used to differentiate between
abangan and santri and between traditionalist and
modernist Muslims.
Aliran sesat Deviant group.
Amir Leader.
Ansor See: Gerakan Pemuda Ansor.
Aqidah Faith/creed.
Asas tunggal Sole basis. The obligation for associations to declare
that Pancasila is their only ideological principle.
atplp Aliansi Tolak Perda Larangan Pelacuran di Bantul.
Alliance for the Rejection of the Bantul Regulation
Banning Prostitution.
Aurat Parts of the body that should remain covered in public
or when guests are received.
Ayat Qurʾanic verse.
Azan Call to prayer.
Baju koko Indonesian male Islamic attire.
Bappenas Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional. National
Development Planning Agency.
Bayan Explanation/statement.
Bedug Mosque drum.
Bida (Forbidden) innovation in Islam.
brr Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi. Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction Agency (Aceh).
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Bupati Government official heading a kabupaten.
Dakwah Muslimmissionary activity/religious propagation, also
among Muslims.
Darul Islam Islamic rebellion in Indonesia from 1948/9–1965.
Dayah Islamic boarding school (Aceh).
ddi Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah. Islamic Dakwah Council.
ddii Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia. Indonesian
Islamic Dakwah Council.
Desa Village.
Dewan Mustasyar Supreme (Advisory) Council.
Dewan Syuriah Advisory Council.
dom Daerah Operasi Militer. Military Operation Zone
(Aceh).
dpr Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Parliament.
dprd Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah. Legislative assem-
bly at the provincial, kabupaten and municipal level.
Dhikr Repetitive chant of part of the Profession of Faith or
other mystical phrases during religious ceremonies.
Fasakh Divorce by judicial decree.
Fatwa Religious legal opinion.
Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence.
fpi Front Pembela Islam. Front of the Defenders of Islam.
Paramilitary organisation.
gai Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia. Indonesian Ahmadi-
yah Movement.
gam Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. Free Aceh Movement.
Gampong Village (Aceh).
Gerakan Pemuda Ansor Youth organisation of the Nahdlatul Ulama.
Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan Pembanguan Masyarakat Berakhlaqul Kari-
mah. Gate to Love and Peace. Movement to establish
a pious society.
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups). Government
party in the New Order.
Gugat cerai Divorce case filed by the wife.
Guided Democracy Period between 1959 and 1965.
guppi Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan Islam.
Joint Effort to Modernise Islamic Education.
Hadith Traditions about the words and the deeds of the
Prophet.
Halal Permitted according to fiqh.
Harta bersama Joint property acquired by husband and wife during
their marriage.
Haqiqa Essence of God.
Hijab Headscarf that leaves the face visible.
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Indonesian Party of Liberation. Radical, fundamen-
talist Muslim organisation.
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hmi Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam. Islamic Student Associ-
ation. Close to Muhammadiah.
hmi-mpo Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Majelis Penyelamat Or-
ganisasi. Islamic Student Association-Council of the
Rescuers of the Organisation.
Splinter group of the hmi rejecting asas tunggal.
hti See: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.
huda Himpunan Ulama Dayah Aceh. Association of Aceh-
nese Dayah Ulama.
iain Institute Agama IslamNegeri. State Institute of Islamic
Studies.
Ibadah Worship/ritual observance.
icmi Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia. All-Indo-
nesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals.
Id al-Fitri/Idulfitri Feast of the Breaking of the Fast.
Iddah Waiting period for a divorced woman before she is
allowed to remarry.
Iftar Breaking of the fast.
Imam Leader of prayer.
Imam desa Village imam who may also function as an assistant
marriage registrar on behalf of the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs.
Infaq Voluntary gift/charity.
Inpres Instruksi Presiden. Presidential Instruction.
al-Insan al-Kamil Perfect Man.
Insya Allah God willing.
ipb Institut Pertanian Bogor. Bogor Agricultural Univer-
sity.
iptaf Ikatan Pendidikan Tauhid Tasauf. Association of
Tauhid Tasawuf Education.
Isbat nikah Confirmation by the religious court of the legality of a
marriage.
itb Institut Teknologi Bandung. Bandung Institute of
Technology.
jai Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia. Indonesian Ahmadiyah
Community.
Jakarta Charter Alternative to Pancasila from which it differs for
mentioning the obligation ofMuslims to follow Islamic
law.
Jamaah/jemaah Community/congregation.
Jamaah/Jemaah Tarbiyah Community of Education. A network of radical,
fundamentalist Muslims closely linked to pks.
Jaringan Islam Liberal Network of Liberal Islam, an organisation of young
Muslim intellectuals founded in 2001.
Jemaah Islamiyah Islamic Community. Name of an organisation some of
the members of which have been convicted for taking
part in the Bali bombings and other terrorist attacks.
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ji See: Jemaah Islamiyah
Jihad fi sabilillah Struggle along the path of God, often interpreted as
holy war.
Jilbab 1) Headscarf that leaves the face visible.
2) Loose-fitting garment covering the whole body of a
woman.
jprmi Jaringan Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia. Indo-
nesian Network of Mosque Youth and Teenagers.
jt See: Jamaah Tarbiyah.
Kab See: Kabupaten
Kabupaten Regency (administrative area).
Ka(a)ffah Comprehensive (Islam/Islamic law).
Kafir Non-Muslim/unbeliever.
kammi Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia. Action
Union of Indonesian Muslim Students. An association
of strict Muslim students founded in March 1998 and
closely linked to the pks.
Kampung 1) Village.
2) Town quarter.
kh. KyaiHaji, title of a Javanese scholar held in high esteem
(and who performed the pilgrimage to Mecca).
Khalwat A man and woman (not married to each other nor
close relatives) in a secluded space, without others
being present. Illegal according to fiqh.
Kham(a)r Alcoholic drinks/intoxicants.
Khatib Preacher who delivers the Friday sermon in the
mosque.
KemenAg Kementerian Agama. Ministry of Religious Affairs.
Khilafah Caliphate.
ksaf Kelompok Studi Agama dan Filsafat. Religion and
Philosophy Study Group.
Khul(uk) Divorce granted on the initiative of a woman, often
in exchange for financial compensation to her ex-
husband.
kisdi Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia
Islam. Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the
Islamic World. Founded in 1986 by, among other per-
sons, Moh. Natsir, a formerMasjumi leader, to support
the Palestinian cause. A hardline Islamist group.
Kompilasi Hukum Islam Compilation of Islamic Law.
Komnas Perempuan Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan.
National Commission on Violence against Women.
Komnas Anak / Komnas pa Komisi Nasional Perlindungan Anak. National Com-
mission of Child Protection.
Kota City
kppsi Komite Persiapan Penerapan Syariah se-Indonesia.
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All-Indonesian Preparatory Committee for the Imple-
mentation of Islamic Law.
ksd Kelompok Studi Darussalam. Darussalam Study
Group.
kua Kantor Urusan Agama. Local office of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs.
Kyai/Kiai Revered religious leader.
Langgar Prayer house (= musholla).
Laskar Jihad Paramilitary organisation founded in 2000 to recruit
Muslims to fight in the Moluccas. No longer in func-
tion.
lbh Lembaga Bantuan Hukum. Legal Aid Foundation.
ngo providing free legal aid to the poor.
ldk Lembaga Dakwah Kampus. Campus Dakwah Body.
lgbt Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender.
lipia Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab.
Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic. A Saudi
Arabian educational institute in Jakarta inaugurated
in 1981.
Madrasah Modern Islamic primary and secondary school in
which most of the curriculum (70 per cent) is usually
devoted to secular subjects.
Maghrib prayer Prayer at sunset.
Mahar Bride price.
Maisir/maysir Gambling.
Majelis Syuro Deliberation Assembly.
Majelis Ulama Indonesia Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars, a national
fatwa-issuing institution.
Maksiat Vice/immoral act.
Maʿrifa Spiritual knowledge of God.
Maslahat Public interest/the common good.
Masyumi/Masjumi Modernist political party founded in 1943, banned in
1960.
mb Muslim Brotherhood.
Merantau To leave one’s home area for a considerable period of
time.
MoU Memorandum of Understanding.
mpo See: hmi-mpo.
mpr Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. People’s Consulta-
tive Assembly.
mptt Majelis Pengkajian Tauhid Tasawuf. Council for the
Study of Tauhid Tasawuf.
mpu Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama. Consultative Coun-
cil of Ulama.
Muhammadiyah Largemodernist socio-religious organisation, founded
in 1912.
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mui See: Majelis Ulama Indonesia.
Mukenah Garment, usually white, worn by women when per-
forming prayer.
Mukim Area in Aceh comprising a number of gampongs.
Muktamar Congress.
muna Majelis Ulama Nanggroe Aceh. Ulama Council of
Aceh.
Murshid 1) Spiritual guide.
2) Leader.
Murshid ʿamm Grand teacher.
Murtad Apostate.
Mushalla/Musholla Small prayer house or room (= langgar).
Musyrikin Polytheists/idolaters.
Mutʿah Gift of consolation by ex-husband in divorce cases.
Nahdlatul Ulama The Awakening of Ulama, large traditionalist socio-
religious organisation, which in certain periods was
also a political party; founded in 1926.
Nahdliyin Thosewho belong to theNahdlatul Ulama community.
Nafkah iddah Maintenance during the iddah period.
New Order The period between 1965 and 1998.
nkk/bkk Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi
Kemahasiswaan. Normalisation of Campus Life/Body
for the Coordination of Student Affairs. Refers to
measures taken in 1978 to crush anti-government
protests by students.
nu See: Nahdlatul Ulama.
Old Order The Sukarno period until September 1965.
pa Partai Aceh. Aceh Party.
Pancasila Five pillars. The ideological foundation of the Indone-
sian state. The first one, about religion, speaks of the
belief in the One and Only God but does not mention
a religion by name.
pan Partai Amanat Nasional. National Mandate Party.
Political party related to Muhammadiyah, founded in
August 1998.
Parmusi Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Indonesian Muslim Party.
Founded in 1968 to become the successor of the
banned Masjumi. Failed to become so because of
stringent government restrictions.
Partai Demokrat Democratic Party. Party led by Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono.
pas Partai Islam seMalaysia, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party.
pbb Partai Bulan Bintang. Crescent and Star Party. Strict
Islamic political party, founded in July 1998.
pbnu Pengurus Besar nu. Central Board Nahdlatul Ulama.
pcm Pengurus Cabang Muhammadiyah. Board of a Mu-
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hammadiyah branch at the sub-district (kecamatan)
level.
pd See: Partai Demokrat.
pdi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia. Indonesian Democratic
Party. Founded in 1973. Those non-Islamic parties
which were still allowed to exist at that time, among
them the pni, were then forced to merge in the pdi.
pdi-p Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan. Indonesian
Democratic Party-Struggle. Secular political party
headed by Soekarno’s daughter Megawati Soekarno-
putri; an icon of anti-Soeharto protests in the later
years of the New Order.
pdm Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah. Board of the
Muhammadiyah in a kabupaten and municipality.
pds Partai Damai Sejahtera. Prosperous Peace Party. Prot-
estant political party, founded in 2001.
Pemda Pemerintahan daerah. Local administration.
Pengajian 1) Quʾran recitation.
2) Islamic study group; religious lecture.
Penghulu Head of religious administration in colonial days.
Perda Peraturan daerah. Local byelaw.
Perda Sharia(h) / Syariah Local byelaw issued to implement aspects of Islamic
law or promote an Islamic way of life.
Pesantren Islamic boarding school.
pii Pelajar Islam Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic Students.
Banned in the New Order for its refusal to accept asas
tunggal.
pk Partai Keadilan. Justice Party. Fundamentalist political
party, founded in August 1998. See also pks.
pkb Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. National Awakening Party.
Political party related to theNahdlatul Ulama, founded
in July 1998.
pki Partai Komunis Indonesia. Indonesian Communist
Party. Banned in 1966.
pks Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. Prosperous Justice Party.
Continuation of the pk.
pmii Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia. Indonesian
Islamic Student Movement. A Nahdlatul Ulama orga-
nisation.
pni Partai Nasional Indonesia. Indonesian National Party.
Secular political party, ‘Soekarno’s party.’
Posbakum Pos Bantuan Hukum. Legal Aid Post.
pp Peraturan Pemerintah. Government Regulation.
ppp Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. United Development
Party. In theNewOrder the only Islamic political party
allowed. Radicalised after 1998.
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puskumham Pusat Studi Hukum, Konstitusi dan Hak Asasi Manu-
sia. Centre for the Study of Law, Constitution, and
Human Rights.
Qanun 1) Law.
2) Sharia regulation in Aceh.
Qanun Jinayah Islamic Penal Law.
Ramad(h)an Fasting month.
Reform(asi) era The period after May 1998.
Remas Remaja Masjid. Young mosque activists.
rt Rukun Tetangga. Neighbourhood.
Santri 1) Devout Muslim.
2) Pesantren student.
sby Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
Sedekah Voluntary charity; alms.
Sesat Deviant.
Shafiʿi Dominant school of Islamic jurisprudence in South-
east Asia.
Shahadah Muslim profession of faith.
Shalawat(an) Prayers, verses and songs in praise of the Prophet
Muhammad and his family.
Sharia(h) Islamic law.
Shawwal/syawal Month following the fasting month.
Shaykh al-Islam Title of a great scholar of Islam.
Shirk Polytheism.
Shirk jali Apparent polytheism.
Shirk khafi Hidden polytheism.
skb Surat Keputusan Bersama. Joint Ministerial Decree.
In this case of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the
Attorney General and the Minister of the Interior
concerning Ahmadiyah.
Surat Chapter of the Qurʾan.
Surau Small prayer house or room.
Tabligh Missionary activity/religious propagation.
Tajdid Renewal. Fiqh term to indicate a new religious idea,
deviating from tradition.
Takmir Mosque manager.
Talak Divorce; repudiation of one’s wife.
Tarbiyah Lit. education, used to denote the strict Islamic move-
ment at universities.
Tariqa/tarekat Mystical order.
Tarjih Fiqh term to indicate the deliberations to prefer
one opinion over another (to come to a religious
decision).
Tasawuf Mysticism.
Tauhid Unity of God.
Taushiyah Religious advice.
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Teuku Acehnese adat title.
Tgk. Teungku. Acehnese religious title.
Timor Leste East Timor.
tk aba Taman Kanak-kanak Aisyiyah Bustanul Athfal. Aisya-
iah Kindergarten, named Bustanul Athfal (Ar. Chil-
dren’s Garden).
ugm Universitas Gadjah Mada.
ui Universitas Indonesia.
uin Universitas Islam Negeri. State Islamic University.
Ulama Religious scholar(s).
Uleebalang Traditional Acehnese aristocracy.
Umma(h) (Islamic) community.
undp United Nations Development Programme.
Unsyiah Universitas Syiah Kuala.
Usroh Lit. family. Religious study groups, usually small. The
term is associated with strict Islamic movements at
universities.
Ustadz Male religious teacher/leader.
Ustadza Female religious teacher/leader.
uu Undang-undang. Law.
uupa Undang-undang tentang Pemerintahan Aceh. Law
regarding the Governing of Aceh.
Wahdat al-shuhud Unity of witnessing.
Wahdat al-wujud Unity of Being.
Wali 1) Saint.
2) Closest male relative or guardian of the bride who
concludes the marriage contract for her.
Wali Songo The nine saints who spread Islam in Java.
Waria Male transvestite.
Wasiat wajiba Obligatory bequest.
Waqf Religious endowment.
wh Wilayatul Hisbah. Sharia police in Aceh.
Wujudiyya Mystical teaching and movement which follows the
doctrine of wahdat al-wujud.
Zakat Mandatory alms.
Zina Adultery/extra-marital sexual intercourse.
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